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This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 answer	 how	 and	 why	 legal	 institutions,	 in	 particular	 laws,	






First,	 it	 argues	 that	 labour	 laws	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 support	 the	 capitalist	
economy,	enforcing	property	rights	and	institutionalizing	the	rule	of	the	Party-state.	




NGOs	 work	within	 the	 law	 to	 protect	 workers’	 rights	 and	 to	 improve	 the	 legal	
framework,	helping	to	contain	labour	disputes	and	maintain	social	stability.	Third,	it	
finds	that	the	legal	definitions	of	rights	contrast	with	workers’	conceptions	of	rights,	
the	 former	 being	 based	 on	 a	 capitalist	 rationale,	 while	 the	 latter	 is	 based	 on	
concepts	of	morality,	fairness,	equality,	and	on	workers’	socio-economic	conditions.	
Studying	 workers’	 perceptions,	 understandings	 and	 uses	 of	 the	 law	 shows	 that	
some	workers	disagree	with	the	premises	of	the	labour	laws,	do	not	find	the	laws	
useful	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	and	distrust	the	legal	system,	putting	into	question	
the	 legitimacy	of	such	 institutions	of	governance.	 I	 find	that,	according	to	popular	
conceptions	 of	 rights,	workers	 act	 outside	 and	against	 the	 law.	 The	 pitfall	 of	 the	
CPC’s	 ‘adaptive	 governance’	 lies	 in	 its	 simplification	 of	 social	 order	 into	 rational	
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at	 5am,	 again.	 Look	 at	where	we	 are	 eating;	we	 are	 on	 the	 floor.	 These	 are	 not	
labour	 conditions.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 law.	 This	 is	 how	 it	 is:	 there	 is	 no	 standard”.	 He	
paused	 and	 slurped	 some	more	of	 his	 noodles,	 as	 if	 by	 quietening	his	 hunger	 he	
could	calm	his	anger.	But	then	he	cried:	“We	are	the	lowest	class	in	society.	You	are	
here	sitting	down	with	the	lowest	workers	in	China”	(W6,	4	May	2012).	A	few	days	
later,	 at	 the	 same	 construction	 site,	 Worker	 Xi	 made	 the	 same	 claim:	 “You	 are	
sitting	here	with	peasant	workers.	We	are	the	 lowest	class	 in	society	–	we	are	the	
worst	 paid	 and	 we	 work	 the	 hardest…	We	 don’t	 know	 our	 rights,	 and	 we	 don’t	
understand	the	law”	(W11,	25	May	2012).		
	
In	 contrast	 to	Worker	 Xi	 and	Worker	Di’s	 claims,	many	 enthusiastic	 reports	 have	
declared	increasing	‘rights	consciousness’	among	Chinese	people	(Cabestan,	2005;	
Gallagher,	 2006;	 Goldman,	 2005;	 Froissart,	 2005;	 Lee,	 2007a;	 Li,	 2010;	 Lorentzen	




and	 the	 2008	 Labour	 Contract	 Law	 (amended	 in	 2013)	 and	 Labour	 Disputes	
Mediation	 and	 Arbitration	 Law.	 Within	 one	 year	 of	 the	 two	 latter	 laws	 being	
enacted,	 labour	 disputes	 rose	 98%	 (China	 Labour	 Statistics	 Yearbook,	 2009).	 This	
increase	 in	 labour	 dispute	 cases	 has	 been	 taken	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 workers’	





that	 indicates	 the	 level	 of	 purity	 of	 the	white	 liquor.	 It	 is	 usually	 very	 strong,	 the	most	 common	








citizenry,	organized	 in	and	 supported	by	civil	 society	organizations	 such	as	 labour	
non-governmental	organizations	(NGOs),	will	mount	sufficient	political	challenge	so	
as	 to	 initiate	 policy	 and/or	 political	 changes	 (Epp,	 1998;	 Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007;	
McCann,	 1994),	 or	 even	 to	 kick-off	 regime	 transition,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 case	 in	
comparative	 contexts	 in	 ex-Soviet	 republics	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 (Goldman,	 2005;	
Liebman,	2011;	Halliday	and	Liu,	2007).		
	




(Moustafa,	 2007,	 2008,	 2014).	 In	 China,	 in	 line	 with	 Nathan’s	 arguments,	 legal	
institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 above	 labour	 laws,	 enable	 ‘authoritarian	 resilience’	
(Nathan,	2003)	because	they	institutionalize	the	rule	of	the	CPC.	From	a	governance	
perspective,	 legal	 reforms	 have	 proven	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 CPC	 to	 adapt	 to	 new	
social	 and	 economic	 challenges	 without	 having	 to	 undergo	 political	
transformations,	which	 is	described	as	a	 form	of	 ‘adaptive	governance’	 (Heilmann	
and	 Perry,	 2011).	 In	 this	 sense,	 laws	 are	 central	 components	 of	 ‘adaptive	
governance’:	 as	 instruments	 of	 the	 Party-state,	 they	 facilitate	 and	 regulate	
economic	development	which,	in	turn,	bolsters	the	legitimacy	of	the	CPC	(Liebman,	
2011:	168).	At	the	same	time,	the	increasing	number	of	labour	dispute	cases	taken	
into	 the	 legal	 channels	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 legal	 institutions	 absorbing	
potential	 social	 challenges;	 legal	 institutions	 providing	 outlets	 for	 popular	
grievances	 (Diamant	 et	 al.	 2005).	 From	 these	 institutionalist	 and	 governance	
perspectives,	 labour	 laws	 and	 adjoining	 institutions	 regulate	 socio-economic	
relations,	 create	 a	hegemonic	 legal	 order	 and	 contain	 labour	 grievances	 in	 a	way	
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that	 institutionalizes	 the	 governance	 and	 rule	 of	 the	 CPC	 and	 sustains	
authoritarianism	in	China.	
	
Grand	 conclusions	 about	 the	power	of	 law	 to	 sustain	 authoritarianism	or,	 on	 the	




these	 legal	 institutions	 render	 the	 social	behaviour	 considered	appropriate	 to	 the	
legal	order.	Hence,	 in-depth,	grounded	empirical	 research	 from	a	 law	and	society	
perspective	 (Ewick	and	Silbey,	1998;	Galanter,	1983;	McCann,	1994;	Merry,	1990;	
Nielsen,	2007;	Rosenberg,	1991;	Sarat,	2004)	can	provide	a	nuanced	picture	of	how	
law	 functions	 in	 practice,	 to	 better	 understand	 if,	 how	 and	 why	 laws	 sustain	




regime-supportive	 functions,	 such	 as	 institutionalizing	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 Party-state,	
diffusing	the	legal	order,	socializing	workers	in	legal	and	legitimate	behaviour,	and	





integrating	 potentially	 destabilizing	 concepts	 and	 behaviour	 into	 its	 institutions.	










for	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 reasons,	 such	 as	 power	 relations	 embedded	 in	 the	 laws	 or	
economic	constraints.	For	example,	for	Worker	Da,	a	talkative	taxi	driver	in	Beijing,	
“laws	are	not	 fair	 for	us	workers.	Contracts	are	not	 fair.	The	content	 is	not	 fair.	 It	
doesn’t	 have	 any	 effect	 on	 our	 situation	 because	 the	 company	 establishes	 the	
content	of	the	contract,	and	we	can’t	discuss	(shangliang,	商量)	anything	about	it.	













This	 introductory	 chapter	briefly	 situates	 the	 study	of	 Chinese	 labour	 laws	within	
the	 literature	 that	 speaks	 to	 the	 political	 role	 of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 or	 resisting	
authoritarianism.	 Section	 1.1	 outlines	 the	 guiding	 theme	 of	 this	 thesis	 and	
introduces	 the	 research	 questions	 addressed.	 Each	 question	 is	 related	 to	 the	







The	 study	 of	 the	 political	 role	 of	 law	 relates	 to	 the	 oxymoronic	 nature	 of	 law	 as	
domination	 and	 resistance.	 Laws	 present	 a	 number	 of	 curiosities	 in	 authoritarian	
contexts	 and,	 needless	 to	 say,	 China	 provides	 an	 experimental	 terrain	 to	 test	 a	
number	 of	 assumptions	 underlying	 the	 existing	 literature,	 namely,	 that	 legal	
institutions	 sustain	 authoritarianism,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 provide	 avenues	 for	
political	 contestation	 and	 political	 change,	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 thesis,	 therefore,	
addresses	the	main	question:	How	and	why	do	legal	institutions,	in	particular	laws,	






judiciary,	 play	 a	 role	 in	 democratic	 transition	 and	 consolidation.	 Until	 the	 1990s,	
legal	institutions	under	authoritarian	settings	had	scarcely	been	researched,	mainly	
because	 they	were	assumed	 to	be	 instruments	of	 authoritarian	 rulers	 (Gerring	et	
al.,	 2004;	 Hirschl,	 2000;	 Lijhpart,	 1977;	Marvall	 and	 Przeworski,	 2003;	Moustafa,	
2014;	 North	 and	 Weingast,	 1989;	 O’Donnell,	 2001;	 Wibbels,	 2005).	 The	
institutionalist	approaches	to	the	study	of	the	rule	of	law	under	authoritarianism,	or	
thin	 theory	 (Fuller,	 1976;	 Summers,	 1993),	 focus	 on	 legal	 institutions.	 There	 has	
been	 an	 increase	 in	 scholarly	 attention	 paid	 to	 legal	 institutions,	 as	 they	 present	














gain	 social	 control;	 bolster	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 regime,	 adding	 a	 rhetorical	
instrument	 to	 the	 state’s	 use	 of	 force;	 and	 enforce	 private	 property	 rights	 to	
institutionally	 support	 the	 market	 economy,	 among	 other	 functions.	 Therefore,	
legal	 institutions	 contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	
(Moustafa	and	Ginsburg,	2008;	Moustafa,	2007),	and	enable	regime	stability.	In	line	
with	these	arguments,	 in	China,	allegedly,	 the	rule	of	 law	project	 responds	to	 the	
aim	of	the	CPC	to	remain	in	power,	as	it	provides	instruments	of	governance,	social	
control,	 and	 ideological	 legitimacy	 (Ginsberg,	 2008;	 Landry,	 2008;	 Liebman,	 2011;	
Lubman,	 1999;	 Peerenboom,	 2002).	 In	 this	 line,	 Nathan	 (2003)	 and	 Shambaugh	
(2008)	 explain	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	 based	 on	 a	 series	 of	
institutional	 changes,	 innovations	 and	 adaptations	 within	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	
Party	(Shaumbaugh,	2008)	or	the	Party-state	(Nathan,	2003)	that	have	enabled	the	
CPC	to	absorb	political	and	economic	shocks	and	remain	in	power.	According	to	this	
institutionalist	 approach,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 legal	 reforms	 enable	 the	
differentiation	 and	 functional	 specialization	 of	 institutions	 of	 government,	 while	
also	 opening	 channels	 for	 public	 participation.	 These	 are	 two	 of	 the	 factors	 that	
explain,	 in	Nathan’s	view,	the	 ‘authoritarian	resilience’	of	 the	Chinese	Party-state.	
His	 analysis,	 however,	 lacks	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 prove	 why	 and	 how	 legal	





liberalization,	 and	 overcome	 significant	 challenges	 to	 its	 stability,	 because	 of	 its	
capacity	 to	 adapt	 its	 mechanisms	 of	 governance	 (political	 techniques	 and	
procedures)	from	the	revolutionary	and	Maoist	periods	(Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011:	
6),	 as	 will	 be	 further	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	 The	 explanatory	 factor	 of	 the	
political	stability	of	the	Chinese	regime	here	is	the	capacity	of	the	CPC	to	adapt	its	
governance	mechanisms	and	institutions	to	the	challenges	of	the	day.	Adaptability,	
in	 their	 argument,	 accounts	 for	 resilience,	 namely	 the	 lack	 of	 systemic	
transformation	of	the	Party-state	regime.	In	sum,	institutions,	together	with	policy	
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processes,	 account	 for	 the	 ‘resilience’	or	 ‘adaptive	governance’	of	 the	Party-state	
regime.	Among	a	 variety	of	 institutional	 changes	 and	policy	mechanisms	 that	 are	
taken	into	account	in	the	‘adaptive	governance’	thesis,	Liebman	(2011)	argues	that	
law	 has	 been	 a	 central	 component	 of	 China’s	 adaptive	 authoritarianism:	 “Law	 is	





and	 why	 do	 legal	 institutions,	 in	 particular	 laws,	 sustain	 authoritarianism?	 By	
sustaining	 authoritarianism,	 I	 refer	 to	 how	 laws	 render	 the	 adaptiveness	 of	 the	
governance	of	the	CPC	(Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011),	allowing,	therefore,	the	Party-
state	to	maintain	its	stability	through	small	institutional	changes	or	adaptations	but	
without	 systemic	 change.	 By	 legal	 institutions	 I	 refer	 to	 an	 institution-oriented	
approach	to	 law	(Deakin	et	al.,	2015;	La	Torre,	1993;	MacCormick,	2007),	and	use	
the	term	mainly	 in	reference	to	formal	 institutions	pertaining	to	the	 legal	system,	
primarily	 constituted	 by	 the	 state,	 such	 as	 legal	 codes	 (laws),	 institutionalized	
judiciary	 (courts)	 and	 legislature	 (people’s	 congress),	 formal	 conflict	 resolution	
mechanisms	(mediation,	arbitration	and	litigation),	institutions	of	law	enforcement	
(inspectorates),	 and	 legal	 practices	 and	 interactions	 that	 are	 shaped	 by	 these	
institutions.	 In	 particular,	 this	 research	 focuses	 on	 labour	 laws	 such	 as	 the	 1995	
Labour	Law,	and	the	2008	Labour	Contract	Law	and	the	Labour	Disputes	Mediation	
and	Arbitration	Law.	Legal	institutions	here	refer	to	formal	systems	of	rules	and	not	
to	 customary,	 popular,	 or	 informal	 systems	 of	 rules.	 I	make	 this	 clear	 distinction	
with	 the	 intention	 of	 differentiating	 the	 role	 of	 formal	 legal	 institutions	 and	
informal	 institutions	such	as	social	 rules	of	behaviour	(i.e.	morality),	which	will	be	










First,	 to	 assess	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 the	 adaptive	 authoritarianism	 of	 the	 CPC,	 in	
Chapter	Three	I	ask:	what	functions	do	labour	laws	fulfil	for	the	authoritarian	state?	
In	particular,	labour	laws	can	represent	institutional	changes	or	adaptations	of	the	
governance	 of	 the	 CPC	 to	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 market	 economy,	 which	 ensure	
property	 rights	 and	 conflict	management.	 Through	 these	 functions	 laws	 establish	
social	 and	 economic	 control	 and	 provide	 a	 credible	 commitment	 to	 a	 market	
economy,	 enforcing	property	 rights,	 as	North	 (1996)	 suggested.	 These	have	been	
assumed	to	be	central	functions	of	legal	institutions	in	supporting	authoritarian	rule	
(Moustafa,	2007,	2008;	Moustafa	and	Ginsburg,	2008).	Hence,	the	first	assumption	
examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 legal	 institutions,	 laws	 in	 particular,	 sustain	
authoritarianism.	
	
As	 previous	 studies	 on	 the	 political	 role	 of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism	 in	
comparative	contexts	suggest,	 research	on	 ‘authoritarian	 resilience’	and	 ‘adaptive	
governance’	 in	 China	 has	 broadly	 followed	 either	 an	 institutional	 perspective,	 or	
explored	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 policy	 processes	 within	 the	 Party-state	 apparatus.	 In	
other	words,	existing	research	has	mainly	analysed	how	the	formal	legal	institutions	
constituted	 by	 the	 state	 reinforce	 its	 rule,	 examining	 legal	 institutions	 and	 their	
historical-political	 origins	 (Henrischke,	 2011;	 Ho,	 2009;	 Lubman,	 1999;	
Peerenboom,	2002),	policy-,	 law-making	and	 judicial	 reform	processes	 (Cooney	et	
al.,	2007;	Ip,	2012;	Karindi,	2008),	the	agency	of	bureaucrats	and	elites	in	the	policy	
process	 (Mertha,	2009),	 the	politics	of	 courts	 (Yu,	2009),	and	 the	 role	of	 lawyers,	
legislators	 and	 judges	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Party-state	 (Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007).	 This	




In	 a	 second	 instance,	 this	 thesis	 examines	 the	 assumption	 that	 legal	 institutions,	
laws	 in	 particular,	 provide	 resources	 in	 political	 activism	 to	 bring	 about	 political	
change.	Therefore,	 I	ask:	 to	what	extent	do	 legal	 institutions	open	up	avenues	 for	
political	 contestation?	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 laws	 sustain	
authoritarianism,	it	is	important	to	examine	the	regime-supportive	aspects	of	laws,	
and	 legal	 institutions	 more	 generally,	 in	 as	 much	 detail	 as	 their	 counter-regime	
uses.	 Some	 argue	 that	 legal	 institutions	 entrench	 authoritarianism	 and	 sustain	
political	stability	(Gerring	et	al.,	2004;	Hirschl,	2000;	Lijhpart,	1977;	Moustafa,	2014;	
North	 and	 Weingast,	 1989;	 O’Donnell,	 2001;	 Wibbels,	 2005).	 However,	 others	
contend	that	in	authoritarian	contexts	legal	institutions,	such	as	courts,	have	often	
been	 transformed	 into	 sites	 of	 political	 resistance,	 opening	 avenues	 for	 political	
contestation	and	therefore	can	represent	a	challenge	to	the	resilience	of	the	regime	
(Halliday	et	al.	2007;	Halliday	and	Liu,	2007;	Karpik	and	Halliday,	2011;	Moustafa,	
2008;	 Pei,	 2000).	 For	 this	 to	 happen,	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 political	 settings	 such	 as	
authoritarian,	illiberal	democracies	or	dictatorships,	lawyers	and	legal	professionals	
have	formed	a	vanguard	to	 fight	 for	political	 freedom	and	to	contest	state	power	
(Halliday	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Karpik	 and	 Halliday,	 2011).	 Similarly,	 in	 liberal	 democratic	
contexts	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 promoting	 political	 and	 social	 change	 has	 been	
examined,	 legal	 institutions	 providing	 opportunities	 and	 symbolic	 and	 rhetorical	
resources	 for	 political	 activism	 (McCann,	 1994;	 Merry,	 1990;	 Minow,	 1987;	
Scheingold,	1974;	Silverstein,	1996).		
	
The	 political	 use	 of	 law,	 defined	 as	 ‘legal	 mobilization’	 (Zemans,	 1983),	 and	 the	
collective	mobilization	of	 rights	and	 legal	 channels	 to	make	political	demands	has	
catalysed	 social	 movements	 (McCann,	 1994,	 2004).	 However,	 legal	 tactics	 by	
themselves	 do	 not	 assure	 political	 mobilization	 (Scheingold,	 1974);	 an	 effective	
leadership	is	necessary,	as	mentioned	above,	activist	lawyers	being	indispensable	to	
activating	a	campaign	or	political	movement	in	coordination	with	legal	mobilization.	
Activist	 lawyers,	 reform-minded	 judges,	 the	media	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	
provide	the	 ‘support	structure’	 for	effective	political	mobilization	of	 the	 law	(Epp,	




mobilization	 therefore	 allows	 the	 bypassing	 of	 the	 collective	 action	 problem	 in	
politically	 restrictive	 conditions	 (Moustafa,	 2007).	 In	 rural	 China,	 O’Brien	 and	 Li	
(2006)	 have	 identified	 a	 similar	 phenomenon,	 peasants	 creatively	 using	 laws	 and	
policies	 as	 a	 legitimate	 basis	 to	 denounce	 local	 officials	 and	make	 claims	 on	 the	




In	 light	 of	 these	 empirical	 accounts	 and	 theoretical	 propositions,	 to	 assess	 the	
extent	to	which	legal	institutions	support	authoritarianism	I	examine	how	and	why	
legal	 institutions	open	up	avenues	 for	 political	 contestation	by	 asking,	 in	Chapter	
Four:	 how	 does	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 prevent	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	
organizations	 from	 politically	 mobilizing	 the	 law?	 Conversely,	 how	 and	 why	 do	
lawyers	and	civil	society	organizations	use	legal	institutions	(law	and	legal	channels)	
to	challenge	the	Party-state	(if	at	all)?	Subsequently,	in	chapter	Five	I	ask:	to	what	
extent	 does	 the	 mobilization	 of	 the	 law	 (i.e.	 litigation)	 by	 legal	 actors	 such	 as	
lawyers	and	civil	society	organizations	initiate	broad	political	and	social	mobilization	
to	challenge	 the	authoritarian	state?	By	asking	 these	questions	 I	 complement	 the	
study	of	the	role	of	legal	institutions	in	sustaining	authoritarianism	in	China	from	a	
historical	 institutionalist	 and	 policy	 process	 perspective3	with	 a	 law	 and	 society	
approach4	(Diamant	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Galanter,	 1983;	 McCann,	 1994;	 Merry,	 1990;	
																																																						
3 	In	 political	 science,	 the	 study	 of	 institutions	 has	 a	 substantive	 tradition.	 Within	 the	 ‘new’	
institutionalist	 literature,	 historical	 institutionalists	 emphasise	 that	 the	 political	 structure	 has	 a	
decisive	 imprint	 on	 the	 way	 institutions	 originate,	 change,	 are	 employed,	 and	 affect	 group	 and	
individual	 behaviour	 (Steinmo,	 et	 al.,	 1992;	 Thelen	 and	 Steinmo,	 1992).	 Historical	 institutionalism	
conceives	of	institutions	as	a	result	of	processes	of	political	struggle,	lending	particular	attention	to	
the	 historical	 context	 and	 temporal	 sequences	 (Hall	 and	 Taylor,	 1996;	 Leftwich,	 2007).	 The	 policy	
process	perspective	approaches	the	study	of	the	state	and	governance	by	examining	public	policies,	
reform	 and	 implementation,	 lending	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 policy-making	 process	 and	 the	
dynamics	of	the	actors	in	the	system	involved	in	the	policy	process	(Hill,	1997,	2013;	Jenkins,	1997).		
4	‘Law	and	society’	 is	a	field	of	 inquiry	within	the	sub-discipline	of	sociology	of	 law.	 It	originated	 in	
the	USA	in	the	mid-20th	century	and	organized	itself	around	the	Law	and	Society	Association	and	two	







below	 (Santos	 and	 Rodriguez-Garavito,	 2005;	 Merry,	 et.	 al.,	 2010),	 or	 of	 law	 in	
action	(Woo	and	Gallagher,	2011).		
	
Finally,	 these	 questions	 are	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis	 in	 reference	 to	 labour	 laws	 in	








state	 a	 catalyst	 of	 labour	 activism”.	 In	 a	 dispute-oriented	 piece	 of	 research,	




to	 the	 law	 and	 social	 movements’	 arguments,	 rights	 or	 legal	 consciousness,	
therefore,	 is	 taken	as	 an	 indication	of	 increased	 contestation	against	 the	political	
status	quo.	 Indeed,	rising	rights	consciousness	has	been	seen	as	a	potential	driver	
for	workers	to	claim	citizenship	(political)	rights	and	“produce	in	China	changes	as	
profound	 as	 those	 that	 occurred	 earlier	 in	 Eastern	 Europe”	 (Goldman,	 2005:	 24).	
Howell	 (2016)	 argues	 that	 alongside	 market	 liberalization,	 legal	 reforms	 have	
provided	 workers	 with	 alternative	 forms	 of	 organization,	 most	 notably,	 through	
																																																																																																																																																									
among	others.	It	does	not	characterize	itself	as	a	specific	theoretical	or	methodological	approach	to	
the	 sociological	 study	 of	 law;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 research	 in	 this	 field	 embraces	 perspectives	 from	










labour	 non-governmental	 organizations.	 This,	 she	 argues	 in	 line	with	North	 et	 al.	




lead	 to	 systemic	or	 regime	 transformation	are	based	on	 liberal	understandings	of	
rights	of	citizenship	(individual	rights	to	property,	 freedom,	etc.)	or	political	 rights	
that	can	directly	challenge	the	political	nature	of	an	authoritarian	state,	and	are	not	
necessarily	 attuned	 to	 the	 realities	of	political	 life	 in	China.	Perry	 (2008)	 suggests	
that	these	interpretations	are	misleading,	mainly	because	they	base	the	analysis	of	
the	power	of	rights	on	Western	conceptions	of	rights	to	property,	liberty	and	legal	
justice,	 among	others,	while	 in	China	 concepts	of	 rights	 are	based	on	 livelihoods,	




‘politics	 as	 usual’”	 (ibid:	 18)	 that	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 challenge	 or	 propose	 an	
alternative	 political	 authority	 to	 that	 of	 the	 CPC,	 but	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 “rules	
consciousness”,	seeks	to	use	the	state-authorized	language	and	discourse	“in	order	
to	 negotiate	 a	 better	 bargain	with	 the	 authoritarian	 state”	 (ibid:	 20).	 In	 order	 to	
better	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 laws	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism,	 it	 is	 therefore	
equally	 important	 to	 study	 legal	 institutions	 at	 the	 governance	 level,	 and	 at	 the	
grassroots	 level	 following	 a	 law	 in	 society	 approach,	 to	 understand	 the	 uses	 and	
practices	of	law	in	society.		
	
As	mentioned	above,	most	 studies	of	 the	political	 role	of	 law	 in	 authoritarianism	
have	 mainly	 taken	 an	 institutionalist	 or	 policy	 level	 approach	 and,	 agency,	 if	






why	 are	 laws	 understood	 and	 used	 by	 ordinary	 people,	 workers	 in	 particular?	
Examining	this	question	in	contrast	to	the	content	of	law	and	the	social	behaviour	
laws	intend	to	design,	will	allow	for	a	grounded	understanding	of	 if,	how	and	why	
laws	 are	 being	 used	 in	 politically	 challenging	 ways	 to	 defy	 the	 power	 of	 the	
authoritarian	state.		
	
I	 address	 these	 questions	 following	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey’s	 (1998:	 34)	 law	 in	 society	
approach,	 which	 suggests	 that	 to	 study	 the	 law	 “we	 should	 expand	 rather	 than	
narrow	 the	 range	 of	 material	 and	 social	 practice	 and	 actors	 that	 constitute	 it”.	
Basically	 this	 leads	 to	 broadening	 the	 scope	 of	 previous	 studies	 that	 focus	 on	
exclusively	formal	legal	institutions,	to	include	the	study	of	the	understandings	and	
uses	of	law	in	everyday	life,	what	Ewick	and	Silbey	(1998)	call	“legal	consciousness”.	
Inspired	 by	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey’s	 law	 in	 society	 approach	 (1998,	 2003;	 Silbey	 and	
Ewick,	2000),	I	argue	that	to	fully	understand	the	role	and	consequences	of	law	in	









In	 sum,	 to	 examine	how	and	why	 do	 legal	 institutions,	 in	 particular	 laws,	 sustain	
authoritarianism,	 this	 thesis	examines	 the	 following	 sub-questions.	Chapter	Three	
examines	what	functions	do	 labour	 laws	fulfil	 for	the	authoritarian	state?	Chapter	
Four	 asks	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 legal	 institutions	 open	 up	 avenues	 for	 political	




of	 the	 law	 (i.e.	 litigation)	 by	 legal	 actors	 such	 as	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	
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organizations	 initiate	 broad	 political	 and	 social	 mobilization	 to	 challenge	 the	





This	 research	 seeks	 to	 examine	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism	 in	
China,	 in	 particular,	 labour	 laws.	 It	 aims	 to	 situate	 the	 case	 of	 China	 within	 two	
larger	debates	to	offer	a	comparative	perspective,	the	first	related	to	how	the	rule	
of	 law	 supports	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 and	 the	 second	 about	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	
political	 activism,	 social	 movements,	 and	 resistance.	 This	 thesis	 is	 therefore	 a	
theoretical	endeavour	as	much	as	an	empirical	concern	about	the	adaptiveness	of	
authoritarianism	and	the	role	of	legal	instruments	in	contentious	(labour)	politics.	I	
arrived	 at	 these	 theoretical	 interrogations	 from	 being	 first	 attracted	 by	 the	
empirical	 problems:	 China	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 “epicentre	 of	 the	 world’s	
labour	 unrest”	 (Silver	 and	 Zhang,	 2009:	 174),	 and	 in	 2008	 alone	 labour	 disputes	
skyrocketed	 98%	 (China	 Labour	 Statistics	 Yearbook,	 2009).	Why	 did	 this	 happen?	
And	did	this	amount	of	legal	action	mean	anything	in	political	terms?		
	
This	 research	 was	 therefore	 designed	 as	 a	 case	 study	 to	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	
labour	 laws	 on	 workers’	 mobilizations.	 Thereafter,	 inductively,	 it	 grew	 into	 an	
interrogation	of	 the	 role	of	 law	 in	authoritarian	China	 through	 the	 lens	of	 labour.	
Case	study	research	allowed	for	process	tracing	and	for	a	study	of	an	“exploratory	
nature”	(Gerring,	2007:	39),	which	is	appropriate	for	theory	testing,	but	also	allows	
the	 circularity	 between	 conjecture	 and	 refutation.	Once	 in	 the	 field,	 I	 inductively	
developed	 an	 extended	 case	method	 (Buroway,	 1998,	 2009).	 The	 extended	 case	
method	 uses	 participant	 observation	 as	 a	 technique	 of	 investigation	 for	 reflexive	




researcher	 to	 bring	 about	 “reflective	 understanding”	 of	 the	 issues	 researched	
(Burawoy,	1998:	6).	It	also	aims	to	extend	theory.		
	
Qualitative	 research	 methods	 such	 as	 qualitative	 interviews,	 and	 ethnographic-
oriented5	research	techniques	such	as	fieldwork	and	participant	observation,	were	
also	 suitable,	 both	 for	 their	 exploratory	 nature,	 and	 because	 they	 have	 been	
successfully	used	to	study	resistance	(Ong,	1987;	Scott,	1985,	1990),	and	in	law	and	
society	 studies	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998;	 Fleury-Steiner	 and	 Nielsen,	 2006;	Merry	
1990,	 1994;	 Sarat	 1990).	 Ethnographic	 approaches	 have	 also	 been	 extensively	
applied	 to	 studies	of	working	 class-consciousness,	workers’	 subjectivities,	 identity	
formation,	 and	 action	 and,	 although	mainly	 at	 the	 capitalist	 point	 of	 production,	
industrial	 sociology	 and	 labour	process	 theory	 (Braverman,	 1974;	Burawoy,	 1978,	
1979;	 Chan,	 2010a;	 Knights	 and	 Willmott,	 1990;	 Lee,	 1998,	 2007a,	 2007b;	 Pun,	
2005).	 Informed	by	 poststructuralist	 and	 postmodern	 approaches,	 the	 analysis	 of	






dormitories,	 and	 in	 community	 and	 support	 spaces	 such	 as	 labour	 non-
governmental	 organizations,	 to	 examine	 how	 workers	 understand	 and	 construct	
their	 reality.	 This	 strategy	allows	understanding	 the	 relevance	of	 law	vis-à-vis	 the	




even	 exclusive	 and	 distinctive	 to	 social	 and	 cultural	 anthropology	 (Amit,	 2000).	 However,	
ethnographic	 research	 has	 been	 used	 across	 disciplines	 in	 social	 sciences	 (Atkinson	 et	 al.,	 2001;	
Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 1994).	 I	 sympathise	 with	 Willis’	 (2000:	 viii)	 emphasis	 of	 “the	
ethnographic	 as	 conditioning,	 grounding,	 and	 setting	 the	 range	 of	 imaginative	 meanings	 within	
social	thought”.	By	ethnographic	research	I	mean	the	in-depth,	exploratory	and	inductive	study	of	a	
social	 phenomenon	 in	 its	 natural	 setting(s)	 (Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 1994),	 with	 a	 “focus	 on	
complex	 interactions	 of	 economic,	 social,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 processes,	 without	 a	 priori	
privileging	 causally	 any	of	 them”	 (Marcus,	 1998:	 44).	 I	 use	 the	 ethnographic	 research	methods	of	
long-term	 fieldwork	 and	 participant	 observation,	 recording	 data	 in	 textual	 format	 in	 fieldnotes	
(Emerson	et	al.,	1995,	2001).	
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consistent	 with	 the	 law	 in	 society	 approach	 to	 study	 law	 in	 everyday	 life	 (i.e.	 in	
places	 of	 daily	 social	 interactions).	 I	 therefore	 consistently	 conducted	 research	
outside	the	courtrooms	and	formal	legal	spaces,	in	NGO	offices,	and	dormitories	of	
construction	 sites	 where	 workers	 conduct	 their	 daily	 lives	 and	 do	 not	 directly	
interact	with	formal	legal	institutions.		
	
Empirical	 data	 was	 gathered	 during	 twelve	 months	 of	 fieldwork	 in	 China	 (PRC),	
between	2012	 and	2013.	 The	 research	developed	 as	 a	multi-case	 and	multi-sited	
study	 (Burawoy,	 2009;	 Marcus,	 1995).	 During	 an	 exploratory	 phase,	 I	 was	 first	
located	in	Hong	Kong	where	I	visited	two	labour	NGOs	to	familiarize	myself	with	the	
spectrum	of	 organizations	working	 both	 in	Hong	 Kong	 and	 on	 the	mainland.	 The	
second	phase	of	 research	was	 located	 in	Beijing,	where	 I	was	a	visiting	scholar	at	
the	Law	School	of	Peking	University	(PKU)	and	conducted	fieldwork	in	three	labour	
non-governmental	organizations,	mapped	out	and	visited	other	 labour	NGOs,	and	
visited	workers	 in	 construction	 sites.	 In	 a	 third	phase,	 I	 conducted	eight	 research	
visits	 to	 Hong	 Kong,	 Shenzhen,	 Guangzhou,	 and	 Wuhan,	 where	 I	 visited	 other	
labour	NGOs	and	interviewed	workers	for	comparative	and	triangulation	purposes.	
	




and	 to	 study	 “law	 in	 action”	 (Woo	 and	 Gallagher,	 2011:	 1).	 Moreover,	 previous	
research	 mainly	 focused	 on	 institutional	 forms	 of	 law	 as	 formal	 institutions	 and	
dispute	 resolution	 processes	 once	 the	 dispute	 had	 been	 initiated	 (petition,	
mediation,	 arbitration).	 Such	 an	 approach	 overlooked	 studying	 law	 outside	 the	
formal	institutions	and	processes,	which	enables	us	to	better	understand	how	and	
why	 people	 view,	 understand	 and	 use	 the	 law	 (or	 not).	 Ethnographic-inspired	
research	 techniques	 such	 as	 participant	 observation,	 and	 open-ended	





Previous	 research	 on	 the	 development	 of	 labour	 relations	 in	 China	 has	 mainly	
focused	 on	 the	 coastal	 industrial	 areas,	 especially	 Guangdong	 Province.	 Hence,	
during	 the	 first	phase	of	 the	 fieldwork	 I	 conducted	a	 two-month	exploratory	 field	
visit	 based	 in	 Hong	 Kong.	 During	 this	 time	 I	 visited	 labour	 NGOs	 for	 research	
purposes:	I	interned	with	Asia	Monitor	Resource	Centre	(AMRC),	gathered	relevant	
data	 from	 China	 Labour	 Bulletin’s	 (CLB)	 labour	 litigation	 database,	made	 contact	
with	all	the	labour	organizations	based	in	Hong	Kong	and	working	across	the	border	










industry,	 hairdressing,	 etc.).	 In	 2009	 it	 was	 reported	 that	 7.26	 million	 migrant	
workers	 (with	 rural	 household	 registration,	 hukou,	户⼝)	 had	 lived	 in	 Beijing	 for	
over	 six	months,	 corresponding	 to	 37%	 of	 the	 total	 population	 of	 Beijing	 (Meng,	
2010).	 In	 2010	 Beijing’s	 floating	 population	 was	 8.94	million	 (Liang	 et	 al.,	 2014).	
Moreover,	 Beijing	 registered	 the	 second	 highest	 rate	 of	 labour	 conflict	 in	 China,	
after	Guangdong	Province.	According	to	official	statistics,	in	2010	Beijing	registered	
61,050	 disputes,	 10%	 of	 the	 total,	 in	 comparison	 to	 Guangdong’s	 15%	 (Labour	
Statistical	 Yearbook,	2011:	369).	 It	 is	home	 to	a	 relatively	 large	number	of	NGOs,	




it	 enabled	 my	 access	 to	 labour	 law	 experts,	 starting	 at	 Peking	 University	 (PKU).	
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Hence,	 Beijing	was	 a	 suitable	 location	 to	 explore	 the	 interaction	 between	 labour	
laws,	labour	conflict,	and	labour	NGOs.			
	
Labour	 NGOs	 have	 been	 emerging	 in	 China	 since	 the	 mid-1990s	 (Chan,	 2012;	
Howell,	 2004).	 Upon	 commencement	 of	 fieldwork	 in	 Beijing	 I	 mapped	 out	 the	
existing	 labour	NGOs	 in	Beijing.	Throughout	this	thesis	 I	will	use	the	term	NGO	to	
include	the	self-nominated	forms	of	organizations:	non-governmental	organization	
(minjian	jigou,	民间机构),	non-profit	organization	(minban	feiyingli	jigou,	民办非营









and	Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 (CSR)	work	 at	 the	enterprise	 level	 (eventually	
also	with	local	governments).	This	particular	form	of	organization	(labour	NGOs),	is	
not	a	 formation	peculiar	 to	China,	 though	much	of	China’s	political	and	economic	
context	 enable	 them	 to	 carry	 more	 significant	 weight	 given	 the	 absence	 of	




on	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 China	 that	 focus	 on	 providing	 legal	 aid	 or	 legal	 support	 to	
migrant	 workers	 with	 labour	 disputes.	 Hence	 it	 would	 be	 appropriate	 to	
conceptually	 consider	 these	 specific	 formations	 as	 “legal	 action	 labour	 NGOs”	 or	
“legal	 aid	 labour	 NGOs”	 (in	 both	 cases	 abbreviated	 as	 LAL	 NGOs,	 a	 term	 used	




rights.	 Of	 the	 remaining	 four,	 I	 considered	 that	 NGOs	 X,	 Y	 and	 Z	 provided	 a	
comprehensive	sample,	covering	different	locations	in	Beijing,	size	(small,	medium	








was	 established	 in	 1999	 as	 a	 hotline	 to	 provide	 information	 for	 newly	 arrived	
workers	 in	 Beijing.	 In	 2004,	 sponsored	 by	 the	 Beijing	 Xxxxxxxx	 District	 Bureau	 of	
Justice,	 it	 successfully	 obtained	 the	 status	 of	 People’s	 Mediation	 Committee,	 a	
formal	 qualification	 that	 allows	 it	 to	mediate	 in	 labour	 disputes.	 It	 provides	 free	
legal	advice	and	mediation	to	migrant	workers	in	Beijing,	on	site	(meaning	that	the	
legal	personnel	visit	work	sites	such	as	construction	sites	or	factories)	and	at	their	
offices;	 and	 legal	 education.	 It	 runs	 like	 a	 community-based	 organization	 that	
provides	 legal	 advice	 and	 mediation	 services.	 It	 has	 four	 subsidiaries:	 Shenzhen	
(established	 2006),	 Shenyang	 (2006),	 Shanghai	 (2011),	 and	 Chongqing	 (2013).	 In	
Beijing,	 NGO	 X’s	 full-time	 staff	 are	 not	 professional	 lawyers,	 although	 its	 two	
permanent	 personnel	 are	 qualified	 labour	 conflict	 mediators	 and	 provide	 legal	
consultation.	It	also	has	an	average	of	two	to	three	volunteer	lawyers	who	attend	
its	 offices	 daily	 and	 a	 much	 broader	 network	 of	 volunteer	 lawyers	 who	 work	 at	
private	 law	 firms,	 to	 whom	 they	 resort	 for	 representation	 if	 a	 case	 fails	 to	 be	
resolved	through	mediation	and	proceeds	to	arbitration	and/or	litigation.		
	
NGO	 Y	 is	 a	 medium	 size	 legal	 aid	 and	 research	 centre	 focusing	 on	 occupational	
health	and	safety	cases,	 located	 in	 the	district	of	Xxxxxxx.	 It	 started	operations	 in	
2004,	and	was	formally	registered	in	2006	as	a	non-profit	organization	by	a	labour	
public	interest	lawyer	at	Beijing	Municipal	Civil	Affairs	Bureau,	with	the	sponsorship	










China	 and	 has	 seven	 full-time	 pro-bono	 lawyers.	 This	 organization	 also	 has	 a	
research	department	with	three	full-time	legal	personnel	who	conduct	research	on	
various	 issues	 related	 to	 labour	 and	 labour	 legislation,	 and	 issues	 a	 quarterly	
publication.	It	uses	the	practice	of	its	legal	department	as	the	basis	for	its	research	
work,	 which	 targets	 specific	 issues	 to	 formulate	 legislative	 and	 policy	
recommendations,	actively	engaging	in	policy	advocacy.	
	
NGO	Z	 is	the	first	and	biggest	 legal	aid	organization	 in	China,	whose	main	focus	 is	
providing	 legal	 services	 to	 migrant	 workers,	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 being	 labour	
disputes.	 NGO	 Z	was	 established	 in	 2005	 by	 a	 law	 firm	 led	 by	 a	 renowned	 and	
veteran	public	 interest	 lawyer	 (PIL),	and	approved	by	Beijing	Bureau	of	 Justice.	 In	
2009	 it	 succeeded	 in	 registering	 as	 a	 non-profit	 organization	 with	 the	 Beijing	
Municipal	Bureau	of	Civil	Affairs.	It	provides	free	legal	consultation	on	labour	issues	
and	legal	resolution	of	labour	conflict	via	both	hotlines	and	face-to-face.	Moreover,	
it	 provides	 occasional	 legal	 training	 and	 free	 legal	 representation	 for	 migrant	
workers	who	meet	 the	 threshold	 for	 legal	aid	 set	by	ACLA’s	Legal	Aid	Foundation	
Fund	(explained	 in	Chapter	Four).	 It	also	has	a	research	department	that	uses	the	
cases	taken	by	the	legal	department	to	conduct	research	on	workers’	problems	so	
that	 it	 identifies	 gaps	 in	 labour	 legislation	 and	 consequently,	 can	 provide	
recommendations	 to	 the	 relevant	 governmental	 department	 and	 therefore	
participate	in	the	law-making	process.	Moreover,	NGO	Z	covers	a	number	of	other	
legal	 issues	 related	 to	 migrant	 workers	 and	 peasants,	 children,	 and	 rural	
governance.	 It	 has	 approximately	 53	 full-time	 staff	 members,	 with	 20	 legal	
professionals	 at	 its	 Beijing	 office,	 9	 of	 them	 with	 approved	 practice	 lawyer	
certificates	who	provide	consultation	and	representation,	and	15	legal	professionals	







Law	 in	 Shanghai;	 Lee	 and	 Shen	 (2011)	 mapped	 out	 the	 key	 characteristics	 of	
approximately	 thirty	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 China	 (some	 of	 which	 corresponded	 to	 the	
category	 of	 LAL	 NGOs);	 and	 Xu	 (2013)	 studied	 the	 mobilization	 strategies	 and	
approaches	of	thirty	labour	NGOs	across	China,	some	of	which	focused	on	legal	aid.		
	
To	 expand	 the	 comparative	 perspective	 of	 this	 study,	 I	 conducted	 eight	 research	
visits	to	Hong	Kong,	Shenzhen,	Guangzhou,	and	Wuhan,	where	I	 interviewed	local	







Data	 collection	 methods	 included	 review	 of	 secondary	 literature,	 documentary	
material,	 statistical	 data,	 participant	 observation,	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	
open-ended	conversations	 (unstructured	 interviews),	which	 I	 conducted	myself	 in	
Mandarin	 Chinese.	 This	 research	 includes	 four	 levels	 of	 analysis	 and	 mobilizes	
different	types	of	data	to	address	each	one.	I	will	hereby	explain	the	data	collection	
methods	 that	 suited	 each	 research	 question,	 the	 corresponding	 level	 of	 analysis	




To	 assess	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism,	 I	 first	 use	 a	 historical	
institutionalist	approach	to	examine	the	historical	process	through	which	the	labour	
laws	came	about,	 the	economic	and	social	 changes	 introduced,	and	 the	 functions	
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these	 laws	 serve	 for	 the	 Party-state	 under	 the	 market	 economy.	 Therefore,	 to	
understand	 the	 historical	 process	 of	 labour	 and	 legal	 reforms,	 I	 use	 secondary	
(historical)	 research;	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 labour	 laws	 and	 the	 changes	
introduced,	 I	 contrast	 the	historical	 evidence	of	 the	 labour	 regime	pre-1978	with	
the	contemporary	labour	framework,	using	documentary	material	(labour	laws),	to	
highlight	the	changes	introduced	by	the	legal	framework;	and	I	use	statistical	data	
to	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 legal	 channels	 and	 the	 evolution	 and	 nature	 of	 labour	
disputes.	Using	 this	 combination	of	historical,	 statistical,	 and	documentary	data,	 I	




enable	 the	adaptiveness	of	 the	authoritarian	 regime	 I	 study	how	 lawyers	and	LAL	
NGOs	work	in	practice	with	the	law.	I	conducted	participant	observations	at	three	
LAL	 NGOs,	 attending	 daily	 operations	 and	 activities,	 researching	 internal	 NGO	
material,	 examining	 the	 institutional	 settings	 of	 the	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 lawyers,	 and	
observed	 the	 interactions	 between	 lawyers	 and	 workers.	 Once	 I	 had	 gained	 the	
trust	 of	 the	 NGOs,	 I	 conducted	 semi-structured	 interviews	 (Jovchelovitch	 and	
Bauer,	2000)	with	 lawyers	and	 legal	staff.	Lawyers,	 legal	staff	and	NGO	 leaders	at	
LAL	NGOs	formed	“natural	groups”	(Gaskell,	2000:	42)	or	an	“epistemic	community”	
that	facilitated	the	selection	of	respondents.	These	natural	groups	also	provided	a	
range	 of	 views,	 opinions	 and	 experiences	within	 one	 set	 of	 research	 questions.	 I	
interviewed	as	many	lawyers	and	legal	staff	as	was	possible	in	all	three	LAL	NGOs,	
and	 reached	 the	 point	 of	 saturation	 (ibid:	 43)	 when	 common	 themes	 and	
confirmation	 of	 data	 appeared	 across	 the	 interviews.	 Most	 interviews	 were	
recorded,	and	later	transcribed	by	my	research	assistant;	they	vary	in	duration	from	
30-90	 minutes.	 In	 total,	 I	 conducted	 34	 interviews	 at	 the	 three	 main	 LAL	 NGOs	
studied	 in	 this	 thesis.	 All	 interviewees	 remain	 anonymous	 throughout	 the	 entire	
thesis.	 A	 list	 of	 (anonymized)	 interviews	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Appendix	 1.	 During	 the	
interviews	 I	 also	wrote	notes	 that	 I	 typed	up	 immediately	 after	 the	 interviews	or	
after	 the	 day	 of	 fieldwork.	 These	 notes	 supplemented	 the	 transcripts	 of	 the	
interviews.	The	 interview	and	participant	observation	material	gathered	allow	the	
	 37	
assessment	 of	 if	 and	 how	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	mobilize	 the	 law	 and	 organize	
politically,	 and	 show	 the	 existing	 constraints	 of	 and	 limitations	 to	 their	 political	
mobilization	of	the	law.	This	also	provides	evidence	to	assess	if,	how	and	why	the	
law	 opens	 up	 avenues	 for	 lawyers’	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 to	 contest	 the	




as:	 lawyers’	 motivations	 to	 work	 for	 the	 LAL	 NGO	 and,	 by	 implication,	 for	 the	
protection	of	workers’	rights;	their	experience	working	for	the	LAL	NGO,	and	their	
views	 of	 the	 functioning	 and	 aims	 of	 the	 organization;	 their	 experience	with	 and	
views	 of	 legal	 reforms,	 legal	 implementation,	 and	 the	 legal	 process;	 their	
experience	with	and	views	of	 the	 legal	practice,	 in	particular	 in	 relation	 to	 labour	
dispute	 cases;	 their	 relation	 to	 workers	 and	 what	 (and	 why)	 they	 recommend	
workers	to	do	in	regard	to	labour	disputes,	among	others.	From	these	interviews,	I	





















role?’	 (LL	 standing	 for	 Lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs).	 These	 interviews	 were	 analysed	
through	thematic	analysis	(Boyatzis,	1998;	Flick,	2009),	through	a	manual	coding	of	




organize	 grassroots	 mobilizations	 in	 coordination	 with	 legal	 mobilization,	 in	
opposition	 to	 the	Party-state,	 I	 used	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	 lawyers	 and	
LAL	NGO	staff,	unstructured	interviews	with	workers,	and	participant	observations	
(Hammersley	 and	Atkinson,	 1994)	 in	 LAL	NGOs	 examining	 their	 activities	 and	 the	
dynamics,	interactions	and	relations	between	workers,	and	lawyers	and	NGO	staff.	
Evidence	gathered	through	these	methods	also	allows	a	response	to	the	question	of	
how	 and	 why	 laws	 open	 up	 avenues	 for	 political	 contestation,	 in	 this	 case,	 for	
workers.	For	example,	in	interviews	with	lawyers	I	asked	how	they	manage	labour	
dispute	cases	(especially	collective	cases,	if	any),	if	they	initiate	any	form	of	action	
in	 parallel	 to	 the	 legal	 process,	 and	 the	 advice	 and	 support	 they	 give	 workers	
searching	for	advice	to	take	forms	of	action	‘alternative’	to	formal	legal	action	(e.g.	
organize	 with	 other	 workers,	 select	 a	 representative	 to	 independently	 and	
collectively	 negotiate	 with	 the	 employer).	 Answers	 to	 these	 questions	 would	
indicate	 if	 and	 how	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 organize	 parallel	 actions	 to	 legal	
mobilization,	 and/or	 support	 workers’	 autonomous	 paralegal	 or	 ‘illegal’	





NGOs.	 Initially,	 I	 conducted	passive	participant	observations:	as	an	observer,	 I	 sat	
aside,	and	mainly	listened	and	took	notes.	However,	my	presence	was	unavoidable	
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and	needed	 to	be	 thematized	as	part	 and	parcel	of	 the	 research,	questioning	my	
role	and	my	influence	on	the	research	sites	and	interactions.	In	the	three	LAL	NGOs,	
legal	consultations	were	carried	out	in	rather	open	spaces	in	their	offices:	in	NGOs	X	
and	 Y,	 at	 a	 large	 rectangular	 table	 where	 lawyers	 and	 workers	 sat	 together,	
sometimes	 several	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 sometimes	 queuing	 in	 the	 same	 room	
listening	 to	 another	 worker	 discussing	 his/her	 case;	 in	 NGO	 Z,	 a	 long	 front	 desk	
where	lawyers	sat	opposite	the	workers.	Obviously,	in	all	three	cases,	the	presence	
of	 a	 foreign	woman	 sitting	 somewhere	 nearby	 the	 lawyer	 or	 the	worker	 seeking	
consultation	 did	 not	 go	 unnoticed.	Upon	 arrival	 of	 the	worker,	my	 presence	was	
always	noticed,	and	explained	by	the	lawyer,	primarily	for	ethical	reasons,	to	gather	
workers’	agreement	to	my	presence	during	the	consultation,	and	informed	consent.	




the	 narrative	 interview	 (Jovchelovitch	 and	 Bauer,	 2000),	 but	 was	 unstructured	
(Oakley,	2005).	These	conversations	were	 intended	 to	study	workers’	perceptions	
and	attitudes	of	the	legal	institutions,	and	their	subjective	experience	with	the	law	
and	 the	 labour	 dispute.	 This	 research	method	 suited	 the	 law	 in	 society	 approach	
(Ewick	and	Silbey,	1998),	through	which	I	aimed	to	study	law	from	below	in	order	to	
better	assess	the	level	of	penetration	of	law	in	society,	which	in	turn	can	shed	light	
on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 law	 in	 obtaining	 the	 desired	 social	 behaviour	 and	 legal	
order,	and	in	sustaining	authoritarianism.			
	
During	 participant	 observations	 I	 sought	 to	 observe	 the	 relational	 dynamics	
between	 lawyers	 and	 workers	 in	 legal	 consultations,	 and	 the	 forms	 of	 advice	
lawyers	 provided	workers	with.	 These	 legal	 consultations	 are	 one	 of	 the	ways	 in	











in	 political	 movements	 (Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Scheingold,	 1974).	 Therefore,	 in	
participant	 observations	 I	 sought	 evidence	 that	 would	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 this	
proposition,	 seeking	 indications	 of	 how	 lawyers	 interacted	 with	 workers,	 if	 they	
coordinated	 legal	 action	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 workers’	 actions,	 if	 they	 would	
organize	workers	 to	 take	alternative	 forms	of	 action;	 all	 in	 all,	 if	 lawyers	 stepped	
outside	 the	 law	or	encouraged	workers	 to	do	 so.	Observing	how	 lawyers	provide	
advice	to	workers	and	paying	attention	to	the	form	of	advice	provided	sheds	light	
on	the	capacity	of	 lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	to	mobilize	workers	to	take	actions	that	
contest	 the	 Party-state.	 The	 absence	 of	 these	 would	 suggest	 the	 avenues	 for	
political	 contestation	 opened	 by	 law	 are	 not	 as	 such,	 in	 turn,	 the	 law,	 and	 by	
extension	lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs,	supporting	the	political	status	quo.		
	
I	manually	 coded	 the	 interview	 transcripts	 and	 participant	 observation	 fieldnotes	
on	 the	basis	of	 “concept-driven”	and	 “data-driven”	 codes	 (Gibbs,	 2007:	44-46)	or	
themes.	 Concept-driven	 codes	were	 developed	 from	 the	 literature,	 searching	 for	
categories	derived	 from	the	 literature	–	 'institutional	arrangement’	or	 ‘LL	political	
role?’	 as	 indicated	above.	Data-driven	 codes,	which	derive	 from	grounded	 theory	
approaches	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967;	Strauss	and	Corbin,	1997),	developed	during	
fieldwork	 once	 common	 categories	 started	 to	 arise	 from	 the	 interviews	 with	
lawyers	 and	 workers	 (as	 explained	 below),	 and	 during	 engagement	 with	 the	
interview	 transcripts	 and	 fieldnote	material.	 During	 fieldwork	 I	 conducted	 a	 first	
round	 of	 analysis,	 keeping	 a	 separate	 set	 of	 fieldwork	 memos	 (Auerbach	 and	
Silverstein,	 2003;	 Strauss	 and	Corbin,	 1998)	 or	 reflections	 from	 the	 field,	where	 I	
recorded	 the	 main	 themes	 that	 gradually	 appeared	 in	 the	 interviews	 and	 in	
participant	 observations.	 Once	 I	 concluded	 fieldwork,	 I	 read	 through	 all	 my	
interviews,	 field	 notebooks,	 fieldnotes	 and	 memos,	 to	 identify	 the	 data-driven	
coding.	 During	 a	 second	 round	 of	 analysis	 I	 combined	 data-driven	 coding	 with	
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concept-driven	coding.	I	used	themes	that	evolved	from	the	interviews	themselves,	






will	 enable	 assessment	 of	 whether	 legal	 institutions	 are	 effective	 for	 the	 CPC’s	
adaptive	governance.	In	response	to	the	law	in	society	approach	(Ewick	and	Silbey,	
1998),	I	studied	workers’	perceptions,	attitudes,	support	for	and	use	of	the	law.	In	
the	offices	of	LAL	NGOs	 I	 conducted	 interviews	with	workers	 that	had	experience	
with	 the	 law,	 as	 just	mentioned.	 For	 comparative	 reasons,	 I	 sought	 to	 study	 the	
same	factors	with	workers	who	had	not	engaged	with	the	 law.	 I	did	so	by	visiting	
workers	 at	 two	 construction	 sites	 in	 Beijing.	 These	 interviews	with	workers	were	
unstructured	 interviews	 or	 “interviews	 as	 conversations”	 (Burgess,	 1993:	 101)	 as	
used	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 disciplines	 in	 the	 social	 sciences	 (Oakley,	 2005),	 most	
specifically,	as	used	in	ethnography	as	the	“ethnographic	interview”	(Skinner,	2012;	
Spradley,	 1979).	 Unstructured	 interviews	 try	 to	 eliminate	 the	 power	 relation	
between	 informant	 and	 researcher	 (Corbin	 and	 Morse,	 2003),	 it	 being	 the	




the	 offices	 of	 the	 three	 LAL	 NGOs,	 and	 at	 the	 two	 construction	 sites.	 In	 the	
dormitories	of	the	construction	sites,	workers	were	grouped	on	the	basis	of	origin	
(e.g.	from	Sichuan,	Shandong,	Hebei,	etc.).	The	dormitories	of	the	construction	sites	
were	 “natural	 settings”	 that	 enabled	 my	 conducting	 a	 purposeful	 sampling,	 and	
over	two	months	and	a	total	of	fifteen	field	visits,	I	visited	different	dormitory	units	
to	 gather	 the	 maximum	 variation	 (Gobo,	 2004;	 Patton	 1990)	 of	 workers’	
perspectives	 across	 province	 of	 origin.	 The	 construction	 industry	 is	 male-
dominated,	and	so	at	one	of	the	two	construction	sites,	I	purposely	visited	the	one	
women-only	 floor	 in	 the	 entire	 dormitory	 compound.	 I	 also	 visited	 the	 common	
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spaces	of	 the	dormitories,	 such	as	a	 small	 library	 room,	 the	kitchen	and	 the	yard	
that	was	used	for	dinner	in	the	warm	months,	where	I	talked	to	any	worker	present	
in	 the	 space.	 In	 the	 offices	 of	 the	 three	 LAL	 NGOs,	 I	 proceeded	 with	 the	
unstructured	interviews	without	sampling,	as	the	fact	that	workers	visited	the	LAL	
NGOs	 already	 provided	 a	 natural	 purposive	 sampling	 of	 workers	 with	 labour	
disputes	that	were	seeking	legal	advice	and/or	representation.	During	the	course	of	
nine	months	of	fieldwork	in	these	three	LAL	NGOs,	I	visited	their	offices	on	average	
four	 times	 per	 week,	 and	 conversed	 with,	 at	 least,	 five	 workers	 per	 week;	 this	
approximately	came	to	one	hundred	and	fifty	workers	that	I	engaged	with	in	open-
ended	 conversations	 during	 the	 course	 of	 fieldwork.	 From	 these,	 I	 chose	 27	
conversations	 with	 individuals	 and	 groups	 of	 workers	 or	 conversational	 events.	
Workers’	profiles	differed	in	age,	place	of	origin	and	industrial	sector,	although	they	
were	 predominately	 construction	 workers	 (15	 conversations).	 Of	 these	
conversations,	16	took	place	at	the	offices	of	LAL	NGOs,	1	was	part	of	a	participant	





Evidence	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 directly	 drawn	 from	 these	 27	 conversations,	 not	
because	of	 their	 statistical	 representation	of	 the	distribution	of	workers’	opinions	
on	 the	 law	 to	 the	 totality	 of	 Chinese	workers	 (Merkens,	 2005),	 but	 because	 they	
captured	 typical	 representations	or	 patterns	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 perceptions,	 opinions	
and	 subjectivities,	 and	 allowed	 me	 to	 elucidate	 the	 subtleties,	 intensities,	 and	
differentiation	of	workers’	perceptions,	opinions	and	conceptions	of	the	law.	I	aim	
to	show	the	depth,	multiplicities	and	complexities	of	workers’	accounts	and	views	
of	 rights	 and	 the	 law,	 against	 the	 general	 theoretical	 concept	 of	 ‘rights	






for	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 findings	 (Gobo,	 2004:	 406)	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
theoretical	 propositions.	 By	 doing	 so,	 this	 data	 provides	 nuanced	 empirical	
evidence	 for	 the	overwhelmingly	 consensual	 narrative	 in	 the	 literature	 about	 the	
political	significance	of	workers’	 rights	consciousness,	and	allows	us	to	gain	depth	
of	 understanding	 how	 and	why	workers	 comprehend	 and	 use	 the	 law,	 and	what	
this	 means	 politically.	 In	 addition,	 the	 extended	 case	 method	 does	 not	 aim	 at	
representativeness	 of	 the	 samples	 or	 cases	 chosen,	 but	 invites	 the	 researcher	 to	
extend	from	the	micro-	to	the	macro-,	from	the	case	to	the	theory	(Burawoy,	2009).		
	
None	 of	 these	 conversations	 were	 recorded	 because	 I	 believed	 that	 a	 recording	
device	would	 interfere	with	 the	natural	development	of	 the	 conversational	event	
and	with	the	informality	that	I	was	seeking	with	the	openness	of	the	conversational	
events.	 Instead,	 I	 took	 notes	 during	 the	 conversations,	 as	 accurately	 as	 possible.	
These	 interview	 notes	 were	 supplemented	 with	 fieldnotes	 of	 the	 visit	 and	
conversational	 event.	 I	 typed	 up	 my	 notes	 immediately	 after	 the	 field	 visits,	 in	
journals	 and	 post-conversation/post-observation	 reflections.	 My	 fieldnotes	 and	
field	diaries	gathered	a	significant	amount	of	thick	description	(Geertz,	1973),	and	
combined	different	voices	from	the	personal	to	the	professional	researcher,	as	well	
as	 other	 voices	 from	 the	 field	 –aggrieved	 workers,	 lawyers,	 legal	 advisors,	 NGO	
staff.	 These	 fieldnotes	 are	 also	 highly	 personalized	 accounts	 (van	Maanen,	 2011)	
that	unavoidably	present	the	fieldworker’s	standpoint.	To	abstract	myself	from	the	
accounts	 of	 the	 worker,	 I	 annotated	 verbatim	 quotes	 where	 possible	 and	 have	
included	 these	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 give	 voice	 to	 the	workers.	All	 quotes	 are	my	own	
translations	 from	 the	 verbatim,	 an	 accurate	 reproduction	 of	 how	 and	 what	 the	
worker	said	during	these	conversations,	unless	stated	otherwise.		
	
I	 used	 this	 qualitative	method	 during	 interactions	with	workers	 in	 dormitories	 of	
construction	 sites	 and	 at	 the	 offices	 of	 LAL	 NGOs.	 I	 initiated	 conversation	 with	
workers,	introducing	myself	and	my	research,	and	a	space	always	followed	in	which	
my	 conversational	 partner/s	 would	 ask	 me	 all	 sorts	 of	 questions	 about	 myself,	
allowing	for	the	interview	to	be	an	‘interchange’	(Kvale,	1996).	Next,	I	would	pose	
some	 specific	questions	about	 the	worker’s	work	and	 labour	 conditions,	 and	also	
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open-ended	questions	followed	by	a	considerable	amount	of	silence	on	my	side,	in	
order	 to	 elicit	 their	 own	 narratives	 and	 life-stories.	 This	 aimed	 to	 uncover	 their	
subjective	 experiences	 of	 work,	 family,	 relations,	 labour	 disputes,	 and	 most	
importantly	their	perceptions	and	opinions	of	the	legal	institutions.	This	last	theme	
was	 elicited	 with	 questions	 such	 as	 “do	 you	 have	 a	 labour	 contract	 at	 your	
workplace?”,	“do	you	know	about	the	Labour	Contract	Law,	what	do	you	think	of	
it?”,	“have	you	had	a	dispute	at	work?”;	 if	yes,	“can	you	tell	me	about	 it?”,	“how	




this	 thesis,	 namely,	workers’	 social	 norms	and	 conceptions	of	 justice	vis-à-vis	 the	
law.		
	
These	 interviews	with	workers	 provided	 evidence	 of	 the	 forms	 of	 action	workers	
take	in	relation	to	labour	disputes	and	the	reasons	for	taking	one	or	another	form	
of	action,	which	are	explored	in	Chapter	Seven.	The	most	salient	evidence	gathered	
through	 these	 interviews	 relates	 to	 workers’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 laws,	 and	 their	
‘rights’	and	‘rules	consciousness’.	Economic	factors,	time,	inequality,	severity	of	the	
dispute	 (e.g.	work	 injury),	 level	of	knowledge	of	 the	 law,	 level	of	experience	with	
the	law	and	access	to	legal	aid,	and	lawyers’	advice	would	be	indicators	for	workers’	
views	and	opinions	of	 the	 law	and	the	 legal	process.	For	example,	a	worker	using	
legal	 terminology	 and	 responding	 that	 “the	 law	 protects	 our	 rights”,	 “the	 labour	
contract	 protects	 us”,	 or	 that	 he/she	 sought	 legal	 assistance	 to	 “protect	 his/her	
rights”,	or	identified	his/her	labour	dispute	as	the	result	of	an	“illegal”	(buhefa,	不





social	 norms	 that	 differed	 from	 the	 law,	which	 explains	why	 they	might	 not	 take	
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legal	action	and/or	disagree	with	 the	 law.	For	example,	a	worker	 responding	 that	
he/she	would	not	take	legal	action	because	it	would	lead	to	loss	of	face	(mian,	面),	
or	 be	 harmful	 to	 social	 relations,	 indicates	 that	 there	 are	 social	 norms	 informing	
workers’	 views	 of	 the	 laws	 and	 their	 decisions	 to	 take	 legal	 action.	 Moreover,	
workers	responding	that	the	“law	is	useless”	(falü	meiyong,	法律没用)	or	“unfair”	
(bugongping,	不公平),	or	a	specific	behaviour	is	“not	right”	or	“wrong”	(budui,	不对
)	but	not	using	the	 legal	 terms	mentioned	above	 indicate	the	prevalence	of	social	
norms,	morality	 and	 ‘rules	 consciousness’,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 law-informed	 ‘rights	
consciousness’.	 I	manually	 coded	 the	 notes	 of	 these	 unstructured	 interviews	 and	
fieldnotes,	combining	“concept-driven”	and	 inductive	“data-driven”	coding	(Gibbs,	
2007).	Concept-driven	codes	were	developed	from	the	literature	review,	searching	
for	 indicators	 of	 ‘rights	 talk’	 (‘rights	 consciousness’)	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 and	
‘workers	 conceptions	 and	 subjective	 experiences’.	 Codes	 developed	 from	 the	
interview	 data	 such	 as	 ‘morality’,	 ‘socio-cultural’,	 ‘social	 relations’	 or	 ‘fairness’,	
referred	 to	 the	 broader	 theme	 ‘rules	 consciousness’.	 These	 codes	 facilitated	 the	
analysis	 and	 identification	 of	 the	 data	 to	 address	 each	 of	 the	 research	 questions	






fulfilled	 the	 Ethics	 Review	 Questionnaire	 for	 Researchers	 (prior	 to	 fieldwork	 in	
2011).	 In	 addition,	 it	 adhered	 to	 the	 Statement	 of	 Ethical	 Practice	 of	 the	 British	
Sociological	Association	(2002).	All	people	interviewed	and	who	participated	in	the	
research	provided	 informed	consent:	 in	 the	case	of	NGOs,	a	written	statement	of	
my	 research	 project	 was	 provided	 to	 them	 prior	 to	 my	 initiating	 regular	
participation	 in	 NGO	 activities	 and	 observations.	 Consent	 was	 provided	 at	 the	
beginning	of	my	 fieldwork	by	all	 three	NGOs	via	consultation	with	 the	director	of	
each	organization.	All	those	interviewed	(whether	formally	through	semi-structured	
interviews	 or	 through	 informal	 conversations)	 were	 informed	 of	 the	 aim	 of	 the	
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research	 and	 participated	 voluntarily	 in	 the	 conversations/interviews,	 providing	
oral	 consent.	 I	 reassured	 each	 and	 every	 participant	 of	 confidentiality	 and	
anonymity.	The	only	third	party	involved	in	the	process	that	had	access	to	interview	
data	 was	my	 research	 assistant,	 who	 only	 partook	 in	 transcribing	 the	 interviews	
with	 lawyers	 and	NGO	 staff,	 all	whom	consented	 to	 the	 recording	 and	 agreed	 to	








and	 Lawyer	Guo	who	 received	me,	 immediately	 opened	 the	 door	 of	
the	 consultation	 room	 and	 invited	 me	 to	 enter	 and	 have	 a	 seat.	 A	
consultation	was	ongoing	between	a	lawyer	and	two	women,	one	of	
them	 an	 injured	 worker.	 She	 walked	 with	 crutches	 and	 had	 an	
obviously	 serious	 injury	 to	 her	 leg.	 The	 lawyer	 introduced	 me	 and	
explained	my	presence	and	my	research	project	and	asked	the	worker	
if	she	agreed	to	my	presence.	Informed	consent	was	provided	and	the	
consultation	 continued.	 After	 the	 consultation	 ended,	 I	 initiated	
conversation	 with	 her.	 She	 talked	 without	 me	 needing	 to	 ask	 her	
many	 questions.	 She	was	 just	 so	 happy	 to	 talk,	 so	much	 in	 need	 to	
share	 her	 grief,	 to	 have	 somebody	 interested	 in	 her	 situation	more	
than	 in	 the	 technicalities	 of	 her	 case	 –	 her	 employer,	 her	 accident,	





and	 I,	 too,	 had	 tears	 in	my	eyes	within	 seconds.	 (Fieldnote,	 12	 June	
2012)	
	





in	 Hebei	 Province	 just	 to	meet	 the	 lawyer,	 a	 long	 journey.	 Her	 son,	
who	lost	his	leg	in	an	accident	at	work,	could	not	bear	his	injuries	and	




just	 sat	 with	 her	 in	 her	 grief.	 The	 other	 worker	 in	 the	 room	 also	
listened	to	her	while	he	waited	for	his	lawyer	and	filled	in	some	forms,	
and	while	other	 staff	 came	 in	and	out	of	 the	 room	doing	 their	work	
but	without	paying	attention	to	her	-	I	thought	they	had	to	be	immune	
to	 situations	 like	 this.	 I	 held	 her	 hand.	 She	 kept	 crying	 and	 crying.	 I	
couldn’t	 understand	her	any	 longer.	 I	 just	 listened	and	 sat	with	her.	
(Fieldnote,	28	August	2012)	
	
During	 fieldwork	 I	 participated	 in	 numerous	 legal	 consultations	 and	 listened	 to	
many	 different	 testimonies	 of	 workers	 who,	 as	 with	 these	 two	 women,	 were	
anxious	 and	 in	 need	 of	 somebody	 who	would	 just	 listen	 to	 them	with	 affect.	 In	
these	 situations,	 I	 could	 not	 but	 pause	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 research.	 Neutrality	 was	
impossible;	 emotions	 and	 empathy	 dominated.	 Further,	 how	 could	 I	 ‘use’	 these	




stories,	 and	 by	 using	 them	 in	 this	 thesis,	 I	 betray	 their	 sincerity	 and	 trust,	 even	
though	 I	 always	had	 their	 informed	 consent	 to	participate	 in	 this	 research.	 Then,	
and	 now,	 I	 struggle	 with	 dissociating	 the	 personal	 from	 the	 researcher.	 During	
fieldwork,	 research	 and	 research	 ethics	 were	 as	 important	 as	 my	 personal	













improve	workers’	 rights	and	general	working	 conditions.	 I	 have	deep	 respect	and	
admiration	 for	 the	 lawyers	 and	 NGOs	 I	 followed,	 listened	 to	 and	 learned	 from	
during	 my	 fieldwork,	 and	 I	 am	 grateful	 for	 their	 welcoming	 me	 into	 their	 daily	




Chapter	 Two	 sets	 out	 the	 theoretical	 terrain	 for	 this	 thesis,	 which	 lies	 at	 the	
intersection	of	the	literatures	on	rule	of	law	in	authoritarianism,	and	law	and	social	
movements.	It	locates	China	within	the	contemporary	discussion	about	the	role	of	
law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism,	 and	 its	 opposite,	 in	 resistance	 and	 political	
transformation.	 Equally,	 legal	 institutions	 provide	 a	 lens	 to	 better	 understand	
changing	 governance	mechanisms	 and	 state-society	 interactions	 in	 contemporary	
China,	 which	 serve	 comparative	 purposes	 with	 other	 authoritarian	 settings.	 The	
chapter	 outlines	 and	 critiques	 the	 dominant	 institutional	 narratives	 employed	 to	
explain	 how	 and	 why	 legal	 institutions	 enable	 the	 institutionalization	 and	
consolidation	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	 (Moustafa,	 2007,	 2014)	 and	 bolster	 regime	
legitimacy	(Landry,	2008;	Ginsburg,	2008;	Moustafa,	2007,	2014).	It	also	points	out	
the	virtues	of	grounded	analyses	of	the	law	and	society	approach	to	gather	a	more	
comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 processes	 at	 play	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 legal	
consciousness,	 and	 more	 broadly	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 political	 movements	 and	
resistance,	and	therefore,	in	challenging	authoritarianism.		
		
Chapter	 Three	 describes	 the	 historical	 process	 of	 labour	 and	 legal	 reforms	 that	
preceded	the	historical	moments	analysed	in	this	thesis:	the	enactment	of	the	1995	
and	 the	2008	 labour	 laws,	 and	 the	 conflict	 that	 followed.	 It	 also	 interrogates	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 labour	 laws,	 to	 show	 the	 fundamental	 transformations	 that	 were	
settled	 with	 these	 new	 laws.	 It	 first	 argues	 that	 the	 development	 of	 legal	
institutions	 to	 regulate	 labour	 relations	 in	 China	 reflects	 an	 institutionalization	
process	 of	 property	 rights	 to	 support	 the	 market	 economy.	 These	 legal	
institutionalizations	are	regime	supportive.	Second,	it	argues	that	the	development	
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of	 labour	 laws	 was	 also	 a	 response	 to	 the	 enormous	 amount	 of	 social	 pressure	
coming	from	workers’	large-scale	strikes	and	protests	in	the	late	1980s,	early	1990s,	
and	 the	 early	 2000s.	 These	 clearly	 illustrate	 Polanyi’s	 concept	 of	 the	 “double	
movement”	(Polanyi,	2001:	130)	by	which	the	extension	of	unregulated	markets	is	
followed	by	 a	 countermovement	 to	 regulate	 the	market	 and	protect	 labour	 from	
the	excesses	of	capital,	either	with	legislation,	trade	unions,	factory	regulations	or	
welfare	systems	(Silver,	2003:	17).	In	China,	the	enactment	of	labour	laws	illustrates	
this	 countermovement	 to	 protect	 workers,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 depicting	 a	
strategy	 of	 enshrining	 workers’	 interests	 as	 rights	 in	 labour	 legislation	 to	 pacify	
labour	unrest.	Third,	 it	 shows	 that	 the	Party-state,	even	when	 facing	endogenous	
(within	 the	 Party-state)	 and	 exogenous	 (from	 foreign	 enterprises)	 opposition	 to	
enact	the	laws,	did	so	in	order	to	keep	its	capacity	to	control	the	labour	market	and	
to	regulate	capital,	hence,	it	was	an	adaptation	of	its	governance	to	the	challenges	
of	 the	 time	 (in	 reference	 to	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry,	 2011).	 Fourth,	 it	 analyses	 the	
content	of	the	1995	and	2008	labour	laws	to	highlight	the	socio-economic	changes	
introduced	 in	 labour	 relations.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 two	 most	 significant	
transformations	 affected	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 labour	 relations,	 namely,	 that	 it	
officially	recognized	the	commodification	of	 labour	and	the	antagonism	of	 labour-
capital.	 It	 thus	 established	official	mechanisms	 to	manage	 labour	 disputes,	which	
have	 resulted	 in	 a	 ‘judicialization’	 of	 labour	 politics.	 It	 then	 introduces	 the	 new	
labour	 actors,	 that	 is,	 labour	 NGOs,	 which	 have	 arisen	 in	 an	 extremely	 complex	
labour	 scenario,	 and	 provides	 an	 outline	 of	 labour	 NGO	 development	 to	 finish	
situating	the	case	of	the	research	historically.		
	
Against	 evidence	 from	 comparative	 authoritarian	 and	 post-Socialist	 contexts,	
Chapter	Four	sets	out	to	examine	why	in	China	legal	reforms	have	not	triggered	the	
amount	 of	 political	 transformation	 as	 would	 be	 expected	 when	 following	 the	
theoretical	 propositions	 that	 view	 a	 causal	 relation	 between	 legal	 reforms	 and	
political	 liberalism	 (Goldman,	 2005;	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 2007;	
Karpik	and	Halliday,	2011),	even	with	democratization	(Dahl,	1957;	Linz	and	Stepan,	
1996).	 It	 addresses	 the	 question	 of	 how	 and	why,	 if	 at	 all,	 labour	 laws	 open	 up	
avenues	 for	 political	 contestation.	 Looking	 at	 how	 the	 Party-state	 ensures	 that	
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lawyers	and	 legal	aid	NGOs	fulfil	 the	function	of	securing	social	stability,	 it	argues	
that	this	is	done	through	an	institutional	arrangement	designed	by	the	Party-state	
that	 guarantees	 lawyers’	 self-censorship	 and	 core	 compliance;	 dependent	 and	
patronage	relationships	between	the	legal	profession	and	the	state	(in	the	form	of	
the	Ministry	 of	 Justice);	 and	 feedback	mechanisms	 that	 enable	 legal	 institutional	
cultivation	and	perfection.	I	argue	that,	due	to	the	institutional	constraints	in	place,	




Chapter	 Five	 examines	 the	 premise	 that	 legal	 institutions	 provide	 avenues	 for	
political	contestation	(Moustafa,	2007,	2008,	2014;	Moustafa	and	Ginsburg,	2008)	
and	political	 liberalism	 (Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 examine	 the	 legal	
process	 as	 a	 relational	 one,	 and	 to	 decentre	 the	 analysis	 from	 legal	 institutions,	
namely	 courts,	 and	 disputes,	 this	 chapter	 examines	 how	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	
provide	legal	assistance	to	workers,	to	assess	how	and	why	lawyers	and	civil	society	
organizations	mobilize	the	 law,	and	 if,	how	and	why	they	catalyse	workers’	broad	
actions	 and	 movement	 to	 challenge	 the	 Party-state.	 LAL	 NGOs	 protect	 workers’	
rights	 ‘according	 to	 the	 law’,	 and	 provide	 legal	 education	 and	 representation	
services,	 raising	 workers’	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 and	 assisting	 workers	 in	 legal	
mobilization.	 This	 chapter	 shows	 that	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	NGOs,	 however,	 are	more	
efficient	 in	 maintaining	 social	 stability	 (to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 regime)	 than	 in	
supporting	 political	 activism	 because	 of	 three	 key	 issues:	 first,	 in	 legal	
representation	lawyers	act	‘on	behalf	of	workers’,	which	comes	about	through	the	
transfer	of	workers’	agency	to	lawyers	and	develops	into	a	dependent	relationship	
between	 workers	 and	 lawyers;	 second,	 by	 focusing	 only	 on	 individual	 legal	
resolutions	 of	 labour	 disputes,	 LAL	 NGOs	 depoliticize	 labour	 conflict	 by	 virtue	 of	
‘juridicalizing’	 it	and	 limiting	any	possible	action	to	 the	assertion	of	 rights,	 that	 is,	
only	rights-based	claims	and	actions;	and	third,	on	a	fundamental	 level,	LAL	NGOs	





and	 act	 before	 and	 beyond	 the	 law.	 Through	 an	 analysis	 of	 workers’	 subjective	
experiences	of	work,	their	perceptions	and	opinions	of	the	laws,	and	their	concepts	
of	justice,	Chapter	Six	contests	two	assumptions:	the	first,	that	with	the	increase	in	
workers’	 rights	 consciousness,	 we	 can	 expect	 to	 see	 increased	 contestation	 and	
resistance	 to	 the	 Party-state,	 in	 a	way	 that	 holds	 it	 accountable	 to	 its	 own	 legal	
institutions;	 and	 the	 second,	 that	workers	have	accommodated	and	accepted	 the	
rule	 of	 law	 ideology	 of	 the	 Party-state.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	 chapter	 shows	 that	
there	 is	considerable	contestation	of	 the	precepts	of	 the	 laws,	workers	dissenting	
from	 their	 principles	 and	 uses.	 Against	 the	 laws,	 workers’	 conceptions	 of	 labour	
relations,	rights	and	justice	are	based	on	a	universe	of	socio-cultural	norms	(such	as	
morality),	material	needs	(livelihoods	and	subsistence)	and	subjective	experiences.	
In	 short,	 the	 introduction	 of	 legal	 institutions	 has	 created	 a	 situation	 of	 tension	
between	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 and	 ‘rules	 consciousness’	 (Perry,	 2008),	 in	 which	
each	provides	conflicting	and	mutually	contradictory	rationales	and	logics	of	action.	
In	line	with	these	socio-cultural	concepts,	workers	take	a	range	of	paralegal,	illegal	




Chapters	 Six	 and	 Seven	 point	 out	 that	 if	 anything,	 for	 its	 ideological	 value,	 the	
tension	 between	 the	 legal	 norms	 and	 popular	 and	 social	 norms,	 what	 could	 be	
interpreted	as	a	tension	between	 ‘rights	consciousness’	and	 ‘rules	consciousness’,	
illustrates	the	shortcoming	of	the	CPC’s	‘adaptive	governance’	(Heilmann	and	Perry,	
2011).	How	 the	Party-state	will	 reconcile	 social	norms	and	popular	practices	with	
the	legal	order	will	test	the	limits	of	its	adaptive	governance:	this	poses	a	question	
to	the	CPC	whether	to	better	adapt	its	legal	institutions	to	popular	knowledge	and	
practices	 (which	 is	 not	 necessarily	 achievable	 by	 granting	 more	 rights,	 such	 as	
collective	bargaining	or	 right	 to	strike),	or	 to	better	obtain	society’s	cognitive	and	
behavioural	 alignment	 with	 the	 legal	 order	 (either	 by	 consent	 or	 coercion).	 It	
becomes	clear	that	a	study	of	 law	in	everyday	life	is	necessary	in	order	to	see	the	































especially	 courts,	 have	 been	 proved	 key	 functions	 in	 state	 formation,	 political	
stability,	market	and	regime	transitions,	and	democratization.	The	rule	of	 law	has	




legal	 institutions	 play	 a	 role	 in	 democratic	 transition	 and/or	 consolidation.	
Therefore,	 until	 the	 1990s,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	had	not	 been	 studied	 in	 authoritarian	
regimes,	 mainly	 because	 legal	 institutions	 were	 considered	 ‘pawns’	 of	 the	
authoritarian	 rulers	 (Moustafa,	 2014),	 instruments	 of	 the	 sovereign	 (Marvall	 and	
Przeworski,	 2003),	 institutional	 sources	 for	 the	 regime	 to	 preserve	 its	 hegemony	
(Hirschl,	2000:	95),	centrepieces	for	political	stability	(Gerring	et	al.,	2004;	Halliday	
et	 al.,	 2007:	 6;	 Lijhpart,	 1977;	 North	 and	Weingast,	 1989;	 O’Donnell,	 2001),	 and	
central	to	the	exercise	of	state	control	(Shapiro,	1981).	However,	there	has	been	a	
“rule	of	law	revival”	in	transitional	and	developing	states	(Carothers,	1998),	and	an	
increasing	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 ventured	 into	 examining	 the	 role	 of	 legal	
institutions	 in	 the	governance	of	authoritarian	 regimes,	 as	 these	play	much	more	
multifaceted	 political	 roles	 than	mere	 instruments	 of	 dominance	 of	 authoritarian	
rulers.	For	example,	Moustafa	(2007)	argues	that	authoritarian	regimes	increasingly	
use	 courts	 to	 institutionalize	 their	 rule,	 resulting	 in	 the	 “judicialization” 6 	of	
authoritarian	 politics.	 As	 a	 result,	 legal	 institutions	 (in	 particular	 courts)	 gain	
presence	 in	 political	 life,	 and	 increasingly	 protect	 individual	 rights,	
																																																						
6	‘Judicialization’	of	politics	refers	to	“(1)	the	process	by	which	courts	and	judges	come	to	make	or	
increasingly	 dominate	 the	making	 of	 public	 policies	 that	 had	 previously	 been	made	 (…)	 by	 other	






and	 Halliday,	 2011).	 Legal	 institutions	 have	 also	 been	 regarded	 as	 sites	 of	
‘contentious	 politics’,	 providing	 opportunities	 and	 resources	 for	 resistance	 to	
authoritarian	rulers	(Halliday	et	al.,	2007;	Karpik	and	Halliday,	2011).	
	
Law	 embodies	 an	 intrinsic	 paradox:	 domination	 and	 resistance.	 The	 anticipation	
that	 its	 capacity	 for	 resistance	 will	 outgrow	 that	 of	 domination	 creates	 the	
expectation	 that,	 in	 authoritarian	 settings,	 legal	 institutions	 will	 induce	 political	
liberalization,	 installing	 the	 rule	of	 law,	and	 leading	 to	democratic	 transition.	Past	
examples	 from,	 among	 others,	 post-Soviet	 and	 Eastern	 European	 countries	
(Schwartz,	 2000;	 Straughn,	 2005;	 Solomon,	 1996,	 2008	 2010),	 or	 East	 Asian	
countries	(Ginsburg,	2003,	2008;	Rajah,	2012)	have	been	used	to	analyse	the	CPC’s	
capacity	 to	 undergo	 market	 liberalization	 and	 legal	 institutionalization	 without	
political	 transformation.	 China	 is,	 in	 this	 respect,	 the	 deviant	 case	 that	 attracts	
comparative	attention.		
	
There	 is	 research,	 however,	 which	 points	 out	 that	 there	 is	 no	 necessary	 inter-
relation	between	legal	institutions	and	regime	liberalization	(Root	and	May,	2008).	
Research	 on	 China’s	 prolific	 legal	 reforms	 indicates	 that	 the	 “rule	 of	 law	 as	
implemented	in	China	is	a	political	reform	project	that	offers	some	of	the	promise	
of	 political	 liberalization	 without	 the	 loss	 of	 political	 power	 by	 the	 ruling	 party”	
(Gallagher,	2006:	787).	It	is	also	said	that	the	rule	of	law	has	been	used	as	a	strategy	
to	 fill	 the	 ideological	 vacuum	 that	 overshadows	 the	 post-1978	 period,	 and	 to	
bolster	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 CPC	 (Ginsberg,	 2008;	 Landry,	 2008;	 Liebman,	 2011;	
Lubman,	1999;	Peerenboom,	2002).	By	so	doing,	legal	institutions	contribute	to	the	




many	authors,	Pei	 (2000:	23)	has	asserted	 that	“despite	 the	 limited	nature	of	 the	















2.1,	 I	 examine	 the	dominant	explanations	of	why	and	how	 legal	 reform	and	 legal	
institutions	 enable	 regime	 stability	 and/or	 adaptation	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts,	
pointing	out	their	underlying	 institutionalist	assumptions.	 In	section	2.2	 I	consider	
the	variety	of	explanations	of	why	and	how	legal	 institutions	are	transformed	into	
sites	of	 contention	 in	both	 liberal	democracies	and	authoritarian	contexts,	paying	
particular	attention	to	the	Chinese	case.	In	section	2.3	I	offer	concluding	remarks	to	
summarize	 the	 framework	 that	 informs	 this	 study,	 which	 extends	 from	 the	 two	
bodies	of	research	on	law	as	domination	and	resistance.	I	argue	that	there	is	a	need	
to	 go	 beyond	 the	 institutionalist	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 legal	 institutions	
(mainly	through	courts),	which	see	legal	institutions	as	a	neutral	and	objective	unit	
of	 analysis	 and	 examine	 its	 uses,	 effects,	 and	 processes	 without	 examining	 the	
nature	of	 law	and	 its	 relational	 aspects	 (and	power	 relations).	 There	 is	 a	need	 to	
integrate	institutionalist	and	policy	process	approaches	with	micro-level	studies	of	
law	 outside	 the	 courtrooms,	 in	 everyday	 life	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998),	 to	
understand	the	extent	to	which	legal	institutions	are	accommodated	and	accepted	
or	trusted	as	 legitimate	forms	of	governance	of	a	given	authoritarian	regime.	This	
approach	 to	 law	 in	 society	will	 inform	how	 resilient	 the	 regime	 is	due	 to	 its	 legal	





Since	 the	 1990s	 there	 has	 been	 a	 surge	 in	 research	 on	 the	 role	 of	 law	 and	 legal	
institutions	in	authoritarian	regimes	(Moustafa,	2014).	There	has	been	a	variety	of	
case	 studies	 that	have	examined	either/or	both	 the	questions	of	 the	 role	of	 legal	
institutions	 as	 forms	 of	 governance	 and	 as	 sites	 of	 contestation	 in	 authoritarian	
regimes	 or	 transitional	 regimes,	 in	 contexts	 such	 as	 post-communist	 Europe	
(Schwartz,	 2000;	 Straughn,	 2005)	 and	 Southern	 Europe’s	 dictatorships	 such	 as	
Portugal	 and	 Spain	 (Toharia,	 1975;	 Hilbink,	 2007),	 post-Soviet	 Russia	 (Solomon,	
1996,	 2008,	 2010),	 Latin	 American	 military	 dictatorships	 in	 Brazil,	 Chile	 and	
Argentina	(Barros,	2008;	Hilbink,	1999,	2008;	Osiel,	1995;	Pereira,	2008),	Egypt	and	
the	 Gulf	 (Brown,	 1997;	Moustafa,	 2007,	 2008),	 the	 Philippines	 (Tate	 and	Haynie,	




this	 literature	 that	 can	be	 reduced	 to	 two	main	 areas.	On	 the	one	hand,	 existing	
research	shares	an	institutional	perspective,	which	derives	from	‘thin’	conceptions	
of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 This	 perspective	 focuses	 on	 the	 formal,	 institutional	 and	
procedural	aspects	of	the	rule	of	law	(Fuller,	1976);	while	a	‘thick’	conception	adds	
to	 the	 instrumental	 aspects	 substantive	 conceptions	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 which	
include	political	morality,	economic	and	political	arrangements	and	conceptions	of	
rights	 (Peerenboom,	 2002,	 Chapter	 3;	 Summers,	 1993).	 Rule	 of	 law	 is	 usually	
considered	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 a	 democratic	 polity	 (see	 Linz	 and	 Stepan,	 1995;	
Maravall	 and	 Przeworski,	 2003;	 or	 Huntington,	 1991),	 hence	 some	 observers	 use	
the	 term	 “rule	 by	 law”	 to	 suggest	 the	 incompatibility	 between	 “rule	 of	 law”	 and	
authoritarian	 contexts	 (Moustafa	 and	 Ginsburg,	 2008).	 In	 relation	 to	 China,	 the	
“rule	of	law”	or	“rule	according	to	law”	(yifa	zhiguo,	依法治国)	is	understood	as	the	
state’s	 instrumental	 use	 of	 law	 (Baum,	 1986;	 Potter,	 1999;	 Peerenboom,	 2002).	
Lubman	 (1999)	deliberately	uses	neither	 ‘rule	of	 law’	nor	 ‘rule	by	 law’	but	 rather	












indicates	 the	 common	 functions	 of	 the	 judiciary	 as	 instruments	 of	 governance	 in	
authoritarian	regimes:	to	exercise	state	power;	to	advance	administrative	discipline	
within	 state	 institutions	 (Shapiro,	 1989);	 to	 maintain	 cohesion	 among	 ruling	
factions;	 to	 facilitate	 market	 transitions	 by	 providing	 credible	 commitments	 to	
property	 rights;	 to	contain	majoritarian	 institutions,	namely,	democratic	or	 liberal	
rights	 and	 political	 parties	 (courts	 becoming	 authoritarian	 enclaves);	 to	 delegate	
the	 implementation	of	unpopular	 reforms	and	policies;	 and	 to	 strengthen	 regime	
legitimacy	 (Moustafa,	 2007;	 2014:	 283).	 Due	 to	 these	 functions,	 legal	 institutions	
enable	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	 (Moustafa,	 2014)	 and	 the	




2008)	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	 leads	 to	 opening	 spaces	 for	 political	 activism,	
explored	below	in	section	2.2.	Authoritarian	rulers	are	aware	of	the	risks	involved	in	
legal	reform	and	devolving	power	to	the	judiciary;	still,	explained	from	a	rationalist-
choice	perspective,	 they	develop	 legal	 systems	and	 institutions	mainly	due	 to	 the	
principal-agent	problem:	to	secure	their	power	either	by	setting	up	institutions	that	
enable	 their	 predatory	 behaviour	 (Olson,	 1993),	 or	 to	 address	 the	 decline	 in	
ideology	as	a	 source	of	 state	 legitimacy	 in	 those	 regimes	with	 long-term	horizons	
(Moustafa	and	Ginsburg,	2008;	Ginsburg,	2008).	This	last	point	has	been	used	in	the	
Chinese	 case	 to	 explain	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s,	 Jiang	 Zemin’s,	 and,	 today,	 Xi	 Jinping’s	
emphasis	 on	 building	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 post-Mao	 ideological	







There	are	 important	 insights	to	be	gained	from	the	studies	of	 the	role	of	 law	and	
legal	institutions	under	the	Chinese	Communist	Party-state.	There	has	been	a	wide	
interest	 in	 understanding	 how	 and	 why	 the	 CPC	 has	 been	 able	 to	 undergo	 such	
tremendous	 economic	 transformation	 since	 1978	 without	 systemic	 change	 or	
political	 liberalization.	This	 interest	and	perplexity	with	the	case	of	China	 is	based	
on	 assumptions	 derived	 from	modernization	 theory,	 democratization	 and	 regime	
transition	 studies	 (especially	 regarding	 post-Socialist	 transition	 of	 the	 Soviet	 and	
East	 European	 cases):	 market	 liberalization	 and	 political	 liberalization	 (more	
specifically,	 democracy)	 are	 supposed	 to	 go	 hand	 in	 hand,	 and	 by	 extension,	
necessarily	bring	about	the	rule	of	law	to	first	secure	economic	property	rights	and	
then	 grant	 civil	 and	 political	 liberties.	 Hence,	 China	 represents	 the	 deviant	 case	
(Gerring,	2007:	105)	that	defies	the	expectations	of	these	theories,	and	provides	an	
exceptional	 setting	 to	 further	 the	 “debate	 about	 models	 of	 development”	
(Heilmann	 and	 Perry,	 2011:	 4).	 A	wealth	 of	 research	 has	 addressed	 these	 issues,	
looking	 at	 the	 changes	 and	 adaptations	 at	 the	 institutional	 and	 policy	 levels	 that	
have	 enabled	 the	 CPC	 to	 remain	 in	 power,	 and/or	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	
changes	can	facilitate	political	 liberalization	and/or	regime	transition	(Gilley,	2004,	







differentiation	and	 functional	 specialization	of	 institutions	 (most	 importantly	here	
would	 be	 the	 increasing	 autonomy	of	 the	National	 People’s	 Congress	 to	 legislate	
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and	the	 increasing	 independence	of	courts	granted	by	 the	1994	 Judges	Law);	and	
the	creation	of	input	institutions,	or	channels	for	public	participation	such	as	village	
elections,	the	petitioning	system,	and	the	1989	Administrative	Litigation	Act	which	
enables	 citizens	 to	 sue	 government	 departments	 or	 officials	 for	 violations	 of	
government	 policy	 (Nathan,	 2003:	 15).	 These	 four	main	 institutional	 changes	 are	
the	 central	 explanatory	 factors	 of	 Nathan’s	 ‘authoritarian	 resilience’	 thesis.	 His	
rationale	is	that	the	increasing	institutional	differentiation	within	the	structures	of	
power	(government	and	Party),	and	judicial	independence	as	a	sort	of	separation	of	
powers,	 are	 sources	 of	 regime	 resilience	 because	 they	 allow	 for	 increased	
efficiency,	 systematization,	 and	 professionalization	 of	 the	 institutions	 of	
governance.	Similarly,	Lee	(2010)	argued	that,	among	other	factors,	the	increasing	
strength	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 in	 terms	 of	 sheer	 number	 of	 laws	 or	 the	 increasing	
power	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 and	 Local	 People’s	 Congresses	 to	 issue	 laws	 and	
regulations,	 indicates	 the	 political	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 CPC,	 which	 enables	
political	stability.	These	arguments	correspond	to	Moustafa	and	Ginsburg’s	 (2008)	






policy.	 In	 his	 view,	 these	 also	 sustain	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Party-state	 by	
maintaining	 the	 focus	 of	 people’s	 concerns	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Although	 Nathan’s	
arguments	 resonate	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 legal	 institutions	 (mainly	 courts)	
institutionalize	 authoritarian	 rule	 (Moustafa,	 2007,	 2008,	 2014;	 Moustafa	 and	











and	 improved	 to	 govern	 individual	 behaviour	 (ibid:	 23).	 These	 modes	 of	






Moving	 beyond	 a	 purely	 institutionalist	 perspective,	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry	 (2011)	




The	 regime	 is	 “increasingly	 adept	 at	 managing	 tricky	 challenges”	 (including	 legal	
institutionalization)	 (Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011:	1-2),	because	of	 the	maintenance	
of	 Soviet-inspired	 institutions	on	 the	one	hand	 (namely,	 the	 Leninist	 party-state),	
and	on	 the	other,	 changes	and	adaptations	of	 its	policy	mechanisms,	 governance	
techniques	 and	 procedures,	 and	 institutions,	 mainly,	 its	 guerrilla-style	 policy-
making,	decentralization,	and	fragmented	political	system	that	enables	bottom-up	
input	 (ibid:	 6),	 the	 continued	 use	 of	 the	 campaign	 tradition	 (Perry,	 2011)	 and	
experimentation	 in	 policy-making	 (Heilmann,	 2011).	 Continuity	 and	 adaptability	
account	for	resilience	or	the	lack	of	systemic	transformation.	Heilmann	and	Perry’s	
thesis	 resonates	 with	 Shambaugh’s	 (2008)	 argument,	 from	 an	 institutionalist	
perspective,	 about	 the	 “learning	 capacity”	 of	 the	 CPC.	 However,	 by	 focusing	 on	




Heilmann	and	Perry	assert	 that	 the	 ‘adaptive	governance’	of	 the	CPC	 is	what	has	
enabled	 its	 sustainability,	by	adjusting	and	absorbing	endogenous	and	exogenous	
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of	 legal	 rights”	 (ibid:	 166).	 By	 arguing	 that	 the	 legal	 system	 has	 enabled	 the	
‘adaptive	 authoritarianism’	 of	 the	 CPC,	 Liebman	 is	 proposing	 the	 same	 line	 of	
reasoning	 as	 that	 of	 the	 studies	 mentioned	 above	 about	 the	 role	 of	 legal	
institutions	 in	 advancing	 the	 interests	 and	 power	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 rulers	
(Hirschl,	2000;	Marvall	and	Przeworski,	2003;	Moustafa,	2007);	at	the	same	time	it	
is	 also	 similar	 to	 Nathan’s	 institutionalist	 approach,	 as	 legal	 institutions	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 input	 institutions.	 Liebman	 expands	 his	 analytical	 framework	 and	
includes	 in	his	explanation	of	 the	CPC’s	adaptive	 legality	policy	dynamics	 (such	as	
experimentation	 in	policy	 implementation)	 and	 cognitive	and	behavioural	 aspects	
of	legality	(public	opinion,	social	norms	and	conceptions),	which	would	be	closer	to	
a	thick	conception	of	rule	of	law.	Most	insightfully,	Liebman	suggests	that	the	CPC	
has	 achieved	 its	 adaptive	 legality	 not	 by	 installing	 institutional	 constraints	 on	 its	
legal	 institutions	 –	 in	 particular,	 courts	 –,	 as	Moustafa	 (2007,	 2008,	 2014)	would	
suggest;	but	by	ensuring	 that	 legal	 institutions	embrace	“aspects	of	 revolutionary	
history,	most	notably	populist	 legality,	 in	new	ways	as	 they	seek	to	 increase	their	
legitimacy	within	the	party-state	and	within	the	public”	(Liebman,	2011:	166).	
	
What	 is	 most	 interesting	 in	 both	 the	 adaptive	 governance	 (Heilmann	 and	 Perry,	
2011)	 and	 adaptive	 legality	 (Liebman,	 2011)	 arguments	 is	 that	 their	 proponents	
allude	 to	 the	 combination	 of	 an	 agency-oriented	 analysis	with	 a	 governance	 and	
institutional	 analysis.	 Their	 definitions	 of	 adaptability	 are	 “agency-oriented”	
(Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011:	8)	because	they	consider	that	“actors	in	a	system”	will	
“intentionally	or	unintentionally”	 react,	 interact	and	use	 institutions,	and	because	
the	degree	of	adaptability	of	 the	government	of	 the	CPC	“depends	upon	people’s	
readiness	 to	 venture	 forth	 into	 unfamiliar	 environments	 to	 act,	 experiment,	 and	








any	 agency	 considered	 is	 that	 of	 rationalist	 choices	 of	 political	 elites.	Moreover,	
when	 reading	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry’s	 volume	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 Fewsmith,	
2011),	 one	 can	 identify	 similarities	with	 institutionalist	 explanations,	which	 argue	
that	 these	 ‘adaptations’	 of	 methods	 of	 governance	 are	 the	 results	 of	 gradual	
institutional	changes	(Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005;	Mahoney	and	Thelen,	2010).	Such	
changes	 could	 occur,	 for	 example,	 due	 to	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 political	 and/or	
economic	environment	in	which	they	are	embedded	at	the	hands	of,	if	any,	political	




To	 highlight	 another	 institutional	 aftertaste	 of	 the	 adaptive	 governance	 thesis,	
Liebman’s	 adaptive	 legality	 suggests	 that	 legal	 institutions	 adopt	 the	 popular	
legalism	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 period	 (such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 mediation	 to	 resolve	
disputes)	 in	 order	 to	 align	 themselves	 to	 the	 dominant	 social	 norms	 (Liebman,	
2011:	166).	This	resembles	the	cultivation	of	institutions	to	avoid	cognitive	frictions	
that	 could	 result	 in	 destabilizing	 endogenous	 shocks	 (Thelen	 and	 Streeck,	 2005).	
Whether	with	an	 institutionalist	perspective	or	a	governance	mechanism	one,	the	
outcome	 to	be	explained	 is	 change	 that	enables	 continuity.	 Even	when	Heilmann	
and	 Perry	 (2011)	 suggest	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 agency,	 as	 mentioned	
above,	the	empirical	evidence	in	their	volume	of	how	political	elites	(cadres,	judges,	
etc.)	 who	 use	 and	 cultivate	 the	 changes	 and	 adaptations	 of	 these	 governance	
mechanisms	actually	use	the	processes,	policies	and	institutions	at	hand	is	scarce.	
Instead,	 these	 studies	 remain	 at	 a	 policy	 process	 and	 historical	 institutionalist	
levels,	which	methodologically	do	not	 include	agency	as	a	unit	of	analysis	 (or	 if	 it	
does,	 only	 considers	 rational	 choices	 of	 elites).	 Furthermore,	 conclusions	 are	




mentions	 that	 “populism	also	 refers	 to	 efforts	 by	 legal	 institutions	 to	 seek	public	
support	by	aligning	outcomes	with	perceived	dominant	social	norms	or	conceptions	
of	 popular	 morality	 or	 by	 making	 legal	 institutions	 more	 accessible”.	 The	 CPC’s	
populism	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 period,	 applied	 to	 the	 legal	 system,	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
crucial	 source	 of	 the	 adaptability	 of	 the	 regime,	 but	 what	 is	 still	 missing	 is	 a	
grounded	analysis	of	if	and	how	legal	institutions	are	actually	aligning	social	norms	
and	 conceptions	 of	 morality	 to	 obtain	 popular	 support,	 and	 hence,	 institutional,	
governance,	 and	 regime	 adaptability	 and	 continuity.	 This	 thesis	 will	 address	 this	
gap,	 conducting	 empirical	 research	 following	 a	 law	 in	 society	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey;	
1998,	 2003;	 Silbey	 and	 Ewick,	 2000)	 approach.	 This	 will	 complement	 the	




that	 this	 grounded	 approach	 has	 also	 been,	 to	 a	 great	 degree,	 missing.	 Lubman	
(1999:	4-5)	 studied	 the	 relations	between	 legal	 institutions	and	economic	 reform.	
He	argues	 that	 there	are	 a	number	of	 administrative	 and	 institutional	 issues	 that	
obstruct	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 autonomy	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 (especially,	 the	
judiciary)	 in	 post-reform	China,	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	more	 generally.	 In	 particular,	
this	relates	to	the	increased	authority	of	local	governments	to	control	local	courts,	
influence	 their	 decisions	 and	 curb	 them	 in	 their	 interest,	 in	 a	 sort	 of	 “local	
protectionism”	 (ibid:	 266-269).	 The	 “legal	 fragmentation”	 (ibid:	 302)	 and	 the	
relative	 power	 of	 local	 Party	 officials	 over	 the	 judiciary,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	
Supreme	 People’s	 Court,	 weakens	 the	 legal	 system	 by	 making	 it	 arbitrary	 and	
lacking	unified	and	cohesive	proceedings.	This	also	implies	the	lack	of	power	of	the	
judiciary	to	interpret	legislation	and	adjudicate	accordingly;	courts,	on	the	contrary,	
are	 controlled	 (or	 ‘guided’)	 by	 the	 local	 Party-state.	 This	 finding	 challenges	 the	
argument	put	forward	by	Shapiro	(1989)	and	reasserted	by	Moustafa	(2007)	about	
the	 capacity	 of	 legal	 institutions	 to	 discipline	 state	 bureaucrats	 and	 maintain	
cohesion.	Moreover,	it	disregards	the	opportunities	that	the	“legal	fragmentation”	
opens	 for	 local	 courts	 to	 adjudicate	 with	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 from	
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intervention	 from	upper	 level	courts	 (as	suggested	by	Yu’s	2009	study).	However,	
Lubman’s	(1999)	findings	confirm	that	legal	institutions	secure	the	interests	of	local	
governments	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 control	 over	 the	 judiciary,	 in	 other	 words,	
entrenching	the	local	Party-state.	Furthermore,	Lubman	asserts	the	increasing	role	
legal	 institutions	 have	 in	 reaffirming	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 CPC	 against	 the	 post-
Maoist	crises	in	values	and	ideology:	“the	rule	of	law	could	fill	the	growing	vacuum	
of	belief,	despite	the	absence	of	a	strong	rights-based	tradition	in	Chinese	history”	
(Lubman,	 1999:	 306).	 Similarly,	 as	 Gallagher	 (2005:	 57)	 posits,	 “rule	 of	 law	 is	
intended	 to	 substitute	 for	 more	 radical	 political	 change,	 and	 to	 bring	 with	 it	
increased	channels	 for	citizens	to	seek	redress	 for	 their	grievances	and	to	protect	
their	 legal	 rights.	 It	 is	 also	 designed	 to	 legitimate	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 CCP	 as	 an	
institution	 that	 can	 not	 only	 bring	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 but	 also	 ensure	 social	
stability	through	the	use	of	laws	and	courts”.		
	
Potter	 (2001),	 through	 an	 analysis	 of	 legal	 documents,	 discourses,	 and	 historical	
research	 of	 the	 legal	 reforms,	 argues	 that	 the	 development	 of	 legislation	 post-
1980s	has	been	driven	by	globalizing	forces	that	have	encouraged	the	Chinese	legal	
system	to	conform	with	the	international	system.	Legal	reform	in	China	has	brought	
about	new	 legal	 (liberal)	norms	 that	 confront	with	 local	norms,	values,	behaviour	
and	 attitudes,	 or	 Chinese	 local	 legal	 culture;	 this	 is,	 a	 process	 of	 “selective	
adaptation”	 of	 international	 legal	 institutions	 to	 local	 conditions,	 whereby	 new	




prevailing	 in	 China	 (based	 on	 the	 collectivist	 approach	 to	 social	 welfare	
characteristic	 of	 the	 socialist	 period’s	 public	 law).	 In	 other	 instances,	 such	 as	 in	
intellectual	 property	 law	or	 human	 rights	 law,	 there	 are	more	 complex	 dynamics	
between	the	imported	global	liberal	legal	norms	and	Chinese	local	legal	culture	(i.e.	
individual	 versus	 collectivist	 ownership,	 or	 the	 pre-eminence	 of	 the	 right	 to	







with	 rule	 of	 law.	 Peerenboom	 also	 argues	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 a	 central	
component	of	the	CPC’s	legitimation	strategy.	In	line	with	Shapiro	(1989),	he	claims	
that	legal	 institutions	enable	the	disciplining	of	state	bureaucrats,	and	ensure	that	












2011;	 Lubman,	 1999;	 Moustafa,	 2007,	 2014;	 Moustafa	 and	 Ginsburg,	 2008;	
Peerenboom,	 2002;	 Tate	 and	 Haynie,	 1993),	mainly	 because	wilful	 compliance	 is	




penetration	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 ideology	 in	 Chinese	 society,	 the	 levels	 of	 trust	 in	
																																																						
7	In	Gramscian	 terms	the	role	of	 the	 law	 is	 to	establish	systems	of	punishment	and	sanctions,	and	
ideas	of	obligations	and	behaviours	(linked	to	morality)	that	exert	a	“collective	pressure	and	obtains	
objective	results	in	the	form	of	an	evolution	of	customs,	ways	of	thinking	and	acting,	morality,	etc.”	
(Gramsci,	 1977:	 242).	 Hence,	 law	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 hegemonic	 ideology	 that	 obtains	 the	 desired	
consenting	 behaviour	 of	 the	masses	 to	 the	 ruling	 class.	 For	 Althusser,	 law	 is	 a	 centrepiece	 of	 his	
theory	of	ideology;	as	part	of	the	ideological	state	apparatus,	legal	ideology	is	to	secure	consent	of	
the	 masses	 by	 “constituting’	 concrete	 individuals	 as	 subjects”	 (Althusser,	 1971:	 160,	 emphasis	 in	
original).	Note	that	a	Marxist	analysis	of	law	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	
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these	 institutions	 (with	 the	exception	of	Landry,	2008,	2011),	or	popular	opinions	





and	 rational-behavioural	 approach	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 legal	
institutions	signals	the	idea	that	people	deem	the	legal	system	legitimate,	and	that,	
in	 turn,	 these	 institutions	 legitimize	 the	 CPC.	 For	 example,	 workers	 using	 legal	
mechanisms	to	resolve	disputes	or	aggrieved	citizens	using	Letters	and	Visits	Offices	
‘prove’	 that	 these	 are	 legitimate	 means	 to	 address	 grievances.	 However,	 a	
grounded,	 law	 and	 society	 approach	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998;	 Galanter,	 1983;	
McCann,	1994;	Merry,	1990;	Nielsen,	2007;	Rosenberg,	1991;	Sarat,	2004)	is	largely	
missing	 from	 existing	 research	 (with	 the	 exceptions	 of	 Diamant	 et	 al.,	 2005,	
Gallagher,	2006,	and	Woo	and	Gallagher,	2011).	Such	an	approach	can	be	of	great	
value	to	the	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law	in	authoritarianism	as	it	can	generate	
evidence	 of	 if,	 how	 and	 why	 ordinary	 people	 (not	 political	 elites	 or	 legal	
professionals	 such	 as	 judges),	 despite	 or	 because	 of	 coming	 in	 touch	 with	 legal	
institutions,	 deem	 them	 as	 legitimate	 forms	 of	 governance,	 and	 therefore,	
legitimate	the	power	of	the	CPC.	Such	an	approach	also	allows	the	study	of	ordinary	
people’s	 agency,	 consenting	 to	 or	 dissenting	 from	 the	 new	 legal	 institutions	 and	
legal	ideology.	These	accounts	are	largely	missing	from	the	existing	literature	on	the	
rule	 of	 law	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	 although,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 China,	 there	 is	 the	
exception	of	Landry	(2008)	who,	through	survey	data,	argues	that	what	makes	legal	
institutions	(courts)	take	root	in	Chinese	society	(institutional	diffusion)	is	that	they	
instil	 trust	 in	 Chinese	 citizens.	 Trust,	 the	 media,	 and	 social	 networks	 explain,	
according	 to	 Landry,	why	people	 adopt	 these	 legal	 institutional	 innovations	 (ibid:	










regime	adaptation	or	bolster	regime	 legitimacy.	Hence,	 in	this	 thesis	 I	propose	an	
ethnographic-oriented	study	of	social	norms	and	popular	conceptions	of	justice	vis-
à-vis	 legal	 institutions;	 this	will	 provide	 new,	 nuanced	 and	 grounded	 evidence	 to	
the	extent	to	which	legal	institutions,	in	particular	law,	enable	regime	resilience	by	
bolstering	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 ordinary	 people.	 This	 resembles	 a	 grassroots	
approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 law	 in	 society	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998),	 to	 examine	
everyday	conceptions	and	practices	 coherent	with	and/or	against	 the	 images	and	
practices	 (Gupta,	 1995)	of	 the	new	 legal	 institutions,	 and	 that	 is	de-centred	 from	
courts.	 This	 approach	 is	 aligned	 with	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey’s	 (1998)	 study	 of	 law	 in	
everyday	 life,	 Migdal’s	 (2001)	 state-in-society	 approach,	 and	 Scott’s	 (1998)	
ethnographic	 study	 of	 the	 state	 from	 its	 contrast	 to	 popular	 knowledge	 and	
practices.	 This	 approach	 can	 enable	 theoretical	 refinement	 of	 the	 regime’s	
‘authoritarian	 resilience’	 or	 ‘adaptive	 governance’	 theses,	 by	 providing	 a	 deeper	
understanding	of	how	 legal	 institutions	are	actually	 taking	 root	 in	Chinese	society	
and	 being	 accepted	 by	 ordinary	 people	 into	 their	 repertoire	 of	 behaviour	 or	
resisted.		
	
Legal	 institutions	 need	 to	 appear	 to	 have	 some	 degree	 of	 judicial	 independence	
(Moustafa,	2007)	 in	order	to	consolidate	 legality.	This	can	be	an	additional	source	
of	 internal	 institutional	 inconsistency	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts.	 In	 order	 for	 legal	
institutions	to	secure	the	power	of	the	authoritarian	rulers,	in	China	the	Party-state	
would	need	to	alter	“the	allocation	of	power	between	the	courts	and	the	rest	of	the	
Party-state.	 That	 cannot	 be	 done	 without	 the	 Party	 abandoning	 its	 dominance”	




of	 local	 courts	 to	 adjudicate	 and	 innovate	 in	 constitutionally	 significant	 cases.	 Yu	
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(ibid:	 5)	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘judicial	 context’	 (institutional	 constraints,	 or	 relaxation	
thereof)	 explains	 the	 increasing	 constitutional	 surge	 of	 local	 courts	 despite	 the	
increasing	 conservatism	 of	 the	 Supreme	 People’s	 Court.	 She	 has	 put	 forward	 a	
number	 of	 reasons	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 judicial	 power	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 among	
which	are:	the	malleability	of	locally-designed	supervisory	institutional	mechanisms	
between	higher	level	courts	and	local	courts	(e.g.,	individual	case	supervision)	and	
the	 local	 courts’	maintenance	 of	 good	 institutional	 relationships	with	 upper	 level	
courts	 and	 other	 competitive	 branches	 of	 the	 government	 at	 the	 local	 level	




is	 suggested	 to	be	a	 crucial	 factor	 for	 the	 judiciary	 to	prompt	political	 transitions	
(Ginsburg,	 2003)	 because	 “political	 diffusion	 creates	more	 disputes	 for	 courts	 to	
resolve	 and	 hinders	 authorities	 from	 overruling	 or	 counterattacking	 courts”	 (Yu,	
2009:	312).	On	the	contrary,	Yu	argues	that	the	 increasing	number	of	 local	courts	
represents	 a	 form	 of	 de	 facto	 institutional	 diffusion	 (or	 differentiation)	 between	







In	 addition,	 Ip	 (2012)	 has	 seen	 signs	 of	 increasing	 judicial	 independence,	 and	
potential	 drivers	 of	 political	 liberalization.	 According	 to	 Ip’s	 (ibid.)	 study,	 the	
Supreme	People’s	Court	appears	 to	be	 increasingly	 influential	and	 independent	 in	
policy	 areas	 and	 in	 law-making:	 it	 has	 not	 only	 been	 issuing	 guidance	
(Administrative	Judicial	Interpretations)	to	national	laws	that	has	local	applicability,	










Additionally,	 Chen	 and	 Xu	 (2012), in	 a	 case	 study	 of	 how	 courts	 handle	 labour	
disputes	 in	 Dongguan	 (Guangdong),	 found	 that	 courts	 were	 containing	 collective	
labour	conflict	by	individualizing	collective	disputes;	hence,	functioning	to	maintain	
social	 stability.	 Su	 and	 He	 (2010)	 also	 found	 that	 courts	 were	 engaged	 in	 extra-
judicial	 mechanisms	 to	 contain	 collective	 action	 (strikes)	 on	 the	 streets.	 Hence,	
courts	 appear	 to	 be	 fulfilling	 functions	 for	 regime	 stability,	 containing	 potentially	






state	 control;	 the	 other	 by	 the	 citizenry	 and	 political	 activists	 who	 either	
increasingly	 bring	 disputes	 into	 legal	 institutions	 and	 press	 the	 government	 to	
delegate	 authority	 to	 these	 to	 adjudicate	 in	 a	 lawful	 manner	 (according	 to	 law	
rather	than	the	interests	of	the	Party-state),	and/or	directly	use	legal	institutions	to	
challenge	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Party-state	 and	 demand	 increased	 rights,	 for	
example,	by	suing	rulers	directly.	If	legal	institutions	provide	such	opportunities	for	
resistance,	 as	 will	 be	 explained	 below,	 how	 do	 authoritarian	 rulers	 build	 control	
mechanisms	into	the	legal	system	to	prevent	this	from	happening?	Moustafa	(2007)	
argues	that	authoritarian	regimes	prevent	legal	reforms	from	backfiring	by	securing	
control	over	 the	 judiciary	 in	 four	ways:	1)	 regimes	provide	 institutional	 incentives	
that	promote	self-restraint	and	‘core	compliance’	with	the	key	legal	framework	and	
core	 regime	 interests;	2)	 they	ensure	a	 fragmented	 judicial	 system	that	 limits	 the	










politics	 to	obtain	 increasing	 independence	 to	 adjudicate	without	 local	 Party-state	
interference,	 and	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 legal	 institutions	 open	 avenues	 for	 the	
citizenry	 to	 oppose	or	 challenge	 the	Party-state.	 This	 thesis	 does	not	 explore	 the	
avenue	 of	 political	 contestation,	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 opportunities	 that	 legal	
institutions	open	for	the	citizenry	outside	the	courtroom.	Hence,	according	to	these	
theoretical	 propositions,	 this	 thesis	 asks:	 through	what	 processes	 or	mechanisms	
does	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 ensure	 that	 the	 legal	 institutions	 contain	 political	
activism	 and	 control	 the	 pressures	 for	 political	 liberalization?	 In	 Chapter	 Four	 it	
examines	 how	 the	 Chinese	 Party-state	 prevents	 legal	 institutions	 from	 opening	












the	 Chinese	 case,	 most	 significantly,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 legal	 institutions	
																																																						
8	Term	 coined	 after	 Epp	 (1998),	who	 argued	 that	 the	most	 critical	 factor	 in	 legal	mobilization	 for	




provide	 legitimate	 spaces	 for	 grievances	 to	 be	 aired	 against	 local	 officials,	 for	
example,	 which	 legitimizes	 the	 regime	 by	 protecting	 the	 central	 government.	
Significant	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 how	 legal	 institutions	 incite	 or	 contain	
disputes	 in	China,	 and	 stabilize	or	destabilize	 the	political	 regime	 (Lubman,	1999;	
Diamant,	Lubman	and	O’Brien,	2005;	Woo	and	Gallagher,	2011;	Stern,	2010,	2013).	
There	 is	 a	 variety	 of	 case	 studies	 in	 China	 that	 arrive	 at	 the	 same	 dichotomous	
conclusion:	 either	 legal	 institutions	 provide	 a	 site	 for	 political	 contestation	 and	
open	 avenues	 for	 political	 liberalization	 or	 they	 are	 an	 “outlet	 for	 expressing	
grievances”	(Diamant	et	al.,	2005:	6),	which	stabilizes	the	regime.		
	
“Like	 their	 democratic	 counterparts,	 authoritarian	 rulers	 need	 effective	 courts	 to	
perform	the	basic	functions	of	courts	-	to	resolve	disputes,	to	impose	social	control,	
and	 to	 regulate	 at	 least	 aspects	 of	 public	 life”	 (Shapiro,	 1981,	 in	 Solomon,	 2008:	
261).	 But	 how	 do	 authoritarian	 rulers	 ensure	 that	 legal	 institutions	 fulfil	 this	
function?	The	extent	to	which	 legal	 institutions	provide	avenues	for	resistance,	or	
prevent	grievances	from	outgrowing	the	system	and	spilling	over	into	other	forms	





hand,	 legal	 institutions	 are	 an	 instrument	 of	 domination;	 on	 the	 other,	 and	
paradoxically,	 a	 resource	 and	 site	 for	 political	 contestation.	 Below	 I	 review	 the	
relevant	 studies	 of	 law	 and	 resistance	 in	 liberal	 democracies,	 post-Socialist	 and	
hybrid	 regimes,	 and	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 with	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	




Halliday	 and	 Karpik	 (2001)	 and	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 recognise	 the	 integral	
significance	of	law	to	political	stability	and	change,	and	develop	the	thesis	that	legal	
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professions	 have	 been	 agents	 of	 political	 liberalism.9	The	 “legal	 complex”	 is	 the	
concept	 they	 develop	 to	 encapsulate	 the	 “structure	 and	 dynamics	 of	 lawyers,	
judges	and	the	diversity	of	legal	occupations”	that	constitute	“a	putative	collective	
actor	 on	 behalf	 of	 political	 liberalism”	 (Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007:	 6).	 Under	 this	
conceptualization	a	number	of	case	studies	have	served	the	comparative	purpose	
of	developing	a	theory	of	the	linkage	between	lawyers	and	political	liberalism.	They	
show	 in	 what	 contexts	 and	 forms	 the	 legal	 complex	 mobilizes	 towards	 legal	
freedoms	 to	 advance	 political	 liberalism	 in	 four	 different	 ways:	 the	 whole	 legal	
complex	mobilizing	 for	 political	 liberalism	 (Korea,	 Taiwan,	 Francoist	 Spain,	 Egypt,	
Hong	 Kong,	 Venezuela,	 Uruguay);	 only	 lawyers	 mobilizing	 (China	 in	 2002-2006,	
Japan	after	the	Meiji	Restoration	1886-1920	and	again	in	1980s-2005,	and	the	USA	
in	the	early	2000s);	a	selective	mobilization	of	the	legal	complex	due	to	contextual	
conditions	 or	 inhibitions	 such	 as	 threats	 to	 personal	 security	 (Israel,	 Brazil,	
Argentina);	 and	when	 the	 legal	 complex	 fails	 to	mobilize	 or	 is	 hostile	 to	 political	
liberalism	 and	 on	 the	 contrary,	 contributes	 to	 the	 contraction	 of	 legal	 freedoms	
(Chile	under	Pinochet,	 Italy	 in	 the	1920s-1930s	under	Mussolini,	 Japan	during	 the	
Great	 Depression	 between	 1920s-1930s).	 These	 case	 studies	 provide	 a	
comprehensive	picture	of	the	conditions	that	enable	the	 legal	complex	(especially	
lawyers)	 to	 play	 a	 role	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 political	 change,	 accompanying	 its	 “claims	




it	 achieves	 success	 in	 gaining	moments	of	political	 liberalism	or	 in	bringing	about	
political	 transitions	 because	 of	 courts	 granting	 independence	 and	 room	 to	
manoeuvre	 to	 lawyers	 (ibid:	17).	Courts,	 therefore,	provide	political	opportunities	
(such	 as	 restructuring	 of	 the	 judiciary	 or	 legal	 reform)	 for	 political	 liberalism.	 In	









leadership	 within	 civil	 society	 to	 stimulate	 mobilization	 and	 political	 change	 by	
leading	the	formation	of	coalitions	within	civil	society	(lawyers,	NGOs,	media,	and	
other	civil	society	groups,	such	as	international	NGOs)	that	support	liberal	courts	in	
furthering	 legal	 freedoms;	and	 the	 role	of	market	 conditions	 influencing	 the	 legal	
complex	in	their	pursuit	of	political	liberalism	(foreign	investment,	trade,	economic	
expansion	 pressing	 for	 the	 state	 to	 recognize	 property	 rights)	 (ibid:	 19).	 In	 the	
second	 scenario,	 the	 case	 studies	 explain	 why	 only	 lawyers	 mobilize	 in	 contexts	
where	 the	 judiciary	 is	 controlled	 by	 a	 one-party	 state,	 and	 where	 the	 legal	
profession	faces	the	control	of	an	“’iron	triangle’	of	police,	prosecutors	and	judges”	
(ibid:	 20).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 China	 (2002-2006),	 for	 example,	 lawyers	 engaged	 in	
criminal	defence	manage	to	drive	some	marginal	or	sometime	significant	instances	
of	political	liberalization,	not	by	coalescing	with	judges,	but	by	forming	a	collective	
identity	 as	 a	 professional	 (or	 epistemic)	 community	 through	 a	 public	 forum,	
paradoxically	 provided	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice-controlled	 online	 forum,	 and	 by	
seeking	support	from	legal	academics	who	draft	new	laws	(Halliday	and	Liu,	2007).	
The	 authors’	 expectation	 is	 that	 through	 this	 collective	 identity,	 criminal	 lawyers	
(categorized	as	political	lawyers)	might	be	able	to	create	alliances	with	commercial	
and	mainstream	 lawyers	when	 the	 Party-state	 tightens	 its	 control	 and	 regulation	
over	commercial	lawyers	as	well.	Halliday	and	Liu	(ibid.)	presume	that	lawyers	will	
react	 to	 the	 tension	of	economic	 liberalization	without	political	 liberalization,	and	
eventually	organize	collective	action	for	political	 liberalism.	In	other	instances,	the	
legal	complex	contributed	to	illiberalism	(Chile	under	Pinochet,	Mussolini’s	Italy	and	
Japan	 in	 the	 1920s-1930s)	 due	 to	 a	 significant	 differentiation	 within	 the	 legal	




It	 is	 worth	 emphasising	 that	 the	 main	 explanatory	 factor	 for	 lawyers	 exerting	
pressure	for	political	change	is	the	occurrence	of	political	opportunities,	which	vary	
from	 supportive	 or	 reform-minded	 judiciary,	 to	 institutional	 or	 structural	
independence	 from	 the	 executive.	 For	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 the	most	 important	
factor	 is	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 legal	 complex,	 a	 viewpoint	 similar	 to	 that	 of	
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Moustafa	(2007),	who	stressed	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	as	crucial	to	legal	
institutions	 opening	 up	 channels	 for	 political	 activism.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 worth	
emphasising	that	the	possibilities	of	forming	alliances	within	the	legal	complex	and	





the	 relationship	 between	 lawyers	 and	 political	 liberalism.	 However,	 they	
acknowledge	that	 the	outlier	 (legal	complex	conserving	political	 illiberalism)	cases	
prove	that	“mobilization	by	the	legal	complex	is	to	be	analysed	by	particular	issues	
at	 particular	 times”	 (ibid:	 28).	 The	 generalizability	 of	 their	 theory	 is	 therefore	
reduced	to	identifying	the	“mobilization	opportunities	across	time”	and	space	that	
allow	 the	 legal	 complex	 to	 mobilize,	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 reduced	 to	 being	
reactive	agents	of	change	(Halliday	and	Karpik,	2001).	This	implies	the	lessening	of	
the	agency	of	lawyers	and	civil	society	actors	in	the	process.	Besides,	I	find	that	they	
provide	 little	explanation	of	 the	negative	cases	 to	explain	 the	 institutional	 factors	
that	impede	or	constrain	lawyers	from	becoming	agents	of	political	change.	Finally,	
in	their	explanation	of	lawyers	leading	the	fight	for	political	liberalism	on	behalf	of	





the	 constituency	 it	 speaks	 for	and	whose	 rights	 it	 seeks	 to	protect.	What	are	 the	






procedural	 analysis	 to	 grounded	 and	 relational	 analysis	 can	 also	 provide	 some	
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insight	into	the	conditions	that	determine	why	lawyers	press	for	political	change,	or	






a	 ‘myth	of	 rights’	 (Scheingold,	 2004),	 a	 belief	 or	 an	expectation	of	 rights	 and	 the	
legal	system,	and	by	triggering	social	action	when	people	face	cognitive	dissonances	
between	the	expectations	of	those	rights	and	what	is	actually	realized	in	their	daily	
situations.	 In	 this	 line,	 it	has	been	shown	 that	 law	 is	a	useful	 resource	 in	political	
movements.	 For	 example,	 in	 his	 case	 study	 of	 the	 civil	 rights	 movement	 in	 the	
United	States	(1954-1968),	Scheingold	(2004:	xix)	argued	that	the	‘myth	of	rights’	is	
not	directly	politically	transformative	because	of	the	difficulty	of	translating	rights	
into	 public	 policies	 and	 implementing	 them.	 The	 simple	 idea	 or	 belief	 in	 rights,	
however,	 is	 a	 resource	 in	 itself	 that	 creates	 expectations	 and	 shapes	 the	 identity	
and	 behaviour	 of	 people,	 which	 when	mobilized,	 can	 have	 an	 indirect	 effect	 on	
political	 processes.	 Scheingold	 therefore	 studied	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	
ideology	of	rights	(‘myth	of	rights’	in	his	words)	and	political	action.	In	the	American	
context,	 the	everyday	presence	of	 rights	and	 legal	 values	 is	 termed	as	 “rights”	or	
“legal	 consciousness”,	 or	 “the	 ways	 people	 understand	 and	 use	 law	 (…)	
Consciousness	 (…)	 is	 the	way	people	 conceive	of	 the	 ‘natural’	 and	normal	way	of	
doing	 things,	 their	 habitual	 patterns	 of	 talk	 and	 action,	 and	 their	 commonsense	
understanding	 of	 the	 world”	 (Merry,	 1990:	 5),	 which	 is	 also	 embedded	 in	 and	
constitutive	of	everyday	life	(Comaroff,	1985).		
	
The	 linkage	between	rights	or	 legal	consciousness	and	 legal	and	political	action	 is	
based	on	the	principle	that	 law	is	realistic,	convenient	and	moral	because	it	seeks	
the	maximization	of	individual	freedom,	and	it	rests	“on	reason	and	not	on	power”	







This	political	use	of	 law	has	been	defined	as	 “legal	mobilization”	 (Zemans,	1983),	
“invoking	 legal	 norms”	 as	 “a	 form	of	 political	 activity	 by	which	 the	 citizenry	 uses	
public	authority	on	its	own	behalf”	(Zemans,	1983:	693).	The	assumption	that	 law	
provides	 both	 the	 political	 opportunity	 and	 the	 institutional	 and	 discursive	
resources	 to	 be	 mobilized	 in	 political	 activism	 has	 been	 framed	 as	 the	 “legal	
mobilization	 theory”:	 a	 “synthetic	 approach	 to	 analysing	 law	 and	 social	
movements”	 that	 integrates	 the	 dispute-oriented	 analysis	 of	 legal	 studies	 with	
social	movements	 theories	 about	 collective	 action	 based	 on	 the	 political	 process	




Legal	 mobilization	 theory	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 assumption	 that	 law	 “is	 a	 primary	
medium	 of	 social	 control	 and	 domination”	 (McCann,	 1994:	 9);	 however,	 law	
provides	 strategies	 of	 action,	 with	 discourse	 and	 symbols	 that	 are	 “malleable	
resources”	(McCann,	1994:	6-9)	for	people	to	define	interests	and	make	claims,	and	
to	 act	within	 and	 outside	 the	 rights	 discourse	 and	 the	 legal	 system,	 to	 stimulate	
progressive	action	“on	rights	that	have	not	been	formally	recognized	or	enforced”	
(Minow,	1987:	1867).	Therefore,	 law	 is	“a	political	 instrument”	 (Scheingold,	2004:	
95),	 that	 when	 mobilized,	 prompts	 citizens’	 political	 participation	 and	 access	 to	




between	 people’s	 beliefs,	 perceptions	 and	 ideas	 of	 rights	 and	 reality	 creates	 the	
cognitive	 dissonance	 that	 is	 necessary	 for	 political	 activation,	 to	 make	 use	 of	
governmental	 institutions	 and	 taking	 grievances	 to	 court.	 Legal	 mobilization	 by	






movement	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 in	 the	United	 States.	 He	 argued	 that	 the	
existing	literature	on	social	movements	provided	little	positive	outlook	on	the	role	
of	legal	instruments	and	legal	tactics	in	achieving	political	change.	He	showed	how	
legal	 tactics	 provided	 substantial	 power	 to	 the	 pay	 equity	movement	 in	 terms	of	
resources,	 strategies	 and	 rights-based	 claims.	 Rights	 consciousness	 and	 legal	
mobilization	 enabled	 the	 movement	 to	 further	 itself	 in	 the	 phases	 of	 political	
negotiation	 and	 most	 importantly,	 movement	 formation	 or	 building.	 But	 it	 was	
organizing	political	 activities	 and	 campaigns	parallel	 to	 litigation	 that	 enabled	 the	
development	 of	 collective	 identities,	 collective	 sustained	 action	 and	 social	
movement	development.	Legal	mobilization	was	therefore	assumed	to	be	“a	 legal	
catalysis”	 of	 social	movement	 development,	 especially	 during	 the	 early	 stages	 of	
movement	 formation	 (McCann,	 2004:	 512;	 1994:	 48).	 However,	 it	 has	 also	 been	
argued	that	in	specific	contexts	such	as	Egypt,	judicial	institutions	“enabled	activists	




As	 in	Halliday	et	al.’s	 (2007)	 legal	 complex,	 in	 liberal	democracies	activist	 lawyers	
have	been	seen	to	be	pivotal	actors	 in	 legal	mobilization,	turning	legal	tactics	 into	
political	mobilization	 (Scheingold,	 2004:	 210).	 This	 is	 due	 to	 lawyers’	 professional	
skills,	 as	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 teaching	 the	 language	 of	 rights,	 mediate	 in	 courts,	
“transform	 individual	discontents	 into	political	demands”	 (Scheingold,	2004:	135),	
and	 of	 accessing	 legal	 channels	 effectively.	 McCann	 (1994:	 50)	 also	 argued	 that	
lawyers	become	“leaders”	and	pivotal	mobilizers	in	specific	phases	of	an	advocacy	
campaign,	litigation,	and	movement	development.	He	showed	that	an	issue	such	as	
individual	 wage	 discrimination	 gained	 power	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 a	 collective	 spirit	
when	 lawyers	 framed	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 law	 and	 legal	 discourses	 (ibid:	 51).	 Lawyers	
therefore	enabled	women	to	learn	the	rights	discourse	and	engage	in	“naming”	and	
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“claiming”	 directly	 in	 their	 workplace	 or	 everyday	 environment	 (ibid:	 65).	 This	





action	 and	 trigger	 grassroots	 participation	 in	 non-legal	 activity	 in	 support	 of	 a	
political	 cause.	 In	 this	 way,	 legal	 mobilization	 incites	 extra-legal	 political	 activity;	
however,	it	 is	not	the	law	per	se,	but	lawyers	who	incite	and	organize	these	other	
forms	 of	 political	 activity	 such	 as	 rallies,	 protests	 and	 marches.	 These	 forms	 of	
action	 in	 the	American	 context	 are	not	unlawful,	 yet	 fall	 outside	 the	 formal	 legal	
institutions.	 Here	 the	 importance	 lies	 in	 organizing	 paralegal	 and	 sustained	
collective	action	in	combination	with	legal	action,	in	order	for	legal	mobilization	to	
have	 a	 political	 impact.	 This	 is	 a	 crucial	 insight	 to	 look	 for	 when	 studying	 legal	
mobilization	 with	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 especially	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	
where	 political	 freedoms	 and	 the	 possibilities	 for	 collective	 organization	 are	
constrained	or	absent.		
	
Lawyers,	 however,	 are	 only	 one	 of	 the	 key	 players	 in	 the	 effective	 political	
mobilization	of	law.	According	to	Epp	(1998),	the	effective	mobilization	of	law	into	
political	movements	 requires	 some	 pre-conditions:	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 organized	
leadership	of	activist	lawyers	and	civil	society	organizations,	and	supportive	political	
and	 legal	 structures.	He	developed	 a	 comparative	 study	of	 the	 cases	 of	 the	USA,	
India,	 Britain	 and	 Canada	 (all	 common	 law	 countries),	 where	 he	 examined	 four	
dimensions:	constitutional	structures,	judges,	rights	consciousness,	and	strength	of	
the	support	structure	for	 legal	mobilization.	Due	to	the	characteristics	of	the	legal	
process	 (costly,	 slow	 and	 producing	 only	 incremental	 changes),	 legal	 tactics	 can	
actually	be	an	obstacle	to	the	development	of	a	campaign	or	a	movement	because	
of	 the	need	for	sustained	engagement	and	resources.	Hence,	his	study	concluded	
that	 the	 development	 of	 rights	 (or	 the	 ‘rights	 revolution’)	 is	 mainly	 a	 result	 of	
pressure	 from	below,	 from	 “deliberate,	 strategic	 organizing	 by	 rights	 advocates”,	
which	 was	 possible	 due	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 “support	 structure	 for	 legal	
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mobilization”	(ibid:	2-3).	The	precondition	for	the	political	mobilization	of	law	is	the	
existence	of	 a	 support	 structure	of	 civil	 society	organizations	 and	 rights-advocacy	
lawyers	 and	 sources	 of	 funding	 (ibid:	 18).	 The	 concept	 of	 support	 structure	 has	
been	used	to	study	legal	mobilization	in	other	political	contexts;	most	significantly,	





into	 building	 coalitions	 and	 creating	 solidarity	 for	 collective	 action.	 Hence,	 the	
aforementioned	discussions	provide	an	important	reference	point	against	which	to	
test	the	Chinese	case.	In	this	thesis,	therefore,	I	extend	a	comparative	perspective	
to	 test	 the	 aforementioned	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 propositions	 in	 an	




actors	 such	as	 lawyers	and	civil	 society	organizations	have	 the	capacity	 to	 initiate	
broad	political	and	social	mobilization	to	challenge	the	authoritarian	state?			
	
To	 test	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 conclusions	 about	 law	 and	 resistance	
more	 generally	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 carry	 out	 comparative	 studies	 in	 non-liberal	
democratic	 contexts.	 The	 findings	 outlined	 above	 from	 liberal	 democracies	 and	
common-law	systems	 indicate	 that	not	only	 the	political	 system	 is	 important,	but	
also	the	legal	tradition	(and	ideology),	and	cultural	norms	are	significant	factors.	For	
example,	Scheingold	argued	that	 in	the	American	context,	 the	strong	belief	 in	the	
basis	 that	 constitutional	 rights	 and	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 general	 provide	 ordered	
rules	 and	patterns	of	 behaviour	 for	 social	 interaction	 and	political	 order	 that	 can	
account	for	Americans’	proclivity	to	legal	mobilization.	“The	myth	of	rights	rests	on	




ideology	 is	 so	 present	 in	 the	 USA	 establishes	 significant	 grounds	 to	 explore	 the	
validity	 of	 these	 arguments	 in	 different	 socio-political	 contexts,	 questioning	 how	




Similarly	 to	 the	aforementioned	 studies,	 research	has	been	 conducted	 in	China	 to	
examine	 the	 role	 of	 law	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 Party-state.	 Most	
notably,	 research	has	been	conducted	on	 the	avenues	opened	by	 legal	 reforms	 to	
challenge	 the	 Party-state,	 for	 example,	 in	 terms	of	 the	 administrative	 litigation	 to	
sue	Party-officials	for	misconduct	(O’Brien	and	Li,	2005);	use	of	the	Letters	and	Visits	
Offices	 (a	medium	 for	 lodging	 complaints)	 (Cai,	 2004;	 Chen,	 2003;	Minzner,	 2006;	
Thireau	and	Hua,	2005;	Li,	Liu	and	O’Brien,	2012);	use	of	 legal	channels	 to	resolve	




popular	 contention	 in	 rural	 China	 that	 has	 been	 classified	 as	 ‘rightful	 resistance’	
(O’Brien,	1996;	O’Brien	and	Li,	2006).	Each	of	 these	 forms	of	contention	has	been	
studied	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 significance	 in	 instigating	 political	 reforms.	 The	
underlying	 notion	 is	 that	 legal	 mobilization	 is	 a	 political	 action	 in	 its	 own	 right,	
especially	 in	 an	 authoritarian	 context,	 and	 that	 it	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 effectively	
bring	about	political	change,	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	(Pils,	2011;	Teng,	2009):	
“the	 invocation	of	 legal	norms	and	use	of	 the	 legal	 system	(legal	mobilization)	are	
even	more	 intrinsically	 political	 in	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 than	 in	 an	 established	
democracy”	(Gallagher	and	Wang,	2011:	210).	
	
As	 Epp	 (1998)	 indicated,	 the	 single	 most	 important	 factor	 for	 effective	 legal	
mobilization	 in	 political	movements	 is	 the	 existence	 and	 leadership	 of	 a	 support	
structure.	This	 support	 structure	 integrates	political	activists,	 lawyers,	 civil	 society	
organizations,	and	according	to	Moustafa	(2012),	reform-minded	judges.	Similarly,	
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for	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 and	 Halliday	 and	 Liu	 (2007),	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 legal	





proved	 that	 courts	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 securing	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 regime	 (Yu,	
2009;	Chen	and	Xu,	2012).	Moreover,	Michelson	(2006:	27)	indicates	that	“students	
of	 contemporary	 China	 have	 uncritically	 assumed	 that	 lawyers	 open	 courtroom	
doors	 and	 that	 improving	 procedural	 and	 distributive	 justice	 in	 the	 court-room	
improves	 justice	 writ	 large”.	 To	 temper	 the	 aforementioned	 optimistic	 view	 of	
lawyers	as	activists	and	reform-advocates,	one	should	remember	that	the	socialist	
legality	ensures	 that	 the	 legal	 system	serves	 the	 state’s	 interests	 (Liebman,	2011;	
Michelson,	 2003,	 2006,	 2007;	Potter,	 1999).	 Peerenboom	 (2002)	 in	 fact	 indicated	
that	 the	 legal	 profession	 is	 closely	 overseen	 by	 the	 Party-state	 in	 a	 sort	 of	
corporatist	 or	 clientelist	 relationship	 (Peerenboom,	2002:	 15).	He	argues	 that	 the	
legal	 system	 itself	 restricts	 the	 possibilities	 of	 lawyers	 becoming	 activists:	 “given	
China’s	more	civil	 law	system,	 lawyers	are	 less	 likely	to	emerge	as	major	catalysts	
for	 social	 change”	 (ibid:	 15-16).	 To	 this	 factor,	 Michelson	 (2006)	 showed	 that	





labour	 disputes)	 of	 “the	 poor	 and	powerless”	 (ibid:	 27).	 Economic	 incentives	 and	
cultural	 factors	 therefore	 also	 contribute,	 together	 with	 political	 ones,	 in	








for	 development	 of	 rights	 and	 policy	 changes,	 such	 as	 consumer,	 women’s,	 and	
migrant	workers’	rights.	However,	he	argued	that	the	development	of	the	“rule	of	
law	without	politics”	has	 “created	 strong	 incentives	 and	 limited	opportunities	 for	
activist	 lawyers”	 (ibid:	 341).	 The	 rise	 of	 public	 interest	 litigation	 (PIL),	 or	 cause	
lawyering,	 that	 is,	“the	use	of	 litigation	as	a	strategy	to	protect	a	general	 interest	
that	is	larger	than	that	of	the	individual	case	interest”	(Fu,	2011:	348;	Fu	and	Cullen,	
2010:	 1),	was	 initiated	 after	 1995.	 This	 type	of	 lawyering	has	been	 termed	 rights	
protection	(weiquan,	维权)	 lawyering	and	 is	seen	as	a	political	action,	as	“lawyers	





approaches	 to	 oppose	 the	 system	 and	 create	 a	 socio-political	 transformation.	
Factors	 that	 account	 for	 the	 radicalizing	 process	 include	 political-legal	 contextual	
changes	 that	 create	 opportunities	 for	 certain	 issues	 (such	 as	 the	 constitutional	
amendment	 of	 2004	 that	 provided	 constitutional	 protection	 for	 human	 rights),	





Given	 the	 institutional	 legacies	of	 the	 socialist	 period	 (Liebman,	2011;	Michelson,	
2006,	2007)	and	the	institutional	constraints	on	lawyers’	activism	(Michelson,	2006,	
2007),	 this	 thesis	 asks:	 how	 and	 why	 do	 legal	 professionals	 and	 civil	 society	
organizations	 constitute	 a	 support	 structure	 for	 solidarity	 action	 in	 authoritarian	








appeared.	Operating	with	social	movements	 theory,	 they	build	 their	argument	on	
the	basis	of	opportunity	structures	(Eisinger,	1973;	McAdam,	1996;	Tarrow,	1998),	
claim	 framing	 (Goffman,	 1975),	 and	 repertoires	 of	 action	 (McAdam	 et	 al.,	 2001).	
They	define	rightful	resistance	as	“a	form	of	popular	contention	that	operates	near	
the	 boundary	 of	 authorized	 channels,	 employs	 the	 rhetoric	 and	 commitments	 of	
the	 powerful	 to	 curb	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	 (…).	 In	 particular,	 rightful	 resistance	
entails	innovative	use	of	laws,	policies,	and	other	officially	promoted	values	to	defy	
disloyal	political	and	economic	elites”	 (O’Brien	and	Li,	2006:	2).	 In	 their	view,	 it	 is	
actually	the	poor	implementation	of	central	policies	at	the	local	level	that	presents	
opportunities	 for	 people	 to	 express	 their	 grievances	 and	 organize	 rightful	
resistance,	 to	 hold	 the	 state	 accountable	 to	 its	 own	 policies.	 Rightful	 resistance	
implies	“employing	authorized	symbols	 to	pose	 inconvenient	 rhetorical	questions,	
these	 villagers	 wrap	 their	 resistance	 in	 sweet	 reason	 and	 tender	 impeccably	




are	 provided	 by,	 for	 example,	 legal	 reform	 or	 policy	 reform,	 in	 shaping	 popular	
contention.	They	assume	that	rightful	resisters	enjoy	growing	rights	consciousness	
but	 include	 little	 account	 of	 how	 people’s	 identities,	 consciousness,	 perceptions	
and	rationales	of	action	are	formed,	and	how	these	factors	account	for	their	rightful	




exploring	 the	 factors,	 processes	 and	 mechanisms	 (including	 socio-cognitive)	 that	
link	 individual	 consciousness	 with	 collective	 action,	 rather	 than	 assuming	 that	







into	 claims	 to	 political	 rights	 (citizenship	 rights)	 (ibid:	 116-123).	 This	 prognosis	
corresponds	 to	 a	 Western-centric	 liberal	 understanding	 of	 rights	 of	 freedoms	 of	
speech,	 movement,	 property	 and	 association	 (Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007:	 3).	 “Such	
entitlements	 become	 citizenship	 rights	when	 the	 object	 of	 claims	 is	 a	 state	 or	 its	




into	 rights	 (Chen	and	Tang,	2013;	Tilly,	 1999).	More	 so,	 there	 is	 an	understanding	
that	popular	struggles	will	turn	political	because	of	claiming	citizenship	rights,	which	
include	civil,	political	and	social	ones	(Giddens,	1982;	Tilly,	1998:	59,	in	reference	to	
T.H.	 Marshall,	 1965).	 Hence,	 it	 follows	 that	 engaging	 in	 rights-based	 actions	 in	
authoritarian	contexts	is	a	political	action	with	potential	challenges	for	the	regime:	
Goldman	writes	 that	 “[o]ne	 of	 the	major	 changes	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 of	 the	
twentieth	 century	 was	 a	 growing	 sense	 of	 rights	 consciousness,	 particularly	 of	
political	rights”	which,	she	argues	has	the	potential	“to	produce	in	China	changes	as	
profound	as	those	that	occurred	earlier	in	Eastern	Europe”	(Goldman,	2005:	2,	24).	
However,	 Zhou	 (2005:	 1)	 argues	 that	 this	 conception	 of	 rights	 is	 particular	 to	 the	





(1992)	argued	 that	market	 liberalization	opens	up	channels	 for	 labour	activism	to	
be	 absorbed	 and	 therefore,	 pacified.	 One	 such	 alternative	 channel	 for	 labour	
activism	in	authoritarian	China	is	the	legal	channel.	It	has	been	argued	in	a	number	
of	studies	that	 legal	 institutions	provide	workers	with	a	mechanism	to	individually	
address	 their	 grievances	 (Gallagher	2005a,	2006),	or	 state-sanctioned	channels	 to	
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resolve	 labour	 conflict	 (Chan	and	Pun,	 2009;	Gallagher,	 2005;	 Lee,	 2010;	 Lee	 and	
Hsing,	 2010).	 Legal	mobilization	 is	 characterized	 by	workers’	 use	 of	 the	 available	
and	authorized	legal	and	judicial	mechanisms	to	address	their	grievances	and	make	
claims	on	management	and/or	on	the	Party-state,	for	example,	using	the	law	to	file	
a	 lawsuit	 against	 the	 employer	 for	 non-payment	 of	 wages.	 Legal	 mobilization	 to	
resolve	labour	disputes	therefore	can	be	seen	as	a	form	of	‘contained	contention’	
(McAdam	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Chen,	 2003),	 as	 it	 creates	mechanisms	 for	 workers	 to	 air	
their	 grievances	at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 it	 enables	 the	CPC	 to	 remain	 in	 control	of	
these	disputes	and	maintain	social	order.		
	
However,	 it	 has	 also	 been	 argued	 that	 “inadvertently	 and	 sometimes	
serendipitously,	legal	reform	has	made	the	state	a	catalyst	of	labour	activism”	(Lee,	
2007a:	 61),	 precisely	 because	 it	 has	 opened	 up	 spaces	 for	 resistance,	 as	 the	
literature	above	suggests.	The	extent	to	which	legal	reforms	have	been	assumed	to	
catalyse	 labour	 activism	 has	 been	 studied	 through	 two	 lenses:	 1)	 workers’	 legal	
mobilization;	 and	 2)	 workers’	 collective	 action	 and	 solidarity.	 As	 Lee	 (2007a)	
suggests,	 legal	reform	has	propelled	labour	struggle	in	China.	A	number	of	studies	
have	 claimed	 an	 increasing	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 among	 Chinese	 workers	
(Gallagher,	2006;	Goldman,	2005;	Froissart,	2005;	 Lee,	2007a;	 Li,	2010;	 Lorentzen	






2006,	 2007)	 and	 labour	 NGOs	 (Chan,	 2013;	 Lee	 and	 Shen,	 2011)	 instrumentally	
educating	 workers	 on	 their	 legal	 rights.	 The	 Party-state	 and	 its	 policies	 are	
presumed	 to	 be	 the	 origin	 of	 such	 rights	 consciousness,	 workers	 reacting	 and	
complying	 with	 the	 entitlements	 recognized	 by	 law;	 hence,	 laws	 shape	 workers’	
rights-based	 actions	 (as	 discussed	 below).	 This	 understanding	 does	 not	 take	 into	
account	workers’	 rights	 conceptions	 prior	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 labour	 laws,	 or	
their	agency	over	this	rights	consciousness	formation.	
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that	explains	 rights	 consciousness	as	a	 result	of	 three	changes:	 in	values,	 in	 state	
policies,	 and	 in	 societal	 equilibrium	 (shared	 expectations).	 They	 argue	 that	 rights	
consciousness	that	results	from	changes	in	state	policies	is	likely	to	have	stabilizing	
effects,	 while	 that	 which	 emanates	 from	 changes	 in	 values	 and	 in	 shared	
expectations	 could	 have	 destabilizing	 effects	 (ibid:	 654).	 Hence,	 certain	 types	 of	
rights	consciousness	may	directly	pose	a	challenge	to	the	Party-state,	while	others	
do	 not.	 Their	 study	 certainly	 brings	 some	 value	 to	 the	 discussion	 on	 rights	
consciousness	 in	 terms	 of	 disaggregating	 the	 concept.	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	
empirical	evidence	to	support	why	people	made	the	choices	of	action	that	they	did	
in	 the	 three	 cases	 that	 they	 research	 means	 that	 their	 model	 is	 based	 on	
suppositions	 and	 hypothesis,	 and	 the	 methodological	 flaws	 of	 game	 theory	 are	
embedded	 in	 it.	 Ethnographic	 research	provides	a	much	deeper	understanding	of	
why	 people	make	 the	 choices	 that	 they	 do,	 and	 the	 rationales	 and	 explanations	







in	 referring	 to	 legal	 consciousness	 as	 a	 result	 of	 legal	 aid	 plaintiffs’	 engagement	
with	 the	 legal	 system,	 and	 argues	 that	 this	 process	 occurs	 in	 two	 separate	
dimensions:	 in	terms	of	 feelings	of	efficacy	and	competency,	and	perceptions	and	
evaluations	of	the	legal	system.	With	this	study	she	tries	to	address	the	gap	in	the	
existing	 literature	 that	 reaches	 conclusions	 based	 on	 observed	 attitudes	 and	





(2011:	 204).	 They	 argue	 that	 people’s	 evaluation	of	 the	 legal	 system	depends	 on	
political	identity	(citizenship,	political	socialization,	role	of	the	state	in	the	dispute),	
and	 find	 that	 workers’	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 legal	 system	 are	 shaped	 by	 their	
experience	 of	 it:	 experience	 with	 the	 legal	 system	 decreases	 the	 view	 that	 the	
system	 is	 efficient	 and	 responsive,	 but	 disenchanted	 plaintiffs	 might	 still	 have	
positive	 attitudes	 due	 to	 their	 increased	 sense	 of	 internal	 efficacy	 and	 better	
understanding	of	the	procedures.	But	where	do	the	perceptions	and	beliefs	about	
the	 legal	 system	of	workers’	without	 experience	with	 the	 legal	 system	originate?	
How	 do	 these	 perceptions	 inform	 their	 choice	 to	 take	 legal	 action?	 And	 more	
importantly,	how	do	these	beliefs	work	for	the	benefit	or	challenge	the	legitimacy	
of	the	rule	of	 law	ideology,	which	the	CPC	is	building	on	to	remain	in	power?	This	




legal	 institutions	 on	 people’s	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 law,	 and	 more	
broadly,	 extract	 conclusions	 about	 their	 actions	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Party-state	 as	 being	
political	by	nature.	These	studies	assume	an	institutional	unidirectional	relationship	
between	 legal	 institutions	 and	 people’s	 attitudes,	 beliefs	 and	 actions,	 without	





understand	 the	 likelihood	 of	 legal	 institutions	 taking	 root	 in	 Chinese	 society	 and	
being	viewed	as	legitimate	tools	of	resistance	or	governance.	In	general,	it	has	been	
assumed	that	the	 increased	use	of	 legal	mechanisms	to	resolve	disputes	 is	due	to	
people’s	 increased	 rights	 consciousness,	 which	 in	 turn	 can	 potentially	 have	 a	
destabilizing	 effect	 for	 a	 given	 regime,	 especially	 an	 authoritarian	 one.	 However,	
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the	 extent	 to	which	 legal	 institutions	 become	 instruments	 of	 resistance	 not	 only	
depends	on	institutional	constraints	on	the	autonomy	of	the	legal	system,	support	
and	 opportunity	 structures	 of	 legal	 mobilization	 and	 people’s	 attitudes	 once	




whether	 the	 system	 is	 legitimate	 in	 their	 eyes,	 and	 why	 they	 decide	 to	 use	 it.	
Furthermore,	 conclusions	 have	 been	 reached	 about	 how	 legal	 institutions	
ultimately	embolden	the	legitimacy	of	the	CPC	because	they	provide	people	with	a	
new	ideology	(Landry,	2008;	Lubman,	1999;	Peerenboom,	2002),	a	sense	of	political	
participation	 through	 input	 institutions	 (Nathan,	 2003)	 and	an	outlet	 for	people’s	
grievances	 (Diamant	 et	 al.,	 2005:	 4).	 However,	 very	 little	 evidence	 has	 been	





previously	 been	 argued	 that	 legal	 institutions	 partake	 in	 the	 making	 of	 a	 new	
working	 class	of	migrant	workers	 (nongmingong,	农民⼯,	 or	dagong, 打⼯)	 (Pun,	
1999,	2005,	2009;	Chan	and	Pun,	2009)	which	differs	from	the	traditional	working	
class	of	 the	Maoist	period	(see	Chapter	Three).	The	new	 legal	 institutions	provide	
workers	with	the	basis	 for	their	 increasing	rights	consciousness,	which	then	 is	 the	
explanatory	 factor	 for	 their	 activism.	 Lee	 (2007)	 examined	 the	 factors	 that	






were	 the	 categories	 of	 citizenship,	 proletariat	 and	 subaltern,	 all	 of	 which	 forge	
workers’	 subjectivity.	Of	 these	 three,	 she	 argues,	 “the	most	 empowering	 identity	
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workers	have	found	is	grounded	in	one	variation	of	citizenship	–	citizens’	rights	to	
legal	 justice	 (…)	 As	 workers	 and	 the	 general	 public	 learn	 to	 articulate	 their	
grievances	 and	 demands	 by	 adopting	 the	 language	 of	 the	 state,	 in	 this	 case	







from	 interests,	 and	 that	 rights-based	 action	 gives	 way	 to	 further	 interest-based	
action	 (Clarke	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 On	 some	 occasions,	 authors	make	 a	 clear	 distinction	
between	interests	and	rights,	and	elaborate	on	how	interests	precede	rights	(Chan,	
2011;	Chan	and	Siu,	2012;	Feng	and	Tang,	2013).	Rights	refer	to	entitlements	that	
are	enshrined	 in	 law,	 and	 that	 the	Party-state,	 responsible	 for	 the	welfare	of	 the	
people,	 is	 supposed	 to	 protect;	 while	 interests	 are	 ‘not	 yet’	 defined	 as	 rights.	 In	
general,	 rights	have	historically	originated	 “from	 the	 confluence	of	work	on	 state	
transformation	 and	 work	 on	 collective	 action”	 (Tilly,	 1998:	 57).	 In	 particular,	 on	
labour	rights:	“economic	rights	had	to	be	won	by	 the	working	class	 in	 the	 face	of	
opposition	both	from	employers	and	from	the	state”	(Giddens,	1982:	172).	Hence,	
following	 a	 conceptualization	 of	 rights	 based	 on	 T.H.	Marshall’s	 (1965)	 theory	 of	
citizenship10,	workers’	rights	were	derived	from	class-	or	interest-based	action;	class	




China,	 workers	 being	 more	 class-conscious	 and	 therefore	 engaging	 in	 interest-
based	action,	which	does	not	preclude	them	from	using	rights	discourse.	 Interest-
based	 action	 mainly	 takes	 the	 shape	 of	 protests,	 strikes	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
																																																						
10	Based	 on	Western	 industrialized	 nations,	 England	 in	 particular,	 civil	 and	 political	 rights	 precede	
social	rights.	Consequently,	collective	labour	rights	as	the	civil	rights	of	workers	as	a	class	(industrial	








of	 action,	 is	 clear	 in	 Chan’s	 (2011)	 comparative	 study.	 Rights-based	protests	 take	
place	in	China	in	relation	to	violations	of	workers’	legal	rights,	while	interest-based	
protests	 were	 found	 in	 Vietnam	 where	 workers’	 demands	 went	 beyond	 the	
minimum	 legal	 standards	 (ibid:	 46).	 Chan	 also	 argues	 that,	 in	 China,	 rights	
protection	(weiquan)	has	been	framed	around	a	rights	discourse	based	on	the	word	
‘rights’	 (quanyi,	权益),	 which,	 when	 “used	 in	 China	 today	 about	 labour	 issues	 it	
refers	 almost	 exclusively	 to	 legal	 rights,	 not	 to	 interests”	 (ibid:	 49).	 Hence,	 rights	




Similarly,	Chen	and	Tang	 (2013)	 classify	 labour	 conflicts	 in	China	according	 to	 the	
bases,	 claims	 and	 framing	 workers	 use:	 rights,	 interests,	 or	 pre-reform	
entitlements.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	provide	 conceptual	 clarity	 to	 the	discussion	 about	
labour	conflict	in	China,	they	argue	that	the	source	of	rights-based	claims	rests	on	
the	state’s	legal	institutions:	“once	a	legal	institution	governing	labour	relations	is	in	
place,	 the	 demarcation	 between	 rights-based	 and	 interest-based	 labour	 conflicts	
can	be	largely	made”	(2013:	563).	Hence,	they	define	rights	as	“legally	sanctioned	
interests”	while	 interests	 go	 beyond	 and	 “ask	 for	more”	 than	 the	 law	 stipulates:	
“interest-based	disputes	 involve	workers’	demands	 for	economic	benefits	beyond	
those	stipulated	in	law	(…)	Interest-based	claims	have	commonly	been	expressed	in	
positional	 terms	that	embody	a	raw	sense	of	economic	 justice”	(ibid:	564-565).	 In	
addition,	 labour	 conflicts	 pertaining	 to	 the	 pre-reform	 era	 are	 those	 in	 which	
workers’	claims	refer	to	their	dependency	on	the	state	enterprise	for	the	provision	
of	welfare.	 Finally,	 they	 indicate	 that	 these	 three	 types	of	 labour	 resistance	have	
evolved	historically	from	pre-reform	entitlement	claims,	to	rights-based	conflicts,	to	
now	an	 increasingly	 interest-based	conflict.	 Interest-based	conflicts	 take	 the	 form	
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of	 collective	protests	and	 spill	 outside	of	 the	 legal	 system	because	 interest-based	
claims	are	not	 legally	recognized.	Hence,	these	forms	of	consciousness	and	action	
have	the	potential	to	profoundly	challenge	the	Party-state	“to	build	institutions	to	
channel	 these	 energies”	 (ibid:	 583),	 one	 of	 them	 being	 collective	 bargaining	
through	the	trade	union	(Chan,	2011).		
	
In	 this	 respect,	 Chan	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 interest-based	 claims	 require	 a	proactive	
and	collective	behaviour,	 collective	bargaining	being	 the	most	 suitable	channel	 to	
pursue	 workers’	 interests;	 this	 means	 that	 basically	 interests	 are	 to	 be	 pursued	
through	 the	 trade	 union,	 the	 All	 China	 Federation	 of	 Trade	 Unions	 (ACFTU).	
However,	 workers	 continue	 to	 pursue	 their	 interests	 without	 the	 support	 of	 the	
ACFTU	 (Chan,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Chan	 and	Hui,	 2013;	 Chan	 and	 Pun,	 2009),	 as	most	
forms	 of	 workers’	 collective	 actions	 are	 autonomous	 protests,	 direct	 action,	 and	
‘wildcat’	 strikes	 (without	 the	 support	 or	 endorsement	 of	 the	ACFTU).	 There	 have	
been	a	number	of	labour	actions	that	reflect	interest-based	claims	and	the	fact	that	
Chinese	 workers	 use	 the	 language	 of	 rights	 and	 legal	 action	 to	 resolve	 their	
grievances	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	workers	are	not	pursuing	their	interests.	
Clear-cut	 conclusions	 have	 been	 arrived	 at	 in	 the	 literature	 about	 rights	 versus	
interests	awareness	based	on	the	types	of	actions	workers	take	in	China,	with	the	
underlying	 assumption	 that	 rights	 consciousness	 precludes	 workers’	 class	





Another	 example	 of	 how	 rights-based	 conflict	 can	 represent	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	





rights’,	 and	Minow’s	 assertion	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 rights	 or	 rights	 consciousness	 can	
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stimulate	 the	 imagination	 and	 action	 “on	 rights	 that	 have	 not	 been	 formally	
recognized	 or	 enforced”	 (Minow,	 1987:	 1867).	 Hence,	 rights	 consciousness	 can	
trigger	political	action	when	people	believe	in	rights	that	are	not	yet	recognized	and	
use	 litigation	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 action,	 such	 as	 protests	 and	 strikes,	 as	 political	
means	to	establish	these	interests	as	rights.	The	challenge	then	lies	in	the	capacity	







political	 actions	 to	 make	 claims	 on	 the	 Party-state	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 political	 or	
citizenship	rights.	This	form	of	activism	can	challenge	the	stability	(both	economic	
and	 political)	 of	 the	 regime.	 Legal	 institutions	 have	 been	 seen	 to	 provide	 the	
opportunity	 and	 resources	 for	workers	 to	 develop	 their	 activist	 behaviour	 (Chan,	
2010a),	and	engage	 in	more	 interest-based	and	collective	 forms	of	action	outside	
the	frames	of	the	law.	The	increase	of	rights	consciousness	brings	about	“not	only	
increases	 [in]	 the	 frequency	 of	 resistance,	 but	 changes	 the	 forms	 of	 such	
resistance”	 (Pei,	 2000:	 20).	 Thus,	 legal	 institutions	 could,	 in	 fact,	 trigger	 a	
‘radicalization	 of	 labour’	 (Lee,	 2007a:	 160),	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 “post-socialist	 labour	
insurgency”	 (Lee,	2002).	Howell	 (2008)	 suggests	 that	 the	 transition	 to	 the	market	
economy	 and	 the	 legal	 reforms	 have	 provided	workers	with	 alternative	 forms	 of	
organization.	 The	 gradual	 structural	 and	 institutional	 changes	 following	 the	
broadening	 of	 market	 relations	 have	 extended	 the	 rights	 and	 opportunities	 of	
subordinate	 groups	 such	 as	workers,	 and	have	provided	 spaces	 for	 new	 forms	of	
organizing	 –	 labour	 NGOs	 –	 and	 inclusive	 institutions	 for	 workers	 to	 foster	
institutional	 changes	 that	 benefit	 them	 (Howell,	 2016:	 7,	 21).	 This,	 she	 argues	 in	




On	 a	 contrasting	 note	 to	 the	 studies	 above	 on	 rights	 consciousness,	 rights-based	
action	 and	 its	 political	 significance,	 Perry	 (2008)	 calls	 for	 a	 tempering	 of	 the	
enthusiastic	 readings	 of	 ‘increasing	 rights	 consciousness’.	 She	 argues	 that	 the	
literature	 on	 rights	 consciousness	 has	 based	 the	 analysis	 of	 rights	 on	 Western	
conceptions	of	individual	rights	to	property,	liberty	and	legal	justice,	among	others,	
as	pointed	out	above.	In	turn,	this	analysis	of	rights	has	led	to	misinterpreting	the	
political	 undertones	 of	 Chinese	 claims	 to	 citizenship.	 She	 argues	 that	 Chinese	
conceptions	of	 rights	have	a	 long	 tradition,	but	based	on	 concepts	of	 livelihoods,	
subsistence	and	development,	“from	Mencius	to	Mao	–and	beyond”	(Perry,	2008:	
38).	Therefore,	the	rhetoric	of	rights,	or	the	rights	consciousness	found	in	previous	




to	use	 the	state-authorized	channels	 to	better	 their	 livelihoods	or	“to	negotiate	a	
better	 bargain	with	 the	 authoritarian	 state”	 (Perry,	 2009:	 20),	 but	 not	 to	 bring	 it	
down.	 I	 find	Perry’s	arguments	extremely	 insightful,	calling	for	an	 interrogation	of	
the	nature	of	rights	as	contingent	to	historical,	political	and	cultural	contexts,	which	
has	 not	 always	 been	 done	 in	 previous	 studies.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 previous	
studies	 have	 taken	 law	 as	 an	 objective	 and	 discrete	 unit,	 without	 analysing	 its	














need	 to	 be	 examined:	 (judicial)	 independence,	 institutional	 fragmentation,	 core	
compliance,	 and	 constraints	 on	 the	 support	 structures.	Moreover,	 studies	 on	 the	
rule	of	law	in	authoritarian	contexts	have	also	stressed	the	role	of	legal	institutions	
in	 supporting	 regime	 legitimacy.	 In	 the	 following	 chapters	 I	will	 provide	 evidence	
from	 the	 Chinese	 case	 to	 examine	 the	 validity	 of	 these	 arguments.	 I	 have	 also	
asserted	 that	 previous	 studies	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	 have	
provided	 little	 analysis	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 legal	 institutions;	 been	 largely	
institutionalist	 and	 institution-centred,	without	 looking	 at	 the	processes	of	 law	 in	
action	beyond	 the	courtrooms;	and	when	studying	 the	political	 role	of	 law,	 there	
has	been	 a	 large	oversight	 of	 non-elites’	 agency	 (beyond	political	 elites	 and	 legal	
professionals).	I	have	therefore	argued	that	a	grounded	analysis	of	legal	institutions	
outside	 the	 courtrooms	 can	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	 value	 of	 law	 in	 everyday	
political	 life,	 and	most	 interestingly,	 examine	 if	 and	how	 legal	 institutions	bolster	
regime	 legitimacy	 by	 looking	 into	 popular	 opinions,	 perceptions	 and	 uses	 of	 the	
legal	institutions.			
	
In	 relation	 to	 law	and	social	movements	and	contentious	politics	 (resistance),	 the	
five	main	themes	identified	are:	rights	and	legal	consciousness	triggers	rights-based	




politically	 significant	 if	 combined	 with	 parallel	 collective	 action	 and	 political	
campaigns.	 In	 the	 Chinese	 context,	 there	 has	 been	 fruitful	 research	 on	 rightful	
resistance	 (O’Brien	and	Li,	2006),	weiquan	 lawyers’	activism	(Fu	and	Cullen,	2008,	
2010,	 2011;	 Pils,	 2011;	 Teng,	 2009),	 and	 legal	 mobilization	 in	 labour	 disputes	
(Froissart,	2014;	Gallagher,	2005a,	2006;	Gallagher	and	Wang,	2011).	These	studies	
conclude	 either	 that	 rights-based	 action	 can	 potentially	 trigger	 political	
transformations	(even	democratic	systemic	change)	or	that	 it	 is	regime	stabilizing.	
In	 any	 case,	 as	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 law	 and	 authoritarianism,	 these	 pieces	 of	
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research	take	legal	institutions,	and,	more	significantly,	rights,	as	discrete	units	but	
do	 not	 examine	 their	 nature	 and	 historical	 processes.	 The	 present	 study	 aims	 to	
examine	 the	 nature	 of	 legal	 institutions	 in	 contrast	 to	 prevalent	 conceptions	 of	







































China	 initiated	 its	 transition	 to	 a	market	 economy	 in	1978.	Under	 the	 socialist	 or	
planned	economy,	social,	political	and	productive	life	in	urban	China	was	organized	
under	 the	work	 unit,	 or	 danwei	 (单位).	With	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 ‘socialist	market	
economy’	 (shehuizhuyi	 shichangjingji,	 社会主义市场经济)	 life	 as	 known	 under	
Chinese	 socialism	 was	 radically	 transformed,	 social	 relations	 and	 relations	 of	
production	being	reshaped	and	restructured	to	fit	the	capitalist	logic.	Consequently,	
the	Party-state	retreated	from	planning	and	managing	the	economy,	relinquishing	
some	 of	 its	 monopoly	 over	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 (Naughton,	 2008).	
However,	far	from	being	unregulated,	capitalism	in	China	has	been	fostered	by	the	
Party-state,	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘bureaucratic	 capitalism’	 (Meisner,	 1996)	 or	 “state	
capitalism”	 (Lin,	 2015:	 24).	At	 the	 local	 level,	 the	decentralized	political	 structure	
gave	way	 to	 a	 variety	of	modes	of	 convergence	between	a	 rising	entrepreneurial	
class	 and	 the	 local	 political	 elite,	 characterised	 as	 ‘state	 entrepreneurialism’	
(Blecher,	1991;	Blecher	and	Shue,	1996;	Duckett,	1998),	‘bureau-preneurialism’	(Lu,	
2000:	 275),	 ‘local	 state	 corporatism’	 (Oi,	 1992,	 1995),	 or	 ‘socialist	 corporatism’	
(Pearson,	1994).	Others	have	argued	that	the	Party-state	has	restored	capitalism	in	
a	 Gramscian	 ‘passive	 revolution’	 (Gray,	 2010),	 restoring	 class	 relations	 with	 a	
combination	 of	 institutional	 economic	 reforms,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 rhetorical	
devices	 on	 the	 other	 that	 build	 the	 ‘ideological	 state	 apparatus’	 (Lin,	 2015),	 to	
secure	the	CPC’s	hegemony	(Hui,	2014).		
	
The	 role	 of	 the	 Party-state	 in	 market	 transition	 is	 seen	 from	 a	 variety	 of	
perspectives;	 however,	 the	 undisputable	 common	point	 is	 that	 the	 Party-state	 at	
national	 and	 local	 levels	 has	 been	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 capitalist	 development	 in	
China.	The	central	government	has	been	engaged	in	an	institutionalization	process,	
which	 has	 both	 secured	 private	 property	 and	 facilitated	market	 processes	 in	 the	
Chinese	 economy,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 it	 has	 enabled	 the	 CPC	 to	 remain	 in	
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political	 power	 as	 grantor	 of	 the	 wonders	 of	 China’s	 economic	 development.	
Particularly	 pertaining	 to	 relations	 of	 production,	 “the	 state’s	 withdrawal	 from	
direct	management	of	industrial	relations	required	the	development	of	labour	laws	
and	 regulations”	 (Pringle,	 2011:	 41).	 Between	 1979	 and	 1994	 approximately	 160	
labour	regulations	and	rules	were	issued	(Ngok,	2008:	49).	In	1994	the	Labour	Law	
was	 enacted,	 followed	 by	 the	 Labour	 Contract	 Law	 (LCL),	 the	 Labour	 Disputes	
Mediation	 and	 Arbitration	 Law	 (LDMAL)	 and	 the	 Employment	 Promotion	 Law,	
enacted	 in	 2007.	 Such	 a	 prolific	 legal	 development	 is	 indicative	 of	 an	
institutionalization	 process	 through	 which	 the	 CPC	 aimed	 to	 support	 the	market	
economy	 and	 thus,	 strengthen	 (and	 regain)	 its	 legitimacy.	 As	 Gilley	 (2008:	 260)	
suggests,	 legitimacy	 is	 both	 explanatory	 and	 constitutive	 of	 institutional	 change,	
and	 “maintaining	 legitimacy	 means	 shifting	 institutions	 to	 generate	 valued	
performance”.	Some	argue	that	after	1992,	and	especially	 since	China’s	accession	
to	 the	 WTO	 in	 2001,	 this	 performance	 rests	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 on	 sustained	
economic	growth	(Peerenboom,	2002).	
	
Authoritarian	 regimes	create	 regulatory	and	 legal	 institutions	 to	govern	economic	
relations	 to	 facilitate	 market	 transitions	 by	 providing	 credible	 commitments	 to	
property	 rights:	 “establishing	 autonomous	 institutions	 is	 a	 common	 strategy	 to	
ensure	credible	and	enduring	policies	in	the	economic	sphere”	(Moustafa,	2007:	7).	
Legal	institutions	and	legal	mechanisms	to	channel	disputes	have	therefore	enabled	
the	 CPC	 to	 undergo	 titanic	 economic	 transformations	 without	 systemic	 change	
(Nathan,	 2003;	 Peerenboom,	 2002).	 Labour	 laws,	 in	 particular,	 have	 fulfilled	 this	
function	 for	 the	 Party-state,	 by	 redefining	 and	 legislating	 labour	 relations	 on	 the	
basis	of	property	rights	(labour	as	a	property	that	can	be	sold	in	the	marketplace)	
and	by	providing	an	attractive	environment	for	foreign	direct	investment.	Although	
the	 CPC	 has	 not	 officially	 endorsed	 capitalist	 relations	 of	 production,	 China’s	
‘socialist	market	economy’	and	its	 labour	 laws	 implicitly	acknowledge	antagonistic	
class	relations	between	labour	and	capital	based	on	the	principle	of	property,	that	
the	state	is	to	regulate	by	protecting	labour	from	the	excesses	of	the	market,	and	
managing	 and	 containing	 labour	 conflict.	 In	 this	 sense,	 labour	 laws	 were	 also	 a	
historical	 response	 to	 the	mounting	 labour	 struggle	 in	 the	 1990s	 of	 state-owned	
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enterprise	 (SOE)	 workers	 that	 had	 lost	 their	 pre-reform	 entitlements	 from	 the	
‘moral	 economy’	 (Scott,	 1976;	 Chen,	 2000;	 Chen	 and	 Tang,	 2011;	 Lee,	 2007;	
Solinger,	 2001).	 The	 CPC	 therefore	 adapted	 its	 governance	 mechanisms	 to	 the	
internal	and	external	pressures	of	the	time	and	enacted	a	number	of	labour	laws	to	
govern	 labour	 relations.	 Hence,	 labour	 laws	 have	 a	 two-fold	 purpose	 for	 the	
resilience	of	 the	Chinese	authoritarian	 regime:	 secure	private	property	 rights	 and	
support	 the	 market	 economy	 on	 the	 one	 hand;	 and	 safeguard	 social	 order,	
particularly	industrial	peace	on	the	other.	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 first	 provide	 the	 economic	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 main	
transformations	 that	 have	 occurred	 since	 1978	 from	 the	 danwei	 system	 to	 the	
labour	 legal	 framework	 in	 section	 3.1.	 Sections	 3.2	 and	 3.3	 present	 the	 ‘double	
movement’	(Polanyi,	2001)	or	double	functions	of	labour	laws	as	pacifiers	of	labour	
unrest	and	protectors	of	 labour	by	regulating	capital.	 In	section	3.3	 I	examine	the	
nature	 of	 the	 labour	 laws,	 dissecting	 the	 main	 changes	 introduced	 in	 terms	 of	
labour	contracts,	 labour	dispute	 resolution,	and	worker	 representation.	 In	section	
3.4	 I	 argue	 that	 given	 the	 inefficiencies	 and	 constraints	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 in	
representing	 workers’	 interests,	 new	 actors	 have	 appeared	 to	mediate	 in	 labour	
relations	(also	some	to	perform	governance	functions)	and	protect	workers’	rights:	
labour	NGOs.	 All	 in	 all,	 legal	 institutions,	 and	 traditional	 (ACFTU)	 and	 new	 actors	













(so-called	 ‘iron	 rice	 bowl’,	 tiefanwan,	 铁 饭 碗 )	 and	 material	 entitlements	 as	
housing,	 social	 welfare,	 and	 education.	 In	 the	 planned	 economy	 of	 the	 Maoist	
period,	the	labour	regime	of	the	danwei	was	a	system	of	‘organized	dependency’	of	
workers	 on	 the	 state	 (Walder,	 1986),	 in	which	material	 benefits	were	distributed	
according	to	production	targets	and	outcomes.	Everyday	life	was	highly	politicised	
and	there	was	an	overall	penetration	of	the	state	into	society.	Lü	and	Perry	(1997:	
5-6)	 note	 that	 the	danwei	 had	 five	 attributes:	management	of	 labour	 force	 (hire,	
fire	 and	 transfer);	 provision	 of	 welfare	 as	 housing,	 or	 communal	 facilities;	
independent	accounting;	organization	in	urban	industrial	sector;	and	public	sector.	
Pringle	 (2011:	 12)	 adds	 three	 characteristics:	 labour	 stability;	 a	 “top-down	
administrative	 remuneration	 system”;	 and	 “the	 ideological	 integration	 of	 the	
interests	of	managers	and	managed”.	In	the	danwei,	management	was	performed	
through	 three	 committees	 (lao	 san	 hui, 老 三 会 ):	 the	 Factory	 Management	
Committee,	Workers’	Representative	Conference,	and,	run	by	the	trade	union,	the	
Staff	and	Workers	Congress	 (Pringle,	2011;	Sheehan,	1998).	Walder	 (1986)	argues	
that	 this	 structure	 within	 the	 danwei	 system	 established	 a	 bargaining	 system	




the	 ideological	 integration	 between	 managers	 and	 workers,	 which	 ultimately	




11	The	central	 feature	of	 this	 ‘communist	neo-traditionalist’	 system	was	“networks	of	patron-client	
relations	that	links	the	party	organization	and	shop	management”	(Walder,	1986:	24),	under	which	
rank-and-file	 workers	 would	 pursue	 their	 interests	 via	 informal	 social	 ties	 with	 supervisors,	
managers	 or	 officials	with	 power	within	 the	 enterprise,	 informally	 negotiating	 their	 interests	 and	







2007:	 56),	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 the	 danwei	 system	 resulted	 in	 an	 inefficient	 state-
owned	 sector.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 danwei	 system	 was	 overstaffed	 with	
unskilled	and	unnecessary	labour	(Korzec,	1992;	White,	1987,	1988),	where	workers	
lacked	 incentives	 to	 perform	 and	 increase	 productivity	 (Howell,	 1993),	 as	 they	
enjoyed	life-tenure	(and	other	mechanisms	of	secure	employment,	as	the	dingti	-顶
替-	 allocation	 mechanism	 through	 which	 parents’	 employment	 was	 inherited),	
lacked	mobility	options,	 and	enjoyed	 relatively	high	 standards	of	 living	and	 social	
welfare	 and	 material	 benefits.	 Therefore,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Maoist	 period	
unemployment	 levels	 appeared	 to	 be	 rising,	 while	 the	 economy	 was	 stagnating	
with	 inefficient	 capital	 –	 and	 technology-intensive	 industries	 and	 a	 virtually	 non-
existent	services	sector	(White,	1989;	Pringle,	2011:	24;	Naughton,	2007:	81).		
	
With	China’s	Open	Policy	 a	 ground-breaking	 transition	 to	 a	market	 economy	was	
initiated.	In	practice,	it	meant	allowing	foreign	direct	investment	and	foreign	trade	
to	expand	onto	Chinese	soil12	and	build	industries	capable	of	absorbing	the	growing	




“dramatic	changes	 in	 labour	policy,	 institutions	and	relations”	(Howell,	1993:	209)	
were	to	follow.		
	
To	start	with,	 the	composition	of	 the	Chinese	workforce	was	transformed	 in	both	
the	 rural	 and	urban	 sectors,	as	were	 labour	 relations	 and	managerial	 practices	 in	
the	 mid-1980s.	 In	 the	 rural	 economy,	 household-based	 smallholding	 agriculture	










and	a	more	general	 subjection	of	SOEs	 to	profitability-criteria	began	to	 transform	
the	 urban	 economy.	 “The	 most	 significant	 change	 since	 1978	 has	 been	 the	
expansion	of	the	private	sector	which,	by	1985,	was	providing	13.6%	of	new	urban	
jobs	 and	 largely	 lies	 outside	 the	 framework	 of	 administrative	 labour	 allocation”	
(White,	 1988:	 183).	 Employment	 in	 the	 private	 and	 non-state	 sector	 grew	 while	
state-owned	 employment	 seriously	 declined	 (Cai	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 With	 the	
privatisation	 of	 SOEs	 under	 the	 so-called	 ‘seizing	 the	 large	 and	 letting	 go	 of	 the	
small’	 (zhuada	 fangxiao,	 抓⼤放小)	 policy	 after	 1997,	 state-owned	 enterprise	
workers	 were	 dismissed	 on	 a	 large	 scale.14	Privatization	 allowed	 the	 merging	 of	
foreign	 and	 domestic	 private	 capital	 with	 small	 and	 medium	 public	 enterprises	




autonomy	 in	 personnel	 management	 early	 on	 (Gallagher,	 2005b),	 the	 Chinese	
government	enacted	the	Equity	Joint	Venture	Law	of	1979,	which	was	extended	in	
1980,	 to	grant	more	power	to	enterprises	 in	SEZs	to	manage	 labour,	hire	and	fire	
workers,	and	establish	wages	more	flexibly.	With	the	Provisions	of	the	State	Council	
of	 the	 PRC	 for	 the	 Encouragement	 of	 Foreign	 Investment	 of	 1986,	 managers	 in	
foreign-invested	 enterprises	 could	 hire	 and	 fire	workers	 in	 relation	 to	 production	
requirements,	with	the	mediation	of	the	Labour	Service	Corporations,	a	new	set	of	
non-state	 institutions	designed	 to	 facilitate	 labour	allocation,	and	approval	of	 the	
Labour	Bureau	(Howell,	1993).		
	
Gradually	 market	 forces	 determined	 employment	 and	 remuneration.	 For	 basic	













state	 and	 society,	 which	 would	 in	 turn	 represent	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 ideological	
legitimacy	of	 the	Party	 (White,	1988).	However,	after	Deng	Xiaoping’s	 ‘trip	 to	 the	
South’	in	1992,	to	break	the	post-Tiananmen	economic	and	political	stagnation,	the	
CPC	pushed	towards	more	decisive	reforms	(Naughton,	2008),	establishing	market-
oriented	 labour	 employment	 and	 remuneration	 mechanisms.	 For	 White	 (1987:	
365),	“the	general	aim	of	China’s	reformers	[was]	to	create	a	new	system	of	labour	








labour	 contract	 system	 (White,	 1988).	 This	 mechanism	 eliminated	 the	 social	
contract	of	socialist	labour	relations.	Labour	contracts	were	first	piloted	in	1980	in	
Shanghai	 with	 skilled	 workers	 (Pringle,	 2011:	 27).	 Instituted	 first	 in	 the	 SEZs	 of	
Shenzhen	and	Zhuhai	(Gallagher,	2005b:	106;	Giles	et	al.,	2006;	Howell,	1993:	219;	
White,	1987),	labour	contracts	were	generalized	in	1983,	but	only	started	to	affect	
the	 state-owned	 sector	 in	 1986	 (Giles	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Howell,	 1993:	 212)	when	 the	
State	Council	 issued	the	Temporary	Regulations	on	the	Use	of	Labour	Contracts	in	
State-Run	Enterprises	(Cai	et	al.,	2008).	Contracts	were	initially	limited	to	the	non-




1985,	 was	 providing	 13.6%	 of	 new	 urban	 jobs	 and	 largely	 lies	 outside	 the	 framework	 of	
administrative	labour	allocation”	(White,	1988:	183).		
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labour	 relation	 spread	 as	 a	 form	of	 ‘contagious	 capitalism’	 (Gallagher,	 2005b).	 In	
1986,	 labour	 contracts	 were	 rolled	 out	 to	 the	 national	 level	 via	 “provisional	
regulations	on	hire	 and	 fire	 and	unemployment	 insurance”	 (Pringle,	 2011:	 27).	 In	
1994,	with	the	enactment	of	the	Labour	Law,	contracts	were	finally	the	legal	form	
of	 labour	 relations	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 regardless	 of	 industry	 and	 enterprise	




the	 most	 symbolic	 change	 in	 Chinese	 labour	 relations,	 representing	 the	
transformation	of	the	socialist-style	ethos	of	worker	collectivism	and	social	contract	
of	state-worker	relations	to	capitalist	labour	relations	based	on	legal	contracts	and	
the	 recognition	 of	 labour-capital	 relations.	 This	 change	 came	 about	 because	 a	
labour	 contract	 system	 establishes	 the	worker	 as	 a	 separate	 legal	 entity	who,	 as	
Collins	 (2010:	 3)	 emphasises	 quoting	 Marx,	 driven	 by	 the	 “dull	 compulsion	 of	
economic	necessity”	 sells	his/her	 labour	 in	 return	 for	a	wage.	The	contract	 is	 the	
legal	expression	of	an	economic/market	transaction,	and	encapsulates	 labour	as	a	
factor	 of	 production.	 Hence,	 as	 Pringle	 (2011:	 44)	 argues	 “contracts	 and	 the	
concomitant	commoditization	of	labour	are	now	the	legal	basis	of	the	relationship	
between	 labour	 and	 capital	 in	 China”.	 Labour	 laws	 therefore	 reinforced	 the	
contract	as	the	legal	entity	on	which	to	base	labour	relations	in	China.	
	
In	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 therefore,	 the	 Party-state	 retreated	 from	 the	 direct	
economic	 functions	 that	 it	 held	 during	 state	 socialism	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	
emergence	of	a	market	economy,	notwithstanding	 it	retained	a	crucial	role	 in	the	
economy.	 The	 Party-state	 broadly	 saw	 its	managerial	 functions	 transformed	 into	
regulatory	(with	the	exception	of	some	sectors	of	the	economy	and	SOEs),	hence	its	
developing	 regulatory	mechanisms	 and	 institutional	 arrangements	 to	oversee	 the	
economy,	 and	 labour	 relations	 specifically.	 Therefore,	 in	 consonance	 with	 the	
market	 economy,	 to	 secure	 property	 rights	 and	 regulate	 the	 market,	 the	 CPC	




derived	 from	the	 transformation	of	workers’	economic	and	social	 lives	 (as	will	be	




Political,	 economic,	 and	 top-down	 forces	 that	 stimulated	 the	development	of	 the	
labour	 legislation	 are	 related	 to	 the	 Chinese	 Party-state’s	 need	 to	 maintain	 an	
attractive	 environment	 for	 foreign	 investment	 and	 to	 regulate	 the	 diversity	 of	
managerial	 practices.	 However,	 equally	 important	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 this	
institutional	transformation	is	to	consider	the	“popular	practices	and	politics”	(Lee,	
2007a:	 14).	 Pringle	 (2011:	 46)	 asserts	 that	 the	 development	 of	 recent	 legislation	
appears	to	be	due	to	workers	militancy,	stating	that	“the	original	law	[Labour	Law	
of	1995]	was	aimed	at	heading	off	unrest	whereas	 the	Labour	Contract	Law	 is	an	
attempt	to	placate	 it”	(Pringle,	2011:	46).	This,	 I	would	argue,	 is	supported	by	the	
fact	 that	 the	2008	LCL	was	not	enacted	 in	 isolation,	but	 in	parallel	with	a	 second	
piece	 of	 legislation	 specifically	 designed	 to	 manage	 labour	 conflict:	 the	 Labour	
Disputes	 Mediation	 and	 Arbitration	 Law	 (LDMAL).	 As	 evidenced	 by	 Gallagher	
(2005b),	the	long	period	between	the	enactment	of	the	1995	Labour	Law	and	that	
of	 the	 supplementary	 laws	 in	2008	 indicates	 that	 these	 laws	were	 “caught	 in	 the	
same	 bureaucratic	wrangle	 that	 delayed	 the	 passage	 of	 the	National	 Labour	 Law	
itself	 throughout	 the	 1980s	 until	 the	 rise	 of	 labour	 strikes	 and	 exploitation	 in	
foreign-invested	companies	gave	 impetus	 to	 its	passage”	 (Gallagher,	2005b:	113).	
While	 the	 research	 of	 Gallagher	 (2005b),	 Chan	 (2010a)	 and	 Leung	 (1998)	
demonstrated	the	impact	of	protest	waves	between	1992	and	1994	on	the	making	
of	 the	 1995	 Labour	 Law,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 coincidence	 that	 in	 2008	 the	most	 significant	
labour	 legislation	 created	 thereafter	 was	 a	 package	 that	 addressed	 both	 the	
formalization	 of	 capitalist	 labour	 relations	 (contractual-based)	 and	 conflict	
management.	 Thus,	 this	 section	will	 examine	 the	pushing	 forces	 from	below	 that	
stimulated	the	creation	of	the	post-1994	labour	legal	institutional	framework,	more	
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As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 state-owned	 sector,	 throughout	 the	 1990s	
workers	 at	 state-owned	 enterprises	 engaged	 in	 labour	 protests	 and	 strikes.	 The	
elimination	 of	 the	 urban	 work-unit	 or	 danwei,	 job	 tenure	 and	 social	 benefits	
enjoyed	by	state-sector	workers	(the	‘iron	rice	bowl’)	created	widespread	hardship	
and	discontent.	 Especially	 after	 the	1997	SOE	 reform	workers	 in	 the	 state-owned	
sector,	 privileged	 under	 socialism	 (Lee,	 2007a)	 were	 seriously	 affected:	 large	
numbers	 were	 laid-off	 (xiagang,	 下岗),	 or	 became	 unemployed.	 For	 example,	
between	1993	and	1998,	official	 counts	of	 laid-off	workers	 rose	 from	3	million	 to	





officially	 defined	 as	 unemployed18	(hence	 very	 difficult	 to	 reintegrate	 into	 the	
developing	 labour	 market),	 nor	 were	 they	 receiving	 sufficient	 welfare	 support	
																																																						
16	Chinese	workers	do	not	have	 the	 right	 to	 strike,	 nor	 to	 stage	demonstrations	 (Chen,	 2000:	 61).	
Therefore,	 there	 is	 no	 accurate	 data	 available	 from	 the	 Chinese	 government	 on	 the	 number	 of	
strikes	 and	 protests	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 China,	 the	 number	 of	 participants,	 their	 claims,	
grievances,	or	outcomes.	Moreover,	due	to	the	government’s	control	of	the	media,	the	information	
available	 from	 these	 sources	 is	 very	 limited	 and	 in	 many	 cases,	 unreliable.	 However,	 there	 are	
growing	attempts	by	Chinese	 local	media	to	cover	these	 incidents,	as	well	as	 from	labour	scholars	
and	labour	organizations,	which	are	developing	research	on	the	topic	(CLB,	2010:	12-13).	
17	This	 disparity	 in	 the	 accounts	 of	 laid-off	 workers	 signals	 the	 sensitiveness	 of	 the	 topic,	 and	
emphasises	that	official	accounts	of	laid-off	workers	vary	and	are	inaccurate.	
18	Unemployment	 rates	were	 rising	 throughout	 the	 1990s;	 although	 the	 official	 statistics	 reported	
unemployment	rates	of	3%	to	4%	in	the	1990s,	academics	reported	rates	3	to	4	times	higher	(Lee,	
2007a).	 For	 example,	 in	 2001	 there	 was	 an	 approximate	 12.9%	 unemployment	 rate	 (Giles	 et	 al.,	
2006).	However,	unemployment	statistics	are	not	accurate	 in	evidencing	 the	scale	of	 the	effect	of	
SOE	restructuring	(Solinger,	2001),	as	officially,	“laid-off”	(xiagang,	下岗)	is	defined	as	a	worker	who	
meets	 the	 following	 conditions:	 a)	 began	 working	 in	 the	 SOE	 before	 the	 contract	 system	 was	
introduced	 in	 1986	 and	 had	 a	 permanent	 job	 in	 the	 SOE;	 b)	 was	 laid-off	 due	 to	 financial	 or	
operational	 problems	of	 the	 firm	but	 has	 not	 been	 formally	 detached	 from	his	 relations	with	 the	






received,	were	 below	 the	minimum	 required	 for	 basic	 livelihood,	 and	 the	 state’s	
welfare	 schemes	 (the	 “three	 lines	 of	 guarantees”:	 unemployment	 insurance,	 the	
Re-employment	 Project	 and	 the	 policy	 on	 basic	 living	 allowance)	 were	 both	
inefficient	and	insufficient.19	Therefore,	not	only	did	workers	from	the	state-sector	
suffer	 from	 the	 breaking	 of	 the	 socialist	 social	 contract,	 the	 “implicit	 state	






protest,	which	 unfolded	 against	 the	 historical	 background	 of	 SOE	workers	 having	
been	highly	militant	and	politically	mobilized	during	the	Maoist	period	 (Cai,	2002;	




in	 organization	 and	 mobilization	 inherited	 from	 the	 Maoist	 class	 politics	 (Hurst,	
2009;	Lee,	2000,	2002,	2007a).	Thus,	in	the	1990s	these	workers	had	the	knowledge	
and	capacity	to	launch	the	most	large-scale	protests	(Chen,	2000).	Militant	protests	
of	 SOE	 workers	 occurred	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 and	 their	 confrontations	 with	 local	
officials	 and	 managers	 between	 1999	 and	 2002,	 especially	 in	 the	 northeast	 or	
Rustbelt	 (Hurst,	2009;	Lee,	2007a),	 raised	the	concerns	of	 local	governments	who	







the	 social	 insurance	 schemes	 were	 deficient	 (decentralized	 and	 dependent	 on	 the	 economic	
resources	of	the	local	government)	(Solinger,	2002).		
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Although	 the	 role	 of	 SOE	 workers	 in	 collective	 actions	 has	 been	 significant,	 Lee	
(2007a)	 indicates	 that	 their	protests	were	highly	 ‘cellular’,	 localized	and	bound	 to	
the	 work-unit,	 hence	 putting	 pressure	 on	 local	 governments.	 Since	 the	 1990s,	
however,	 it	 has	 been	migrant	 or	 peasant	workers	who	have	 registered	 increased	
strike	and	protest	activity	(Lee,	2007a:	6).	According	to	official	statistics	released	by	
the	Ministry	of	Public	Security,	the	number	of	mass	incidents	(quntixing	shijian,	群








The	 introduction	 of	 foreign-direct	 investment	 created	 huge	 employment	
opportunities	in	the	SEZs	of	the	southeast	coast	of	China,	which,	together	with	the	
relaxations	of	the	household	registration	system	(hukou,	户⼝)	and	the	reforms	in	
the	 rural	 sector,	 stimulated	 an	unprecedented	 internal	migration	phenomena:	 by	
the	mid-1990s,	 rural	 surveys	estimated	 that	 there	were	between	50	 to	70	million	
migrant	labourers	(Roberts	et.al,	2004:	49),	increasing	to	120	million	in	2000	(China	
National	 Census,	 2000),	 and	 to	 an	 estimated	 130	 million	 in	 2006	 (China’s	 State	
Council,	2006,	 in	Pun	et.al.,	2009:	135).	 In	the	2010	census,	261.39	million	people	




However,	 this	 pool	 of	 rural	 migrant	 workers	 holds	 a	 rural	 hukou	 that	 does	 not	
entitle	 them	 to	 social	 protection	 or	 welfare	 in	 urban	 areas.	 Moreover,	 these	
workers	are	the	‘cheap	labour’	that	has	endured	the	most	serious	hardships	in	post-




labour-rights	 violations”	 (Chan,	 2001:	 7).	 Although	 they	 have	 not	 directly	
experienced	 the	Maoist	 state	 industrialism	and	socialist	production	 regime	of	 the	
urban	 danwei,	 rural	 migrant	 workers	 have	 been	 redefining	 their	 working	 class	
identity	as	 that	of	nongmingong	 (农民⼯)21	or	dagong	 (打⼯),22	in	 reaction	 to	 the	
commodification	of	their	labour	(Pun,	1999;	2005,	2009;	Chan	and	Pun,	2009;	Pun	




to	 the	different	 labour	 regimes	 that	 rural	migrant	workers	have	grown	 into,	 they	
have	 tended	 to	 use	 mobilization	 strategies	 different	 from	 SOE	 workers,	 namely	








coast	 do	 not	 strike	 or	 stage	 street	 protests	 as	 often	 as	 state-owned	 enterprise	
workers	 in	 the	 northeast	 do,	 research	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	migrant	workers	 not	
only	engage	in	a	type	of	subtle	or	‘everyday	forms	of	resistance’	(Scott,	1985)	in	the	
workplace	(Pun,	2005),	but	also	that	their	collective	and	direct	action	has	become	
increasingly	 common	 in	 the	 export-oriented	 industrial	 zones	 of	 China’s	 southeast	
coast	 (Chan,	 2001;	 Chan,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Lee,	 2000,	 2002;	 Pun	 et	 al.,	 2010).	
Continuous	waves	 of	 protests	 and	 increasing	 labour	 disputes	 of	migrant	workers	
also	 constitute	 driving	 forces	 that	 press	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 labour	
institutional	 framework.	 Inversely,	 the	 increase	 in	 rural	 migrant	 workers’	






Such	distinction	between	 SOE	workers	 and	peasant	 or	migrant	workers	 has	 been	
continuously	 made	 in	 the	 literature,	 suggesting	 contrasting	 experiences	 and	
conditions	 for	 their	 collective	 action.	On	 the	one	hand,	 SOE	workers,	 the	original	
working	class	 (gongren	 jieji,	⼯⼈阶级),	engaged	 in	collective	action	 in	 relation	 to	
their	 pre-reform	 entitlements	 (Chen	 and	 Tang,	 2013)	 or	 due	 to	 their	 subsistence	
crisis	 (Chen,	 2000),	 while	migrant	 or	 peasant	workers	 (nongmingong,	农民⼯,	 or	
dagongzhe,	打⼯者	 ),	 do	 so	 in	 reference	 to	 violations	 of	 their	 legal	 rights	 (Chan,	






rights	 consciousness	 are	 mutually	 exclusive,	 peasant	 workers	 only	 having	 rights	





however,	 argue	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 labour	 laws	 was	 in	 response	 to	 the	 CPC’s	
‘passive	revolution’	(Gray,	2010),	or	to	the	hegemonic	project	of	the	Party-state	to	
gain	 workers’	 consent	 to	 its	 rule	 and	 to	 capitalism	 (Hui,	 2014).	 Furthermore,	
according	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 authoritarianism,	 the	 enactment	 of	
















As	 Polanyi	 (1944:	 176-177)	 once	 indicated,	 the	 deepening	 of	 a	 market	 economy	
entails	 a	 counter-movement	 to	 “protect	 society”,	 what	 he	 called	 a	 “double	
movement”,	through	which	the	state	would	attempt	to	regulate	the	labour	market	
through	 a	 variety	 of	 mechanisms	 including	 social	 legislation,	 factory	 laws,	
unemployment	 insurance	 and	 trade	 unions.	 According	 to	 Collins	 (2010:	 5)	 labour	
law	 “addresses	 the	 paradox	 encapsulated	 in	 the	 slogan	 ‘labour	 is	 not	 a	
commodity’.23	It	 regulates	 labour	 relations	 for	 two	 principal	 purposes:	 to	 ensure	
that	 they	 function	 successfully	 as	market	 transactions,	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 to	














The	only	 law	 inherited	 from	the	socialist	period	was	 the	Trade	Union	Law	(1992),	
which	 is	 a	 compilation	 of	 the	 previous	 Trade	 Union	 Law	 (1950)	 and	 the	 Labour	
																																																						






Insurance	 Regulation	 (1951).24	Otherwise,	 the	 first	 labour	 legislation	 under	 the	
‘socialist	market	economy’	 is	the	1995	Labour	Law,	which	derives	from	a	series	of	
regulations	 that	 were	 first	 introduced	 in	 the	 SEZs,	 beginning	 with	 the	
aforementioned	 Equity	 Joint	 Venture	 Law	 of	 1979.	 The	 1986	 Temporary	
Regulations	on	the	Labour	Contract	System	allowed	foreign-invested	enterprises	to	
hire	 workers	 in	 relation	 to	 production	 requirements	 under	 fixed-term	 contracts	
(Gallagher	 and	 Jiang,	 2002;	 Josephs,	 1995).	 This	 system	was	 later	 generalized	 to	
other	 types	of	enterprises	 in	1983,	and	only	 in	1986	did	 it	 touch	 the	 state-sector	
when	 it	 had	 initiated	 its	 reorganization	 (Howell,	 1993:	 212).	 These	 regulations	
introduced	 a	 ground-breaking	 change	 in	 Chinese	 labour	 relations,	 especially	 for	
urban	 industrial	workers,	 as	 it	 authorized	 the	 labour	 relation	 to	be	 set	 through	a	
contract	 system	 instead	 of	 through	 bureaucratic	 allocation,	 signalling	 “the	
beginning	 of	 the	 end	 of	 the	 work-unit	 system	 of	 employment	 in	 place	 since	 the	
1950s”	(Gallagher	and	Jiang,	2002:	7).	
	
In	 1994	 the	National	 Labour	 Law,	which	had	 already	 started	 to	be	drafted	 in	 the	
1980s,25	was	 adopted	by	 the	National	 People’s	 Congress,	 and	 came	 into	 effect	 in	
1995.	 “It	 took	 nearly	 fifteen	 years	 to	 build	 the	 necessary	 consensus	 within	 the	
leadership,	the	ministries,	and	the	ACFTU	for	its	passage”	(Gallagher,	2006a:	57),	as	
the	 law	 had	 to	 balance	 the	 perspectives	 of	 the	 different	 factions	 in	 the	 highest	
echelons	of	 the	CPC	 (leftists	 and	 rightists	 or	 pro-reformers),	 and	 the	 elements	 of	
the	 state’s	 command	 economy	 with	 the	 market	 economy.	 Such	 a	 long	 drafting	
period	 not	 only	 indicates	 “how	 sensitive	 and	 contentious	 the	 subject	 of	 labour	












The	 Labour	 Law,	 among	 other	 issues,	 recognized	 workers’	 basic	 legal	 rights	 and	
established	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 new	 labour-for-wage	 relation.	 It	 mainly	
recognized	workers’	 individual	 rights	 and	 also	 the	 rights	 of	 employers,	who	were	
granted	 managerial	 autonomy	 in	 their	 labour	 relations,	 regardless	 of	 their	







as	 the	 socialist	 labour	 system	 did;	 nor	 only	 to	 workers	 of	 foreign-invested	
enterprises,	 as	 the	 previous	 regulations	 in	 the	 SEZs	 did.	 This	 Law	 recognized	 the	
basic	rights	of	workers	without	distinction	of	the	type,	ownership,	or	nationality	of	
the	 enterprise	 (Gallagher,	 2005b).	 Moreover,	 as	 this	 Law	 entrusted	 the	
implementation	 of	 labour	 policy	 to	 local	 labour	 departments,	 it	 recognized	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Security	 (now	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Human	 Resources	 and	 Social	 Security,	 MHRSS)	 over	 all	 labour,	 including	 urban	
industrial	 workers,	 state-owned	 enterprise	 workers,	migrant	 workers,	 and	white-
collar	 or	 managerial	 and	 technical	 workers	 who	 had	 previously	 been	 termed	
‘cadres’	 and	managed	under	 the	Ministry	 of	 Personnel	 (Josephs,	 1995:	 567).	 This	
Law	 legally	 unified	 different	 status	 groups	 of	 workers	 and	 recognised	 the	





which	 came	 into	 effect	 in	 2008.	 Although	 the	 labour	 contract	 and	 the	 dispute	
resolution	systems	had	been	in	place	since	1986	and	1993	respectively,	the	new	set	
of	 labour	 laws	 enacted	 reinforced	 and	 specified	 their	 operations.	 The	 LCL	
specifically	referred	to	the	establishment,	performance,	variation,	and	termination	
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of	 labour	 contracts,	 and	 is	 particularly	 directed	 to	 regulate	 the	 increasingly	
temporary	nature	of	employment	in	China.			
	
The	 period	 between	 the	 1995	 Labour	 Law	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 new	 set	 of	
labour	 laws	 in	 2007	 saw	 a	 number	 of	 events	 and	 incidents	 that	merit	 attention.	
Firstly,	 although	 the	 ACFTU	 was	 not	 regarded	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 International	
Confederation	 of	 Free	 Trade	 Unions	 (ICFTU),26	in	 2007,	 after	 significant	 signs	 of	
change,27	there	were	heated	discussions	within	the	ICFTU	about	whether	to	grant	it	




labour	 conditions.	 Pressures	 from	 both	 domestic	 and	 international	 forces	 can	 be	
considered	influential	factors	driving	the	development	of	the	legislative	framework.			
	
The	 ACFTU	 had	 previously	 contributed	 to	 labour	 legislative	 and	 institutional	
reforms,	 established	 legal	 advice	 departments,	 and	 had	 been	 actively	 involved	 in	
mediation	and	arbitration	of	labour	disputes	(Howell,	2006,	2008).	However,	it	had	





particularly	 pressed	Wal-Mart	 –	 the	 global	 retailer	 well	 known	 for	 its	 anti-trade	
union	 stance	 (BBC,	 2004)	 –	 to	 establish	 trade	 union	 branches,	 while	 Wal-Mart	
																																																						
26	This	was	due	to	its	non-independent	nature	and	therefore,	its	non-representativeness	of	Chinese	
workers.	 In	 2002,	 the	 ICFTU	 issued	 its	 policy	 towards	 the	ACFTU	where	 it	 stated	 that	 “the	 ICFTU,	
noting	 that	 the	 ACFTU	 is	 not	 an	 independent	 trade	 union	 organization	 and,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	
regarded	as	an	authentic	voice	of	Chinese	workers,	reaffirms	its	request	to	all	affiliates	and	Global	
Union	 Federations	 (GUF)	 having	 contacts	 with	 the	 Chinese	 authorities,	 including	 the	 ACFTU,	 to	
engage	in	critical	dialogue”.	(IHLO:	http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/000706.html;	Last	accessed	on:	
5	December	2015).	
27	Since	 the	mid-1990s	 there	had	been	attempts	 to	 introduce	direct	 elections	 for	 grassroots	 trade	
union	 cadres	 in	 Zhejiang,	 Shanghai,	 Shandong,	 and	 Guangdong	 provinces	 (Howell,	 2008),	 and	 in	




the	 Trade	 Union	 Law.	 Met	 with	 refusal	 to	 establish	 trade	 unions	 through	 the	
enterprise	 management,	 as	 was	 the	 usual	 procedure,	 the	 ACFTU	 engaged	 in	 a	
grassroots	mobilization	strategy	to	organize	workers	to	set	up	trade	unions	in	Wal-
Mart	shops.	In	July	2006,	the	ACFTU	unionised	the	first	Wal-Mart	store	in	the	city	of	
Quanzhou,	 Fujian	 (Chan,	 2006;	 China	 Daily,	 2006;	 Howell,	 2006).	 This	movement	
was	an	unprecedented	bottom-up	unionizing	experience	 in	 the	ACFTU’s	practices	
(Chan,	 2006),	 which	 indicates	 the	 Union’s	 increased	 effort	 to	 represent	 Chinese	
workers.	 Moreover,	 it	 signalled	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Trade	 Union	 Law	 made	 by	 both	
workers	 and	 the	 trade	 union	 (Chan,	 2006),	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 these	 legal	
instruments	in	supporting	the	development	of	labour	relations.	Hence,	this	episode,	
which	occurred	 concurrently	with	 the	 first	 drafting	of	 the	 LCL	 (the	 first	 draft	was	





had	 more	 actively	 taken	 rural	 migrant	 workers	 into	 its	 sphere	 of	 responsibility	
(Howell,	2006:	9),	which	attracted	some	policy	attention	to	the	needs	and	rights	of	
these	 workers.	 There	 were	 also	 waves	 of	 protests	 and	 strikes	 in	 the	 Pearl	 River	
Delta,	 demanding	 minimum	 wages	 and	 a	 trade	 union	 to	 represent	 workers’	









brickyards	 in	 Shanxi	 province.	 As	 a	 reaction,	 the	 central	 government	 held	 an	 investigation	 and	





of	 officials	 from	 various	 Communist	 Party	 and	 government	 departments”	 (Shirk,	
1993:	 7)	 and	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 negotiation	 or	 bargaining	 between	 different	
bureaucratic	units	that	are	normally	equal	 in	rank	(Lampton,	1987:	18;	Lieberthal,	







centralism’	 of	 the	 CPC	 (Lieberthal,	 2004);	 nonetheless,	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LCL	 is	
remarkable	 because	 the	 CPC	 opened	 for	 public	 consultation	 the	 formulation	
process	 of	 a	 national	 law.	 The	 ACFTU	 had	 previously	 “contributed	 to	 significant	
reforms	 in	 the	 legislative	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 governing	 labour	 relations”	
(Howell,	 2008:	 848);	 however,	 it	 is	 almost	 unheard	 of	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	
primary	national	law	(jiben	fa,	基本法),	which	holds	the	highest	rank	of	the	Chinese	
legislative	 hierarchy	 and	 has	 precedence	 over	 all	 other	 local,	 provincial	 or	
administrative	regulations	 (Ho,	2009:	72),	 to	be	opened	to	public	consultation.	As	









as	 they	 have	 been	 acknowledged	 by	 law	 in	 the	 1989	 Administrative	 Litigation	 Act	 which	 allows	
citizens	to	sue	the	government.	Consultations	are	a	governmentally-initiated	mechanism	for	public	
participation	that	include	the	people	involved	or	affected	by	a	policy,	and	have	been	carried	out	in	
China	 in	 relation	 to	price	 reforms,	and	environmental	 impact	assessment	projects	 (Johnson,	2010;	
Zhao,	2010).		







variety	 of	 actors	 and	 opinions.	 Intellectuals,	 technicians	 and	 labour	 experts	were	
actively	engaged	in	its	formulation,	with	two	groups	leading	the	discussion.	The	first	
was	supported	by	Professor	Dong	Baohua,	chief	consultant	to	the	expert	group	for	
the	 labour	 contract	 legislation	 of	 the	 State	 Council,	 which	 supported	 equal	
protection	of	the	rights	of	workers	and	employers;	while	the	second,	aligned	with	







interests	 in	 China.	 For	 example,	 the	 Shanghai	 Association	 of	 Human	 Resources	
Management	 in	 Multinational	 Companies	 pointed	 out	 the	 negative	 effects	 that	
could	result	from	the	passing	of	the	Law.	The	European	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	
China	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 flexibility	 and	 low	 cost	 of	 labour	 in	 China	were	 the	




investment	 or	 continuing	 their	 activities	 in	 China”.32	The	 American	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce	openly	stated	that	the	introduction	of	labour	contracts	as	stipulated	in	
the	 first	 draft	would	 reduce	 labour	employment	opportunity	 for	Chinese	workers	




32	The	European	Union	Chamber	of	Commerce	 in	China	 (EUCCC).	 “Re:	Comments	of	 the	European	
Union	Chamber	of	Commerce	 in	China	on	the	Draft	Labour	Contract	 law”.	18	April	2006.	Available	




such	 as	 Global	 Labour	 Strategies,	 Hong	 Kong	 Liaison	 Office	 (IHLO),	 Worker	
Empowerment	 (WE),	 Dagongzhe	 Migrant	 Worker	 Centre,	 China	 Labour	 Bulletin,	
International	 Labour	 Rights	 Forum,	 Citizens’	 Rights	 and	 Livelihood	Watch,	 among	




at	 the	National	People’s	Congress.	 Thus,	when	 it	 finally	 came	 into	effect	 in	2008,	
the	 Law	 represented	 “an	 attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 demands	 of	 these	 competing	






labour	 law-making	 process	 has	 been	 a	 dynamic	 and	 complex	 one,	 in	 which	
significant	bottom-up	forces	interacted	with	the	economic	and	political	factors	that	
were	leading	the	labour	reforms.	Labour	laws	therefore	can	be	understood	as	part	








As	 established	 above,	 the	 introduction	 of	 labour	 contracts	 has	 been	 the	 most	
representative	 of	 all	 the	 institutional	 transformations	 of	 the	 labour	 relation,	
highlighting	its	change	towards	a	capitalist	form.	In	the	language	of	the	Labour	Law	
and	 the	 LCL,	 the	 labour	 relation	 is	 established	 between	 two	 parties	 (shuangfang	
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dangshiren, 双⽅当事⼈):	 labourer	 (laodongzhe,	劳动者)	 and	 employer	 (yongren	
danwei,	 用⼈单位 ).	 This	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 rationalization	 of	 economic	
relations	 in	which	 both	 parties	voluntarily	 confirm	 this	 relation	 via	 an	 agreement	
that	 standardizes	 and	 clarifies	 each	party’s	 roles	 and	 responsibilities;	 or	 it	 can	be	





interests	 of	 labourers…”	 (Labour	 Law,	 Article	 1).	 The	 first	 instance	 of	 this	
‘protection’	is	the	legally	binding	character	of	labour	contracts.	In	its	third	chapter,	
under	 articles	 16	 to	 35,	 the	 Labour	 Law	 defined	 and	 regulated	 the	 conclusion,	
content,	 termination,	and	revocation	of	 labour	contracts.	 Individual	and	collective	
labour	 contracts	 were	 stipulated	 in	 this	 Law,	 although	 only	 three	 articles	 are	
dedicated	to	the	latter.	It	also	included	stipulations	on	minimum	standards	(wages	




the	employment	unit	 the	power	 to	administer	and	manage	 labour	 (hire	and	 fire).	
Although	 this	 Law	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 Chinese	 labour	 legal	 framework,	 its	
implementation	 and	 consequences	 were	 not	 without	 problems.	 For	 example,	
because	it	did	not	specify	the	practicalities	nor	recognize	the	guarantees	of	labour	
contracts	 (starting,	 termination,	 amendment,	 invalidity,	 consequences	 of	 not	
signing	a	contract,	etc.),	 it	enabled	the	continuation	of	short-term	employment	or	









dispatch,	 and	 part-time	 employment;	 supervision	 and	 inspection;	 legal	
responsibility;	and	supplementary	provisions.	The	LCL,	“compared	with	the	Labour	






signified	 a	 clear	 departure	 from	 the	 socialist	 labour	 system	 and	 the	 full	




that	 it	 introduces	 provisions	 regarding	 underpayment	 of	 wages,	 establishes	 the	
mandatory	existence	of	a	written	contract	between	employer	and	employee,	and	
guarantees	 that	 workers	 who	 have	 a	 signed	 contract	 will	 not	 be	 disadvantaged	
should	 the	 enterprise	 undergo,	 for	 example,	 a	 merger	 or	 buy-out.	 Wang	 et	 al.	
(2009)	argue	that	this	law	was	particularly	concerned	with	limiting	the	use	of	short-
term	contracts,	and	establishing	a	legal	framework	for	job	security;	however,	this	is	




2	 of	 the	 LCL	 introduces	 an	 important	 addition	 to	 the	 Labour	 Law:	 regulation	 of	
labour	 dispatch	 agencies	 and	 other	 sub-contracting	 employment	 units.	 Although	
the	 existence	 of	 state-run	 Labour	 Service	 Corporations	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 early	
																																																						
33	Ho	(2009)	found	that	some	enterprises	have	created	two	separate	legal	entities	to	simultaneously	
hire	workers	 in	 two	 part-time	 shifts,	while	Worker	 Empowerment	 (2009b)	 found	 that	 enterprises	
have	created	subsidiaries	 to	 sub-contract	workers	 that	have	worked	 for	 two	years	 for	 the	mother	










Article	 58,	 66).	 The	 Law	 makes	 the	 third	 party	 or	 receiving	 unit	 responsible	 for	
applying	 the	 labour	standards,	 for	paying	overtime	and	 for	performance	bonuses,	
as	 well	 as	 for	 providing	welfare	 benefits	 (LCL,	 Article	 62.2).	 Overall,	 Ngok	 (2008)	
conveys	 that	 the	 strong	 point	 of	 the	 LCL	 is	 that	 it	 establishes	 a	 sound	 contract	
system,	regulating	temporary	employment,	and	severance	payments.	However,	Xu	




This	 ground-breaking	 transformation	 has	 more	 substantive	 significance	 if	
considering	 its	 far-reaching	 effects,	 transforming	 not	 only	 economic	 and	 social	
institutions,	but	much	more	embedded	cultural	and	historical	tenets,	as	Lawyer	Eng	
emphasises:	 “before	 the	market	 reforms,	 labour	 relations	 in	China	were	based	on	
trust,	 on	mianzi	 (面子),	 on	 social	 relations.	After	 the	 introduction	of	 laws	 in	1995	
and	especially	 since	2008,	 the	mandatory	contract-based	 labour	 relation	distorted	
some	 basic	 socio-cultural	 components	 of	 China’s	 social	 arrangements	 –	 basically,	
before	people	treated	work	as	an	extension	of	their	social	lives,	and	people	agreed	
orally,	 that	was	enough;	 the	contract	now	represents	distrust”	 (D1,	25	September	
2012).	 The	now	capitalist	 labour	 relation	 is	 an	antagonistic	one,	 and	 requires	 the	
labour	contract	to	prove	its	formalization.	This	removes	the	basic	social	component	
of	the	socialist	system	of	production,	 in	which	production	was	considered	a	social	
process.	 Today,	 some	 workers	 regard	 labour	 relations	 not	 as	 economic	
transactions,	but	as	social	relations,	hence,	their	view	of	the	labour	contract	as	an	
element	of	distrust	 in	 the	social	 relation.	Workers’	 conceptions	of	work	 relations,	
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legislation	 necessarily	 established	 a	 system	 to	 manage	 and	 contain	 disputes	
between	 them.	 In	 the	 Labour	 Law	 labour	 disputes	 can	 be	 addressed	 through	
mediation,	arbitration	committees,	and	courts	if	necessary,	or	through	consultation	
(Labour	 Law,	 Article	 77).	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 clarity	 about	 what	 constitutes	 a	
labour	dispute,	apart	 from	that	 related	to	an	 invalid	contract	 (Labour	Law,	Article	
18).	The	LCL	maintains	the	same	provisions	as	the	Labour	Law	in	terms	of	disputes.	




workers’	 representation	 that	were	 covered	 in	 previous	 laws	 and	 regulations.	 The	
1986	Regulations	on	Worker	Representative	Councils	established	workers’	councils	





settled	 the	 role,	 responsibilities,	procedures,	powers	and	 functioning	of	 the	 trade	
union	in	the	workplace.	The	role	of	the	union	in	the	tripartite	labour	relation	was	to	
represent	 workers;	 however,	 its	 power	 in	 collective	 negotiations	 and	 collective	
contracts	remained	subordinate	to	the	CPC	(Gallagher	and	Jiang,	2002).	On	paper,	
as	 established	 in	 the	 1992	 Temporary	 Regulations	 on	 Labour	 Disputes	 in	 SOEs,	
(superseded	by	the	1993	Regulations	on	Labour	Disputes	in	Enterprises),	the	trade	
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union	 was	 also	 the	 sole	 legal	 representative	 of	 workers	 (Pringle,	 2011),	 which	
applies	 also	 to	 labour	 disputes.	 However,	 the	 new	 2008	 LDMAL	 established	 a	









of	 labour	 contracts;	 expulsion,	 charge,	 resignation	 or	 severance;	 working	 hours,	




The	 LDMAL	 reinforced	 the	 four-stage	 labour	 dispute	 resolution	 process	 that	 had	
been	 established	 under	 the	 Labour	 Law:	 consultation,	mediation,	 arbitration	 and	
litigation.	Consultation	constitutes	the	first	step,	and	can	be	done	through	the	trade	
union	 for	 collective	 contract-related	 disputes,	 or	 through	 other	 workers’	
representatives	 for	 individual	 cases	 in	which	 there	 is	 no	 established	 union	 in	 the	
workplace.	 Mediation	 and	 especially	 arbitration	 are	 significantly	 stressed	 in	 this	
Law,	while	 litigation	 is	 seen	as	 the	 last	 resort.	The	Law	expanded	the	roles	of	 the	
existing	 mediation	 and	 arbitration	 committees	 and	 enabled	 other	 non-labour	
related	mediation	committees	to	deal	with	labour	disputes	(such	as	neighbourhood	
or	township	mediation	committees;	CLB,	2009b).	The	LDMAL	has	a	special	focus	on	
arbitration:	 it	 stipulates	 the	 procedures	 and	 qualifications	 of	 the	 arbitration	
committees,	and	awards	them	legal	status	as	their	decisions	are	 legally	binding.	 It	
makes	 arbitration	 a	 compulsory	 stage	 of	 the	 resolution	 process,	 and	 reduces	 the	




82;	 LDMAL,	 Article	 30),	 and	 that	 to	make	 an	 adjudication	 from	 sixty	 to	 forty-five	




as	 it	 neither	 appears	 in	 the	 title	 of	 the	 Law,	 nor	 is	 it	 extensively	 regulated:	 its	




that	 the	 labour	 relation	 is	 a	 conflictual	 one	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 capitalist	 nature.	 The	
creation	 of	 specialized	 legal	 instruments	 and	 institutions,	 such	 as	 mediation	 and	
arbitration	 committees,	 that	 intervene	 in	 labour	 disputes	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	
the	Party-state	recognizes	the	conflictual	character	of	labour	relations	and	intends	
to	regulate	and	control	them.	Against	a	background	where	workers	lack	freedom	of	





The	enactment	of	 the	 LCL	and	 the	 LDMAL	brought	about	a	 significant	 increase	 in	
labour	disputes.	Since	the	mid-1990s	 labour	disputes	had	been	rising	steadily,	but	
the	 year	 2008	 saw	 a	 sudden	 increase	 from	 350,182	 cases	 accepted	 in	 2007	 to	
693,645	in	2008	(see	Figure	3.1),	a	98%	increase	in	only	one	year.	The	majority	of	






for	 managing	 labour	 conflict.	 In	 2012,	 882,487	 workers	 were	 involved	 in	 labour	
disputes	 cases,	 a	mere	 0.08%	of	 the	 767	million	workers	 employed	 in	 China	 that	
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as	 the	prime	means	of	 resolving	 labour	disputes.	This	emphasis	on	mediation	has	
been	 seen	 as	 a	 return	 to	 the	 non-legalistic	methods	 of	 the	 socialist	 period	 in	 an	
attempt	to	resolve	conflicts	(Zhuang	and	Chen,	2015).	Liebman	(2011)	 interpreted	
this	 as	 the	 CPC’s	 revival	 of	 ‘populist	 legality’;	 an	 ‘adaptive	 legality’	 strategy	 that	
aims	 to	 align	 popular	 social	 norms	 and	 informal	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanisms	
with	 the	 Party-state	 legal	 instruments.	 By	 doing	 so,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	make	 ‘popular	
legalism’	a	source	of	 legitimacy.	Alternatively,	the	recent	surge	in	mediation	vis-à-
vis	arbitration	may	be	seen	as	workers’	unwillingness	to	go	through	the	whole	legal	




























Finally,	 comparing	 collective	 and	 individual	 labour	disputes	handled	by	mediation	
and	 arbitration	 committees	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 the	 real	 value	 that	 legal	 institutions	





































labour	strikes	and	protest	 in	China;	however	 incomplete,	 it	 shows	 indications	and	
patterns	 of	 labour	 activity.	 In	 2009,	 the	 China	 Labour	 Bulletin	 (CLB,	 2011:	 11)	
indicated	 that	 there	were	 approximately	 30,000	 labour-related	mass	 incidents	 in	
that	year	only,	which	ranged	from	involving	200	workers	to	thousands.	As	shown	in	
Figure	 3.4,	 the	number	of	 strikes	 and	protests	 has	 been	 growing	 in	 recent	 years.	
When	taking	place,	strikes	and	collective	actions	are	large-scale	and	potentially	very	
disruptive,	 politically	 and	 economically.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 government	 usually	




































Moreover,	Chen	and	Xu	 (2012)	 found	 that	 courts	 in	Dongguan	actively	used	both	
judicial	 and	 extrajudicial	 mechanisms	 to	 contain	 collective	 labour	 cases,	 for	
example,	by	breaking	them	into	individual	cases.	“The	individualization	of	collective	
disputes	 (…)	 makes	 the	 formation	 of	 collective	 identity	 and	 consciousness	 more	
difficult”	(ibid:	107).	They	conclude	“the	courts	as	state	institutions	have	performed	
a	role	 in	 foreclosing	 labour	movements	 in	China”	 (ibid:	106).	Hence,	 the	potential	
capacity	that	legal	institutions	have	to	provide	open	avenues	for	activism	in	China	is	
limited	 to	 individual	 cases	 that	 could	 represent	 public	 interests	 (Public	 Interest	
Litigation).	 This	means	 that	 the	potential	 destabilizing	 effect	 on	 the	 authoritarian	
regime	is	held	to	a	minimum	because	the	opportunity	to	use	the	 law	to	strive	for	
political	 change	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	 legal	 professionals	 or	 elites	 –	 lawyers	 and	
judges,	or	the	legal	complex	(Halliday,	Karpik	and	Feeley,	2007;	Karpik	and	Halliday,	
2011).	 In	 China,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 only	 a	 marginal	 number	 of	 lawyers	 are	
‘radical’	weiquan	 lawyers	 (Fu	 and	 Cullen,	 2008,	 2011)	 that	 openly	 challenge	 the	
state	 through	 the	 legal	 system.	 The	 Party-state,	 in	 turn,	 has	 devised	 informal	
practices	and	institutional	mechanisms	to	ensure	that	lawyers	abide	by	its	interests	
(Solomon,	 2010),	 many	 lawyers	 actively	 functioning	 as	 gatekeepers	 of	 justice	
																																																						



















have	been	 violated	 are	much	more	 likely	 to	 seek	 arbitration	under	 the	new	 law”	
(Wang	et	al.,	2009:	492).	It	has	been	argued	that	the	above	statistical	data	indicates	




mandated	 the	 priority	 of	 managing	 labour	 disputes	 to	 pacify	 labour	 conflict	 and	
prevent	the	development	of	collective	identities	and	a	labour	movement	(Chen	and	




Labour	 relations	 in	 the	 workplace	 still	 follow	 a	 tripartite	 system:	 trade	 unions,	
enterprises	 and	 the	 state.	 The	 ACFTU	 is	 the	 sole	 trade	 union	 in	 China,	 and	 is	 in	
charge	of	protecting	and	representing	workers	in	the	workplace.	The	ACFTU,	in	the	
Leninist	 ‘classical	 dualist’	 terms,	 “provides	 a	 two-way	 conduit	 between	 the	 party	
centre	and	the	workers.	(…)	Thus,	it	has	two	functions:	by	top-down	transmission,	
mobilization	of	workers	 for	 labour	production	on	behalf	of	 the	nation's	 collective	
good;	and	by	bottom-up	transmission,	protection	of	workers'	rights	and	interests”	




Due	 to	 the	 economic	 reforms,	 the	 degree	 of	 enterprise	 directors’	 autonomy	 to	
manage	labour	has	widely	increased,	and	currently	there	are	a	variety	of	modes	of	
connections	 between	 enterprises	 and	 local	 governments.	 Ding	 et	 al.	 (2002:	 436)	
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indicated	that,	although	in	the	foreign-invested	sector	the	role	of	the	trade	union	is	











From	 the	 legal	 perspective,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 1992	 Trade	 Union	 Law,	 the	 LCL	
strengthens	 the	 role	 of	 workers’	 organizations,	 such	 as	 unions	 and	 workers’	
congresses	 in	 labour	 relations	 (Ngok,	 2008:	 59).	 The	 role	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 had	




35	Note	 that	 the	 wording	 of	 “collective	 negotiation”	 or	 “collective	 consultation”	 is	 an	 intentional	
refusal	of	policymakers	to	recognize	mechanisms	for	“collective	bargaining”,	which	relates	to	a	more	
conflictual	 understanding	 of	 labour-capital	 relations	 as	 having	 antagonistic	 interests,	 and	 through	
which	the	ACFTU	would	have	to	adopt	a	more	confrontational	attitude	with	the	Party	and	capital.	
This,	 however,	 is	 the	 most	 recent	 change	 in	 the	 Guangdong	 provincial	 government	 and	 the	
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of	the	enterprise	branch	of	the	ACFTU	vis-à-vis	management,	but	they	are	mostly	a	




workers’	 representative	 units	 (trade	 unions	 or	workers’	 congresses)	 to	 take	 part,	
“on	an	equal	footing”	(LCL,	Article	4)	in	the	decision-making	process	regarding,	for	
example,	 changes	 in	 contracts	 (ibid.)	 or	 the	 content	 of	 collective	 contracts	 (LCL,	
Article	51).	This	does	however	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	union	uses	this	space	
to	 represent	workers’	 interests.	The	ACFTU’s	 identification	with	 the	state	and	 the	
enterprise	management	distances	 it	 from	the	workforce;	and	although	the	 labour	
laws	have	strengthened	the	power	of	 the	trade	union	to	sign	collective	contracts,	
perform	 ‘collective	 consultations’,	 and	mediate	 in	 labour	disputes	 in	 the	name	of	
workers,	it	usually	sides	with	the	enterprise	management	in	the	workplace.	
	
However,	 it	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 trade	 union	 does	 represent	 workers’	
interests	(individual	or	collective)	when	they	are	strictly	related	to	economic	terms,	
and	 “as	 long	 as	 their	 claims	 are	made	 through	 state-sanctioned	 channels”	 (Chen,	
2003:	 1008).	 Still,	 it	 does	 not	 advance	 “the	 fundamental	 rights	 of	 freedom	 of	
association	 and	 collective	bargaining”	 (Josephs,	 2008:	 391)	 nor	 does	 it	 effectively	
use	“its	powers	at	the	grassroots	level”	(ibid.:	392),	namely,	to	mobilize	workers	to	
fight	for	their	interests	and	rights.	There	is	considerable	debate	about	the	power	of	
the	ACFTU	to	assert	workers’	 interests,	one	reason	being	that	 it	has	been	slow	 in	
catching	 up	 with	 the	 economic	 reforms	 affecting	 industrial	 relations,	 having	 to	
develop	strategies	and	techniques	to	handle	legal	disputes,	collective	contracts	and	
negotiations	 (Howell,	 2008).	 Pringle	 (2011:	 36)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that,	 despite	 the	
difficulties	 of	 trade	 union	 reform,	 the	 ACFTU	 has	 actually	 attempted	 on	 several	
occasions	 to	 remain	 devoted	 to	 the	 collective	 identity	 of	 the	 working	 class	 and	
lobbied	 for	collective	rights	 to	be	 included	 in	 the	 legislation.	However,	as	pointed	
																																																																																																																																																									
Guangdong	 FTU	 has	 been	 experimenting	 with	 a	 regulation	 on	 collective	 negotiations,	 the	




capital,	 the	ACFTU	would	have	 to	engage	 in	a	more	confrontational	way	with	 the	
CPC.	 This	 has	 not	 been	 the	 case,	 due	 to	 its	 double	 identity	 (Chen,	 2003)	 or,	 as	
highlighted	by	Pringle’s	study,	even	if	“there	are	examples	of	the	union	reacting	to	
the	changes	 in	 the	 industrial	 relations	map,	and	 in	particular	 to	 the	 labour	unrest	




Therefore,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ACFTU	 is	 deeply	 ambivalent.	 As	 the	 sole	 legal	
representative	 of	workers’	 interests,	 it	 is	 bound	 to	 safeguard	workers’	 rights	 and	
interests,	integrating	peasant	workers	into	its	membership	(in	2003);	but	as	a	mass	
organization	under	 the	direct	 command	of	 the	CPC,	 the	ACFTU	primarily	 upholds	
the	Party-state	policies	(ibid:	52).	Moreover,	 its	 limited	capacity	to	organize	at	the	
grassroots	 is	 related	 to	 the	 trade	 union’s	 under-representation	 in	 certain	 sectors	
(such	as	foreign-invested	enterprises	and	private	enterprises).	However,	there	have	
been	 growing	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 the	 trade	 union	 has	 increasingly	 been	




Since	 the	 1990s,	 there	 have	 also	 been	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 grassroots	
organizations	 and	 individual	 actors	 which	 claim	 to	 represent	 workers	 and	 either	
provide	alternative	platforms	for	workers’	organizations	or	protect	workers’	rights.	
These	 include	 labour	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 legal	 aid	 centres,	






person	 of	 the	 labour	 group,	 was	 attacked	 and	 seriously	 injured	 (Worker	 Empowerment,	 2008;	
Diamant	et	al.,	2005:	12;	Josephs,	1995:	572).	Also,	human	rights	lawyers	are	constantly	monitored,	
and	 threatened	with	 suspension,	 or	 even	 arrested	 and	 charged	with	 criminal	 sanctions.	 The	 year	
2011	 saw	 an	 intensification	 of	 the	 crackdown	 against	 human	 rights	 activists	 in	 China,	 especially	
against	 lawyers.	 In	 2015,	 there	 was	 a	 serious	 intensification	 of	 repression	 against	 human	 rights	
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labour	 relations	 and/or	 representing	 workers’	 interests	 is	 multifaceted	 and	
complicated.	 Most	 significantly,	 these	 organizations	 contribute	 to	 educating	
workers	 on	 their	 rights,	 and	 some	 claim	 to	 represent	workers	 at	 the	policy	 level,	





Chinese	 labour	 politics,	 especially	 given	 the	 questionable	 ability	 of	 the	 ACFTU	 to	






Research	 on	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 China	 focuses	 on	 two	 main	 issues:	 labour	 NGOs’	
relationship	 with	 the	 state;	 and	 the	 role	 they	 play	 in	 relation	 to	 workers.	 This	
second	 aspect	 is	 examined	 in	 Chapter	 Six,	 and	 for	 matters	 of	 clarity,	 I	 do	 not	
address	it	here,	but	focus	on	the	relationship	between	labour	NGOs	and	the	Party-
state.	The	main	findings	arrived	at	in	the	literature	point	to	the	state’s	surveillance,	
co-optation	 and	 repression	of	NGOs	 (Friedman	and	 Lee,	 2010),	 pressing	NGOs	 to	




political	 support	 to	 promote	 social	 harmony	 and	 justice”.	 However,	 labour	NGOs	












2010).	 This	 confidence	 dilemma	 might	 take	 the	 NGO	 to	 stagnation	 or	 demise	
because	of	its	inability	to	create	strategies	to	act	in	response	to	local	governments’	
diverse	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	 Xu	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 beyond	 coercion,	NGOs	 are	 co-
opted	 by	 the	 Party-state	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 forms,	 some	 organizations	 becoming	
domesticated.	In	this	fashion,	Howell	(2015)	shows	that	since	2012	the	government	
has	 begun	 to	 procure	 services	 (fuwu	 goumai,	 服务购买)	 from	 labour	 NGOs	 to	
deliver	 to	migrant	workers	 in	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘welfarist	 incorporation’.	 Chan	 (2013)	 and	
Friedman	and	Lee	 (2010)	assert	some	commonalities	with	 the	above,	by	stressing	
the	 service-delivery	 orientation	 of	 labour	NGOs.	 Co-optation	 and	procurement	 of	
services	for	migrant	workers	from	labour	NGOs	is	a	mild	and	subtle	strategy	of	the	
Party-state	 to	 integrate	 within	 its	 institutional	 structures	 any	 potential	 source	 of	
conflict	and	potential	activism	from	labour	NGOs,	thus	maintaining	social	stability.		
	
Some	 labour	NGOs	 focus	 their	efforts	on	protecting	workers’	 rights,	 this	however	
does	not	prevent	their	service	delivery	orientation	(Chan,	2013;	Friedman	and	Lee,	
2010;	 Howell,	 2015;	 Xu,	 2013)	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 legal	 services	 and	
training.	Froissart	 (2011b:	 18)	 argues	 that	while	defending	workers’	 rights,	 labour	
NGOs	 “contribute	 to	 the	 political	 system’s	 flexibility	 and	 the	 regime’s	 dynamic	
stability,	and	 thus	 to	 the	Communist	Party’s	ability	 to	 remain	 in	power”.	This	 is	a	
common	 argument	 in	 the	 literature,	 responding	 to	Nathan’s	 (2003)	 authoritarian	
resilience	thesis,	as	highlighted	in	Chapter	Two.	Inasmuch	as	it	appears	to	be	a	well-
established	narrative,	and	one	 that	 the	evidence	here	 supports,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	
elaborate	 on	 the	mechanisms	 and	 analyse	 in	 detail	 the	 institutional	 factors	 that	
enable	 or	 determine	 certain	 labour	 NGOs	 to	 undertake	 functions	 that	 are	
supportive	 to	 the	 CPC’s	 remaining	 in	 power.	 The	 next	 chapter	 will	 study	 the	
institutional	 arrangement	 that	 determines	 that	 some	 of	 these	 labour	 NGOs,	
specifically,	 those	 which	 provide	 legal	 services	 according	 to	 the	 legal	 framework	
described	 above,	 hereby	 called	 legal	 action	 labour	 (LAL)	NGOs,	 efficiently	 comply	
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with	the	 legal	system	and	fulfil	 functions	beneficial	 to	the	authoritarian	state.	LAL	
NGOs	 are	 integrated	 into	 the	 legal	 system,	 or	 as	 Howell	 (2015)	 suggests,	
incorporated	into	the	state’s	provision	of	welfare	services.	
	
The	provision	of	 legal	services	by	NGOs	dates	back	to	 the	mid-1990s.	 In	1994	the	
MOJ,	with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 governments	 of	 Canada	 and	 Australia,	 propelled	
the	 development	 of	 a	 legal	 aid	 system;37	in	 1996	 the	 Lawyers	 Law	 was	 enacted	
(amended	in	2007),	enabling	the	dissociation	of	the	legal	profession	from	the	state	
(previously	 law	 firms	 were	 state-owned	 and	 lawyers	 were	 state	 bureaucrats),	 as	
well	 as	 the	 commercialization	 of	 the	 legal	 profession	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	
private	 law	 firms.	 Since	 then,	 the	 legal	 profession	 has	 begun	 to	 emulate	 the	
commercial	 model	 of	 the	 Western	 counterparts	 that	 supported	 these	 reforms	
(mainly	 Canada,	 Australia	 and	 the	 USA),	 starting	 to	 be,	 to	 a	 certain	 degree,	
independent	 from	 the	 state.	 Given	 these	 legal	 reforms,	 a	 small	 but	 significant	
number	of	non-profit	and	non-state	organizations	focused	on	the	provision	of	legal	
aid	and	assistance	to	the	‘disadvantaged’	(ruoshi	qunti,	弱势群体)	segments	of	the	
population,	 forming	 grassroots	 organizations	 as	 legal	 aid	 stations	 or	 centres,	 and	
legal	 clinics.38	Of	 these	 disadvantaged	 social	 groups,	 peasant	 or	 migrant	 workers	
constituted	 the	 main	 group,	 followed	 by	 children.	 Therefore,	 a	 small	 number	 of	
organizations	started	to	work	on	labour	issues	from	the	legal	perspective,	providing	






established	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 several	 law	 professors	 based	 at	 universities	 such	 as	 Wuhan	
University	and	Xi’an	Northwestern	University	of	Politics	and	Law	(Gallagher,	2007).	Legal	aid	centres	
were	 also	 established	 at	 the	 district	 and	 municipal	 levels	 of	 government,	 and	 at	 trade	 union	








to	advocate	and	 take	 labour	dispute	 cases	 to	make	public	 interest	 (gongyi,	公益)	
standpoints,	in	a	sort	of	Public	Interest	Litigation	(PIL),	or	“the	use	of	litigation	as	a	
strategy	to	protect	a	general	interest	that	is	larger	than	that	of	the	individual	case	




and	 Cullen’s	 (2008,	 2011)	 definition:	 lawyers	 committed	 to	 “defending	 the	 legal	
rights	of	vulnerable	groups	against	official	abuses”,	for	example,	“(migrant)	workers	
against	 employers	 in	 labour	 disputes”	 (Fu	 and	 Cullen,	 2008:	 114).	 It	 is	 these	
lawyers,	the	most	radical	ones,	who	are	seen	to	be	using	the	legal	 institutions	“to	




weiquan	 lawyers	 openly	 use	 the	 law	 to	 challenge	 the	 regime;	 those	 that	 do	 are	
mainly	 human	 rights	 lawyers	 (Pils,	 2011;	 Teng,	 2009)	 while	 others	 remain	
moderate.	 Labour	 NGOs	 such	 as	 these	 that	 provide	 legal	 assistance	 are	 relevant	
cases	 to	 examine	 whether	 and	 how	 legal	 institutions	 are	 opening	 avenues	 for	
contestation,	 as	 the	 literature	 reviewed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 suggests.	
Moreover,	with	the	increasing	number	of	public	interest	lawyers	and	labour	NGOs	
in	China	and	the	availability	of	legal	resources,	how	does	the	Party-state	ensure	that	





interest	 litigation	 in	China	 in	 the	early-mid	1990s.	Guo	 Jianmei	 is	one	of	 the	 first	 lawyers	 in	China	
advocating	 for	 legal	 aid	 and	 public	 interest	 litigation	 for	 women’s	 rights;	 she	 is	 based	 at	 Peking	
University	(PKU),	and	participated	in	the	1995	UN	World	Women’s	Conference	in	Beijing.	She	set	up	
a	legal	aid	station	at	the	Law	School	in	Peking	University	(PKU).	Li	Lihong	established	a	legal	aid	clinic	




Labour	 laws	 have	 developed	 in	 China	 as	 a	 result	 of	 different	 forces,	 economic,	
political	 and	 social,	 but	mainly	 workers’	 struggle.	 The	 resulting	 legal	 institutional	
framework	creates	an	entirely	different	labour	regime	from	the	one	existing	in	the	
Maoist	period	under	the	socialist	planned	economy.	The	new	laws	allow	the	Party-
state	 to	 govern	 labour	 relations	 and	 the	 labour	market,	 in	 a	 form	 of	 “law-based	
labour	 regime”	 (Lee,	 2007a:	 40).	 This	 chapter	 has	 shown,	 through	 a	 historical	
overview,	that	the	Party-state	has	introduced	labour	laws	to	support	the	capitalist	
economy	 and	 to	 provide	 credible	 commitments	 to	 private	 property,	 which,	 as	
indicated	by	Moustafa	(2007),	is	one	of	the	main	functions	legal	institutions	fulfil	in	
authoritarian	 regimes.	 Through	 such	 a	 legal	 institutionalization,	 the	 Party-state	







In	 practice,	 labour	 laws	 introduced	 two	main	 changes	 that	 radically	 restructured	
social	 relations	and	 relations	of	production.	Under	 the	 ‘socialist	market	economy’	
labour	 relations	 have	 been	 redefined	 as	 economic	 relations	 between	 labour	 and	
capital	which	are	formalized	through	labour	contracts,	and	have	been	recognized	as	
antagonistic;	hence	the	 institutionalization	of	conflict	resolution	mechanisms.	This	




work	was	based	on	a	 social	 contract	between	workers	and	 the	 state	 to	a	market	
economy	where	workers	are	now	‘the	weak;	an	individual	party	in	the	contractual	
relation	 of	 employment,	 in	 need	of	 protection	 by	 the	 state	 from	 the	 exploitative	
logic	 of	 the	 market.	 This	 has	 much	 more	 far-reaching	 socio-cultural	 significance,	
affecting	deeply	embedded	socio-cultural	traits	as	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	Six.		
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The	 second	 change	 is	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 conflictual	 character	 of	 the	 labour-
capital	 relation	 and	 the	 state’s	 establishment	 of	 legitimate	 and	 authorized	
mechanisms	 to	 resolve	 disputes.	 These	 legal	 mechanisms	 (mediation,	 arbitration	
and	 litigation)	mitigate	social	conflict	by	channelling	 labour	disputes	 into	the	 legal	
system	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 maintaining	 industrial	 and	 social	 harmony.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	however,	this	reform	has	enabled	new	actors	to	partake	in	the	management	
and	resolution	of	labour	disputes,	such	as	mediation	committees,	lawyers	and	civil	
society	 representatives.	 Labour	 NGOs	 are	 one	 such	 actor	 that	 has	 appeared	 to	
represent	workers	and	provide	services	at	different	 levels.	This	calls	 into	question	
the	 role	 of	 the	 ACFTU	 as	 supposed	 sole	 legal	 representative	 of	 Chinese	workers.	
Moreover,	some	of	these	organizations	have	become	integral	to	the	 legal	system,	
diffusing	the	law,	raising	rights	and	legal	awareness,	monitoring	legal	enforcement	
and	 compliance,	 and,	 crucially,	 participating	 in	 legal	 reform	 and	 development.	








disputes	 is	a	response	to	an	attempt	to	 institutionalize,	and	therefore,	 ‘judicialize’	
labour	 politics,	 a	 means	 for	 the	 Party-state	 to	 secure	 an	 increased	 oversight	
through	a	 system	 in	which	 legal	 institutions	 (courts)	 do	not	necessarily	 enjoy	 the	
independent	 capacity	 to	 adjudicate	 cases	 or	 to	 recognize	 further	 rights	 (i.e.	
collective	rights).	A	dispute-centred	analysis	that	examines	the	use	of	legal	dispute	
channels	does	not	allow	us	 to	understand	why	workers	opt	out	of	 the	 legal	path,	
what	is	not	contemplated	in	the	law,	and	what	alternative	forms	of	action	workers	
take.	 Examining	 how	 legal	 resolution	 mechanisms	 are	 not	 only	 used,	 but	 also	
perceived	by	workers,	and	how	workers	choose	to	address	labour	conflict	through	
paralegal	 or	 illegal	 actions	 will	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 view	 of	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 legal	 institutions	 secure	 social	 stability	 or,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 incite	 socio-
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The	rule	of	 law	 is	a	statecraft	and	modernization	project	 that	was	 initiated	 in	 the	
late	Qing	dynasty	and	Republican	period	when	a	system	of	political	order	based	on	
laws	 (fazhi,	法治)	 was	 given	 predominance	 over	 previous	 concepts	 and	 forms	 of	
political	 rule40	(lizhi,	 礼治	 ,	 and	 renzhi,	 ⼈治)	 (Peerenboom,	 2002;	 Zhou,	 2005).	
Serious	legal	reforms	were	initiated	after	1978	when	Deng	Xiaoping	commanded	a	
comprehensive	modernization	 programme,	 enacting	 the	 Four	Modernizations	 set	
earlier	by	Premier	Zhou	Enlai.	These	were	to	create	the	institutional	framework	to	
support	 the	 transition	 to	 the	market	 economy.	 Since	 then,	 the	National	 People’s	
Congress	 (NPC)	 has	 been	 involved	 in	 an	 intense	 law-making	 process.	 Important	
milestones	 include	 the	 1989	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Law	 that	 established	 the	
process	of	the	legal	system;	the	1992	reform	of	the	legal	profession;	and	the	2004	
legal	 reforms	 to	ensure	 judicial	 independence.	Between	1978	and	2013,	243	 laws	





Chinese	 characteristics”	 (The	 Economist,	 2014a,	 2014b;	 Xinhua,	 2014b).	 By	 so	









Chapter	 Three	 has	 provided	 a	 historical	 account	 of	 how	 the	 legal	 institutions	
governing	 labour-capital	relations	came	about	 in	response	to	the	marketization	of	
the	 Chinese	 economy	 and	 increasing	 labour	 unrest.	 Controlling	 the	 labour	 force,	
and	 ensuring	 stable	 labour-capital	 relations	 is	 crucial	 to	 sustaining	 growth	 and	
productivity	 in	a	market	economy,	hence,	 labour	 laws	aimed	at	sustaining	China’s	
growth	 patterns	 (Peerenboom,	 2002).	 Together	 with	 the	 radical	 endorsement	 of	
commoditised	 labour-capital	 relations,	 these	 laws	 established	 formal	 legal	
institutional	 mechanisms	 to	 resolve	 labour	 conflict	 outside	 the	 workplace.	 The	
increased	emphasis	of	the	laws	on	legal	resolution	of	labour	disputes	decreased	the	
relative	 prominence	 of	 trade	 union	 while	 creating	 legal	 actors	 that	 intervene	 in	
labour	 disputes	 such	 as	 mediation	 and	 arbitration	 committees, 41 	signalling	 a	
‘judicialization’	 of	 labour	 politics.	 These	 legal	 reforms	 and	 the	 increasing	 space	
available	for	civil	society	organizations	in	China	enabled	the	appearance	of	an	new	
player,	outside	the	traditional	 tripartite	 labour	system,	but	which	has	strategically	
come	 to	 intervene	 in	 (and	mitigate)	 labour	 conflict:	 legal	 aid/action	 labour	 (LAL)	
NGOs	and	weiquan	lawyers.	The	resulting	institutional	setting,	which	includes	legal	
institutions	 such	as	 labour	 laws	and	dispute	 resolution	mechanisms,	 the	 tripartite	
labour	system,	and	NGOs,	reflects	different	degrees	of	institutional	change	that	the	
CPC	 has	 put	 in	 place	 to	 absorb	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 pressures	 resulting	
from	abandoning	state	socialism	and	transitioning	to	the	market	economy.	In	other	
words,	 institutional	 changes	 that	 were	 meant	 to	 recalibrate	 the	 socio-economic	
environment	and	maintain	political	stability,	as	Nathan	(2003)	would	suggest.	
	
China’s	 success	 when	 compared	 to	 examples	 from	 the	 ex-Soviet	 republics	 and	
Eastern	 European	 countries	 draws	 much	 attention,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 the	
question	of	how	the	CPC	has	been	able	to	promote	overwhelming	socio-economic	
transformation	whilst	avoiding	systemic	change	(Gilley,	2004,	2008;	Heilmann	and	
Perry,	 2011;	 Pei,	 2006;	 Shambaugh,	 2008;	 Shirk,	 2007;	 Yan,	 2011).	 In	 addition	 to	
																																																						
41	During	state	socialism,	prior	 to	1978,	 the	 factory	or	 the	workplace	was	a	social	order	 in	 its	own	
right.	As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	Walder	 (1986)	 showed	how	 the	 factory	 relied	on	 a	 system	of	









liberal	 democracies	 as	 US,	 Canada	 or	 UK	 (Epp,	 1998;	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	
McCann,	 1994;	 Minow,	 1987),	 or	 in	 the	 Chinese	 context	 (Fu	 and	 Cullen,	 2008,	
2010).	 The	 assumption	 in	 aforementioned	 literature	 would	 be	 that	 legal	
development,	 specifically	 with	 the	 proliferation	 of	 laws,	 the	 increasing	
professionalization	 of	 lawyers	 and	 the	 appearance	 of	 public	 interest	 litigation,	
would	catalyse	important	political	challenges	to	the	regime.	It	is	therefore	of	great	
interest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 China,	 to	 explore	 the	 question:	how,	 if	 at	 all,	 does	 the	
Party-state	ensure	that	legal	institutions	fulfil	the	function	of	securing	social	stability	
(and	 not	 that	 of	 opening	 avenues	 for	 political	 contestation)?	 Underlying	 this	




fulfil	 the	 function	 of	 sustaining	 the	 regime,	 by	 examining	 how	 it	 contains	 social	
actors	 from	 politically	mobilizing	 the	 law.	 Hence	 I	 ask:	 how	 does	 the	 Party-state	
prevent	lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	from	politically	mobilizing	the	law?		
	
Section	4.1	examines	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 through	which	the	Party-state	
contains	 lawyers	and	 LAL	NGOs,	ensuring	 therefore	 that	 legal	 institutions	are	not	
politically	mobilized.	This	 institutional	arrangement	determines	that	LAL	NGOs	are	
essential	 to	 the	 legal	 system,	 and	 fulfil	 a	 crucial	 function	 for	 the	 Party-state	 –	
exerting	 social	 control	 to	 secure	 social	 stability.	 Section	 4.2	 examines	 two	 case	
studies	 that	 additionally	 highlight	 the	 central	 role	 LAL	 NGOs	 play	 in	 the	
development	 of	 legal	 frameworks.	 By	 showing	 how	 LAL	 NGOs	 engage	 in	 legal	
advocacy	work,	I	argue	that	they	are	creating	feedback	channels	(input	institutions	
in	Nathan’s	(2003)	view)	that	enable	legal	institutional	adaptation	or	drift	(Streeck	









1978	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 the	 administrative	 and	 regulatory	 reforms	 that	
followed,	 such	 as	 the	 1998	 Regulations	 on	 the	 Registration	 and	Management	 of	
Social	 Organizations	 (Lu,	 2009;	 Ma,	 2002,	 2006).	 These	 factors	 enabled	 the	
existence	 of	 civil	 society	 organizations	 within	 the	 formal	 institutional	 structures.	








that	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 disadvantaged	 groups	 (ruoshi	 qunti,	 弱势群体 )	 are	
protected,	 and	 social	 contradictions	 and	 conflict	 (shehui	 maodun, 社会⽭盾)	 are	
reduced.	 It	 [LAL	NGO]	advances	 social	 equilibrium”	 (Z7,	 19	December	2012).	How	
does	the	Party-state	ensure	that	these	civil	society	organizations	and	actors	remain	
faithful	 to	 the	 ethos	 of	 maintaining	 social	 stability,	 and	 do	 not	 mobilize	 the	 law	
politically	against	the	Party-state?	This	section	explores	the	various	components	of	





transition	 to	 the	market	 economy,	 economic	 liberalization,	 legal	 reform,	 and	 the	 burgeoning	 of	 a	






Organizations	 and	 the	 2004	 Regulations	 on	 the	 Management	 of	 Foundations,43	
NGOs	in	China	(non-profit	social	organizations,	non-governmental	non-commercial	
enterprises,	 and	 foundations)	 have	 to	 register	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Civil	 Affairs	
(MOCA)	or	local	bureaus	of	civil	affairs.	To	register	with	MOCA,	organizations	need	
a	 governmental	 sponsor	 (zhuguan	 danwei,	 主管单位)	 or	 ‘mother-in-law’	 unit	 to	







For	 example,	 since	 2004	 NGO	 X	 has	 been	 registered	 with	 the	 Beijing	 Xxxxxxxxx	
District	 Justice	 Bureau	 as	 a	 People’s	 Mediation	 Committee	 which	 qualifies	 it	 to	
provide	mediation	services;	NGO	Y	was	approved	by	Beijing’s	Bureau	of	 Justice	 in	
2007	 and	 registered	under	Beijing’s	Municipal	 Civil	 Affairs	 Bureau	 as	 a	 non-profit	
civic	 organization;	 and	 NGO	 Z	 is	 registered	 as	 a	 non-profit	 organization,	 also	 at	
Beijing’s	 Municipal	 Civil	 Affairs	 Bureau	 and	 approved	 by	 the	 Beijing	 Bureau	 of	
Justice.	NGO	Z	also	serves	as	the	branch	office	of	the	Legal	Aid	and	Public	Interest	
Committee	of	 the	All	China	Lawyers	Association	 (ACLA).	Additionally,	as	providers	




the	Administration	of	Overseas	Non-Governmental	Organizations”	 (jingwai	 feizhengfu	 zuzhi	guanli	
fa,境 外 非 政 府 组 织 管 理 法 ).	 Available	 at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2015-
05/05/content_1935666.htm	(Last	accessed	on:	8	December	2015).	This	Law	will	allow	the	Ministry	
of	 Public	 Security	 to	 control	 and	 prohibit	 foreign	 NGOs	 from	 working	 in	 China,	 and	 will	 require	
foreign	 NGOs	 to	 have	 a	 governmental	 sponsor,	 yearly	 inspections	 and	 authorization	 from	 the	
Ministry	of	Public	Security	(Duchatel	and	Kratz,	2015).	
44	Howell	 (2015:	 707-708)	 points	 out	 that	 since	 2008	 there	 have	 been	 experiments	 in	 Shenzhen,	






Usually,	 NGOs	 have	 a	 dual	 registration	 status	 with	 MOCA	 and	 a	 governmental	
professional	partner;	however,	LAL	NGOs	have	an	additional	layer	of	supervision	as	
providers	 of	 legal	 services,	 due	 to	 their	 membership	 of	 the	 ACLA	 (as	 explained	
below).		
	
The	 challenges	 and	 benefits	 of	 the	 registration	 process	 have	 been	 previously	
discussed	(Ma,	2002,	2006;	Lu,	2009).	For	example,	Yu	(2006:	117)	indicates	"every	
NGO	needs	 to	 accept	 the	 simultaneous	 guidance	of	 the	 concerned	 governmental	
authorities	 and	 the	 professional	 competent	 department,	 in	 its	 daily	 professional	
activities,	 it	 receives	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 responsible	 unit".	 Besides	 providing	
legitimacy	and	official	endorsement,	this	dual	(or	triple)	registration	process	can	be	
seen	as	a	form	of	control	exerted	by	the	Party-state	(Ma,	2006).	In	fact,	civil	society	
organizations	 in	 China	 are	 classified	 in	 a	 state	 domination-autonomy	 continuum	
depending	 on	 their	 registration	 status,	 those	 organizations	 not	 yet	 registered	
enjoying	 the	highest	 degree	of	 autonomy	 from	 state	 control	 (Howell	 and	Pearce,	
2001),	 although	 also	 being	 more	 exposed	 to	 its	 harassment.	 LAL	 NGOs	 such	 as	
NGOs	Y	and	Z	would	be	in	the	higher	end	of	the	domination	spectrum,	even	under	
the	patronage	of	the	Party-state,	having	been	registered	within	two	governmental	





What	 is	most	 relevant	 is	 to	 examine	 if	 and	 how	 these	 institutional	 requirements	
pose	any	actual	practical	(and/or	political)	opportunities	for	and	constraints	on	the	
operations	 of	 LAL	 NGOs.	 As	 shall	 be	 explained	 below,	 it	 is	 precisely	 by	 being	
approved	by	the	Bureau	of	Justice	and	having	ACLA	membership	that	NGOs	Y	and	Z	
qualify	 to	access	 funding	 from	ACLA’s	Legal	Aid	Foundation	Fund;	and	because	of	
LAL	NGOs’	professional	and	recognized	status	these	organizations	enjoy	a	political	
space	to	advocate	for	policy	changes	(see	section	4.2).	At	the	same	time,	however,	




LAL	NGOs’	dual	 registration	under	MOCA	and	 the	MOJ	 (or	 local	equivalents),	and	
with	ACLA,	represents	one	of	the	first	institutional	arrangements	through	which	the	
Party-state	 secures	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 oversight	 of	 these	 organizations.	






During	the	state	socialist	period,	 in	 line	with	the	 instrumentalist	view	of	 law	(as	a	
tool	 of	 class	 struggle),	 lawyers	 were	 employees	 of	 the	 state	 in	 state-owned	 law	
firms,	and	were	“to	serve	the	state	and	‘the	people’	(renmin, ⼈民)”	(Peerenboom,	
2002:	 347).	 However,	 during	 the	 Maoist	 period	 and	 especially	 during	 the	 anti-
rightist	 movement	 in	 1957,	 lawyers	 demanded	 changes	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 for	
which	they	were	labelled	as	capitalists	and	persecuted,	and	law	firms	were	closed	
down,	especially	during	 the	Cultural	Revolution.	 In	 the	early	 stages	of	 the	 reform	
period,	echoing	 some	of	 these	 claims	during	 the	Maoist	period	 to	professionalize	
the	 legal	 industry	 and	 separate	 law	 from	 politics,	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 started	 to	
encourage	 the	 re-development	 of	 the	 legal	 profession	 to	 support	 the	 new	
regulatory	and	 legal	process	accompanying	 the	market	economy.	To	stipulate	 the	
responsibilities,	 rights	 and	 obligations	 of	 lawyers,	 and	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 and	
interests	of	clients,	the	Lawyers	Law	(NPC,	2007c,	hereafter	LL)	was	passed	in	1996	
(amended	 in	2007).	 It	 superseded	 the	 single	 regulation	on	 the	 legal	profession	of	
the	 reform	period,	 the	 Provisional	 Regulations	 on	 Lawyers,	 passed	by	 the	NPC	 in	
1980	 (in	 effect	 in	 1982).	 The	 LL	 effectively	 inserted	 market	 logic	 into	 the	 legal	
profession,	 allowing	 lawyers	 more	 independence	 from	 the	 state	 than	 they	 had	
previously	enjoyed.		
	




the	 legal	 profession,	 by	 defining	 the	 practice	 qualification	 requirements	 and	
discipline	criteria	of	 lawyers	 in	the	LL	(lawyers	shall	abide	by	the	Constitution	and	
the	 law	 in	 their	 practice;	 LL,	 Article	 3)	 and	 in	 the	 1993	 Lawyers	 Professional	
Responsibility	 and	 Practice	 Discipline	 Standards.	 The	 Party-state	 also	 created	 the	
official	 governing	 body,	 the	 ACLA	 (the	 public	 organization	 for	 lawyers’	 self-




Under	 the	 LL	 (LL,	 Article	 6)	 "the	 State	 institutes	 a	 system	 of	 uniform	 national	
examination	 for	 the	 qualification	 of	 a	 lawyer"	 granted	 by	 "the	 judicial	
administration	department	under	 the	 State	Council".	 The	MOJ	 is	 responsible	 “for	
administering	 the	 bar	 examination,	 assessing	 lawyers’	 qualifications,	 issuing	
practice	certificates	to	lawyers	and	business	certificates	to	law	firms	and	conducting	
the	 annual	 renewal	 review,	 supervising	 compliance	 with	 professional	
responsibilities	 and	 disciplinary	 rules,	 and	 ultimately	 disciplining	 lawyers”	
(Peerenboom,	 2002:	 355).	 To	 become	 a	 lawyer,	 a	 person	 shall	 acquire	 a	
qualification	and	a	practice	licence	(LL,	Article	5).	To	acquire	such	a	qualification,	a	
person	 must	 uphold	 the	 Constitution,	 have	 a	 minimum	 of	 three	 years	 of	 legal	
education	 and	 pass	 the	 national	 bar	 examination	 (LL,	 Article	 6).	 	 To	 acquire	 the	
practice	 licence,	 a	 person	 shall	 have	 the	 lawyers’	 qualification	 and	 one	 year	 of	











an	existing	 law	 firm	or	establishing	a	 law	 firm	 from	scratch.	This	 second	option	 is	
financially	 challenging	 for	 most	 NGOs	 because	 it	 requires	 a	 significant	 upfront	
capital	of	assets	of	RMB	100,00045	or	more	(LL,	Article	15),	which	substantially	adds	




However,	 NGO	 Y	 and	 NGO	 Z	 both	 have	 lawyers	 as	 staff.	 NGO	 Y’s	 legal	 aid	
department	has	seven	 full-time	 lawyers,	while	NGO	Z’s	 legal	aid	department	 runs	
with	 twenty	 legal	 staff,	 nine	 of	 them	 lawyers	 with	 practice	 licences.	 None	 are	
employed	directly	by	the	NGO,	but	rather	by	a	private	law	firm.	For	example,	NGO	Z	
had	 originally	 been	 run	 using	 the	 duplicate	 structure,	 the	 legal	 entity	 having	
emerged	out	of	the	restructuring	of	a	state-owned	law	firm	which	was	privatized	in	
the	late	1990s	as	a	commercial	law	firm;	it	then	became	a	public	interest	law	firm	in	
2005	 serving	 as	 the	 hiring	 unit	 for	 and	 hosting	 the	 practice	 licences	 of	 all	 the	
lawyers	at	NGO	Z	(Z1,	23	May	2012).	In	effect,	for	lawyers,	the	administrative	issue	
of	 the	 location	 of	 their	 licence	 or	 their	 employment	 unit	 does	 not	 affect	 their	
practice	as	 they	are	aware	that	 they	are	hired	to	deliver	 legal	aid	at	 the	attached	
NGO.		
	
This	 arrangement	 ensures	 the	 close	 monitoring	 (double	 supervision	 from	
governmental	 bodies)	 and	 fragmentation	of	 civil	 society	 organizations	 (NGOs	 and	
law	firms),	obstructing	a	coordinated	or	unified	political	action	on	their	behalf.	This	
is	 also	 an	 important	 institutional	 obstacle	 to	 the	 development	 of	 public	 interest	
lawyering	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 in	 China,	 as	 it	 imposes	 a	 double	 financial	 and	
administrative	burden	to	set	up	two	organizational	structures	(NGO	and	law	firm)	in	
order	 to	 deliver	 legal	 aid.	 This	 duplicate	 requirement	 adds	 complexity	 and	
institutional	 layers	 to	 the	 LAL	 NGOs.	Moreover,	 it	 also	 affects	 the	 organizational	











It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 these	 registration	 and	 organizational	 duplication	
requirements	are	proof	that	the	authoritarian	Party-state	is	institutionally	designing	
a	 fragmented	 landscape	 for	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 lawyers	 who	 face	 a	 complex	 and	
constraining	 institutional	environment	 if	 they	were	 to	mobilize	 the	 law	politically.	
Moustafa	(2007)	argued	that	judicial	fragmentation	was	one	of	four	key	strategies	
through	 which	 authoritarian	 regimes	 ensure	 that	 legal	 institutions	 expand	 the	
power	of	 the	rulers.	Similarly	 in	this	case,	 this	 fragmentation	of	 legal	actors	could	




lawyers,	 building	 standards	 and	 accountability	mechanisms	 into	 the	 legal	 system.	
However,	these	institutional	arrangements	strongly	 influence,	formulate	even,	the	
organizational	 structure,	human	 resource	management,	and	culture	of	 LAL	NGOs,	
yet	again,	ensuring	that	they	comply	with	the	legal	system	as	designed	by	the	Party-
state.	It	should	not	be	forgotten,	either,	that	the	Party-state	also	creates	and	runs	
the	 legal	 disciplinary	 institutions.	 Additionally,	 the	 design	 of	 the	 legal	 profession	
determines	that	LAL	NGOs	are	useful	to	the	legal	system:	they	provide	the	platform	
for	 junior	 lawyers	 to	 fulfil	 their	 internship	 requirements	and	obtain	 their	 lawyers’	






According	 to	 the	 legal	 institutions	 governing	 the	 legal	 profession,	 lawyers	 are	
required	 to	 fulfil	 a	 one-year	 internship	 practice	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 their	 practice	
certificate	form	the	MOJ.	LAL	NGOs	such	as	NGOs	Y	and	Z,	which	are	registered	and	
attached	 to	 a	 law	 firm,	provide	one	 such	platform	 for	 junior	 lawyers	 to	 fulfil	 this	
requirement.	For	example,	 in	2012	 two	of	 the	 seven	 lawyers	working	 in	 the	 legal	




my	 internship	 here,	 so	 after	 graduating	 I	 simply	 stayed	 here	
working	 (…)	 I	 think,	 for	 us	 young	 people,	 this	 public	 interest	 is	
really	 just	doing	 the	 job,	 it’s	 the	 same	as	any	other	ordinary	 job.	
It’s	 the	 same	as	 teachers,	or	working	 in	a	 company,	 it’s	a	 job.	 In	
any	case,	at	the	same	time	you	do	your	job	you	can	also	help	many	
people.	 It’s	 like	 any	 other	 job.	 At	 that	 time,	 I	 was	 doing	 an	
internship,	I	had	not	considered	doing	this	work;	but	after	a	year	of	
internship,	 I	 felt	 this	 work	 is	 ok,	 so	 I	 graduated	 [acquired	 the	
lawyers	 practice	 certificate]	 and	 stayed	 here	 working	 (…)	 There	









of	 the	 legal	 system,	 and	 especially	 of	 legal	 aid.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 having	 been	
offered	 training	 opportunities,	more	 junior	 lawyers	will	 become	 interested	 in	 the	
public	 interest	 sector.	 For	 example,	 intern	 Lawyer	 Wei	 explained	 that	 he	 had	
become	 interested	 in	 public	 interest	 litigation	 after	 attending	 an	 activity	 on	 the	
topic	at	Tsinghua	University	and	this	led	him	to	seek	an	internship	at	NGO	Y	(Y8,	21	
November	 2012).	 Providing	 training	opportunities	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	needed	




resources,	as	well	as	uncommitted	staff	 that	 see	 their	work	at	 the	NGO	“just	 like	
any	other	job”	as	Lawyer	Zeng	mentioned	above,	and	only	having	an	instrumental	
value	in	their	own	career	development.	Lawyer	Yan	at	NGO	Z	stated:	"We	have	very	
low	 salaries	 and	 the	 public	 interest	 sector	 is	 not	 yet	 developed	 in	 China.	 Besides,	
there	is	no	security	or	protection	for	lawyers	that	are	doing	this	type	of	work.	Some	
of	the	lawyers	here	are	early	[older	generation]	lawyers,	but	the	young	generations	
of	 lawyers	 do	 not	 want	 to	 enter	 this	 sector	 because	 the	 system	 is	 not	 well	
developed"	(Z7,	19	December	2012).	The	lack	of	recognition	of	lawyers’	practice	in	
the	 public	 interest	 sector	 (public	 interest	 lawyering	 is	 not	 an	 institutionally	
recognized	 sector	 per	 se),	 and	 the	 low	 economic	 rewards	 leads	 to	 a	 rather	 high	
turnover	of	licenced	lawyers.	For	example,	in	NGO	Z,	in	2011	four	licenced	lawyers	
left	 for	 private	 practice,	 while	 in	 2012	 two	 more	 had	 left	 looking	 for	 better	
remunerated	 work	 (Lawyer	 Song,	 NGO	 Z,	 Beijing,	 6	 September,	 2012).	 This	 can	








function	 for	 the	 reproduction	and	development	of	 the	 legal	profession	 (and	 legal	
institutionalization	more	broadly),	granting	opportunities	to	junior	lawyers	to	fulfil	
the	 internship	 requirements	 on	 the	 one	 hand;	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 for	 the	
development	 of	 the	 legal	 aid	 system,	 which	 is	 understaffed	 and	 lacks	 financial	
resources	(Peerenboom,	2002:	362-364).	Through	these	institutional	arrangements,	
																																																						
46	Beijing	 is	 a	 notoriously	 constrained	 institutional	 environment	 for	 lawyers:	 since	 2010,	 due	 to	 a	
surplus	of	lawyers	in	the	capital,	the	Beijing	Municipal	Bureau	of	Justice	has	restricted	the	provision	
of	 lawyers’	 licences	 to	 only	 those	 with	 a	 Beijing	 hukou	 (Y8,	 21	 November	 2012).	 This	 is	 another	
institutional	arrangement	to	control	the	supply	of	(quality)	lawyers	in	the	cities,	which,	by	virtue	of	
distributing	 lawyers	across	 the	nation,	also	creates	a	 system	of	 segregation	and	 tiered	 lawyers.	At	
the	same	time,	it	is	an	institutional	constraint	on	lawyers	deciding	where	to	develop	their	practice.	
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established	 by	 provinces,	 autonomous	 regions,	 and	 municipalities	 directly	 under	
the	 Central	 Government”	 (LL,	 Article	 37).	 The	 ACLA	 is	 the	 bar	 association	 that	
ensures	lawyers’	self-discipline	(LL,	Article	37)	in	complying	with	the	law	through	a	
yearly	 inspection	 and	 evaluation,	 which	 in	 turn	 determines	 the	 renewal	 of	 the	






supervision	 is	 intended	 to	 ensure	 the	 quality	 and	 professionalism	 of	 lawyers	 in	
China.	 In	 fact,	 the	 Ford	 Foundation	 and	 the	American	 Bar	 Association	 have	 been	
providing	 support	 and	 training	 to	 the	 ACLA	 to	 improve	 its	 organization	 and	
management	(Peerenboom,	2002:	350).	To	manage	and	ensure	the	professionalism	
of	 lawyers,	 ACLA	 governs	 lawyers’	 behaviour	 by	 stimulating	 self-discipline	 and	
monitoring	their	compliance	with	the	responsibilities	and	obligations	stipulated	 in	
the	 LL.	 The	 ACLA	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 disciplining	 lawyers	 and	 ensuring	 their	




Lawyers’	 practice	 licences	 are	 reviewed	 annually,	 which	 implies	 that	 ACLA	
membership	also	depends	on	this	renewal	being	approved	by	the	MOJ.	As	part	of	
their	annual	review,	lawyers	have	to	submit	a	number	of	documents	to	the	MOJ	(or	
local	 equivalent):	 “a	 summary	 of	 their	 work	 during	 the	 last	 year,	 a	 certificate	 of	
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completion	 of	 training,	 a	 report	 regarding	 compliance	 with	 professional	
responsibilities	 and	 disciplinary	 rules,	 and	 a	 certificate	 evidencing	 fulfilment	 of	
obligations	set	forth	in	the	articles	of	association	of	the	bar	association”	(ibid:	355,	
quoting	 the	 Lawyers’	 Practice	 Certificate	 Administration	 Measures,	 1996).	 The	
blurred	 division	 of	 managerial,	 supervisory	 and	 disciplinary	 responsibilities	 over	
lawyers	between	the	MOJ	and	ACLA	may	be	seen	as	a	sign	of	lack	of	independence	
of	 the	 bar	 association.	 The	 institutional	 linkages	 between	 the	ACLA	 and	 the	MOJ	




the	MOJ	to	gain	access	 to	business	or	 to	curtail	predatory	officials	 (ibid:	15,	372).	
Moreover,	the	ACLA	still	needs	to	be	“linked	to	government	entities	to	survive	and	
be	 effective”	 (ibid:	 372),	 administratively,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 is	 dependent	 on	




ACLA’s	 supervision	 of	 lawyers	 and	 the	 yearly	 inspection	 before	 renewal	 of	 the	
practice	 licence	 are	 therefore	 the	 disciplinary	 mechanisms	 that	 ensure	 lawyers’	
core	compliance,	basically	pre-empting	them	(in	 theory,	at	 least)	 from	conducting	
any	 unlawful	 or	 undesired	 action.	 These	 particular	 arrangements	 have	 driven	 a	
small	number	of	lawyers	to	abandon	(or	not	enter	altogether)	formal	legal	practice,	
taking	on	 cases	 as	 citizen	 representatives,	 and	entering	what	has	been	 called	 the	
‘black	market’	 of	 lawyers.	 Lawyer	 Bo	 is	 one	 such	 lawyer	 in	 Shenzhen	who,	 after	
working	at	various	 law	firms,	 including	 two	years	at	an	 important	 labour	 law	firm	
(Law	Firm	D	will	be	discussed	further	in	Chapter	Seven),	now	practices	as	a	citizen	
representative.	He	takes	on	mainly	labour-related	cases,	charging	a	small	fee	to	his	
clients,	 but	 works	without	 a	 lawyers’	 licence	 and	 so,	 without	 affiliation	 to	 ACLA.	
This,	 he	 argues,	 gives	 him	 “a	 bit	more	 freedom”	 (T1,	 6	 January	 2013)	 to	 take	 on	
sensitive	cases	as	his	practice	does	not	depend	on	his	 licence	being	approved	 for	
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renewal.	 Sensitive	 cases	 that	 he	 mentioned	 included	 workers	 from	 SOEs	 where	
there	was	no	legal	compliance:		









Shenzhen	 government	 is	 constantly	 suppressing	 (daya,	 打 压 )	
citizen	representatives	and	they	are	considering	ways	of	requiring	
them	to	register	under	the	city	government.	At	the	national	 level,	
the	 2013	 Civil	 Lawsuit	 Law	 initially	 contemplated	 citizen	
representatives,	 but	 then	 it	 was	 taken	 out	 of	 the	 law.	 (T1,	 6	
January	2013)	
In	contrast	to	Lawyer	Bo,	other	lawyers	who	still	work	within	the	NGOs,	and	so	are	




In	 sum,	 ACLA’s	 supervision	 and	 the	 yearly	 inspection	 by	 the	 MOJ	 are	 the	
institutional	 guarantees	 of	 lawyers’	 core	 compliance	 and	 lawful	 behaviour,	
including	lawyers	at	LAL	NGOs.	These	institutional	disciplinary	mechanisms	ensure	
the	quality	 of	 all	 lawyers,	 notwithstanding	 LAL	NGOs,	 but	 also,	 that	 they	 fulfil	 an	







aid,	 while	 the	 2003	 Regulations	 on	 Legal	 Aid	 (State	 Council,	 2003)	 establish	 the	
requirements	more	 in	 detail.	 According	 to	 Lawyer	 Song	 all	 private	 law	 firms	 are	
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required	to	provide	a	stipulated	annual	quota	of	free	legal	representation	as	 legal	





lawyer	 per	 year,	 which	 she	 fulfils	 by	 volunteering	 with	 NGO	 X	 (X8,	 7	 December	
2012).	
	
Taking	 advantage	 of	 this	 regulation,	 NGO	 X	 has	 created	 a	 network	 of	 over	 300	
volunteer	lawyers	(X7,	23	November	2012),	who	are	called	in	when	labour	dispute	




by	 covering	 spare	 shifts	 at	 governmental	 or	 trade	 union	 legal	 aid	 centres.	 For	
example,	the	Beijing	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	has	at	least	20	partners	at	private	
law	firms,	but	not	from	NGOs,	“because	the	trade	union	doesn’t	like	NGOs”	(E4,	26	







and	 Z	 do),	 LAL	 NGOs	 are	 financially	 dependent	 on	 the	 state	 or	 on	 private	 or	
philanthropic	contributions.	 
	
Legal	aid	 is	a	 financially	 taxing	exercise,	more	so	because	 the	average	time-frame	
for	labour	cases	undergoing	litigation	is	two	to	four	years	(depending	on	the	nature	




conducted	 in	 legal	 institutions	 such	as	Arbitration	Committees	or	People’s	Courts	









does	not	qualify	 to	 access	 legal	 aid	 funds.	 Instead,	NGO	X	 relies	on	 funding	 from	
international	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	 Ford	 Foundation,	 the	 American,	 Japanese	
and	 Canadian	 Embassies,	 and	 even	 international	 labour	movement	 organizations	
such	as	 the	German	Rosa	Luxemburg	Foundation.	 In	contrast,	both	NGOs	Y	and	Z	
receive	 their	major	source	of	 funding	 from	the	Ministry	of	Finance	via	 the	ACLA’s	
Legal	Aid	Foundation	Fund.	A	RMB	100	million	legal	aid	fund	was	set	up	in	2010	by	
the	government	 to	provide	 funding	 to	 legal	aid	centres	and	contract	out	 some	of	
these	legal	aid	services	to	private	law	firms	(Z11,	22	January	2013).	47	In	addition	to	
funding	 from	 the	 Legal	 Aid	 Foundation	 Fund,	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z	 also	 receive	 some	




The	Legal	Aid	Foundation	Fund	has	 its	own	standards	 that	NGOs	Y	and	Z	have	 to	
comply	with.	It	provides	funds	to	cover	the	costs	of	legal	aid	(mainly	representation	
costs)	 post-facto,	 meaning	 that	 NGOs	 have	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 funding	 on	 a	 yearly	
basis	based	on	 their	provision	of	 legal	aid	 the	previous	year.	Moreover,	 the	Legal	
Aid	Foundation	Fund	has	established	standards	as	to	who	qualifies	for	legal	aid:	in	





hardship	 or	 poverty	 levels48	(pinkun, 贫困)	 (Z1,	 23	 May	 2012).	 This	 restricts	 the	
scope	of	NGOs’	reach	as	they	have	to	abide	by	these	qualifiers	when	accepting	legal	
aid	cases.	For	example,	NGO	Y	provides	free	legal	representation	to	workers	with	a	
rural	 hukou	 if	 they	 can	 provide	 proof	 that	 their	 income	 is	 below	 RMB	 500	 per	
month	per	 family	 (Y1,	 2	May	2012).	Abiding	by	 the	 categories	 established	by	 the	
Legal	 Aid	 Foundation	 Fund	 is	 necessary	 for	 NGOs	 because	 otherwise	 they	would	
incur	unfunded	costs.	However,	 this	 stipulation	 is	another	channel	 through	which	






Funding	 constraints	 increase	 the	 service	 delivery	 orientation	 of	 LAL	 NGOs,	which	
Howell	(2015:	703)	has	described	as	a	“welfarist	incorporation”	(fuwu	goumai,	服务
购买).	NGOs	Y	 and	Z’s	 entrenched	 reliance	on	 funding	 from	 the	ACLA’s	 Legal	Aid	
Foundation	 Fund	 reveals	 that	 the	 Party-state	 continuously	 procures	 legal	 aid	
services	 for	migrant	workers	 from	 LAL	NGOs.49	This	 financial	 dependency	 induces	
LAL	NGOs	 to	 self-discipline	and	 core	 compliance	 in	order	 to	 secure	 their	 funding.	
Additionally,	this	source	of	funding	is	dependent	on	the	LAL	NGO’s	having	satisfied	
previous	 requirements	of	 formal	 registration	and	recognition	by	 the	MOJ	and	 the	





one	 of	 them	 being	 in	 receipt	 of	 social	 benefits	 or	 being	 in	 the	 lowest	 income	 range.	 The	 lowest	
income	range	is	dependent	on	the	administrative	level	of	government.	Moreover,	the	corresponding	
governmental	 jurisdiction	 can	 add	 to	 the	 requirements	 established	 in	 the	 regulations	 to	 provide	
legal	 aid.	However,	 the	 State	Council	 has	 suggested	 that	 no	 requirement	 is	 necessary	 for	migrant	
workers	 applying	 for	 legal	 aid	 in	 cases	 of	 labour	 remuneration	 and	 occupational	 injury	
compensation.	See	State	Council	Suggestions	to	Resolve	the	‘Peasant	Workers	Problem’,	Article	29	
(guowuyuan	guanyu	jiejue	nongmingong	wenti	de	ruogan	yijian,	国务院关于解决农民⼯问题的若
⼲ 意 见 ) State	 Council,	 27	 March	 2006.	 Available	 at:	 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
03/27/content_237644.htm	(Last	accessed	9	December	2015).	
49	This	is	especially	significant	against	a	context	of	tightening	monitoring	of	international	funding	to	







is	 simply	giving	 the	 impression	that	 this	 is	 so,	 is	necessary	 for	 legal	 institutions	 to	
effectively	build	legitimacy	and	sustain	authoritarianism	at	the	same	time	that	their	
perceived	independence	attracts	legal	activism.	As	pointed	out	in	Chapter	Two,	the	
independence	 of	 courts	 in	 China	 is	 a	 tricky	 question,	 even	 if	 the	 judiciary	 has	
manoeuvred	 autonomous	 spaces	 at	 various	 levels	 in	 recent	 years	 (Ip,	 2012;	 Yu,	
2009).	The	lack	of	judicial	independence	has	effects	on	the	roles	and	capacities	that	
other	 legal	 institutions	 have,	 for	 example,	 to	 implement	 laws,	 and	 on	 legal	
professionals.		
	
In	 reference	 to	 the	 implementation	 and	monitoring	 of	 labour	 laws,	 research	 has	
pointed	out	the	lack	of	legal	enforcement	by	Labour	Bureaus	(Henrischke,	2011;	Ho,	
2009;	 Worker	 Empowerment,	 2009b,	 2010;	 Wang	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 For	 example,	
according	 to	 Lawyer	Ou:	“the	 Labour	Bureau	doesn’t	 care	 (buguan,	不管).51	If	 the	
worker	 has	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	 relation,	 then	 they’ll	 do	 something;	 if	 there	 is	 no	
proof,	then	they	won’t	care”	 (Y9,	26	December	2012).	When	a	worker	attends	the	
Labour	 Bureau	 to	 seek	 assistance	 for	 their	 labour	 issue,	 the	 lack	 of	 proof	 of	 the	
labour	 relation	 is	 indicative	 that	 no	 labour	 contract	 has	 been	 signed	 and	 the	
employer	 is	breaking	 the	Labour	Law	and	 the	LCL.	 Labour	Bureaus	 rarely	monitor	
contract-signing	rates,	and	generally	do	not	respond	to	disputes	that	lack	proof	of	
labour	relation	which	are	indicative	of	legal	violations	by	the	employer.	Lawyer	Eng	
emphasised	 the	 problem	 of	 lack	 of	 state	 capacity	 to	 implement	 and	 monitor	 in	
relation	 to	 Shenzhen’s	 local	 authorities:	“for	 example,	 in	 Shenzhen	 there	are	over	
200,000	companies,	while	the	labour	inspection	department	has	only	approximately	










not	have	 the	 capacity	 (or	 granted	power)	 to	 enforce	or	monitor	 compliance	with	
national	legislation,	but	also,	might	have	vested	interests	(e.g.	corporatist	interests	
with	 the	 enterprises	 in	 the	 locality)	 in	 not	 fully	 implementing	 laws	 and	 local	
regulations.		
Equally,	the	local	courts	have	no	capacity	to	meet	the	demands	of	
a	 growing	 number	 of	 labour	 conflict	 cases.	 For	 example,	 in	
Shenzhen	 every	 court	 has	 three	 people	 [the	 judge	 and	 two	
assistants].	 In	 Shenzhen	 there	 are	 simply	 not	 enough	 people	 to	
take	all	the	cases	and	that	is	why	they	keep	pushing	and	delaying	
cases.	 It	 is	 a	waste	 of	 resources,	 because	 labour	 conflict	 exceeds	
the	capacity	of	the	courts.	(D1,	25	September	2012)	
Beijing	 also	 suffers	 from	 the	 problem	 of	 judicial	 overcrowding:	 “There	 are	 over	
seven	million	peasant	workers	in	Beijing,	so	just	imagine	the	problem	of	their	access	
to	 justice	 and	 the	 law!”	 (Z11,	 22	 January	 2013).	With	 an	 increasing	promotion	of	
legal	 standards	and	a	growing	emphasis	on	 the	 law	 from	 the	 central	 government	
(Choi,	2015;	Huang	and	Huang,	2015;	Minzner	et	al.,	2015),	there	is	more	pressure	
on	all	levels	of	local	government	and	on	the	judicial	system	–	to	implement	national	
laws,	 to	 develop	 their	 own	 local	 regulations	 according	 to	 the	 law	 and	 to	 local	
conditions,	and	to	deal	with	an	increasing	use	of	the	legal	system	by	the	people.	As	
Lawyers	 Eng	 and	 Song	 indicated,	 both	 the	 governmental	 (Labour	 Bureaus)	 and	










52	Wang	 Lijun	 is	 the	 former	 police	 chief	 of	 Chongqing,	 who	 had	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 the	





There	 is	 a	 problem	 of	 judicial	 independence.	 It	 is	 a	 distribution	
problem.	 This	 distribution	 problem	 is	 also	 related	 to	 the	 power	













institutions	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 that	 they	will	 not	 act	 against	 its	 interests.	 LAL	
NGOs	act	as	a	buffer	to	the	potential	problems	caused	by	lack	of	judicial	capacity	by	





One	 way	 that	 this	 problem	 is	 being	 addressed	 is	 by	 relying	 on	 professional	 and	
approved	NGOs,	such	as	the	NGOs	in	this	study,	to	alleviate	some	of	the	pressure	
on	the	system.	In	a	way,	this	responds	to	the	‘incorporation’	of	NGOs	as	providers	
of	 services,	 as	 Howell	 (2015)	 pointed	 out.	 These	 LAL	NGOs	 provide	 legal	 aid	 and	
absorb	many	cases	that	would	otherwise	revert	to	the	Labour	Bureaus,	the	Letters	
and	 Visits	 Offices,	 or	 look	 for	 their	 own	ways	 of	 resolving	 the	matter	 (as	will	 be	
shown	 in	 Chapter	 Seven).	 “So	 NGOs	 come	 and	 resolve	 many	 problems	 that	 the	
																																																																																																																																																									
Committee,	General	 Secretary	of	 the	CPC,	and	President	of	 the	PRC,	 in	 the	18th	Party	Congress	of	
November	2012.	This	incident	precipitated	Bo	Xilai’s	downfall	and	imprisonment.	Wang	Lijun’s	trail	









government	 cannot	 resolve,	 for	 example,	 providing	 legal	 training	 (pufa,	 普法),	
providing	services,	and	preventing	many	more	 inconveniences	 (mafan,	麻烦)	 from	




and	other	 legal	means	 (Z12,	 22	 January	 2012),	was	 absorbing	 social	 conflict.	 This	
suggests	 an	 important	 correlation	 between	 LAL	NGOs	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 action,	
LAL	 NGOs	 acting	 as	 a	 buffer	 to	 potential	 social	 disruption.	 Hence,	 LAL	 NGOs	
perform	 a	 parallel	 role	 to	 that	 of	 legal	 institutions	 in	 preventing	 the	 pressure	 of	
labour	 conflict	 from	spilling	over	 to	other	 institutions	of	 the	 state	 such	as	 Labour	
Bureaus	 and	 the	 petitioning	 system.	 By	 doing	 so,	 they	 also	 become	 palliative	
instruments	 of	 labour	 conflict.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 LAL	 NGOs	 become	 buffers	 of	
labour	 conflict	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 as	 they	 drive	 disputes	 into	 the	 authorized	 and	
legal	 resolution	channels,	 increasing	 the	 institutionalization	and	 ‘judicialization’	of	








contributing	 to	 the	 dissemination,	 maintenance	 and	 development	 of	 the	 legal	
system,	and	ultimately,	securing	social	order	and	the	stability	of	the	regime.	These	
institutional	 arrangements	 include	 the	 NGO	 formal	 registration	 and	 dual	
management	 system;	 the	 regulatory	 institutions	 of	 lawyers	 –	 including	 the	 LL,	
lawyers’	practice	licence	and	ACLA	membership	–	and	patronage	relations	between	










engaging	 in	 ‘radical’	 weiquan	 lawyering	 (i.e.	 collective	 labour	 cases	 in	 SOEs	 or	
human	rights	cases),	according	to	Fu	and	Cullen’s	taxonomy	(2008,	2010).	LAL	NGOs	
are	extraordinarily	useful	 to	 the	 legal	 system	and	 the	Party-state	more	generally,	
for	yet	another	reason:	they	are	increasingly	becoming	‘intermediary’	organizations	
between	the	state	and	society,	creating	 input	 institutions	 through	which	accurate	
data	on	the	effectiveness	and	implementation	of	the	laws	is	being	transferred	back	
to	 the	 Party-state.	 Through	 this,	 LAL	 NGOs	 are	 advocating	 and	 nurturing	 the	

















LAL	 NGOs	 such	 as	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z	 are	 recognized	 as	 legitimate	 legal	 actors	 that	
provide	 legal	 aid	 to	 migrant	 workers	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 lawful	 resolution	 of	
labour	 disputes;	 they	 are	 able	 or	 allowed	 to	 engage	 in	 legal	 advocacy.	 These	
organizations	and	their	staff	lawyers	are	committed	to	the	law	and	believe	it	is	the	
best	 instrument	 to	 protect	 workers’	 rights	 and	 advance	 China’s	 socio-economic	
	 165	












participates	 in	 the	 making	 of	 labour	 regulations	 and	 national	 level	 laws	 through	
different	political	channels,	with	the	background	aim	of	developing	public	 interest	
litigation	and	the	‘rule	of	law’	in	China.	In	the	following	I	explain	how	and	why	each	
of	 these	 two	 LAL	 NGOs	 engage	 in	 legal	 advocacy	 through	 two	 case	 studies,	 and	
indicate	 the	 factors	 that	 determine	 that	 such	 organizations	 partake	 in	 the	 law-






has	been	conducting	 research,	mainly	on	occupational	health	and	 safety	 (OHS)	 in	
China,	 given	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 it	 manages	 are	 those	 of	 injured	 migrant	
workers.	This	has	given	NGO	Y	the	evidence	to	produce	extensive	research	reports	
and	 policy	 recommendations	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Regulations	 on	 Worker	 Injury	
Insurance	 (2008),	 the	Occupational	Disease	Prevention	Law	 (NPC,	2011,	hereafter	
ODPL),	the	Social	Security	Law	(2011),	and	it	continues	to	do	research	on	uninsured	











Between	 2010	 and	 2012	 the	 NPC	 reviewed	 the	 Occupational	 Disease	 Prevention	
Law	 (ODPL);55	the	 State	 Council	 Legislative	 Affairs	 Office	 opened	 the	 draft	 of	 the	
amendments	to	the	Law	to	public	consultation	in	three	rounds:	June	2011,	October	
2011	 and	December	 2011.	 In	 December	 2011	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 Law	were	
approved	 (NPC,	 2011).	 Against	 this	 timely	 context,	 NGO	 Y	 produced	 a	 research	
survey	on	occupational	disease	victims	based	on	the	cases	arriving	at	their	legal	aid	
department.	Between	2010	and	2011	with	a	sample	of	1,026	workers,	and	172	in-
depth	 cases,	 the	 research	 showed	 that	 pneumoconiosis	 is	 the	 most	 prevalent	
occupational	 disease	 (70.2%),	 followed	 by	 poisoning	 (19.1%);	 the	 majority	 of	
affected	 workers	 were	 from	 the	 mining	 industry	 (36.4%).	 Only	 23.3%	 of	 the	
sampled	 workers	 had	 some	 form	 of	 protective	 facilities	 in	 the	 workplace.	 The	
report	 also	 showed	 that	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 workers	 affected	 by	 an	
occupational	 injury	 or	 disease	 (84.3%)	 are	 migrant	 workers,	 only	 half	 of	 which	
(50.6%)	 had	 a	 written	 contract	 of	 employment.	 This	 latter	 fact	 is	 of	 great	
importance	 given	 that	 proof	 of	 labour	 relation	 and	 medical	 certificates	 are	 pre-
conditions	to	apply	for	certification	of	a	work-related	injury	or	disease	as	stipulated	
in	the	Regulations	on	Occupational	Injury	Insurance	issued	in	2003,	and	amended	in	
2010	 (State	 Council,	 2010).	 All	 this	 documentation	 and	 the	 certification	 of	









disease/injury	 is	 work-related.	 However,	 the	 report	 showed	 that	 only	 40%	 of	
affected	workers	get	any	compensation	at	all.	Furthermore,	based	on	this	study	and	
its	 experience	 in	 occupational	 health	 casework,	 NGO	 Y	 indicated	 that	 the	 chief	
obstacle	 for	 workers	 is	 obtaining	 medical	 recognition	 of	 their	 disease	 or	 injury	
because	 of	 the	 official	 documentation	 requirement	 (such	 as	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	
relation).	 Without	 a	 medical	 certification,	 workers	 are	 unable	 to	 proceed	 to	 a	
labour	dispute	and	therefore,	do	not	receive	compensation	for	their	injury/disease,	
as	mandated	by	the	Social	Insurance	Law.	At	the	time,	when	advocating	for	specific	
changes	 to	 drafts	 of	 the	 Law,	 NGO	 Y	 indicated	 that	 due	 to	 their	 lack	 of	
documentation,	48%	of	affected	workers	were	“rejected	by	the	official	occupational	





Health	 to	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	NPC	Commission	 reviewing	 the	 Law.	 In	
March	2011,	NGO	Y	was	the	only	NGO	invited	to	an	internal	meeting	organized	by	
the	Education	and	Science	Committee	(jiaoke	weiyuanhui,	教科委员会)	 to	discuss	
the	draft	 amendments	of	 the	 Law.	 In	 June,	 the	draft	was	disclosed	 to	 the	public,	
calling	for	recommendations.	At	this	time,	NGO	Y,	working	with	the	Workers’	Daily	





NGO	 Y’s	 strategy	 was	 to	 send	 their	 report	 and	 recommendations	 to	 the	 170	
Standing	Committee	commissioners	of	the	NPC,	with	suggestions	for	amendments	
to	 the	 draft.	 According	 to	 Legal	 Researcher	 Ying,	 these	 suggestions	 were	 very	
positively	received,	the	Vice-chief	Commissioner	even	reproducing	the	language	of	
this	 report	 in	his	 comments	 to	 the	media	 (Y2,	30	October	2012).	 It	 also	provided	
recommendations	 to	 the	 second	 and	 third	 round	 of	 consultation	 on	 the	 draft	
amendments.	For	the	October	2011	round,	NGO	Y	organized	a	second	forum,	while	
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included	 some	 of	 the	 recommendations	 that	 NGO	 Y	 suggested	 to	 the	 Legislative	
Affairs	 Office	 and	 the	 Commissioners	 of	 the	 NPC	 Standing	 Committee.	 Among	
others,	NGO	Y’s	recommendations,	which	were	linked	to	its	research	report,	were	
reflected	 in	 amendments	 to	 Articles	 44	 and	 62	 of	 the	 ODPL.	 Organizations	 that	
perform	the	diagnosis	of	the	occupational	disease	may	not	refuse	workers	that	seek	
diagnosis	 (ODPL,	 Article	 44)	 and	 can	 perform	 workplace	 inspections	 to	 gather	
information	 about	 occupational	 health	 conditions	 and	 hazards	 (Article	 48).	
However,	workers	who	cannot	prove	their	labour	relationship	may	apply	to	a	local	
civil	 affairs	 bureau	 for	 medical	 assistance	 (ODPL,	 Article	 62).	 In	 relation	 to	
compensation,	 the	 amended	 Law	 increases	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 imposed	 on	








process	 is	 the	 lack	of	 legal	 (and	empirical)	knowledge	that	 legislators	have.	 In	 the	
case	at	hand,	only	20	of	the	170	Commissioners	have	any	background	or	experience	
in	 law;	 the	 NPC	 Standing	 Committee	 has	 a	 serious	 lack	 of	 legal	 expertise.	 This	
expertise	is	crucial	when	particular	areas	of	the	law	are	being	developed.	Therefore,	




and	 even	 seeks	 their	 advice	 in	OHS-related	matters.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 his	 dedication	





governmental	 system	 (…).	 It	means	 that	 he	 is	 safe"	 (Y2,	 30	October	2012).	 These	
prizes	 represent	 Lawyer	 Pan’s	 political	 status,	 and	 signal	 state-endorsement	 and	
recognition	 of	 his	 position	within	 the	 legal	 apparatus.	NGO	 Y	 and	 its	 lawyers	 are	
embedded	into	the	system	(tizhinei,	体制内).	"Anyone	can	give	recommendations,	
but	when	officials	want	 to	 invite	an	expert	 to	give	advice,	 they	will	 first	 check	his	
background"	 (Y2,	30	October	2012).	Therefore,	 it	 is	NGO	Y's	acquired	professional	
and	 expert	 status	 on	 OHS	 matters	 which	 enables	 it	 to	 provide	 advice	 to	 the	












to	 certain	 gatekeepers	 at	 the	 governmental	 level,	 and	 to	 have	 knowledge	 of	 the	
political	 dynamics	 of	 law-	 and	 policy-making	 in	 China.	 NGO	 Y	 concentrates	 its	
efforts	where	it	knows	it	will	see	an	outcome:		
Here	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 change	 the	 law,	 not	 the	 regulations	 of	 the	
different	 governmental	 departments.	 Legislators	 are	 independent	
and	 they	 don’t	 have	 conflicts	 of	 interests.	 [Government]	
departments	 have	 interests	 and	 if	 regulations	 are	 too	 strict,	 it	 is	
them	 that	 are	 affected	 (…).	 It	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 change	 the	
regulations	from	departments.	(Y2,	30	October	2012)	
For	 example,	 Legal	 Researcher	 Ying	 compared	 the	 outcome	of	NGO	Y’s	 advocacy	
work	during	the	drafting	of	the	ODPL	and	the	current	work	they	are	conducting	on	
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points	 out:	 “you	 can	 see	 the	 interests	 in	 the	 departments,	 their	 willingness	 to	
protect	 their	 interests”,	 for	 example,	 each	 department	 being	 concerned	 by	 the	
budgetary	implications	that	would	derive	from	providing	insurance	to	workers.	This	
would	 require	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 fund	 for	 uninsured	 workers,	 and	 would	 imply	
different	departments	having	to	decide	which	one	had	the	main	responsibility	(i.e.	
the	 Department	 of	 Labour,	 the	 Department	 of	 Work	 Injury	 Insurance,	 or	 the	
Department	of	Medical	Insurance	under	the	Ministry	of	Labour	and	Social	Security,	
or	other	departments	under	the	Ministry	of	Health).	Moreover,	she	said:	
There	 is	no	 judicial	 review	of	 the	 regulations	of	 the	departments;	
the	 departments	 make	 regulations	 without	 supervision	 by	 a	
legislative	 body,	 while	 the	 national	 legislator	 [NPC]	 is	 kind	 of	
independent,	 kind	 of	 independent.	 Because	 departments	 are	
disconnected,	 and	 no	 department	 alone	 can	 decide	 on	 a	 law	 by	
themselves,	but	 they	can	decide	on	regulations	 (…)	 in	 the	case	of	







Different	 government	 departments	 can	 have	 different	 interests	 and	 on	 some	
occasions,	their	regulations	can	be	contradictory.	NGO	Y	orchestrates	a	coordinated	
advocacy	 approach	 that	 aims	 to	 propose	 institutional	 changes	 that	 balance	 the	
interests	 of	 different	 governmental	 departments	 (the	 different	 stakeholders),	 are	
more	 effective	 and	 have	 a	 higher	 likelihood	 of	 impacting	 regulations.	 However,	
because	of	the	complexities	of	coordinating	the	interests	of	different	departments,	
when	it	comes	to	policy	advocacy,	and	specifically	in	the	case	of	advocating	for	the	








NGO	Y	 therefore	 is	a	 recognized	and	endorsed	actor	 that	operates	within	and	 for	






extremely	 valuable	 feedback	 to	 improve	 the	 legal	 institutions.	 NGO	 Y	 therefore	




Since	 2002,	 NGO	 Z	 has	 engaged	 in	 legal	 and	 policy	 advocacy,	 most	 importantly,	
promoting	 public	 interest	 (gongyi,	公益)	 law	 in	 China.	 Its	 leader,	 Lawyer	 Fu,	 is	 a	
well-established	 legal	 practitioner,	 scholar,	 and	 policy	 advocator,	 and	 one	 of	 the	
leading	 figures	 in	 China	 advocating	 for	 public	 interest	 law.	 For	 Lawyer	 Fu	 “the	









issue	 into	concrete,	 specific	 issues,	and	advocate	 for	 little	 things,	 this	way	we	can	
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speak	 up	 for	migrant	workers’	 needs”	 (Z12,	 22	 January	 2013).	 NGO	 Z’s	 advocacy	
model	is	based	on	its	well-established	expertise	and	its	empirical	evidence	is	based	
on	 more	 than	 ten	 years	 of	 professional	 work	 and	 its	 legal	 research	 department	
houses	 half	 its	 50	 member	 staff	 (Z1,	 23	 May	 2012).	 Based	 on	 its	 continuous	
casework,	 legal	 researchers	 produce	 the	 evidence	 identifying	 the	 legal	 problems	
and	main	labour	issues	peasant	workers	face	which	informs	their	recommendations	
for	 policy	 or	 legal	 reform.	 In	 a	 broader	 sense,	 NGO	 Z	 also	 acts	 as	 a	 labour	
inspectorate	because	when	handling	a	case,	it	“looks	for	the	people	responsible,	we	
go	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 line,	 and	 demand	 accountability	 and	 responsibility,	 putting	






evidence	 to	make	 policy	 issues	 concrete,	 to	 “break	 things	 down	 and	make	 them	








Occupational	 Injury	 Insurance	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Security	
requesting	his	views	on	the	occupational	injury	insurance	system.	NGO	Z	produced	
a	 report	 based	 on	 152	 cases	 of	 injured	 migrant	 workers	 they	 had	 dealt	 with	
between	 2005	 and	 2007,	 and	 pointed	 out	 more	 than	 1,140	 occupational	 injury	
problems.	 The	 report	 was	 provided	 to	 the	 Department	 of	 Occupational	 Injury	
Insurance,	recommending	reform	of	the	existing	Regulations	on	Occupational	Injury	
Insurance.	 Thereafter,	 between	 2007	 and	 2009,	 Lawyer	 Fu	 and	 other	 lawyers	 at	
NGO	 Z	 were	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 roundtables	 at	 the	 Department	 of	
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Occupational	Injury	Insurance	where	amendments	to	the	Regulations	were	drafted	
prior	 to	 public	 consultation.	 They	were	 also	 invited	 to	 other	 high	 level	meetings,	
such	 as	 the	 February	 2009	 final	 roundtable	 to	 discuss	 the	 problems	 of	
implementation	of	the	Social	 Insurance	Law	with	the	Administrative	Law	Office	of	
the	Legislative	Commission	of	 the	NPC,	the	Political-Legislative	Department	of	 the	
Legislative	 Office	 of	 the	 State	 Council,	 and	 the	 Legislative	 Department	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Security	 (Xxxx,	 2009:	 222).	 In	 July	 2009	 the	 State	
Council	 Legislative	 Office	 announced	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 Regulations	 (Xxxx,	
2009:	227-228).	Years	later,	in	2011,	the	Social	Insurance	Law	was	enacted.		
	











and	 governmental	 legal	 aid	 centres,	 but	 Lawyer	 Fu	 advocated	 for	 civil	 society	






Lawyer	 Fu’s	 own	political	 capital.	NGO	Z,	 having	begun	 life	 as	 a	 state-owned	 law	
firm,	restructured	into	a	private	law	firm	under	which	it	built	a	public	 interest	law	
firm	 or	 NGO.	 It	 already	 had	 state	 endorsement	 as	 a	 legacy	 from	 its	 original	




(regulations	 for	 registration,	 funding,	 etc.).	 This	 enabled	 NGO	 Z	 to	 develop	 and	
engage	in	 large	amounts	of	casework	in	various	fields,	not	only	 labour.	Moreover,	
Lawyer	Fu	is	a	political	figure	with	substantial	political	status:	he	is	a	member	of	the	
CPC;	was	one	of	 the	nineteen	members	 of	 the	 Legislative	Committee	of	 the	NPC	
(falü	 weiyuanhui, 法律委员会);	 is	 the	 legislative	 representative	 at	 the	 Beijing	
People’s	 Congress;	 and	 the	 Director	 of	 the	 Legal	 Aid	 Committee	 of	 the	 ACLA;	 in	
2012	he	was	standing	director	of	the	ACLA,	and	the	legislative	representative	of	the	
Standing	Committee	of	the	People’s	Congress	of	Beijing	City	for	Xxxxxx		District;	he	
was	 one	 of	 only	 three	 lawyers	 to	 attend	 the	 18th	 Party	 Congress,	 where	 he	
advocated	 for	 the	 deepening	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 China.	 Lawyer	 Song,	 NGO	 Z’s	
Executive	 Director	 is	 also	 a	 member	 of	 the	 CPC,	 and	 Secretary	 General	 of	 the	
Committee	on	Public	Interest	Law	at	the	ACLA,	and	has	been	awarded	the	National	
1	May	Medal	by	the	ACFTU.	These	facts	indicate	NGO	Z’s	political	capital,	which,	“of	
course,	 gives	him	 [Lawyer	 Fu]	 enormous	opportunities	 to	 speak	out	and	advocate	
for	policy	and	legal	reforms”	(Z13,	30	January	2013).	Lawyer	Fu’s	background	allows	
NGO	 Z	 a	 privileged	 position	 within	 the	 political	 and	 legal	 systems,	 enabling	 its	
participation	 in	government-led	discussions	and	working	 forums	where	 the	drafts	
of	legislation	are	designed	and	shaped.	Lawyer	Fu	pursues	the	development	of	the	









NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z	 therefore	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 China’s	 labour	
legislation	and	the	 legal	aid	system,	pointing	to	broad	 implications	at	 the	political	
level,	 claiming	 to	 “represent	workers	 at	 the	 policy	 level”	 and	 “to	 speak	workers’	
needs”	 (NGO	Z).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 LAL	NGOs	are	 instrumental	 in	 the	 legal	
governance	of	 labour	 relations	 in	 China,	 as	 they	not	 only	 identify	 legal	 loopholes	
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and	gaps	 in	 implementation,	 but	 also	perform	 functions	properly	 those	of	 labour	
inspectors	 from	 the	 Labour	Bureaus	 as	 they	 identify	workplaces	where	 there	 is	 a	
lack	of	legal	compliance	(for	example,	lack	of	labour	contract	signing,	or	insurance	




Of	 the	 two	cases	discussed,	NGO	Z	more	clearly	 illustrates	 the	 role	LAL	NGOs	are	
playing	 in	 the	macro-structure	of	China’s	 legal	 system,	 instrumentally	 formulating	
and	developing	 legislation	and	providing	the	platform	for	 the	development	of	 the	
legal	aid	system	and	of	lawyers.	Moreover,	the	case	of	NGO	Z	provides	evidence	of	
the	 simultaneous	 role	 LAL	 NGOs	 play	 at	 the	 macro-level,	 promoting	 legal	
development	at	the	same	time	that	they	are	instrumental	in	governing	both	labour	
and	 lawyers	 in	 China.	 NGO	 Z’s	 main	 lawyers,	 Lawyer	 Fu	 and	 Lawyer	 Song	 are	
directors	 of	 different	 units	within	ACLA	 and	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 law-making	
process	also	highlights	 the	 fact	 that,	despite	 the	ACFTU’s	 legal	 status	as	 the	 ‘sole	
legal	 representative	 of	 workers’,	 there	 are	 other	 actors	 taking	 on	 the	 role	 of	
workers’	representative	at	the	policy	level.	They	are	able	to	take	this	role	because	
of	 the	professional	expertise	and	political	 capital	of	 the	 leaders	of	 the	 LAL	NGOs,	
which	reflects	their	state-endorsement.	Moreover,	these	LAL	NGOs	function	within	
the	 state-sanctioned	 frameworks	 and	 perform	 crucial	 functions	 for	 the	
government,	 such	as	 the	delivery	of	 social	 services	 (in	 the	 form	of	 legal	 aid),	 and	
resolution	 of	 labour	 disputes,	 thus	 preventing	 conflict	 from	 overcrowding	 other	
governmental	channels	(such	as	petitioning),	both	of	which	ultimately	contribute	to	
the	primary	 aim	of	 the	 legal	 system	–	 the	preservation	of	harmonious	 social	 and	
labour	 relations,	 and	 social	 order.	 Finally,	 NGO	 Z	 aims	 to	 play	 an	 ever	 more	
transformative	role	within	the	legal	system,	as	 its	 legal	advocacy	work	is	 intended	
to	pave	the	way	to	the	rule	of	law	in	China	(Z13,	30	January	2015).									
	
Through	 this	 advocacy	 work	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z	 constitute	 themselves	 as	 input	
institutions	for	bottom-up	channelling	of	information,	in	the	sense	that	they	enable	





(enabling	 the	 law	 to	 fulfil	 its	 function	 to	maintain	 social	 stability	 (weiwen,	维稳).	
This	sort	of	dynamic	is	analogous	to	the	kind	of	institutional	change	through	active	
‘political	 cultivation’	 of	 the	 institutions	 by	 different	 political	 elites	 to	 adjust	 the	
institutions	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 environment	 (drift)	 which	 ultimately	
enables	both	institutional	and	political	continuity:	“regimes	capable	of	survival	in	a	
complex	environment	are	likely	to	have	built-in	feedbacks	that	inform	rule	makers	
how	 their	 rules	 are	working	 out	 in	 practice”	 (Streeck	 and	 Thelen,	 2008:	 15).	 LAL	








In	 this	 chapter	 I	have	examined	 the	question	of	how	the	Party-state	ensures	 that	
the	law	fulfils	the	function	of	preserving	social	stability	and	maintaining	the	regime.	
I	have	shown	that	it	does	so	through	a	sort	of	incorporation	(Howell,	2015)	of	civil	
society	actors	 (LAL	NGOs	and	 lawyers)	who	become	crucial	players	 in	maintaining	
social	stability.	I	have	examined	the	formal	institutional	arrangement	that	is	in	place	
to	 ensure	 that	 civil	 society	 actors	 (legal	 actors	 such	 as	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 lawyers)	





society	 organizations.	 It	 includes	 the	 regulations	 on	 NGO	 registration	 and	 the	
institutional	duplication	(and	fragmentation)	of	LAL	NGOs	into	private	law	firm	and	
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NGO,	 their	 supervision	 by	 MOCA,	 MOJ	 and	 ACLA;	 the	 legal	 and	 professional	
requirements	demanded	of	lawyers	–	internships,	licences	and	ACLA	membership,–	
ensures	 lawyers’	and	LAL	NGO	legal	staff’s	core	compliance	to	the	 law	(Moustafa,	
2007);	 the	 public	 sources	 of	 funding	 for	 legal	 aid	make	 LAL	 NGOs	 dependent	 on	
public	funding	and	interested	in	cooperating	with	the	state;	and	the	lack	of	judicial	
independence	(Moustafa,	2007)	and	capacity	pressures	LAL	NGOs	to	fill	in	the	gaps	
and	 fulfil	 similar	 functions	 to	 the	 judiciary	 and	 Labour	 Bureaus.	 It	 is	 possible,	
therefore,	 that	 due	 to	 ACLA’s	 close	 relationship	 with	 the	 MOJ	 and	 LAL	 NGOs’	
dependence	 on	ACLA’s	 funding,	 that	 LAL	NGOs	 are	 also	 involved	 in	 patronage	or	
clientelist	 relations	with	 the	MOJ,	hence,	extending	 their	 core	 compliance.	 I	 have	
argued	 that	 these	 institutional	 arrangements	 incorporate	 ‘intermediary’	
organizations	 such	 as	 LAL	NGOs	 beyond	 the	 procurement	 of	 services	 (as	 pointed	
out	by	Howell,	2015).	 In	 these	cases,	LAL	NGOs	appear	 to	be	 integral	 to	 the	 legal	
system,	 which	 enables	 the	 CPC	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 restrain	 themselves	 from	
challenging	the	regime	or	inciting	workers	to	mobilize.	Hence,	these	actors	enable	








the	 law’s	 function	 of	 maintaining	 social	 stability.	 These	 organizations	 do	 so	 by	
contributing	to	the	diffusion,	implementation,	fine	functioning	and	development	of	
the	 laws,	managing	 labour	 disputes	 and	 feeding	 evidence	 about	 laws	 in	 practice	
back	 into	 the	 system.	 LAL	 NGOs’	 research	 and	 advocacy	 is	 hence	 of	 extreme	
importance	 to	 the	 Party-state.	 Identifying	 gaps	 in	 implementation	 and	 advancing	
labour	legislation	is	not	only	extremely	significant	to	furthering	workers’	rights,	but	
also	 crucial	 to	 the	 Party-state	 and	 the	 trade	 union	which	 have	 limited	 first-hand	
knowledge,	legal	expertise	and	capacity	to	develop	the	legal	frameworks.	LAL	NGOs	
such	as	NGOs	Y	and	Z	provide	 the	expertise	and	empirical	data	necessary	 for	 the	
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improvement	and	perpetuation	of	 the	 legal	 framework	governing	 labour	relations	
in	China.	 LAL	NGOs	 therefore	compensate	 for	 the	 inadequacies	and	 limitations	of	
the	Party-state’s	capacity,	and	enable	the	cultivation	and	gradual	 improvement	of	







the	 assumption	 that	weiquan	 lawyers	 in	 China,	 and	 by	 extension,	 LAL	NGOs,	 can	
somehow	 radically	 challenge	 the	 authoritarian	 state	 or	 politically	 activate	 or	
mobilize	 their	 constituency	 (their	worker	 clients),	 as	will	 be	explained	 in	 the	next	





regimes	 and	 to	 push	 for	 policy	 and	 political	 transformation,	 such	 as	 in	 liberal	
democracies	as	in	the	USA,	Britain	or	Canada	(McCann,	1994;	Epp,	1998;	Moustafa	
and	 Ginsburg,	 2008),	 or	 even	 under	 authoritarianism	 (Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007).	 In	
China,	however,	these	LAL	NGOs	do	not	represent	a	challenge	to	the	status	quo	of	
the	regime;	on	the	contrary,	they	are	constructive	to	its	resilience	and	adaptability	
to	 contemporary	 socio-economic	 conditions	 and	 challenges	 having	 been	





























activists]	 to	 challenge	 state	 policy	 because	 most	 other	 formal	 avenues,	 are,	 by	
definition,	 closed	 down	 in	 authoritarian	 states.	 Litigation	 also	 affords	 strategic	
advantages	to	political	activists	because	 it	provides	opportunities	to	challenge	the	
state	without	 having	 to	 initiate	 a	 broad	 social	movement”	 (Moustafa,	 2007:	 42).	
Halliday	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 argue	 that	 the	 necessary	 condition	 for	 legal	 institutions	 to	
open	 to	 transformative	 political	 results	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 ‘legal	 complex’	 or	 a	
vanguard	of	lawyers	that	fight	for	liberalism	(Halliday	et	al.,	2007).	Moustafa	(2007)	
asserted	that	it	is	the	existence	of	a	‘judicial	support	network’	that	is	independent	
enough	 from	 the	 authoritarian	 rulers	 that	 opens	 up	 spaces	 for	 legal	 activism.	 In	
turn,	in	liberal	democracies,	Epp	(1998)	indicated	that	the	necessary	pre-condition	
for	a	 ‘rights	 revolution’	 (the	 transformation	of	 individual	 rights	 into	constitutional	
rights)	is	the	existence	of	a	‘support	structure’	(Epp,	1998),	an	organized	leadership	





of	 providing	 resources,	 strategies,	 and	 frames	 for	 rights-based	 claims.	 Legal	
mobilization	 in	 this	 case	 enabled	 or	 catalysed	 the	 social	 movement	 formation,	
because	it	was	combined	with	grassroots	collective	action.	Hence,	the	assumption	
drawn	 from	 this	 literature	 is	 that	 legal	mobilization,	 in	most	 cases	 by	 lawyers	 or	
with	 the	 support	 structure	 of	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations,	 has	 the	
	 181	




(2006:	 2)	who	 argue	 that	 in	 rural	 areas	 “rightful	 resistance	 entails	 the	 innovative	
use	of	 laws,	policies	and	other	officially	promoted	values	 to	defy	disloyal	political	
and	 economic	 elites”.	 Liebman	 (2011:	 181)	 argues	 that	 “legal	 aid	 has	 been	
encouraged	despite	knowledge	that	the	creation	of	a	public	 interest	bar	has	been	
an	 important	 catalyst	 for	 regime	 challenges	 elsewhere	 in	 Asia	 and	 in	 the	 colour	
revolutions	of	 the	 former	 Soviet	 bloc	 countries”.	Gallagher	 (2006:	 55)	 also	points	
out	 that,	“despite	widespread	pessimism	about	 the	enforcement	of	Chinese	 laws,	
laws	matter	greatly	for	how	disputes	arise	and	how	disputes	are	resolved.	We	must	





avenues	 for	 political	 contestation	 in	 which	 lawyers	 are	 the	 vanguard	 of	 political	
movements	 (Halliday	 et	 al.	 2007),	 and	 form,	 together	 with	 civil	 society	
organizations,	the	support	structure	of	legal	mobilization	(Epp,	1998)	that	catalyses	
social	 movement	 (McCann,	 1994;	 Scheingold,	 2004).	 Therefore,	 to	 assess	 if	 and	
how	 laws	 sustain	 authoritarianism,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 examine	 if	 and	how	 laws	 are	
used	 in	political	 contestation,	 asking:	 to	what	 extent	does	 the	mobilization	of	 the	
law	by	 lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	trigger	political	and	social	mobilization	to	challenge	
the	regime?	By	legal	mobilization	I	refer	to	lawyers’	and	LAL	NGOs’	use	of	the	legal	
institutions	 in	 labour	 disputes,	 such	 as	 mediation,	 arbitration	 and	 litigation;	
however,	I	also	examine	how	LAL	NGOs	mobilize	the	law	for	training	and	education	
purposes.	I	argue	that	it	is	crucial	to	examine	the	process	of	legal	mobilization	and	
the	 relational	 dynamics	 developed	 between	 lawyers	 and	 workers	 in	 order	 to	
understand	how	and	why	lawyers’	and	LAL	NGOs’	legal	mobilization	foster	(or	not)	
workers’	 activism.	 Hence,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 provide	 detail	 of	 the	 interactive	
processes	at	play	between	 lawyers	and	workers	 in	 the	three	LAL	NGOs,	gathering	
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evidence	 from	 participant	 observations	 in	 LAL	 NGOs’	 legal	 consultations	 and	
interviews	with	lawyers	and	workers.	
	
Section	 5.1	 lays	 out	 the	main	 discussion	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 political	 role	 of	
labour	NGOs	and	lawyers	in	China.	Section	5.2	examines	the	organizational	culture	
of	LAL	NGOs	and	how	it	shapes	its	interactions	with	workers.	Section	5.3	examines	
how	 LAL	 NGOs	 socialize	 workers	 in	 the	 laws,	 in	 legal	 consultation	 and	 legal	





As	 asserted	 in	 the	 literature,	 the	 role	of	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	organizations	 is	
necessary	 for	 the	 political	 mobilization	 of	 the	 law	 to	 exert	 policy	 and	 political	
changes	 (Epp,	 1998;	 Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 McCann,	 1994;	 Scheingold,	 2004).	 In	
China,	previous	 research	has	 investigated	 the	political	 role	of	 labour	NGOs	 (Chan,	
2013;	Cheng	et	al.,	2011;	Franceschini,	2014;	Froissart,	2011;	Howell,	2015;	Lee	and	
Shen,	 2011;	 Pun,	 2009;	 Xu,	 2013)	 and	 lawyers	 (Froissart,	 2014;	 Fu,	 2009;	 Fu	 and	
Cullen,	 2008;	 Pils,	 2007,	 2011;	 Teng,	 2009),	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 their	 legal	 and	





the	 literature.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 is	 the	 optimistic	 view	 that	 labour	 NGOs	
represent	 an	 alternative	 form	 of	 workers’	 organization	 (Howell,	 2015),	 that	 both	
empowers	and	includes	workers	 in	urban	spaces	(Gransow	and	Zhu,	2014).	Cheng	
et	 al.	 (2010:	 1082)	 argue	 that	 the	 current	 Chinese	 “pre-civil	 society”,	 of	 which	
labour	NGOs	are	a	part,	“are	becoming	increasingly	powerful	 instruments	through	
which	 Chinese	 people	 take	 part	 in	 public	 affairs,	 develop	 and	 articulate	 personal	
interests,	and	collectively	form	a	more	active	and	participatory	citizenry”.		
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Chan	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 the	 Pearl	 River	 Delta	 are	 based	 in	 the	
community	of	migrant	workers	and	constitute	an	alternative	 form	of	organization	
for	migrant	workers	 in	 the	 area.	 Chan	 (ibid:	 7)	 argues	 that	 labour	NGOs	 that	 are	
“rooted	 in	 migrant	 workers’	 communities,	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 empower	 the	
vulnerable	workers	 and	 create	 a	 space	 for	 an	 independent	 civil	 society,	 although	
they	cannot	be	regarded	as	democratic	working	class	organizations”.	This	is	mainly	
due	 to	 labour	 NGOs	 not	 having	 resources	 from	 within	 the	 migrant	 workers’	
communities	 and	 not	 being	 reliant	 on	 this	 social	 basis	 to	 operate.	 Nevertheless,	
these	 organizations,	 even	 with	 the	 challenges	 presented	 by	 the	 Party-state’s	
repression,	 limited	 access	 to	 international	 funding	 and	 scarcity	 of	 sustainable	
human	resources,	do	create	a	space	“to	empower	the	vulnerable	migrant	workers	
with	 legal	 knowledge	 and	 organizing	 skills”	 (ibid:	 19).	 That	 is,	 labour	 NGOs	 have	
been	seen	to	empower	workers	by	raising	their	rights	consciousness	and	protecting	
their	 rights.	 Gallagher’s	 (2007)	 research	 on	 university-based	 legal	 aid	 clinics	 (not	
registered	as	NGOs,	 but	 generally	 formal	units	 under	 law	 schools	 at	 universities),	
shows	 that	 these	 organizations	 empower	 workers	 by	 teaching	 them	 their	 rights,	
how	to	use	the	law	to	protect	themselves,	and	providing	assistance	in	legal	cases.	
Lee	 and	 Shen	 (2011)	 agree	 with	 these	 authors,	 arguing	 that	 labour	 NGOs	 train	
workers	in	legal	skills,	raise	their	rights	awareness,	and	are	useful	to	claim	workers’	
wages.	However,	they	conclude	on	a	much	more	critical	note,	arguing	that	 labour	
NGOs	 are	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘anti-solidarity	 machine’	 because	 they	 do	 not	 stimulate	 the	
formation	of	a	working	class	identity	and	solidarity	action.		
	
Similarly,	 Hui	 (2014:	 121),	 from	 a	 Gramscian	 perspective,	 argues	 that	 there	 are	
labour	 NGOs	 and	 labour	 rights	 lawyers	 in	 the	 Pearl	 River	 Delta	 in	 Guangdong	
Province	that	reinforce	the	legal	hegemony	rather	than	nurturing	the	formation	of	
workers’	class	consciousness	and	stimulating	their	counter-hegemonic	movement.	
Hui	 sees	 three	 reasons	 for	 this:	 first,	 these	 agents	 follow	 the	 capitalist	 logic	 that	
presumes	that	labour	and	capital	have	“self-autonomy”	to	enter	the	“free	market”;	
second,	 their	 legalistic	 approach	 channels	 “labour	 activism	 into	 the	 legal	 arena”;	
and	 third,	 it	 atomizes	workers	 into	 legal	 subjects,	 detracting	 them	 from	 the	 class	
component	 of	 their	 struggle	 (ibid:	 221-222).	 There	 are,	 however,	 Hui	 (ibid:	 212)	
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admits,	 some	 radical	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 the	 Pearl	 River	 Delta,	 that	 although	 having	














direct	 participation	 of	migrant	workers	 in	NGOs.	 This	 coincides	with	 Chan	 (2013)	
who	 writes	 that	 even	 community-based	 organizations	 lack	 embeddedness	 in	
migrant	 workers	 communities.	 This	 last	 point,	 I	 would	 argue,	 is	 most	 important	
when	 considering	 the	 potential	 labour	 NGOs,	 LAL	 NGOs	 in	 particular,	 have	 to	
politically	activate	workers.	In	the	case	of	LAL	NGOs,	the	professional	composition	
of	NGO	staff	heightens	 the	divide	between	them	and	the	migrant	workers,	which	
highlights	 the	 service	 delivery	 orientation	 of	 the	 NGOs,	 instead	 of	 its	 integration	
and	 embeddedness	 with	 workers,	 which	 would	 allow	 the	 NGO	more	 capacity	 to	
activate	 or	 mobilize	 workers.	 Therefore,	 the	 study	 of	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 weiquan	
lawyers	 requires	 an	 interrogation	 of	 the	 assumptions	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 legal	
institutions,	laws	in	particular,	open	avenues	for	political	contestation	(Halliday	and	
Karpik,	2001;	Halliday,	et	al.,	2007;	Moustafa,	2007;	Solomon,	2008,	2010),	and	that	
legal	mobilization	 by	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 support	 and	 catalyse	
political	movements	(Epp,	1998;	McCann,	1994;	Scheingold,	2004).	In	the	following	
I	will	examine	LAL	NGOs’	organizational	culture,	and	their	legal	education	and	legal	





business	 area	 of	 XXXXXXXXXX,	 in	 the	 heart	 of	 Beijing.	 Peasant	workers	 in	 Beijing	
rarely	have	a	reason	and	time	to	travel	to	the	most	central	point	of	the	city.	NGO	
X’s	centrality	can	be	a	physical	sign	of	 its	distance	to	workers;	other	 labour	NGOs	
choosing	 to	 locate	 closer	 to	 industrial	 areas	 to	 facilitate	 access	 and	 increase	
embeddedness	 in	 workers’	 communities.	 However,	 NGO	 X	 praises	 its	 office	 as	 a	
meeting	point	for	many	migrant	workers.	On	arriving	at	NGO	X’s	office,	workers	–	
always	addressed	as	‘workmate’	(gongyou,	⼯友)	or	‘worker’	(dagongzhe,	打⼯者)	
are	 warmly	 welcomed,	 invited	 to	 sit,	 have	 a	 rest,	 drink	 some	 tea	 or	 hot	 water.	
Before	discussing	the	specific	 labour-related	concern	that	has	brought	the	worker	
to	NGO	X,	there	is	always	a	broader	conversation	involving	the	origin	of	the	worker,	
his/her	migration	 experience,	 daily	 life,	 how	 he/she	 is	 coping	with	work	 and	 the	
city,	 etc.	 In	 the	 open	 space	 of	 NGO	 X's	 office,	 workers	meet	 other	workers,	 and	
overhear	each	other’s	experiences.	In	fact,	one	of	NGO	X's	daily	tasks	is	to	compile	
diaries	and	stories	of	migrant	workers	who	seek	their	services.	To	this	purpose,	 in	
2012	 NGO	 X	 had	 two	 members	 of	 staff	 dedicated	 to	 interviewing	 workers,	
transcribing	their	stories,	and	uploading	them	to	the	"Workers'	Archives"	section	of	
its	 website.	 This	 creates	 an	 enormous	 reference	material	 of	 life-stories,	 histories	
and	experiences	of	labour	migration	and	daily	struggles	for	other	migrant	workers,	





road.	 Its	offices	are	 in	a	two-storey	building.	 In	contrast	to	NGO	X	which	uses	the	
terms	 ‘workmate’	 or	 ‘worker’	 to	 refer	 to	 workers	 under	 the	 condition	 of	
“temporary	or	casual	worker”	and	“workmate”,	NGOs	Y	and	Z	refer	to	workers	as	
‘peasant	 workers’	 (nongmingong,	 农民⼯)	 or	 ‘clients’	 (dangshiren,	 当事⼈).	 The	







workers	 being	 looked	 down	 as	 having	 a	 rural	 and	 ‘backward’	 background,	 low	
education	 levels	and	being	of	 low	quality	 (suzhi,	素质).	The	use	of	 ‘dagongzhe’	or	
‘gongyou’	reflects	the	attitude	of	NGO	X	to	workers,	referring	to	them	not	by	their	
otherness	 and	 rural	 origin,	 but	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 employment	 condition	
(temporary	 or	 casual),	 or	 in	 a	 more	 unifying	 manner,	 as	 ‘workmates’	 (the	 word	








‘the	 weak’.	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 workers	 are,	 in	 fact,	 weak	 due	 to	 their	 material	
conditions,	low	education	and	cultural	levels	and	lack	of	understanding	of	the	law,	
but	 not	 because	 of	 the	 structural	 inequality	 of	 the	 labour-capital	 relation,	 as	
reinforced	by	the	 labour	 laws.	As	Lawyer	Yan	at	NGO	Z	said,	peasant	workers	are	
"very,	 very,	 very	 poor	 people	 who	 have	 no	 culture,	 low	 education	 level,	 no	




and	 ‘the	 weak’	 is	 indicative	 of	 their	 distance	 from	 workers.	 Their	 location	 and	




NGOs’	 ‘synthesising	 and	 spacing’	 of	 their	 own	 offices,	 and	 hospital,	 court	 and	
factory	 spaces	 are	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 could	 potentially	 negotiate	 and	 contest	
institutionalised	urban	spaces.	They	conclude	that	these	labour	NGOs	are	creating	
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urban	 spaces	 for	 migrant	 workers	 in	 the	 cities	 and	 hence,	 empowering	 migrant	
workers	 and	 “developing	 informal,	 innovative	 and	 flexible	 forms	 of	 agency	 by	
means	 of	 organizational	 spacing	 to	 empower	 the	 workers”	 (Gransow	 and	 Zhu,	
2014:	 12).	 Similarly,	 Jakimow	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 migrant	 labour	 NGOs	 provide	
‘spaces	 of	 belonging’	 through	 which	 migrant	 workers	 transform	 and	 construct	 a	
new	identity	in	the	city	that	goes	beyond	the	rural-urban	divide.	These,	she	argues,	
are	 ‘acts	 of	 citizenship’	 (Isin	 and	 Nielsen,	 2008)	 that	 enable	 workers	 to	 claim	
citizenship	rights	(Jakimow,	2015).	NGOs	X,	Y	and	Z	do,	 in	fact,	provide	spaces	for	
workers	to	integrate	in	the	city,	however,	these	spaces	are	also	a	representation	of	




workers	 identifying	 with	 other	 workers.	 As	 portrayed	 in	 Image	 5.1,	 the	 office	
consists	of	a	main	room	which	is	a	small	space	dominated	by	a	big	table	where	all	
consultations	 take	 place	 and	 where	 workers,	 lawyers,	 and	 NGO	 staff	 sit	 around	
without	 regard	 to	 any	 specific	 procedure	 or	 order.	 This	 consultation	 room	 is	
decorated	with	photographs	of	organizational	highlights	–	the	director	of	the	NGO	
meeting	construction	workers,	workers	 in	the	NGO’s	office,	and	workers	receiving	















from	 the	workers’	 everyday	 spaces,	 who	 either	 live	 and	work	 in	 the	 outskirts	 of	




towards	 a	 professional	 delivery	 of	 legal	 services.	 NGO	 Z	 in	 particular	 follows	 an	
approach	 based	 on	 the	 model	 of	 commercial	 legal	 practice.	 Its	 setting	 is	 very	
different	 to	 that	of	NGO	X’s,	and	shapes	 social	 interactions	 in	a	different	way.	As	
portrayed	 in	 Image	5.2,	 in	 the	main	hall	 at	NGO	Z's	 office	 (the	 legal	 consultation	






















between	 lawyer	 and	worker.	 The	 consultation	 hall	 is	 decorated	with	 blue	 frames	
containing	different	articles	of	the	labour	laws.	Although	this	hall	is	an	open	space	
and	many	workers	 queue	or	 sit	 in	 the	 chairs	 beside	other	workers	 being	 advised	



















The	physical	 space	 that	each	of	 the	LAL	NGOs	occupies	 shapes	 social	 interactions	
between	lawyers	and	workers,	and	between	workers	that	meet	at	the	offices.	LAL	
NGOs’	office	spaces	denote	the	professional	background	and	organizational	culture	
of	 the	 NGO.	 As	 a	 less	 formalistic	 LAL	 NGO,	 NGO	 X	 creates	 common	 spaces	 for	
workers	to	identify	with	and	in	which	to	create	social	links	to	other	workers,	and	for	
workers	to	belong	to	the	city.	In	line	with	Gransow	and	Zhu	(2014),	NGO	X	can	be	
seen	 as	 creating	 spaces	 for	 workers’	 collective	 and	 urban	 identification	 beyond	
their	 ‘peasantness’	 or	migrant	 character.	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 due	 to	

















different	 and	 legalistic	 way.	 Chan	 (2013)	 has	 previously	 suggested	 that	 labour	
NGOs’	 lack	 of	 embeddedness	 in	 workers’	 communities	 shows	 that	 these	
organizations	 are	 not	 a	 political	 force	 to	 represent	 and	 organize	 workers.	 In	 the	
case	 of	 LAL	NGOs,	 their	 professional	 culture	 and	 social	 composition	of	 their	 staff	
(lawyers)	 reveal	 their	 conception	of	workers	as	 ‘clients’	and	 therefore,	define	 the	
forms	 of	 professional	 interaction	 between	 workers	 and	 lawyers,	 and	 among	
workers,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 affects	 the	 likelihood	 LAL	 NGOs	 have	 of	 stimulating	
individual	 or	 collective	 forms	 of	 action	 among	 workers.	 By	 examining	 how	 LAL	
NGOs	 deliver	 legal	 education	 and	 how	 they	mobilize	 the	 law	 to	 resolve	workers’	
labour	 disputes	 also	 offers	 a	window	 into	 the	 social	 distance	 between	 LAL	NGOs	









workers	 have	no	 legal	 consciousness”;	 "peasant	workers'	 knowledge	of	 the	 law	 is	
very	 low";	 “their	 capacities	 are	 very	 constrained”;	 "we	 help	 the	 weak"	 and	 "we	
promote	legal	consciousness".		
	
LAL	 NGOs	 educate	 workers	 on	 the	 law	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 in	 both	 the	 legal	
consultations,	and	the	occasional	legal	education	training	sessions	they	hold.	They	









LAL	 NGOs’	 legal	 education	 would	 therefore	 support	 workers’	 mobilization	 by	
providing	them	with	the	legitimate	discourse	upon	which	to	frame	their	claims	on	
the	 Party-state.	 However,	 legal	 education	 initiatives	 can	 also	 function	 as	 the	
socialization	 of	 the	 legal	 rules,	 delivering	 the	 Party-state’s	 new	 legal	 ideology,	 as	
was	the	case	with	legal	education	(pufa,	普法)	campaigns	during	the	Maoist	period,	
“campaigns	to	educate	about	and	induce	compliance	with	the	new	legal	norms	(…)	










NGOs	 X,	 Y	 and	 Z	 provide	 legal	 advice	 through	 telephone	 and	 face-to-face	
consultations.	56	All	three	NGOs	have	established	hotlines,	which	are	the	fastest	and	
easiest	way	 to	 provide	 legal	 consultation.	 In	 2012,	NGO	X,	 for	 example,	 received	
4,593	phone	calls,	of	which	83%	 (3,803)	were	workers	 seeking	 legal	 consultation,	
2%	 (76)	 seeking	 employment,	 and	 15%	 (714)	 related	 to	 other	 matters	 such	 as	




and	advice	provided.	Through	 these	 files,	NGO	X	keeps	 track	of	all	 the	 telephone	






that	 function	 similarly	 and	which	 serve	 a	 double	 purpose:	 legal	 consultation	 and	
education	for	workers,	and	as	a	source	of	data	to	inform	their	advocacy	work	(see	
Chapter	Four).	They	then	produce	research	reports	that	are	sent	to	legislators,	"the	
first	 step	 is	 to	 let	 the	 legislators	 know	how	 serious	 the	 reality	 is,	 and	under	what	
problems	these	people	have	to	carry	out	their	lives”	(Y2,	30	October	2012).	From	the	




face	 legal	 consultations	 at	 their	 offices,	 and	 occasionally	 visit	 the	 workplace	 in	
question.	Legal	consultations	are	carried	out	in	the	main	office	space	at	NGO	X,	and	
in	a	designated	consultation	room	or	hall	in	NGO	Y	and	NGO	Z,	respectively.	In	2012	
NGO	X	 received	 a	 total	 of	 2,192	 visits	 to	 its	 office,	 a	 25%	 increase	over	 2011.	Of	
these,	 58%	 (1,281)	 were	 workers	 seeking	 legal	 assistance,	 23%	 (508)	 were	
volunteers,	 2%	 (42)	 workers	 seeking	 employment,	 and	 17%	 (365)	 other	 social	
groups	 (NGO	X,	 2012	 Yearly	Work	 Report).	NGO	X's	 legal	 staff	 occasionally	make	
field	 trips	 and	 visit	 the	 dormitories	 of	 construction	 sites	 and	 the	 vicinities	 of	
factories	 to	 provide	 legal	 advice,	 distribute	 their	 brochures	 and	 make	 the	
organization	 visible	 to	 workers.	 The	 frequency	 of	 consultations	 at	 NGOs'	 offices	
varies	monthly	and	depends	greatly	on	the	season.	NGO	X	received	an	average	of	





work	 details	 and	 the	 cause	 (if	 any)	 of	 dispute,	 on	 a	 Consultation	 Form.	 In	many	
cases,	 lawyers	 at	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z	 fill	 in	 the	 information	 for	 workers	 while	 the	
consultation	is	taking	place.	Following	this,	workers	will	have	additional	paperwork	
to	fill	in	at	NGOs	Y	and	Z	if	they	wish	to	proceed	to	seek	legal	assistance	(and	aid).	In	
NGO	 X,	 the	 process	 is	much	 simpler	 and	more	 user-friendly,	 as	 the	 assistance	 is	
limited	 to	 legal	 consultation	 and	 mediation.	 At	 NGO	 X	 workers	 fill	 in	 a	 Rights	
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Protection	Registration	Form	portrayed	 in	 Image	5.3	 (left)	and	at	NGO	Y	a	Labour	
Rights	 Protection	 Consultation	 Registration	 Form	 (Image	 5.3	 right).	 The	 second	
form	is	also	very	straightforward,	the	worker	only	having	to	tick	checkboxes	related	
to	 the	 type	 of	 company	 employed	 at,	 the	 type	 of	 dispute,	 and	 the	 like.	 In	 both	
NGOs	X	and	Y	there	is	a	larger	space	for	the	worker	to	explain	in	his/her	own	words	
the	nature	of	the	problem.	This	space	allows	the	worker	to	voice	his/her	issue	and	




professional	 approach	 means	 that	 the	 consultation	 process	 is	 much	 more	
bureaucratized,	 and	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 registration	 form,	 workers	 pursuing	 legal	
assistance	must	 fill	 in	up	 to	eleven	 forms	on	 their	 first	 visit,	 including	a	 Legal	Aid	
Application	Form,	Legal	Aid	Agreement,	and	a	Risks	Acknowledgement	Form.	These	
different	approaches	 illustrate	the	extent	to	which	bureaucracy	 informs	these	LAL	









and	 forms	 used,	 but	 because	 the	 consultation	 follows	 a	 systematic	 process,	with	
standardized	 questions	 and	 pro-forma	 advice	 for	 two	 sorts	 of	 labour	 disputes:57	
labour	 disputes	 (related	 to	wages	 or	 contract	 issues),	 or	 occupational	 health	 and	
injury	 disputes	 (confirmation	 of	 injury,	 evaluation	 of	 labour	 capability,	 injury	
compensation).	 Consultations	 are	 tailored	 to	 the	 individual	 worker	 seeking	
assistance	 and	 they	 are	 case-specific	 to	 the	 degree	 that	 they	 respond	 to	 the	
individual	worker’s	 dispute.	 However,	 lawyers	 provide	 advice	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
																																																						
57	As	 indicated	 in	Chapter	Three,	 labour	disputes	are	defined	as	 “arising	between	employing	units	
and	 workers”	 concerning	 “confirmation	 of	 labour	 relations;	 conclusion,	 performance,	 alteration,	
cancellation	or	termination	of	labour	contracts;	expulsion,	charge,	resignation	or	severance;	working	
hours,	the	period	of	rest	and	vacation,	social	insurance,	welfare	benefits,	training	and	occupational	

























law,	 which	 means	 that	 most	 cases	 are	 treated	 similarly	 and	 are	 advised	 to	 be	
resolved	in	a	similar	way,	‘according	to	the	law’	(i.e.	the	LDMAL).	
	




to	mediate	 ‘on	behalf	of	workers’,	 to	obtain	 their	wages.	Between	 three	and	 five	





issue	 according	 to	 the	 law.	 The	most	 relevant	 and	 recurrent	 example	 is	workers’	
lack	 of	 a	 labour	 contract,	 the	 basic	 proof	 of	 a	 labour	 relation,	 without	 which	
workers	cannot	take	legal	action.	In	these	cases,	lawyers	provide	the	same	sorts	of	
generic	advice,	explaining	why	the	proof	of	the	labour	relation	is	important	for	legal	
purposes,	 what	 constitutes	 proof,	 and	 how	 to	 gather	 it.	 The	 worker	 is	 then	
instructed	 to	 seek	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	 relation	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 LAL	 NGOs’	
assistance	 (for	 arbitration	 and	 litigation).	 For	 example,	 in	 NGO	 Y,	 Lawyer	 Guo	
suggested	to	one	of	the	workers	involved	in	a	collective	dispute	in	a	yoghurt	factory	
on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 Beijing	 that	 he	 should	 take	 pictures	 of	 himself	 holding	 the	
newspaper	 of	 the	 day	 inside	 the	 factory.	 The	 worker	 afterwards	 brought	 three	
photographs	of	himself	doing	so	in	three	different	locations	inside	the	factory,	to	be	
used	 in	 the	 first	 hearing	 at	 the	 arbitration	 court	 the	 next	 day	 as	 proof	 of	 the	





Lawyer	 Zuo	 is	 telling	 the	 worker	 attending	 consultation	 that,	
‘according	 to	 the	 law’,	 he	 needs	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	 relation	
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(zhengju,	证据).	When	the	worker	says	he	doesn’t	have	such	proof,	
he	 tells	 the	 worker	 that	 he	 should	 go	 back	 and	 record	 a	
conversation	with	 the	boss.	At	 the	 same	 time	 that	 Lawyer	 Zuo	 is	
saying	 this,	 he	 is	 holding	 the	 worker’s	 phone	 in	 his	 hand	 and	
making	 a	 gesture	 as	 if	 he	would	 be	 holding	 the	 phone	 under	 his	
arm	 or	 armpit.	 He	 is	 showing	 the	 worker	 how	 he	 can	 record	 a	





once	 he	 has	 gathered	 this	 he	 can	 then	 come	 back	 and	 they	 can	
proceed	 with	 mediation	 to	 try	 and	 resolve	 the	 issue.	 (Fieldnote,	
Participant	observation	at	NGO	X,	Beijing,	17	September,	2012)		
	
In	all	 three	NGOs	 legal	consultation	 is	provided	according	to	the	 law:	the	types	of	






acceptance	 (and	 reproduction)	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 capitalist	 labour	 relation,	 and	
reinforces	it	by	providing	assistance	on	the	basis	of	the	existence	of	a	proof	of	the	





laws,	 their	 legal	 rights	 and	 how	 to	 protect	 them,	 what	 constitutes	 a	 legitimate	
dispute	and	how	to	resolve	it	appropriately.	This	can	be	an	empowering	experience	
for	workers	who	come	to	understand	the	protective	features	of	a	labour	contract,	
for	example,	or	 learn	how	to	seek	proof	of	 their	 labour	 relation	or	how	to	 legally	
deal	with	a	labour	dispute.	However,	there	is	also	a	disempowering	aspect	resulting	
from	consultations,	which	derived	from	LAL	NGOs’	conception	of	workers	based	on	
a	 deficit	 model:	 workers	 are	 not	 perceived	 as	 autonomous	 agents	 capable	 of	
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The	 bureaucratized,	 institutionalized	 and	 systematized	 legal	 consultation	 process,	
especially	at	NGO	Z,	is	not	necessarily	worker-friendly,	does	not	necessarily	cater	to	
workers’	own	 interests	and	needs	that	emerge,	nor	does	 it	help	workers	to	strive	
for	what	 they	 think	 is	 fair	or	 just	 (see	Chapter	Six).	 Lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	 follow	
the	legal	standards,	and	consult	and	advise	workers	on	the	basis	of	the	law,	raising	
workers’	 legal	awareness	or	 legal	rights	consciousness.	By	also	educating	them	on	
what	 claims	 have	 legal	 basis,	 they	 delegitimize	 certain	 claims	 and	 disputes.	 LAL	




LAL	 NGOs	 engage	 in	 legal	 education	 activities	 (pufa,	 普法 )	 not	 only	 in	 legal	
consultations,	 but	 explicitly,	 by	 holding	 legal	 education	 sessions,	 where	 they	
directly	 educate	 workers	 on	 the	 words	 of	 the	 law,	 workers’	 rights	 and	 how	 to	
protect	 them.	 LAL	 NGOs	 have	 developed	material	 that	makes	 laws	 accessible	 to	
workers,	such	as	handbooks.	These	are	self-published	by	the	LAL	NGOs	and	explain	
the	 laws,	 recurrent	 legal	 problems	 encountered	 by	workers,	 and	 how	 to	 address	
them.	They	are	the	material	used	to	 ‘disseminate	 legal	knowledge’	or	 ‘raise	rights	
awareness’.	For	instance,	in	2012	NGO	X	published	in	two	editions	a	total	of	25,000	
copies	of	 their	 “Handbook	 for	Migrant	Workers’	 Integration	 into	 the	City”	 (Image	
5.4	 upper	 right)	 and	 10,000	 copies	 of	 “Workmate	 Communication”	 (gongyou	
tongxun,	⼯友通讯),	 a	 project	 funded	by	 the	Rosa	 Luxemburg	 Foundation.	When	
workers	 visit	 NGO	 X’s	 office	 seeking	 legal	 consultation,	 NGO	 X	 gives	 away	 these	
handbooks	for	the	worker	to	read,	but	on	many	occasions	they	are	given	a	bag	full	
of	handbooks	with	the	instruction	to	distribute	them	to	other	workers	and	friends	
in	 their	 workplace.	 Furthermore,	 in	 2012	 NGO	 X’s	 staff	 regularly	 distributed	
handbooks	in	the	streets	at	the	exits	of	subway	stations,	in	the	surroundings	of	the	
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“Handbook	for	Migrant	Workers	 Integration	 into	the	City”,	which	 includes	tips	for	
the	workers’	 first	days	 in	the	city,	 legal	advice,	contract-related	 issues,	 labour	 law	
revisions,	 prevention	 of	 occupational	 injuries,	 and	 other	 important	 everyday	
knowledge	 such	 as	 an	 explanation	 of	 public	 signs	 and	 billboards,	 media,	 how	 to	
behave	 in	 the	 city,	 and	 how	 to	 communicate	 with	 their	 relatives	 back	 in	 the	
countryside.	 NGO	 Z’s	 “Peasant	 Worker	 Rights	 Awareness	 Handbook”	 (Image	 5.4	
lower	 right)	 takes	 a	different	 approach,	 confining	 itself	 to	 explaining	 labour	 laws.	
This	 handbook	 explains	 each	 chapter	 of	 the	 labour	 laws	 addressing	 common	
questions	in	an	attempt	to	make	the	laws	accessible	to	workers.		
	





















legal	 advisor	 teaches	 the	articles	of	 the	 labour	 laws	most	 relevant	 to	workers,	 or	
specific	 issues	 that	 recurrently	 affect	 workers.	 Legal	 training	 sessions	 use	 the	
handbooks	published	by	the	NGO.	For	example,	NGO	X	holds	legal	training	classes	
in	 the	office	on	a	monthly	basis	 if	enough	workers	have	signed	up	to	attend,	and	
other	 ad	 hoc	 sessions	 as	 necessary.	 NGO	 X	 also	 reaches	 out	 to	 workers	 at	 their	
workplace	and	occasionally	conducts	legal	training	sessions	at	construction	sites	or	
in	factory	dormitories	in	the	outskirts	of	Beijing.	NGO	Y	occasionally	conducts	legal	
education	 sessions	 at	 their	 offices,	 mainly	 over	 the	 weekend	 when	 workers	 are	
more	likely	to	attend.	NGO	Z	also	holds	legal	education	classes	and	in	2006	opened	
a	 ‘Rights	 Awareness	 School’	 at	 its	 offices	 in	 Xxxxxxx	 to	 offer	 weekend	 legal	
education	 classes.	However,	over	 the	 course	of	 this	 fieldwork	 I	was	not	aware	of	
any	 legal	 training	classes	held;	 the	 reason,	 I	was	 told,	was	because	winter,	a	very	





NGO	 Z	 tried	 to	 offering	 cash	 transfers	 to	 attract	 attendance,	 but	 without	 much	




Lawyer	 Liu	 decides	 to	 commence	 the	 legal	 training	 session	 even	
though	 there	 are	 only	 three	workers.	We	 all	 sit	 around	 the	 long	
table	 and	 have	 our	 little	 handbooks	 ready	 for	 the	 instruction.	
Lawyer	 Liu	 asks	 us	 to	 open	 at	 page	 83	 and	 reads	 out	 loud	 the	
passage	 of	 the	 handbook	 related	 to	 the	 labour	 contract	 and	 the	
Labour	Contract	Law,	saying	that	a	worker	should	be	provided	with	
a	contract	within	one	month	of	starting	work	at	the	unit.	He	says	
that	 the	 contract	 is	 a	 very	 good	way	 to	 protect	 the	worker,	 and	
explains	 what	 happens	 if	 the	 contract	 is	 not	 signed	 within	 this	
time,	 reading	 from	the	handbook	passage:	 ‘the	worker	can	go	 to	
the	arbitration	committee	or	 initiate	a	 litigation	process’.	As	well	

















to	 his	 own	 dispute,	 Worker	 Jin	 is	 slowly	 falling	 asleep,	 his	 arms	
now	 free	 of	 the	 handbook,	 crossed	 and	 resting	 on	 his	 belly,	 but	
they	are	slowly	becoming	loose	as	he	dozes	off	and	are	starting	to	




had	 a	 serious	 conflict	 with	 his	 employer	 and	 the	 session	 could	 provide	 useful	
information.	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 topic	 or	 the	 teaching	 strategies	 did	
not	engage	Worker	Jin.	Repetition	as	a	teaching	strategy	does	not	necessarily	raise	
workers’	 awareness:	 workers	 assert	 that	 it	 is	 boring,	 uninspiring,	 and	 does	 not	
apply	to	their	reality	(see	Chapter	Six).	Moreover,	these	sessions	are	theoretical	and	
do	 not	 necessarily	 teach	 them	 the	 specific	 skills	 needed	 to	 protect	 themselves	
which	 the	 one-to-one	 consultations	 are	more	 likely	 to	 provide.	When	 Lawyer	 Liu	
asked	questions	and	invited	workers’	opinions,	the	change	in	technique	triggered	a	
more	critical	understanding	of	the	law	and	how	it	affects	workers’	situations	more	
specifically.	Moreover,	 it	was	when	Worker	Zhang	 related	 the	 legal	 clauses	 to	his	
own	 subjective	 experience	 and	 his	 dispute	 that	 the	 law	 became	 more	 tangible,	
applicable,	and	useful	to	him.	Reading	out	loud	and	repeating	the	articles	of	the	law	
is	 not	 the	 most	 efficient	 strategy	 to	 diffuse	 legal	 knowledge	 and	 raise	 rights	
awareness,	however,	during	fieldwork	at	NGOs	X	and	Z,	it	was	the	most	widely	used	




However,	 the	 situation	 described	 above	 might	 indicate	 that	 workers’	 subjective	
experiences	influence	their	engagement	with	the	law,	and	therefore,	the	formation	
of	 their	 rights	 consciousness.	 Yet,	 the	 situation	 described	 above	 shows	 that	 LAL	
NGOs	 and	 lawyers	 engage	 with	 the	 formative	 process	 of	 workers’	 rights	





way	 as	 the	 existing	 protective	 device	 of	workers’	 rights.	With	 a	 legalistic	 service-
delivery	orientation,	legal	education	by	LAL	NGOs	and	lawyers	is	instrumental	in	the	
uncritical	 reproduction	of	the	 legal	order,	socializing	the	new	legal	 (and	capitalist)	
norms	and	shaping	workers’	legal	rights	consciousness.		
	
Finally,	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 do	 important	 work	 through	 these	 legal	 education	
initiatives:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	workers	 can	 feel	 empowered	 by	 learning	 about	 the	
laws;	on	the	other,	the	socialization	of	legal	norms	is	beneficial	to	the	Party-state’s	
rule	of	 law	project.	However,	LAL	NGOs’	 legal	education	activities	and	 techniques	
also	 illustrate	a	palpable	social	distance	between	 lawyers	and	workers,	which	can	




LAL	 NGOs	 follow	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 process	 stipulated	 by	 labour	 laws,	
specifically,	 the	 Labour	 Disputes	Mediation	 and	 Arbitration	 Law	 (LDMAL)	 (2008),	
which	 defines	 disputes	 and	 the	 processes	 to	 resolve	 them,	 mainly	 through	
mediation,	 arbitration	 and	 litigation.	NGO	X,	 as	 a	 People’s	Mediation	Committee,	
provides	 mediation	 services	 to	 workers.	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z,	 as	 registered	 legal	 aid	






or	act	 ‘on	behalf	of	workers’.	This,	 it	will	be	argued,	can	disempower	workers	 in	a	
number	of	ways.	This	is	not	unique	to	the	Chinese	legal	system;	it	is	the	case	under	









cases,	 uncovering	 LAL	 NGOs’	 rationales,	 the	 narratives	 held	 by	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	
lawyers,	and	the	relations	developed	between	lawyers	and	workers	in	the	process	
of	 legal	 mobilization.	 A	 detailed	 examination	 of	 these	 processes,	 particularly,	











legacies	 of	 today’s	 legal	 institutions,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 ‘adaptive	 legality’	 of	 the	
																																																						
59	Ma	Xiwu	was	a	prominent	figure	at	the	beginning	of	the	Yan’an	period.	 In	the	1940s	he	became	
president	 of	 the	 Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia	 border	 area	 regional	 high	 court	 and	 vice-president	 of	 the	
Supreme	People’s	Court.	He	opposed	“the	formality	and	expertise	implicit	 in	both	Republican	legal	
reforms	 and	 Western	 models”	 and	 introduced	 the	 Ma	 Xiwu	 adjudication	 method	 of	 the	 Yan’an	
period,	which	emphasised	the	resolution	of	disputes	via	mediation	(Liebman,	2011:	174).	
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CPC	 and	 increased	 legitimation	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 because	 it	 embeds	 on	 pre-
existing	norms	or	 institutions.	 Zhuang	and	Chen	 (2015)	argue	 that	mediation	was	
already	the	main	method	to	resolve	labour	disputes	during	the	Maoist	period	under	









stability	 and	 preventing	 ‘mass	 incidents’	 from	 escalating;	 and	 bureaucratic	
interests,	providing	 incentives	to	 judges	(promotion	and	annual	bonuses)	to	reach	
certain	targets,	namely,	a	high	level	of	conciliation	and	low	adjudication	rates	(ibid:	
394).	 However,	 from	 an	 anthropological	 perspective,	 the	 use	 of	 mediation	 is	





The	 return	 to	mediation	 signalled	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Party-state	 had	 realized	 that	
formal	judicial	methods	of	dispute	resolution	were	not	necessarily	penetrating	into	
Chinese	daily	 life	 (see	Chapter	Six).	The	LLDMAL,	however,	highlights	that	there	 is	
an	 institutionalized	 and	 formalized	 ‘revival	 of	 mediation’.	 Article	 3	 of	 the	 Law	
stipulates	“labour	disputes	shall	be	resolved	on	the	basis	of	 facts	and	pursuant	to	
the	principles	of	lawfulness,	impartiality	and	timeliness,	with	stress	on	mediation,	in	
order	 to	 protect	 the	 lawful	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 parties	 according	 to	 law”	
(LDMAL,	 Article	 3,	 emphasis	 added).	 Article	 10	 states	 that	 mediation	 can	 be	
performed	 by	 an	 “enterprise	 labour	 dispute	 mediation	 commission,	 basic	 level	
people’s	mediation	institutes	established	in	accordance	with	the	law,	and	institutes	
with	 labour	 dispute	mediation	 function	 established	 in	 towns	 and	 villages”.	 In	 the	
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mediation	 process,	 both	 employee	 and	 employer	 should	 have	 representatives;	 in	
the	case	of	the	employee	representative,	Article	10	also	stipulates	that	it	“shall	be	
labour	 union	 members	 or	 recommended	 by	 all	 employees”.	 As	 such,	 mediation	
involves	 the	 intervention	of	 a	 third	party	 in	 the	 labour	dispute,	 although	 it	 is	 the	
least	bureaucratic	of	the	resolution	processes	as	any	unit	with	mediation	status	can	
intervene.	 Organizations	 ranging	 from	 neighbourhood	 committees	 to	 formal	
People’s	Mediation	Committees	are	acceptable	thus	it	does	not	necessarily	involve	
the	 trade	 union.	 NGO	 X	 is	 a	 registered	 People’s	 Mediation	 Committee,	 and	
according	to	the	law	it	can	mediate	‘on	behalf	of	workers’	if	they	request	it	to	do	so.	
However,	 with	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 mediation	 in	 the	 LDMAL	 and	 the	







its	 cases	 through	mediation	 (by	 telephone	 or	 on-site	 visit).	 Figure	 5.1	 shows	 the	
evolution	of	and	way	the	dispute	cases	were	handled	by	NGO	X:	provision	of	legal	
advice	 or	 guidance,	 telephone	mediation,	 on-site	mediation,	 and	 referral	 to	 legal	
aid.	Many	 cases	 are	handled	well	 through	 telephone	mediation,	with	 a	 very	 high	
success	 rate.	 In	 2011,	 98%	 of	 the	 cases	 dealt	 with	 by	 NGO	 X	 were	 successfully	




construction	workers	 join	a	 construction	 troop	and	 follow	a	 foreman	 from	 their	 village	directly	 to	
construction	sites	 in	 the	cities.	They	have	no	 formal	 labour	 relation	either	with	 the	 foreman	 (with	
whom	they	normally	have	a	verbal	agreement	based	on	trust	and	social	networks	from	their	village),	
or	 with	 the	 subcontractor	 company.	 Construction	 workers’	 labour	 is	 provided	 with	 a	 stipulated	
salary	 to	be	paid	at	 the	end	of	 the	project	 (which	could	 run	 for	as	 long	as	 twelve	months),	 rather	
than	on	a	monthly	basis	as	stipulated	by	the	LCL	(Article	50).	Usually	the	end	of	the	working	cycle	
will	 be	 a	 certain	 harvest	 season	 or	 Chinese	 New	 Year.	 Until	 then	workers	 receive	 weekly	 pocket	
money	 and	 coupons	 to	 purchase	 food	 at	 the	 canteens	 in	 the	 site	 dormitories.	 Very	 often,	 after	
having	 worked	 for	 the	 length	 of	 the	 project	 and	 just	 before	 Chinese	 New	 Year,	 conflict	 arises	
throughout	 the	 construction	 industry	 because	 the	 subcontractor	 does	 not	 pay	 the	 full	 amount	 of	
wages	owed.	
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NGO	 X	 had	 assisted	 in	 a	 total	 of	 2,886	 cases	 involving	 28,041	 workers	 and	








does	 the	LDMAL	 favour	mediation,	but	 there	 is	a	 common	view	across	 LAL	NGOs	
and	lawyers	that	mediation	is	best	for	peasant	workers	because	it	better	suits	their	
‘needs	and	conditions’.	Volunteer	 Lawyer	Zuo	at	NGO	X	 stated	 that	“for	workers,	
rights	protection	means	to	get	their	money	[wages]	back”	(X4,	17	September	2012).	
For	some	lawyers	at	LAL	NGOs,	the	needs	and	interests	of	workers	are	material	–	to	
get	 their	 wages,	 for	 which	 mediation	 is	 most	 effective	 as	 it	 can	 obtain	 a	 fast	
outcome	within	two	phone	calls,	for	example.		
The	main	issue	is	arrears	of	wages.	Our	[NGO	X]	central	work	is	to	
help	 workers	 demand	 their	 payment.	 Mainly	 we	 resolve	 this	
through	mediation	(…)	For	workers,	the	most	imperative	thing	is	to	
resolve	 the	 issue	 and	 get	 their	 money	 in	 the	 shortest	 time.	 Of	
course,	they	hope	first	to	get	their	money,	that	 it	can	be	resolved	
via	 telephone	 for	 example,	 and	 the	 second	 day	 they	 can	 get	 the	
money	 and	 go	 back	 to	 work!	 If	 mediation	 does	 not	 resolve	 the	
issue	 and	 the	 worker	 decides	 to	 litigate,	 litigation	 takes	 a	 long	
time.	 First	 is	 arbitration,	 when	 arbitration	 finishes	 then	 it	 is	























years	 (…)	 If	 only,	 but	 litigation	 is	 also	 risky,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	
guarantee	a	case	will	win	 (…)	We	explain	 this	 to	 the	worker	very	
clearly,	 that	 litigation	 is	 risky,	 because	 litigation	 requires	 proofs,	
not	 facts.	After	all,	 facts	are	what	you	say,	but	 litigation	requires	
proofs.	 But	 in	 many	 situations	 workers	 don’t	 have	 proofs:	 they	
have	 no	 proof	 of	 anything,	 no	 labour	 contract,	 no	 proof	 of	
anything.		
	
In	wage	 arrears,	we	 [NGO	 X]	 believe	 that	mediation	 is	 the	most	
effective,	because	the	most	important	is	efficiency:	the	worker	can	
come	here	 to	 the	office	 in	 the	morning	seeking	assistance;	 in	 the	
morning	we	can	already	perform	telephone	mediation;	if	the	boss	
responds,	 then	maybe,	 immediately	 the	 problem	 is	 resolved,	 and	
the	 boss	 says	 ‘yes,	 one	month	 of	 wages,	 yes,	 I	 will	 give	 it’.	 It	 is	
possible	 that	 the	 boss	 pays	 this	 to	 the	 worker,	 and	 that’s	 it.	
Mediation	does	not	 consider	 if	 it	 is	a	mistake	of	 the	employer	or	
the	worker	–	when	a	conflict	arises	it	can’t	be	the	responsibility	of	
one	 party,	most	 likely	 it	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 both	 parties,	 and	
this	 or	 that	 problem,	 perhaps	 needs	 to	 be	 negotiated	 by	 a	
mediator,	 perhaps	 both	 parties	 allow	 the	 mediation	 to	 proceed,	
perhaps	 the	 issue	 is	 resolved	and	the	money	 is	paid.	 (X1,	24	May	
2012)	
	
This	 view	 is	 shared	 across	 NGOs.	 However,	 it	 is	 a	 reductionist	 view	 of	 workers’	
needs	 and	 interests,	 and	one	 that	 also	 does	 not	 address	 the	 structural	 origins	 of	
workers’	 disputes.	 Mediation,	 although	 it	 offers	 fast	 and	 positive	 results	 for	 the	
individual	worker,	does	not	address	the	root	causes	of	the	disputes.	This	makes	it	a	
palliative	solution	and	non-transformational.	Lawyer	Guo	in	NGO	Y	felt	that:	
Most	 workers	 don’t	 want	 to	 litigate	 (…)	 most	 workers	 hope	 to	
resolve	the	issue	fast,	therefore	mediation.	Basically	the	tendency	





Mediation	 requires	 fewer	 resources	 in	 terms	of	 time,	documentation,	knowledge,	
skills,	and	support	of	a	 third	party	or	 lawyer.	Moreover,	 it	 is	a	 culturally	 sensitive	
resolution	 process	 that,	 according	 to	 some	 lawyers,	 does	 not	 disturb	 social	
relations,	preserving	 face	 (mianzi,	面⼦)	and	keeping	to	traditional	Chinese	values	
(Y10,	 26	 December	 2012).	 Mediation,	 for	 other	 lawyers,	 best	 fits	 Chinese	
characteristics:		
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Workers	 consider	 both	 options,	 mediation	 and	 arbitration;	 each	
person	 thinks	differently.	 In	general,	 here	 [at	NGO	X]	workers	go	
through	 a	 third	 party	 mediation,	 which	 suits	 one	 of	 China’s	
characteristics,	 it	 is	 a	 harmonious	 resolution	 (…)	 When	 workers	
have	a	third	party	mediating	–	including	in	arbitration	(…)	as	much	
as	 possible	 both	 parties	 are	 balanced,	 it	 takes	 into	 consideration	
the	interests	of	both	parties;	and	under	fair	and	legal	conditions,	it	
fairly	 strives	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 both	 parties,	 not	 harming	 the	
existing	 feelings	 and	 relationships	 between	 the	 two	 parties.	 It	 is	
fair.	(X4,	17	September	2012)	
	
It	appears	 that	 time,	efficiency,	and	 the	alleged	cultural	 component	of	preserving	
social	relations	are	two	of	the	main	reasons	for	mediation	being	the	most	suitable	
channel	 to	 resolve	 disputes;	 this	 supports	 Fei’s	 (1992)	 argument	 about	 Chinese	
traditional	 and	 ‘ritual-based’	 forms	 of	 resolving	 disputes,	 and	 Liebman’s	 (2011)	
indication	of	the	preference	for	informal	resolution	mechanisms.		
	
Allegedly,	mediation	 is	 the	most	 suitable	 dispute	 resolution	 channel	 for	workers.	
However,	mediation	 reduces	 labour	 issues	 to	 the	material	 component,	 especially	
when	 it	 comes	 to	wage	disputes,	 the	 solution	being	 the	payment	of	 these	wages	
and	 not	 addressing	 the	 root	 cause	 of	 the	 problem.	 In	 most	 cases,	 because	
mediation	 tries	 to	 conclude	 the	 dispute	 quickly,	workers	 seeking	 their	wages	will	
accept	employers’	counteroffers,	receiving	some,	but	not	all,	of	their	rightful	wage.	
In	 this	 compromise	 workers	 are	 better-off	 than	 before	 the	 mediation	 having	
obtained,	 at	 least,	 a	 proportion	 of	 their	wages.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 employers	 cut	
their	 production	 costs	 by	 not	 paying	 the	 full	 amount	 of	 wages	 owed,	 yet	 avoid	
administrative	 sanction	 for	 non-compliance	with	 labour	 laws	because	 a	mediated	
dispute	 is	 not	 processed	 by	 the	 Labour	 Bureau	 or	 scrutinised	 by	 any	 labour	
inspectorate.	The	degree	to	which	mediation	protects	workers’	 rights	 is	 therefore	
questionable,	firstly	because	individual	construction	workers,	for	example,	fall	short	
of	obtaining	their	full	and	rightful	wage;	secondly,	because	this	final	product	of	the	
negotiation	 resembles	 a	 ‘class	 compromise’	 (Wright,	 2000);	 and	 thirdly,	 because	
mediation	 resolves	 individual	 problems	 but	 not	 collective	 issues	 or	 the	 structural	




swiftly	 obtains	 social	 stability.	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 lawyers,	 through	mediation,	 obtain	














relation.	 The	 lack	 of	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	 relation	 would	mean	 that	 the	 case	 has	
slight	 legal	 standing,	 the	 worker	 having	 limited	 legal	 options.	 Alternatively,	 the	







is	 complete,	 then	 there	will	 be	 no	major	 problems	 to	 litigate”	 (Y3,	 18	 September	
2012).		
	
LAL	 NGOs	 prefer	 mediation,	 as	 pointed	 out	 above,	 and	 some	 consider	 that	
arbitration	does	not	facilitate	the	resolution	of	labour	disputes;	instead,	they	say,	it	
makes	 the	 process	 lengthier	 and	 more	 bureaucratic	 (Z12,	 22	 January	 2013),	
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introducing	an	additional	unnecessary	but	compulsory	administrative	 layer	before	
taking	 the	 case	 to	 court.	 Alongside	 proof	 of	 the	 labour	 relation	 and	 dispute,	
arbitration	and	litigation	also	require	a	considerable	time	investment.	According	to	
the	 LDMAL,	 an	 arbitration	 case	 can	 take	 up	 to	 30	 days	 from	 application	 to	 the	
hearing	date	(Articles	29,	30,	35,	LDMAL),	the	award	being	made	within	45	days	of	
the	hearing	(Article	43,	LDMAL).		
Arbitration	does	not	 require	 so	much	 time;	 in	general	 arbitration	
takes	60	days.	Arbitration	is	the	faster	of	the	two	[arbitration	and	
litigation].	 After	 arbitration,	 if	 any	 of	 the	 parties	 is	 not	 satisfied	
with	 arbitration	 or	 if	 the	 worker	 is	 not	 satisfied	 then	 comes	




Litigation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 most	 effective	 way	 to	 resolve	
labour	 disputes.	 There	 are	 cases	 when	 both	 parties	 prefer	
mediation,	and	there	are	others	when	neither	wants	to	mediate.	If	
it	 was	 me,	 I	 advise	 that	 the	 legal	 channel	 is	 the	 last	 channel.	 I	
mean,	 honestly,	 there	 are	 other	 channels	 and	ways,	 but	 if	 there	




on	one	or	a	combination	of	the	 legal	merit	of	 the	case,	 the	available	proof	of	 the	
labour	 relation	 and/or	 labour	 dispute,	 and	whether	 the	worker	 qualifies	 for	 legal	
aid	(as	funded	by	the	Legal	Aid	Foundation	Fund).	From	field	observations	at	NGOs	
Y	and	Z,	 if	 lawyers	consider	that	the	case	 is	not	 likely	 to	succeed	at	arbitration	or	
People’s	Courts,	 they	would	discourage	taking	 legal	action.	This	 is	understandable	
when	 considering	 the	 length	 of	 time	 and	 resources	 needed	 to	 take	 legal	 action;	
however,	it	also	illustrates	LAL	NGO	lawyers’	role	as	a	first	filter	(Z5,	20	September	
2012)	or	 ‘gatekeepers	 to	 justice’,	as	argued	by	Michelson	(2006).	This	means	that	
even	if	workers	are	willing	to	take	legal	action,	the	ultimate	decision	is	not	in	their	










legal	 process,	 which	 is	 bureaucratic,	 technical,	 requires	 certain	 resources,	 and	






Legal	 Personnel	 Ma	 stressed,	 “There	 is	 an	 enormous	 gap	 between	 lawyers	 and	
workers,	psychological	and	cultural”	(X5,	25	September	2012).	In	the	cases	of	NGOs	
X,	 Y	 and	 Z,	 the	 social	 distance	 between	 lawyers	 and	 workers	 is	 due	 to	 the	
professional	 and	 legalistic	 orientation	 of	 LAL	 NGOs,	 which	 in	 turn	 indicates	 the	
different	class	or	social	background	and	different	interests	and	aims	of	workers	and	
lawyers.	Clearly	depicted	by	 the	processes	 through	which	LAL	NGOs	provide	 legal	
education	and	consultation,	 LAL	NGOs	 resemble	professional	and	commercial	 law	
firms	 with	 a	 solicitor-style	 culture	 and	 a	 case-based	 legalistic	 approach.	 This	 is	




Moreover,	 the	 legal	 process	 requires	 knowledge,	 technical	 skills,	 and	 the	
investment	of	 time	and	resources.	These	 factors	have	been	said	 to	be	 the	reason	





the	meanings	of	our	existence,	because	 for	workers,	 come	out	 to	
work	 is	 for	their	 livelihoods,	they	don’t	have	that	much	energy	or	
money	to	get	involved	in	litigation	or	take	care	of	these	things.	So	
we	 help	 them	 spare	 some	 time	 and	 clear	 up	 this	 time	 for	 their	
work,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 we	 protect	 their	 rights.	 (Y3,	 18	
September	2012)		
	
The	 technical	 nature	 of	 the	 legal	 process	 makes	 legal	 knowledge	 essential	 to	
mobilizing	 the	 law.	"Without	a	 lawyer,	 it	 is	 simply	not	possible	 to	 litigate"	 (Z1,	23	





claims	 in	 order	 to	 proceed	 through	 the	 legal	 institutions.	 This	 points	 out	 the	
knowledge-based	hierarchical	power	relation	between	lawyers	and	workers.	It	has	
been	observed	that	 in	all	 three	NGOs,	even	 if	 lawyers	explain	the	 legal	process	to	
workers,	 the	 power	 lies	with	 the	 lawyer	 to	 decide	 if	 the	 case	 is	 ‘legitimate’,	 has	
legal	 basis,	 and	 how	 to	 proceed	 to	 resolve	 it	 legally.	 In	 some	 instances,	 lawyers	
even	 fill	 in	 the	 forms	 for	 workers.	 After	 filling	 in	 the	 forms,	 and	 providing	 the	
necessary	proof,	workers	do	not	do	anything	else,	and	they	are	encouraged	to	leave	
the	 case	 to	 lawyers.	Hence,	workers	pass	 responsibility	 for	 their	 cases	 to	 lawyers	
and	 rely	 on	 them	 to	 represent	 them	 and	 fight	 their	 disputes.	Workers	 therefore	
depend	 on	 lawyers	 in	 the	 legal	 process,	 transferring	 their	 agency	 to	 them.	 LAL	
NGOs’	 legal	 services	 (non-profit,	 free	 legal	 aid)	 undoubtedly	 increase	 workers’	
access	 to	 legal	 justice	 and	 the	 chances	 of	 resolving	 their	 labour	 dispute	 via	 legal	
channels.	Nevertheless,	 this	 same	 feature	contributes	 to	 the	dependency	 relation	
between	 workers,	 and	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs.	 After	 visiting	 LAL	 NGOs	 workers	
increase	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 laws	 and	 learn	 how	 to	 protect	 their	 rights;	
however,	 they	 “always	 want	 somebody	 to	 help	 them”.	 Because	 these	 LAL	 NGOs	













and	 reproduced	 through	 the	 legal	 process	 between	 lawyers	 and	 workers.	
Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 independent	
judiciary,	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 containing	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs,	 and	
more	 fundamentally,	 the	 individualizing	 nature	 of	 the	 labour	 laws	 ensure	 the	
apolitical	nature	of	legal	mobilization	in	labour	disputes.	In	other	words,	the	same	
institutions	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	NGOs	 use	 to	 protect	workers’	 rights	 pre-empt	 them	
from	 becoming	 activists	 and	 the	 ‘vanguard’	 of	 workers’	movements.	 Contrary	 to	
lawyers	as	 the	 ‘vanguard’	of	political	 fights	 (Halliday	and	Karpik,	2001;	Halliday	et	
al.,	2007)	or	as	the	‘support	structure’	(Epp,	1998)	for	political	mobilization	of	the	
law,	 in	 coordination	with	 political	 campaigns	 (McCann,	 1994),	 the	 LAL	NGOs	 and	
lawyers	 hereby	 studied	 do	 not	 fulfil	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 political	 force	 of	
workers	 movement.	 This	 would	 imply	 mobilizing	 the	 law	 politically	 to	 push	 for	









who	 is	disempowered	 to	act	 for	him/herself	and	believes	 the	 illusion	 that	he/she	
needs	to	consume	legal	services	in	order	to	resolve	his/her	problems.	This	focus	on	
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‘disciplining’	 ordinary	 workers	 on	 ‘correct’	 behaviour,	 they	 reproduce	 the	 state	
apparatus	–	the	legal	institutions	in	this	case	–	to	“function	to	assure	that	discipline	
reigns	over	society	as	a	whole”	 (Foucault,	1979,	 in	Rabinow,	1984:	206).	The	very	
nature	 of	 the	 legal	 institutions	 as	 disciplinary	mechanisms	 or	 systems	 of	 control,	




Moreover,	 the	 institutionalized	 and	 bureaucratized	 legal	 process	 is	 aseptic,	
technical,	 and	 as	will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 removed	 from	 the	 immediate	
experience	and	reality	of	many	workers.	 It	also	tends	to	remove	the	worker	 from	
the	 lived	 and	 subjective	 experience	 of	 the	 conflict,	 reducing	 the	 dispute	 to	
documents	 and	 forms	 with	 tick	 boxes	 that	 translate	 workers’	 disputes	 into	 legal	
categories	 and	 pre-defined	 logics	 of	 legal	 action.	 The	 legal	 process	 therefore	
subtracts	 the	 labour	 conflict	 from	 its	 natural	 setting,	 displacing	 it	 from	 the	




the	 labour-capital	 conflict,	 and	 a	 disciplinary	 mechanism	 that	 impels	 workers	 to	
follow	the	legal	order.	A	process	of	transfer	of	agency	takes	place	from	the	worker	
to	the	professional	lawyer,	who	‘leads’	workers	through	the	legal	process,	yet,	does	
not	 ‘lead’	 workers	 into	 political	 activism,	 taking	 alternative	 forms	 of	 action	 that	
might	 be	more	 effective	 in	 achieving	workers’	 interests,	 such	 as	 collective	 action	
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(see	Chapter	 Seven).	 This	 legalistic	 approach	 to	 labour	 conflict	 contributes	 to	 the	
maintenance	of	social	stability,	hence,	working	to	the	benefit	of	the	Party-state.	
	
However,	 workers	 are	 creative	 in	 their	 dealings	 with	 labour	 conflict	 and	 do	 not	
always	follow	the	legal	order,	as	will	be	seen	in	Chapters	Six	and	Seven.	They	use	a	
range	of	mechanisms	to	make	their	claims	and	deal	with	their	workplace	conflicts	
and	 are	not	 necessarily	 supported	by	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	NGOs,	 or	 the	 trade	union.	





LAL	 NGOs	 and	 lawyers	 mobilize	 the	 law	 in	 labour	 disputes	 under	 the	 banner	 of	
protecting	workers’	rights	(weiquan).	LAL	NGOs	provide	legal	aid	legal	services,	such	
as	 legal	 consultations,	 education	 and	 legal	 representation,	 broadening	 workers’	
access	 to	 legal	 justice.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 laws	 have	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	
lawyers,	 civil	 society	 organizations	 and	workers	 to	 protect	workers’	 legal	 rights.	 I	
have	 shown	 in	 this	 chapter,	 however,	 that	 LAL	 NGOs’	 legal	 mobilization	 affects,	
sometimes	limiting,	workers’	political	activism	and	mobilizing	capacity	in	a	number	
of	 ways,	 which	 in	 turn	 reflects	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 legal	 actors	 and	 legal	
institutions	sustain	authoritarianism.	
	
LAL	NGOs	provide	very	 significant	 support	 to	workers	 in	 terms	of	 increasing	 their	
knowledge	of	the	laws,	raising	their	legal	rights	consciousness,	and	assisting	them	in	
resolving	 their	 labour	 disputes.	 This	 chapter	 has	 provided	 additional	 evidence	 to	
support	Gallagher’s	(2006)	arguments	that	legal	aid	centres,	in	this	case,	LAL	NGOs,	






However,	 I	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 there	 are	 two	 main	 factors	 that	 preempt	 LAL	
NGOs	and	lawyers	from	empowering	workers’	political	activism:	the	first	is	that	LAL	
NGOs	 and	 lawyers	 socialize	 workers	 in	 the	 legal	 order,	 disciplining	 them	 into	
legitimate	 social	 behaviour.	 The	 second	 one	 is	 due	 to	 the	 power	 relations	
embedded	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 that	 are	 reproduced	 between	 LAL	 NGO	 staff	 and	
lawyers,	 and	 workers	 through	 legal	 education	 and	 representation.	 LAL	 NGOs’	
depiction	of	workers	 as	 ‘the	weak’	or	 as	 ‘clients’,	 their	 location	within	 the	 city	 in	
office	 spaces,	 and	 the	 use	 of	 their	 office	 space	 have	 been	 used	 to	 show	 the	
disconnection	 between	 workers	 and	 the	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 their	 lawyers,	 which	 is	
aggravated	 by	 the	 power	 relations	 that	 unfold	 during	 the	 consultation	 and	
representation	processes.		
	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 process	 of	 providing	 legal	 consultation	 and	 legal	
representation,	LAL	NGOs	and	lawyers	take	on	the	role	of	representing	workers	and	
leading	them	through	the	legal	process.	The	legal	system	and	the	legal	channels	to	
resolve	 disputes	 are	 highly	 bureaucratic,	 individualized,	 lengthy,	 and	 technical,	
which	make	 the	 professional	 skills	 of	 lawyers	 a	 necessary	 resource	 to	 take	 legal	
action,	 creating	 a	 dependency	 of	 workers’	 on	 lawyers	 which	 results	 in	 workers’	
transferred	 agency	 to	 lawyers.	 LAL	NGOs	 and	 lawyers	 act	 ‘on	 behalf	 of	workers’;	
they	 represent	workers	 in	 legal	mobilization	 and	 at	 policy	 levels	 (as	 evidenced	 in	
the	 previous	 chapter),	 not	 because	 of	 workers’	 choices	 of	 representation,	 but	
because	the	system	is	designed	in	a	way	that	workers	need	 lawyers	to	navigate	it.	
This	 concentration	 of	 legal	 knowledge	 and	 technical	 skills	 in	 the	 profession	 of	
lawyers	is	not	particular	to	the	Chinese	legal	system,	but	is	common	to	any	society.	
This	is	what	grants	lawyers	their	professional	and	social	status,	and	determines	that	
the	 legal	 profession	 is	 a	 ‘dominant’	 and	 ‘disabling’	 profession	 (Illich,	 1977).	 The	
power	 relation	 embedded	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 reproduced	 by	 LAL	 NGOs’	
lawyers	 perpetuates	 the	 ‘weakness’	 of	 workers,	 reproducing	 power	 relations	 in	
society	and	class	differences	between	so-called	peasant	workers	and	 lawyers	and	
NGO	staff	 (the	urban	middle-class).	 Even	when	workers	 gain	 rights	 consciousness	
and	legal	knowledge,	it	has	been	demonstrated	here	that	LAL	NGOs	do	not	enable	
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workers	 to	 take	 autonomous	 legal	 or	 extra-legal	 action	 –	 workers	 are	 advised	
against	this	and	strongly	encouraged	to	take	legal	action	instead.		
	
This	 social	 gap	 and	 dissociation	 between	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	workers,	 and	 the	 power	
relation	 developed	 between	 lawyers	 and	workers,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 institutional	





encounter,	 which	 arise	 from	 structural	 inequalities	 between	 workers	 and	
employers	in	a	market	economy.	Even	if	individual	cases	are	resolved	through	legal	
channels,	the	sources	of	these	problems	remain	untouched	by	the	law,	and	are,	in	
fact,	maintained	 and	 reproduced	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 by	 treating	 labour	 rights	 as	




action	 represents	 to	 the	 Party-state	 and	 capital.	 It	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 know	
how	much	of	a	challenge	to	the	Party-state	the	increased	use	of	 legal	channels	to	
manage	 conflict	 represents	economically.	 It	 seems	 that	politically,	 the	Party-state	
has	it	under	control.	
	
With	 regard	 to	 LAL	 NGOs’	 activating	 workers’	 political	 action	 by	 using	 the	 law,	 I	
have	 found	 no	 evidence	 of	 NGOs	 X,	 Y	 and	 Z	 coordinating	 or	 organizing	 legal	
mobilization	 in	 parallel	with	 collective	 campaigns.	 In	 fact,	 these	 LAL	NGOs	 advise	


















of	 law,	 the	 first	 thing	needed	 is	 to	reform	the	social	 structure	and	the	 ideological	
perspective”.	In	this	regard,	LAL	NGOs	complement	the	institutional	change	of	the	
state	 by	 enabling	 the	 cognitive	 change	 and	 socialization	 of	 the	 new	 norms	 into	
everyday	 life	–	 they	are	 instrumental	 in	 the	 state’s	project	of	building	 the	 rule	of	
law.	LAL	NGOs	cultivate	the	new	institutions	of	governance	by	socializing	them	and	
fostering	their	change	or	adaptation	to	the	challenges	of	the	social	context.	In	other	
words,	 they	 socialize	 and	 legitimize	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 project	 of	 the	 state	 (Landry,	
































Neither	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 nor	 in	 this	 one	 do	 I	 intend	 to	 negate	 the	 above	
assertion;	instead,	I	have	argued	in	the	previous	chapter	that	the	underlying	notion	
of	 rights	 consciousness	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 a	 type	 of	 legal	 rights	
consciousness	 (or	 legal	 consciousness).	 Even	 if	 rights	 consciousness	 is	 a	 less	
analytically	narrow	category	than	legal	consciousness	because	it	implies	that	people	
can	 have	 rights	 consciousness	without	 knowledge	 of	 the	 law	 and	 its	 proceedings	











and	 cultural	 apparatuses	 such	 as	 Xinhua,	 the	 People’s	 Daily,	 Gongren	magazine,	 Xinjingbao,	 and	
other	newspapers	and	radio	programmes	have	been	actively	publicizing	the	laws	and	their	content,	





rights	and	 laws	among	Chinese	workers,	as	asserted	 in	 the	 literature	 (Chan,	2013;	Froissart,	2011;	
Gallagher,	2006,	2007;	Lee	and	Shen,	2010).		
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consciousness	 of	 their	 rights.	 Cabestan	 (2005:	 49)	 assumes	 that	 the	 increase	 in	
litigation	 since	 the	1990s	 indicates	 that	 “the	Chinese	 society	 is	more	aware	of	 its	
rights”.	Similarly,	Wilson	(2015:	6)	takes	the	increased	number	of	cases	handled	by	
courts	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 increased	 legal	 consciousness	 and	 social	 conflict	 in	
Chinese	 society.	 These	 assumptions	 presume	 a	 uni-linear	 understanding	 of	 rights	
consciousness	as	caused	by	the	enactment	of	laws	and	the	statistical	outcomes	of	
use	of	 legal	 instruments	–	measured	by	 the	number	of	people	 taking	 legal	action	
(use	 of	 courts)	 (Gallagher,	 2006:	 784).	 This	 understanding	 also	 presumes	 a	
backward	 causal	 link	 between	 the	 increase	 in	 labour	 legal	 disputes	 and	 rights	
consciousness,	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 legal	 labour	 disputes	 signalling	 the	
increase	 of	 rights	 consciousness	 among	 Chinese	 workers,	 and	 their	 increased	
willingness	to	protect	these	rights,	or	to	confront	the	state	in	a	“bottom-up	claim	to	
citizenship”	(Goldman,	2007:	71).	As	Lee	and	Friedman	(2009:	23)	suggest,	"the	rise	
of	 rights	 consciousness	 is	 outgrowing	 institutional	 capacity	 to	 meet	 or	 contain	
workers'	demands.	Workers	have	more	 rights	on	paper	–	and	are	more	aware	of	
them	 –	 than	 ever	 before".	 Such	 an	 enthusiastic	 reading	 of	 increasing	 rights	
consciousness	 is	 historically	 encapsulated	 in	 the	 post-reform	 period	 and	 is	 socio-
culturally	 and	 historically	 misinformed,	 as	 Perry	 has	 suggested:	 in	 China	 “it	 is	
remarkable	 how	 many	 instances	 of	 collective	 protests	 during	 the	 imperial	 and	




In	 this	 chapter	 I	 intend	 to	 challenge	 this	 concept	 of	 rights	 consciousness	 by	
contrasting	it	with	findings	of	a	number	of	Chinese	workers’	understandings	of	law,	
rights,	 justice,	and	 their	 substantive	experiences	of	work.	By	doing	so,	 I	 intend	 to	
show	the	discrepancy	between	legal	rights	consciousness	and	the	notions	of	justice	
that	 some	 Chinese	workers	 hold,	which	 are	 based	 on	 socio-cultural	 and	material	
factors,	 and	not	necessarily	 on	 legal	 precepts.	 This	 shows	a	discrepancy	between	
formal	institutions	of	the	Party-state	and	informal	institutions,	such	as	social	norms,	
local	 knowledge	and	everyday	practices.	 Practice	and	 social	 behaviour,	 therefore,	
are	 consciously	 and	 unconsciously	 informed	 by	 many	 different	 factors	 and	
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structures,	 including	 psychological,	 historical,	 social,	 material,	 cultural	 and	
philosophical,	the	law	being	only	one	among	these.	Perry	(2009)	argues	that,	aside	
from	the	fact	that	Chinese	people	did	use	the	courts	in	the	past	as	one	among	many	
forms	 of	 action,	 rather	 than	 witnessing	 a	 new	 rights	 consciousness	 with	 the	
different	 forms	 of	 protest	 behaviour	 that	 have	 been	 staged	 since	 Tiananmen	 –
strikes	 and	 labour	 protests,	 rural	 protests,	 online	 activism	or	middle-class	NIMBY	
protests,	 these	 forms	 of	 action	 and	 “the	 rhetoric	 of	 rights	 that	 infuses	
contemporary	protest	perpetuates	a	 longstanding	penchant	of	Chinese	protesters	
to	 use	 the	 authorized	 language	 of	 the	 state	 in	 presenting	 their	 grievances	 –	
precisely	 in	order	 to	signal	 that	 their	protest	does	not	challenge	state	 legitimacy”	
(ibid:	18).	This	is	“the	latest	expression	of	a	much	older	rules	consciousness	that	has	
been	 the	 bedrock	 of	 routine	 in	 popular	 protest	 in	 China	 for	 centuries”	 (ibid:	 19,	





In	 an	 attempt	 to	 respond	 to	 Perry’s	 invitation	 to	 conduct	 a	 historical	 and	 socio-
culturally	sensitive	analysis,	I	intend	to	deconstruct	the	‘rising	rights	consciousness’	
argument,	and	posit	 that	 this	assertion	presumes	Chinese	workers’	 consciousness	
to	be	a	 tabula	 rasa,	waiting	 for	 the	concepts	of	 legal	 rights	 to	be	 impressed.	This	
interpretation	 views	 the	 ideas	 of	 rights	 as	 having	 been	 developed	 only	 after	 the	
liberalizations	of	the	market	economy	and	equates	the	concept	of	rights	only	with	
liberal	concepts	of	rights	(rule	of	 law)	that	are	brought	about	by	the	forces	of	the	
market	 economy.	 It	 also	 sees	workers	 as	 having	 no	 agency	 over	 the	 concepts	 of	
rights	that	are	being	derived	from	newly	enacted	laws.	I	argue	that	this	concept	of	
rights	 consciousness	 is	 not	 the	 most	 useful	 analytical	 category	 or	 framework	 to	
understand	 Chinese	 workers’	 consciousness	 and	 actions,	 as	 there	 are	 popular	
understandings	 of	 rights	 and	 justice	 prevalent	 among	 Chinese	 workers	 that	 are	
related	 to	 social	 constructs	 not	 encapsulated	 in	 the	 laws,	 and	 the	 rights	
consciousness	category	put	forward	in	the	literature	does	not	explain	the	drivers	of	
workers’	 actions	 beyond	 legal	 mobilization.	 These	 social	 constructs	 also	 better	
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explain	 the	 diverse	 forms	 of	 action	 workers	 take	 beyond	 legal	 action,	 as	 will	 be	
explained	in	Chapter	Seven.	Workers’	conceptions	and	subjective	experiences	show	






and	 non-material	 factors,	 such	 as	 family	 and	 social	 ties,	 sense	 and	 desire	 of	
equality,	and	broader	desires	and	ideas	of	what	life	should	be	and	how	to	achieve	








law	 (rights	 consciousness	 is	 therefore	 not	 legal	 consciousness,	 and	 it	 does	 not	
necessarily	 derive	 from	 the	 law).	 In	 fact,	 if	 asked	 about	 a	 particular	 law,	 most	
people	would	deny	knowing	its	content,	and	some	would	even	deny	knowing	of	its	
existence.	Wong	 (2011:	882)	has	shown	through	survey	data	 that	 the	Labour	Law	
(1994)	was	the	most	known	law	with	70.1%	of	respondents	being	aware	of	it,	more	
than	the	Constitution	of	the	PRC	(55.1%).	But	does	knowing	of	the	existence	of	the	
Labour	 Law,	 or	 of	 the	 Labour	 Contract	 Law	 (LCL),	mean	 that	workers	 have	 rights	





62	See	 section	 1.1.2	 for	 how	 I	 distinguish	 methodologically	 legal	 rights	 consciousness	 and	 rules	
consciousness,	and	Chapter	2	for	a	discussion	of	these	terms	in	the	literature.	
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In	 this	and	 the	 following	chapter,	 in	a	 sort	of	micro-sociology	of	 law,	 I	 show	how	
workers	understand	their	problems	as	opposed	to	the	law’s	understanding	of	them,	
how	they	address	conflicts,	why	do	they	do	so,	why	they	do	not	use	the	 law,	and	
what	 other	 strategies	 they	 deem	 useful	 or	 not.	 I	 show	 that	 there	 are	 Chinese	
workers	who	have	great	awareness	of	their	 interests	and	rights,63	and	very	critical	
readings	of	their	material	conditions	and	the	causes	of	their	grievances.	This	shows	
that	 deep	 socio-cultural	 constructs	 or	 cognitive	 scripts 64 	(Geertz,	 1973)	 that	
precede	and	prevail	 over	 the	 values	held	 in	 the	 law	are	 also	 formative	 factors	of	









These	 two	 chapters	 provide	 workers’	 own	 voices,	 opinions,	 and	 conceptions,	
extracted	 from	 27	 unstructured	 interviews	 with	 workers.	 They	 are	 used	 in	 this	
chapter	 to	 illustrate	 workers’	 explanations	 of	 their	 working	 conditions,	 their	
understanding	of	law	and	labour	relations,	and	their	conceptions	of	law	and	justice.	
These	 are	 occasionally	 supported	 by	 comments	 from	 LAL	NGO	 staff,	 lawyers	 and	
labour	experts.	Workers’	accounts	were	gathered	using	participant	observation	as	
the	 primary	 data	 collection	 method,	 with	 unstructured	 interactions	 and	 open-
ended	conversations	in	legal	consultations	at	LAL	NGOs,	in	the	offices	of	LAL	NGOs,	
and	in	visits	to	construction	site	dormitories.	Fieldnotes	were	taken	to	capture	the	
data	 during	 participant	 observations,	 which	 following	 Schensul	 et	 al.	 (1999:	 65),	








participant,	 recorded	 demographic	 characteristics	 of	 each	 participant	 wherever	
possible	 (i.e.	 origin,	 age,	 sex),	 and	 used	 verbatim	 quotes	 when	 possible.	 These	
fieldnotes	 attempted	 ‘thick’	 description	 (Geertz,	 1973),	 while	 I	 proceeded	 to	
categorization,	codification	and	analysis	when	re-working	the	fieldnotes	in	a	second	









workers’	 increased	 rights	 consciousness,	 assuming	 a	 backward	 causal	 link	 from	
specific	 forms	 of	 action	 to	 cognition.	 Forms	 of	 popular	 protest	 as	 ‘rightful	
resistance’	(O’Brien	and	Li,	2006;	O’Brien,	1996,	2010),	and	lawful	or	‘rights-based	
activities’	 (weiquan	huodong,	维权活动;	Li,	2010)	provide	evidence	to	ground	this	
conclusion.	 I,	 however,	 suggest	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 the	 use	 of	 the	 rights	
consciousness	 framework	 to	 explain	 workers’	 actions	 is	 analytically	 thin,	 as	 it	
provides	 a	 linear	 reading	 of	 a	 casual	 process	 that	 can	 be	 misleading	 and	
reductionist.	 To	 assume	 that	 one	 form	 of	 action	 is	 due	 to	 one	 cognitive	 process	
(legal	 mobilization	 =	 rights	 consciousness)	 is	 an	 over-simplification:	 the	 relation	
between	 cognition	 and	 action	 is	 a	 much	 more	 complicated	 one	 –	 and	 widely	
debated	in	both	the	disciplines	of	psychology	and	sociology.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	
more	 micro-sociological	 and	 ethnographic	 research	 on	 workers’	 subjectivities	 is	
necessary	 to	 first	 understand	 people’s	 socio-cultural	 concepts	 and	 cognitive	
processes,	which	 can	 later	 be	 linked	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 action.	 This	would	 allow	
people	to	explicitly	explain	how	they	understand	and	justify	their	own	rationales	of	




Finally,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 also	 show	 that	 the	 view	 of	 the	 increase	 in	 rights	
consciousness	 among	Chinese	workers	 is	 enthusiastically	 taken	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	
the	degree	of	penetration	of	 the	rule	of	 law	 ideology	 into	Chinese	society.	This	 is	
even	more	relevant	as	it	is	presumed	to	signify	the	potential	for	China	to	gradually	
move	 forward	 towards	 a	 more	 transparent,	 accountable,	 lawful,	 and	 ultimately	
democratic	form	of	governance,	given	the	increased	willingness	of	Chinese	people	
to	 protect	 their	 rights	 and	 to	 pressure	 the	 authoritarian	 state	 to	 hold	 to	 its	 own	
laws.	 However,	 this	 presumption	 or	 prognosis	 should	 be	 asserted	more	 carefully	
given	 that	 the	economic	and	political	 institutions	derived	 from	the	 transition	 to	a	
market	economy,	of	which	the	current	legal	system	is	a	part,	might	not	necessarily	
be	penetrating	into	Chinese	society	in	the	way	that	is	expected	in	the	literature:	to	
push	 for	 liberalizing	 and	 democratizing	 changes	 in	 the	 political	 sphere	 (Goldman,	
2005;	 Halliday,	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	 Pei,	 2006).	 In	 fact,	 what	 is	
necessary	is	to	further	research	an	ever-changing	China	where	law	is	gaining	more	
weight	in	political	and	social	life	(even	if	only	in	discursive	form),	and	ask:	How	and	
why	do	people	understand	and	use	 these	new	 legal	 institutions	at	hand?	 In	other	
words,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 law	 itself	 that	matters	most,	 but	 rather	what	people	 think	of	
law,	 if	 and	 how	 they	 act	within	 it	 (i.e.	 if	 the	 law	 is	 legitimate	 and	 useful	 in	 their	
eyes)	or,	if	outside	of	it,	how	they	justify	the	alternative	actions	they	take.		
	
Therefore,	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 explore	 workers’	 subjective	 experiences	 of	 work	 in	

















of	 the	 first	because	of	higher	educational	 levels,	awareness	of	 the	 laws,	skills	and	
resources	(in	terms	of	their	use	of	technology	and	social	media;	Zhang,	2010)	and	
anger	 derived	 from	 their	 labour	 conditions	 (Pun	 and	 Lu,	 2010).	 Moreover,	 it	 is	
argued	 that	 their	 aspirations	 of	 making	 a	 ‘better’,	 i.e.	 ‘urban’	 life,	 and	 their	
comparatively	 lower	aims	 to	 return	 to	 the	 countryside	 inform	 their	demands	and	
forms	of	protest	increasingly	going	beyond	the	legal	standards	(Chan,	2010a;	Chan	
and	Pun,	2009;	Leung	and	Pun,	2009;	Wang,	2011).	Despite	 this	 categorization	of	
different	 generation	of	workers,	 the	evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 two	main	 factors	
drawing	 workers	 to	 labour	 migration	 are	 family	 responsibilities	 and	 economic	
factors.	
	
These	 responsibilities	 and	 aspirations	 for	 a	 ‘better	 life’	 drive	 some	 workers	 to	
endure,	 at	 times,	 arduous	 and	 difficult	 working	 conditions	 while	 others	 turn	 to	
more	 radical	 forms	of	 action	 (Chan,	 2010a;	 Chan	 and	Pun,	 2009;	 Leung	 and	Pun,	
2009).	 Workers	 have	 an	 understanding	 of	 their	 material	 conditions	 and	 labour	
relations	 that	 are	 somewhat	 different	 to	 that	 of	 the	 legal	 frameworks.	 Their	
perceptions	and	opinions	of	the	law,	and	their	subjective	experiences	and	common	







work	 comes	 (…)	 because	 of	 our	 children	 and	 elders	 back	 home,	 we	 endure	 the	
hardship”	 (W25,	17	September	2012).	Similarly,	a	group	of	women	workers	 in	the	
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is	nothing	 to	be	done.	No	work,	no	wage!	 (…)	Peasants’	 lives	are	
very	hard,	there	is	no	other	choice	but	hard	work	(…)	It	is	for	your	








that	 appears	 across	 the	 board	 in	 China:	 work	 is	 necessary,	 but	 extremely	 hard;	
workers	endure	the	hardship	because	of	their	family	responsibilities.			
	
Endurance	 and	 resignation	 is	 taken	 as	 far	 as	 to	 even	 tolerate	 unsafe	 working	
conditions.	The	factory	workers	from	Daxing	said:	“The	work	is	too	exhausting;	the	
conditions	 in	 the	 factory	 are	 unsafe.	 There	 is	 a	 lot	 of	 dust	 that	 comes	 out	 of	 the	
clothes	which	is	toxic,	but	we	are	not	provided	with	appropriate	masks	(…)	But	if	one	
is	not	healthy,	there	is	no	work”	(W25,	17	September	2012).	Workers	are,	of	course,	
aware	of	 the	unsafe	conditions,	 impact	on	 their	health,	and	potential	 long-lasting	






and	 an	 identity	 ascribed	 to	 him/her:	 endurance	 of	 appalling	 working	 conditions,	
inherent	to	peasant	workers’	work,	and	having	“no	alternative”	but	to	work	for	low	
wages	and	with	low	job	security;	these	material	conditions	make	them	“the	lowest	








factors,	 as	 NGO	 X’s	 Legal	 Personnel	 Ma	 explained:	 “In	 China,	 it	 is	 traditional	 to	
endure	 a	 little	 hardship;	 as	 the	 saying	 goes,	 it’s	 ok	 to	 bear	 a	 little	 hardship,	 ‘To	
endure	hardship	 is	 happiness’	 (chiku	 shi	 fu,	吃苦是福)”	 (X5,	 25	 September	2012).	
Endurance	is	therefore	seen	as	a	cultural	trait,	and	in	fact,	considered	necessary	for	
China’s	economic	development:		
Workers’	 social	 awareness	 is	 very	 strong;	 they	will	 normally	 seek	
the	 government’s	 intervention	 to	 resolve	 issues,	 but	 as	 China	
develops,	 they	 have	 to	 endure	 hardship	 and	 Chinese	 people	 are	
willing	to	do	this.	It	is	precisely	when	they	encounter	hardship	that	
their	 consciousness	 develops.	 This	 way,	 their	 rights	 protection	
awareness	slowly	rises.	(X5,	25	September	2012)		
	
It	 is	 implied	 that	 migrant	 workers	 are	 willing	 to	 tolerate	 these	 hard	 conditions	
because	of	 their	 own	 familial	 responsibilities	 and	beyond,	 for	 the	 sake	of	 China’s	
development,	and	that	enduring	hard	working	conditions	will	lead	them	to	develop	
their	 consciousness.	 This	 explanation	 differs	 from	 that	 previously	 encountered	 in	
the	 literature:	 that	 their	 rights	 consciousness	 develops	 in	 consonance	 with	 legal	
developments.65		
	
This	 interesting	 insight	 provided	 by	 Legal	 Personnel	 Ma	 indicates	 that	 workers’	
awareness	of	their	rights	and	rights	protection	is	not	necessarily	derived	from	legal	
frameworks,	 but	 more	 importantly,	 from	 pre-existing	 cultural	 factors,	 social	










to	 these	 cultural	 factors,	 social	 constructions	 of	 what	 work	 is	 and	 should	 be	
(expectations),	and	to	their	ability	to	conceive	of	alternatives.	Workers’	actions,	or	
the	ways	in	which	workers	protect	themselves	(and	their	rights	if	so),	will	be	shown	
to	 be	 related	 to	 the	 material	 conditions	 in	 the	 workplace,	 the	 subjective	
experiences	of	these,	and	the	historical	and	socio-cultural	factors	that	have	defined	
Chinese	 people’s	 attitudes	 towards	 hardship,	 conflict,	 and	 resistance.	 This	








by	making	 the	 personal	 collective.	Workers	 share	 their	 adversity	 and	 collectively	
complain	 about	 their	 situations.	 This	 venting	 strategy	 is	 a	 coping	 mechanism,	




that	 other	 workers	 are	 suffering	 similar	 conditions,	 and	 this	 can	 bring	 redress.	
Social	 comparison,	 sharing	 subjective	 experiences	 and	 complaining	 are	 ways	 in	












Endurance	 of	 hardship	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 workers	 accept	 these	 working	
conditions	 or	 that	 they	 cannot	 identify	 that	 there	 are	 legal	 irregularities	 at	 their	
workplace.	 "Workers	 cannot	 think	 that	 far	 [i.e.	 identify	 there	 is	 a	 legal	 problem],	
they	just	have	a	general	feeling	that	something	is	not	right"	(Y2,	30	October	2012).	
This	view	of	workers	not	being	able	“to	think	that	far”	is	rather	patronizing.	In	fact,	
workers	 “feeling	 that	 something	 is	 not	 right”	might	 indicate	 that	 their	 standards	









(…)	 We	 have	 RMB	 600	 (RMB	 20	 per	 day),66	deducted	 from	 our	
salary	 for	 the	 living	 fees.	We	would	 be	 willing	 to	 pay	 this	 if	 the	





These	 workers	 confirm	 Legal	 Researcher	 Ying’s	 words	 above,	 “a	 feeling	 that	
something	is	not	right”,	but	more	than	this,	these	workers	show	that	they	are	not	
only	 aware	 of	 legal	 irregularities	 but	 of	 a	 deeper	 sense	 of	 unfairness	 and	









and	we	didn't	have	all	 these	problems.	Now	ordinary	people	 (laobaixing,	老百姓	 )	
don't	 have	 any	 development"	 (W13,	 11	 June	 2012).	Worker	 Nu	 shows	 the	 same	
view,	when	emphasising	that:	
China’s	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 country	 is	 rich.	 It	 has	 developed	 fast	
and	 the	 money	 has	 come	 fast,	 but	 it	 is	 spent	 quickly	 as	 well.	
China’s	problem	is	that	the	people	that	have	money	have	a	 lot	of	
money;	 and	 those	 that	 are	 poor	 are	 very	 poor,	 too	 (…)	We	have	
made	an	 effort	 to	 come	out	 to	 [migrate	 for]	work,	 but	 there	are	
people	 back	 in	 our	 hometown	 that	 are	 so	 poor	 that	 they	 can’t	
come	out	to	work.	(W10,	25	May	2012)	
	
Worker	 Nu’s	 statement	 provides	 strong	 evidence	 to	 refute	 the	 general	 narrative	
that	 migrant	 workers	 lack	 consciousness,	 whether	 of	 their	 rights	 or	 the	 general	
political	 economy	 of	 China’s	 development.	 Peasant	 workers	 have	 a	 very	 acute	
awareness	 of	 their	working	 conditions	 and	 the	macro-economic	 forces	 of	 China’s	
development.	In	fact,	Worker	Nu	shows	that	workers	analyse	China’s	development,	
which,	 from	 their	 standpoint,	 has	 been	unequal	 and	unfair	 because	 they	have	 to	
endure	harsh	working	conditions	yet	have	seen	no	benefits	of	the	miracle.	As	she	
said,	even	work	is	a	privilege	for	some,	as	others	have	not	been	able	to	migrate	for	






管理67 ),	 and	 respect”	 (Y10,	 25	 January	 2013).	 Workers’	 perceptions	 of	 unfair	
treatment	are	not	only	due	to	material	and	economic	factors	(including	their	work	
and	living	conditions),	and	their	class	position	(the	lowest	in	society),	they	are	also	





Informal	 social	norms	 inform	 the	way	workers	perceive	 their	 labour	 relation,	 and	
consequently,	how	they	expect	to	interact	and	be	treated	at	work.	It	will	be	shown	
below	 that	 many	 workers	 conceive	 of	 labour	 relations	 as	 social	 relations	 rather	
than	economic	relations,	and	hence,	ruled	by	social	norms	of	behaviour.	Worker	Nu	
indicated	that	her	work	relation	with	her	direct	employer	at	the	construction	site,	
the	 baogongtou	 (包⼯头),68	is	 very	 much	 like	 any	 other	 construction	 worker’s	
relation:	“He	is	ok.	We	are	all	from	the	same	place,	so	we	are	all	family,	relatives”	
(W10,	25	May	2012).	Worker	Nu	is	suggesting	that	his	type	of	employment	relation	
in	 the	 construction	 sector	 is,	 in	 fact,	 an	 extension	 of	 kin,	 family,	 hometown	 and	
regional	 networks.	 Workers	 like	 Worker	 Nu	 therefore	 follow	 norms	 of	 social	
relations	 in	what	 is	 now,	 by	 law,	 an	 economic	 relation.	 This	 dissonance	 between	
workers’	 informal	 norms	 of	 social	 behaviour	 and	 the	 legal	 and	 formal	 rules	 that	
now	 govern	 the	 same	 relation	 may	 be	 the	 reason	 why	 workers	 perceive	 labour	
disputes	differently	from	what	the	 law	stipulates:	workers’	conceptions	of	what	 is	




well	 as	 suffering	 from	 an	 occupational	 injury	 and	 being	 involved	 in	 a	 long	 legal	






Zhang,	 2011)	where	 the	 frontline	work	 is	 subcontracted	 to	 small	 private	 companies	which	 gather	
migrant	workers	 that	arrive	at	 sites	 in	 teams	 following	a	baogongtou,	normally	a	person	 from	the	
same	township	or	region.	Workers	normally	follow	the	same	baogongtou	on	multiple	occasions,	and	
rely	 on	 him	 to	 find	 the	work.	 In	most	 cases,	 the	baogongtou	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 arranging	 the	work,	
wages,	and	dormitory	and	living	conditions	with	the	subcontractor.	The	contract-signing	rate	in	the	





and	 lawyers	 and	 the	 Labour	Bureau	but	 the	 company	 refuted	her	 claim	 that	 she	had	 suffered	 an	
occupational	 injury.	 In	 January	 2011	 she	 went	 to	 court,	 but	 only	 in	 August	 2011	 was	 her	
occupational	injury	confirmed.	At	the	time	of	our	conversation	she	was	undergoing	mediation.	
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this	 technology,	 internet,	QQ70,	Weibo,	 I	 could	work	 from	home	 (…)	 I	 have	 a	 two	
year	old	son	who	is	in	kindergarten",	she	said.	"I	have	been	working	for	so	long	for	




her	employer	 “caring”	 for	her	and	 looking	after	her	wellbeing	–	 she	has	a	 son	 to	
provide	 for.	Her	 emotional	 reaction	and	 social	 sharing	denote	 that	 she	perceived	
this	treatment	as	inappropriate	to	her	relation	with	her	employer,	and	disrespectful	
to	her	long	dedication	to	the	company.	Yet	again,	the	behaviour	of	her	employer	in	
this	 regard	 –	 not	 accepting	 her	 request	 to	work	 from	home	–	 is	 not	 illegal,	 even	
though	she	considered	it	wrong	and	disappointing.	
	
Social	 constructs	 of	 equality,	 fairness	 and,	 furthermore,	 morality,	 underlie	 the	
above	 excerpts.	 The	 examples	 indicate	 that	 there	 are	 norms	 of	 social	 behaviour	
that	escape	the	formal	legal	precepts.	Workers	share	a	sense	of	how	they	should	be	
treated,	 irrespective	 of	 what	 the	 law	 dictates.	 When	 they	 are	 not	 treated	
accordingly,	workers	 feel	 that	 it	 is	 ‘wrong’,	which	 is	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	morality	 of	
social	 relations.	Morality,	Fei	 (1992)	argues,	 is	 “the	belief	 that	people	 in	a	society	
should	 abide	 by	 certain	 norms	 of	 social	 behaviour.	 Morality	 always	 includes	
regulations,	 beliefs,	 and	 sanctions,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	 constraints	
imposed	 by	 a	 social	 structure”	 (Fei,	 1992:	 71).	 What	 may	 be	 legal	 treatment	 in	
today’s	 China	 can	 be	 perceived	 by	workers	 as	 immoral	 and	 unfair.	 This	 indicates	
that	there	is	a	disjuncture	between	the	formal	institutions	of	the	state	(in	this	case,	
labour	 laws),	 and	 workers’	 social	 norms	 of	 behaviour	 and	 popular	 or	 local	
constructs	of	morality	which	are	applied	to	labour	relations.	This	sense	of	morality	
applied	 to	 labour	 relations	 also	 informs	 workers’	 conceptions	 of	 fairness	 and	





















River	Delta	 (YRD)	 indicated	 that	 in	2009,	while	75%	of	workers	had	signed	 labour	
contracts,	 such	 contracts	 were	 only	 of	 3	 years	 duration	 at	 best	 (SDMWC,	 2010).	








she	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 these	 local	 authorities	 to	 rigorously	 enforce	 the	 Law	 and	 to	
actively	 create	 supplementary	 instruments	 was	 that	 in	 the	 PRD	 local	 governments	 were	 actually	
trying	to	foster	a	more	capital-intensive	technological	industry,	and	reduce	labour	mobility	and	the	
number	of	migrant	and	low-skilled	workers	in	the	area.	Thus,	a	rigorous	implementation	of	the	Law	
is	 found	to	be	a	strategy	to	encourage	 industrial	upgrading	 in	 the	PRD	(Ho,	2009:	88).	 In	contrast,	
Hendrischke	(2011)	suggested	that	in	Jiangsu	and	Zhejiang,	even	though	signing-contract	rates	were	
high	(95%,	according	to	Zhou,	2008),	the	majority	of	companies	were	reluctant	to	comply	with	this	
legal	 requirement	 due	 to	 the	 inherent	 increase	 in	 labour	 costs.	 Moreover,	 he	 argued	 that	
implementation	was	problematic	because	of	 local	governments’	 lack	of	enforcement	 incentives:	 if	
the	Law	was	rigorously	enforced,	local	governments	feared	it	might	increase	labour	costs,	and	lead	
to	 a	 reduction	 in	 investments,	 retrenchment	 and	 unemployment,	 which	 would	 be	 deleterious	 to	
local	governments’	revenues	(Hendrischke,	2011:	58).	It	can	also	be	argued	that	the	ACFTU	had	been	
more	 proactively	 protecting	 the	 rights	 of	 migrant	 workers	 since	 2003	 (Howell,	 2006:	 9),	 and	
particularly	in	the	PRD	to	pacify	the	waves	of	protests	and	strikes	demanding	minimum	wages	and	a	
trade	 union	 to	 represent	 workers’	 interests	 (Chan,	 2010b:	 169;	 CLB,	 2009a).	 Hence,	 legal	
implementation	could	be	viewed	as	a	mechanism	to	pacify	labour	unrest.	
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rate,	 which	 can	 be	 read	 optimistically	 as	 increasing	 mechanisms	 protective	 of	
workers’	 rights	 and	 conditions	 at	 work,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 explore	 what	 workers	
have	to	say	about	it,	and	to	contrast	sectors	where	there	has	been	improvement	of	
contract-formalization	of	labour	relations,	and	those	that	remain	largely	“informal”	
(lacking	 contractual	 labour	 relations),	 such	 as	 small	 private	 manufacturing	
companies	 and	 the	 construction	 sector.	 According	 to	 the	 law,	 the	 contract	 of	






We	 have	 no	 contract	 of	 employment;	 out	 there	 it	 is	 all	 oral	
agreements.	With	a	contract	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	salaries	are	a	bit	
higher,	 but	 out	 there	 normally	 between	 70-80%	 are	 oral	
agreements	 (…)	 but	 because	 our	 situation	 is	 hard,	 we	 will	 take	






clothing	 factory	 take	 on	 work	 without	 a	 contract	 of	 employment	 out	 of	 pure	
necessity.	 They	 indicate	 that	 contracts	 are	 usually	 an	 oral	 agreement	 between	
worker	 and	 employer,	 rather	 than	 in	 written	 form	 as	 the	 LCL	 stipulates.	 The	
acceptance	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 employment	 relations	 do	 not	 necessarily	 signal	
workers’	resignation	or	endurance	per	se,	but	can	also	indicate	that	work	relations	






an	 extension	 of	 social,	 hometown	 and	 kin	 networks.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 informal	
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labour	 relations	 –	 i.e.	with	 no	 signed	 labour	 contract	 –	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 risk	 for	
workers	who	are	unregulated	and	unprotected,	but	it	has	also	been	explained	as	an	
expression	of	workers’	own	choices:		
The	 government	 is	 now	more	 caring	 about	 peasant	 workers	 (...)	
each	 industry	 has	 its	 own	 regulations,	 and	 the	 construction	
industry	 is	very	particular.	The	problem	of	migrant	workers	 in	the	
construction	industry	is	that	they	are	not	provided	with	insurance,	
with	 injury	 insurance	 in	 the	 construction	 site.	Also,	workers	don’t	
want	 to	 sign	 contracts	 or	 pay	 for	 the	 insurance	because	 it	 is	 not	








previous	chapter	 that	contracts	are	 the	bare	minimum	necessary	 in	order	 to	 take	
legal	 action.	 In	 court,	 physical	 proofs	 are	 required	 to	 establish	 the	 existence	of	 a	
labour	 relation	 in	order	 to	proceed	with	 the	 case.	Workers’	 voices,	 as	 Lawyer	 Lin	
told	Worker	 Shou,	 are	 not	 sufficient,	 they	 do	 not	 carry	 the	 weight	 of	 a	 written	
proof:	“The	contract	is	a	safeguard,	it	is	a	guarantee.	The	key	point	is	to	avoid	the	
problem	 happening	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 and	 for	 this	 the	 labour	 relation	 has	 to	 be	
confirmed;	 the	 labour	 contract	 prevents	 problems”	 (W26,	 16	October	 2012).	 In	 a	









are	 not	 following	 the	 standards,	 and/or	 because	 employers	 do	 not	 have	 legal	
consciousness”	(Z9,	20	December	2012).	As	well	as	employers’	lack	of	awareness	of	
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the	 legal	 standards,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 implementation	 and	 monitoring	 of	 legal	
standards	 by	 Labour	 Bureaus,	 lack	 of	 political	will,	 and	 contrary	 vested	 interests,	
especially	in	the	construction	sector.		
In	 2011,	 for	 example,	 there	 was	 a	 23%	 contract	 signing	 rate.	
Problems	persist,	especially	in	the	construction	industry.	Why	don’t	
workers	have	a	 contract,	 if	 since	2003	Wen	 Jiabao	has	 increased	
attention	 to	 this	 problem.	 The	 baogongtou	 system	 persists.	 The	
construction	industry	has	very	fuzzy	relations.	The	legal	training	is	







very	 different	 to	 what	 the	 laws	 stipulate.	 The	 labour	 contract	 is	 seen	 by	 many	
workers	not	as	a	protective	instrument,	but	as	a	constraint	on	their	mobility,	and	as	
a	 distortion	 of	 their	 social	 relations.	 For	 example,	 Lawyer	 Liu	 told	 a	 group	 of	
workers	attending	a	training	session	at	NGO	X,	“the	Labour	Contract	Law	is	the	law	
that	gives	workers	most	gains.	You	then	have	to	see	if	you	can	protect	your	rights".	
To	 which	 Worker	 Gan	 responded:	 “There	 is	 law,	 there	 are	 rights,	 but	 it	 doesn't	















following	 a	 baogongtou	 who	 she	 recognized	 as	 being	 “family,	 relatives”	 as	
mentioned	above	(W10,	25	May	2012).	Similarly,	Worker	Zhang	had	been	working	
on	 a	 construction	 site	 in	 the	 Haidian	 district	 of	 Beijing	 for	 two	 years.	 When	 he	
arrived	 he	 signed	 a	 contract,	 but	 said	 “I	 have	 no	 idea	what	 the	 contract	 says	 or	
what	the	salary	is	or	anything.	I	do	not	have	a	copy	of	the	contract.	The	copy	is	with	
the	 boss”	 (W1,	 20	 April	 2012).	 Worker	 Zhang	 followed	 a	 baogongtou	 from	 his	
hometown,	 because	 “there	was	 trust	 and	 a	 former	 relation”	 with	 him.	 However,	
workers	 that	 followed	 the	 same	 baogongtou	 but	 came	 from	 different	 towns	 did	
ask,	 discussed	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 and	 received	 a	 contract	 of	 employment,	
according	to	Worker	Zhang.	He	did	not	(W1,	20	April	2012).	Even	when	workers	like	










On	 the	contrary,	many	workers	perceive	 their	 labour	 relation	as	governed	by	 the	
same	 rules	 of	 other	 social	 relations:	 based	 on	 trust,	 respect,	 face	 and	 social	
harmony.	 The	 introduction	 of	 the	 contract	 into	 the	 labour	 relation	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 an	 alteration	 and	 even	 a	 disruption	 to	 the	 trust	 and	 established	
social	 rules,	 and	 some	 workers	 would	 consider	 asking	 to	 be	 provided	 with	 a	
contract	as	an	offense	to	the	basic	trust	that	underlies	any	social	relation.	Lawyer	
Jian	 emphasised,	 “it	 is	 because	 of	 the	 trust	 of	 the	 other	 person;	 people	 are	 not	
willing	 to	ask	 for	 a	 contract	 because	 this	would	harm	 face;	 it	will	 show	 that	 they	
don’t	trust	the	other	person”	(Z2,	13	September	2012).	Therefore,	contracts	(and	by	
extension,	 legal	precepts)	 can	be	perceived	as	a	 sign	of	mistrust	and	 inconsistent	
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with	 cultural	 notions	of	 social	 relations	 and	historical	 experiences	of	work	during	
the	socialist	period.72		
	
This	 same	 social	 dynamic	 can	 apply	 when	 dealing	 with	 conflict.	 For	 example,	
Worker	 Di	 indicates	 that:	 “We	 are	 brothers	 (gemenr,	哥们⼉)	 with	 our	 boss	 (the	
baogongtou),	 there	 is	 no	 way.	 We	 won’t	 address	 the	 problem,	 we	 won’t	 say	
anything.	This	is	the	Chinese	characteristic:	face.	If	we	have	a	problem	or	we	are	not	
satisfied	with	 something,	 it	 is	 just	 like	 that,	 there	 is	 nothing	 to	 do”	 (W6,	 4	May,	
2012).	In	the	same	way	that	many	workers	will	not	demand	a	contract	in	order	not	
to	show	mistrust	or	damage	the	employers’	and	their	own	face,	many	workers	will	
avoid	 conflict	 altogether,	 either	 enduring	 or	 leaving	 the	 work.	 In	 other	 words,	
workers’	conceptions	of	labour	relations	as	social	relations	and	their	perceptions	of	




To	 confirm	 the	 disparity	 in	 the	 use	 of	 labour	 contracts	 vis-à-vis	 relying	 on	 social	
relations,	 Worker	 Li,	 who	 intervened	 in	 my	 discussion	 with	 Worker	 Zhang	 after	
having	 entered	 the	 dormitory	 room	 and	 listened	 to	 our	 conversation,	 stated	







implementation	 and	 monitoring	 that	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 anything	 will	 come	 of	 it.	
However,	 Worker	 Li	 refers	 here	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 labour	 contracts	 are	 not	 a	
guarantee	of	basic	standards	of	life	and	material	conditions,	which	are	what	many	
																																																						




workers	 are	 concerned	 with.	 Worker	 Shao	 reflects	 this	 as	 well,	 claiming:	 “the	
contract,	yes,	yes,	the	contract.	Ok,	but	I	do	not	know	how	to	get	a	contract.	What	
we	 worry	 about	 most	 is	 that	 we	 do	 not	 get	 paid”	 (W5,	 1	 May	 2012).	 Another	
example	is	that	of	Worker	Liu	who	rejected	the	contract	offered	to	him	because	of	
its	 conditions.	 He	 had	 been	 working	 for	 eight	 months	 as	 a	 security	 guard	 for	 a	
company	 owned	 by	 a	 retired	 SOE	manager.	 Shortly	 after	 starting	 work,	 his	 boss	
began	deducting	money	 from	his	 salary	 (more	 than	RMB	1,00073	in	 the	month	of	
June).	When	 he	 queried	 this,	 his	 boss	 refused	 to	 return	 the	money	 deducted	 or	
gave	 any	 explanation	 for	 it;	 instead	 he	 gave	 him	 a	 document	 stating	 that	 the	
amount	deducted	was	only	RMB	900,	but	still	without	an	explanation.	When	asked	





acceptance	 of	 unfair	 and	 poor	working	 conditions	 and	 salary,	which	 he	 rejected.	
However,	he	worked	without	a	contract	while	searching	for	a	better	option.	
	
Lawyer	 Ai	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 “the	 contract,	 the	 labour	 relation	 is	 not	 fair.	
Workers	 are	 aware	 of	 that”	 (Y4,	 14	 September	 2012).	 Workers	 are	 aware	 that	
contracts	 can	 bind	 them	 to	 certain	 working	 conditions	 that,	 as	 with	Worker	 Liu,	
they	do	not	necessarily	accept.	In	this	context,	I	would	like	to	recall	Worker	Da,	the	
taxi	 driver	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	 thesis,	 who	 told	 me	 that	 he	
thought	 the	 laws,	 and	 the	 contracts	 were	 unfair	 because	 workers	 could	 not	
negotiate	 them,	 in	 this	 last	 instance,	 with	 the	 employer	 (W7,	 5	May	 2012).	 This	
argument	is	central	to	the	definition	of	labour	relations	in	a	market	economy,	which	
the	labour	contract	reinforces:	in	a	capitalist	economy,	the	labour-capital	relation	is	
an	 structurally	 unbalanced	 economic	 relation	 and	 individual	 labour	 contracts	
reinforce	 the	 individuation	 of	 labourers	 in	 the	 labour	 process	 (which	 during	 the	




negotiating	 the	 content	 of	 this	 contract	 (see	 collective	 bargaining	 developments	
below	 in	 Chapter	 Seven).	 Worker	 Da	 here	 claims	 that	 the	 central	 unfairness	 of	
labour	contracts,	and	of	 the	 legal	and	economic	system	for	 that	matter,	 is	due	to	
the	unilateral	power	of	capital	to	design	contracts,	and	the	lack	of	worker	power	in	
the	 labour	 relation.	This	 lack	 is	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	workers	have	no	real	process	
through	which	to	negotiate	the	terms	and	conditions	of	employment	or	the	labour	




legal	 resolution	 of	 labour	 conflict.	 The	 following	 example	 is	 a	 description	 of	 a	
participant	observation	during	a	legal	consultation	by	Lawyer	Lin	for	Worker	Xu	at	





to	 be	 re-employed	 in	 the	 same	 company.	 The	 dispatch	 agency	 is	 part	 of	 the	
company74.	Lawyer	Lin’s	reply	was,	"You	think	 it's	unfair.	We	also	think	 it's	unfair,	





have	 to	provide	proof	 so	 that	he	believes	 you",	 Lawyer	 Lin	 said.	 "It	 is	 not	 that	all	
lawyers	can	deal	with	everything,	as	 it	 is	not	 that	 the	 law	can	resolve	any	type	of	
issue",	he	stressed.	Worker	Xu	said	 there	was	no	way	she	could	get	any	evidence	
regarding	 the	 issue,	 that	 that	was	 the	 problem,	 and	why	 the	 system	was	 unfair,	
																																																						
74	This	formula	of	having	a	dispatch	agency	as	an	employment	subsidiary	to	the	mother	company	has	
been	 found	 in	 previous	 research	 (Ho,	 2009;	WE,	 2009b).	 The	 amendment	of	 the	 LCL	 in	 2013	was	
mainly	to	address	the	problem	of	labour	dispatch.		










the	 LCL,	 companies	 increasingly	using	 labour	dispatch	agencies	 to	 circumvent	 the	
legal	 requirement	of	 the	 labour	contract	 (Ho,	2009;	Wang,	et	al.	2009;	Xu,	2008).	
Worker	Xu’s	case	reflects	the	discrepancy	between	what	workers	perceive	as	unfair	
treatment,	yet	(at	that	point)	is	legal.	Furthermore,	it	shows	that	there	are	limits	to	
the	 law’s	 ability	 to	 enable	 workers	 to	 protect	 what	 they	 perceive	 to	 be	 their	










Similarly	 to	 the	 quote	 above,	 Lawyer	 Zeng	 states,	 “laws	 do	 not	 correspond	 to	
reality.	 And	 laws	 say	 nothing	 about	 how	 to	 use	 them”	 (Z5,	 20	 September	 2012).	
Lawyer	Zeng	and	Labour	Expert	Gong	bring	out	the	core	of	the	argument	made	in	
this	chapter:	that	the	law	does	not	reflect	either	workers’	material	reality	and	their	
subjective	 experiences	 or	 local/popular/socio-cultural	 constructs	 of	 justice,	
morality,	and	fairness.	In	this	sense,	when	workers	claim	that	“the	law	is	useless”,	
as	 in	 the	 quote	 above,	 it	 is	mainly	 because	 the	 law	 is	 dissociated	 from	workers’	
realities	and	subjective	experiences	of	work.		
	
The	 legal	 process	 is	 highly	 rational,	 technical	 and	 aims	 to	 standardize	 behaviour.	
This	 creates	 an	enormous	distance	 from	 the	worker	who,	during	 conflict,	 is	most	
focused	on	the	subjective	and	emotional	experience,	and	frustration	due	to	what	is	
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perceived	 as	 unfair	 treatment.	 Contrary	 to	workers’	 feelings,	 the	 legal	 process	 is	
aseptic,	 surgical;	 it	 removes	 the	 worker	 from	 his/her	 most	 basic	 reality	 and	
emotional	reaction	towards	the	conflict.	When	workers	that	have	suffered	serious	
occupational	injuries,	such	as	Worker	Shou	(W26,	16	October	2012),	or	Worker	Ying	




channels.	 For	 example,	 Lawyer	 Song,	 exasperated,	 repeatedly	 told	 a	worker	who	
was	narrating	his	experience	of	a	 labour	conflict	and	sharing	his	 feelings	with	 the	
lawyer	 in	 a	 legal	 consultation:	 “Don’t	 give	 me	 all	 the	 details.	 In	 the	 arbitration	




The	degree	 to	which	 the	 law	can	provide	workers	with	 redress	on	 the	one	hand,	
and	secure	social	stability	(and	regime	stability),	on	the	other,	greatly	depends	on	
how	much	these	institutions	are	able	to	encapsulate	local	knowledge	and	practices,	
and	 informal	 processes,	 as	 argued	 by	 Scott	 (1998).	 How	 far	 laws	 sit	 from	 social	
reality	will	 influence	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 legal	 institutions	are	 integrated	 into	




and	fairness	are	 in	dissonance	with	some	of	the	basic	precepts	of	the	 labour	 laws	
(i.e.	economization	and	commodification	of	social	 relations),	while	not	necessarily	
against	 its	protective	factors	(holidays,	overtime	payment,	health	and	safety).	This	
is	 due	 to	 legal	 rationality	 being	 based	 on	 precepts	 different	 to	 those	 of	 the	
prevalent	morality	and	local	practices	in	Chinese	society	–	a	rationality	that	includes	
social	 norms	 and	 rules	 of	 behaviour,	 concepts	 of	 justice,	 and	 people’s	 subjective	
experiences	and	emotions.	 In	China,	 inasmuch	as	 in	any	other	 society,	 laws	are	a	
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is	 to	 some	degree	 a	 function	 of	 institutional	 norms	 and	 legal	 doctrine	 privileging	
enterprise	mediation	 committees	 and	 government	 labour	 arbitration	 committees	
and	People's	Courts.	Lawyers’	core	compliance,	accompanied	by	the	high	rationality	
and	technicality	of	law,	are	key	in	explaining	why	lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	(and	more	
basically,	 the	 legal	 institutions),	 do	 not	 stimulate	 workers’	 activism.	 The	 law	
separates	 the	dispute	 from	workers’	 reality	and	 subjective	experiences.	This	adds	
limitations	to	workers’	obtaining	substantive	justice,	as	legal	justice	might	not	allow	
their	 emotional	 grief	 to	 be	 released	 in	 the	 legal	 process.	 Strategically,	 this	 is	 the	
most	 crucial	 limit	 the	 law	 imposes	on	workers’	 actions:	 it	 restrains	 the	emotional	
and	 subjective	 component	 of	 their	 experience,	 thereby	 limiting	 its	 potential	 to	
engage	workers	collectively	through	their	identification	with	the	law	and	with	other	
workers’	 grief	 and	 anger.	 This	 aseptic	 legal	 process	 prevents	 the	 formation	 of	
workers’	 solidarity	 by	 removing	 their	 emotions	 from	 the	 legal	 process.	 In	
comparative	settings,	solidarity	has	been	created	through	the	combination	of	legal	
mobilization	 with	 collective	 action	 and	 political	 and	 public	 campaigns	 (McCann,	
1994),	 lawyers	actively	engaging	the	law	with	parallel	political	 initiatives	(McCann,	
1994;	Epp,	1998;	Scheingold,	1974).	During	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	 I	observed	
no	 coordinated	 legal	 mobilization	 and	 collective	 political	 campaigns	 other	 than	
NGOs’	legal	advocacy	work,	which	was	not	directly	engaging	or	mobilizing	workers,	
but	 accessing	 the	 policy	 circles	 and	 elites.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 coordinated	 action,	
legal	mobilization	in	China	of	the	type	depicted	in	this	study	imposes	more	limits	on	










Landry	 (2008)	 explains	 how	 institutional	 diffusion	 (of	 legal/judicial	 institutions)	
takes	place	in	China,	and	argues,	in	line	with	the	institutional	innovation	literature	
(Hetherington,	1998;	Levi,	1999;	Levi	and	Stoker,	2000)	that	institutional	diffusion	is	
a	 necessary	 step	 to	 establishing	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	
trustworthiness	 that	 legal	 institutions	 inspire.	Using	 survey	 data,	 Landry	 confirms	
previous	 studies	 on	 high	 degrees	 of	 interpersonal	 trust	 and	 system-based	 trust,	
mainly	 of	 central	 government	 institutions	 (Inglehart,	 1997;	 Shi,	 2001;	 Tang	 and	
Parish,	 2000).	 Landry	 (2008:	 211;	 2011:	 151)	 finds	 that	 the	high	 levels	 of	 trust	 in	
government	institutions	transfers	to	citizens’	high	levels	of	trust	in	legal	institutions	
(courts),	 even	 when	 people	 have	 no	 experience	 with	 them,	 which	 explains	 the	
likelihood	of	penetration	of	the	rule	of	law	project	into	Chinese	society:	“High	levels	
of	trust	in	legal	institutions	bode	well	for	the	capacity	of	Chinese	citizens	to	adopt	
institutional	 innovations”	(Landry,	2008:	212).	Trust	 in	 legal	 institutions	 is,	 in	turn,	
explained	 by	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	 include	 individual	 characteristics	 and	
ascription	 to	 the	 authoritarian	 Party-state	 (CPC	 and	 Communist	 Youth	 League	




legal	 system.	Lack	of	 trust	 in	 the	 judiciary	 relates	 to	 the	perceived	 lack	of	 judicial	
independence,	and	a	common	perception	 that	 the	courts	will	 seek	 to	protect	 the	
corporate	 side	 –	 based	 on	 the	 corporatist	 behaviour	 of	 local	 governments	 and	
courts,	 corruption,	 etc.	 This	 is	 related	 to	 the	 institutional	 entrenchment	 between	
the	 Party-state	 and	 its	 judiciary,	 and	 capital,	which	 is	 sustained	 by	 the	 structural	
inequalities	of	labour-capital	relations	embedded	in	the	law.	
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Workers	 know	 how	 to	 protect	 their	 rights	 (weiquan).	 There	 are	
workers	that	don’t	want	to	go	through	the	legal	channels.	But	the	
government	 authority	 [Labour	 Bureau]	 is	 not	 enough;	 it	 doesn’t	















workers	 just	want	 to	 protect	 their	 rights.	And	 they	want	 to	 do	 it	





is	 not	 that	 type	 of	 money-interest	 relationship;	 this	 is	 the	 biggest	 limitation	 to	
workers’	 trust.	 And	 this	 is	 the	 main	 advantage	 of	 public	 interest	 lawyers”	 (Y9,	 4	
December	2012).		
	
In	 the	 social	 relation	 between	 workers	 and	 lawyers,	 trust	 improves	 if	 the	
commercial	 transaction	aspect	 (as	applies	 if	 using	a	private	 law	 firm)	 is	 removed.	
With	legal	aid/NGO	lawyers:		
At	 the	 beginning	 workers	 are	 very	 surprised	 that	 the	 service	 we	
provide	 is	 free.	 They	 are	 very	 distrustful,	 but	 then	 they	 become	
friendlier.	Workers	worry	 that	 the	 lawyer	will	 take	 advantage	 of	







legal	 procedures	 (…)	 There	 is	 an	 enormous	 gap	 between	 lawyers	
and	 workers,	 psychological	 and	 cultural	 (…)	 this	 distance	 can	
create	problems	of	trust.	This	is	why	NGOs	that	work	with	lawyers	







the	 law,	 and	extend	 the	 legal	 constraints	 to	workers	when	advising	 them	how	 to	
act.	Lawyer	Eng	considers,	however,	that	“NGOs	have	more	space	to	act”	because	
they	do	not	have	to	confine	themselves	and	their	advice	to	workers	to	legal	actions.	




to	 resort	 to	 it	 to	 resolve	 labour	 disputes	 are	 economic	 and	 psycho-social.	 It	 is	
perceived	as	economically	unsound	once	time	and	money	have	been	factored	in,	as	
described	in	the	previous	chapter.	“Most	workers	don’t	want	to	go	to	court	anyway.	
Economically	 it	 makes	 sense	 for	 workers	 [not	 to	 go	 to	 court];	 it	 is	 economically	
effective	because	they	can	save	money	because	 in	many	cases	 it	 is	very	expensive	
for	the	worker	because	they	have	to	pay	for	the	lawyer”	(D1,	25	September	2012).	
















The	 aforementioned	 feelings	 of	 fairness	 and	 equality	 indicate	 workers	 have	 a	
conception	of	justice,	a	type	of	substantive	justice	that	differs	from	legal	precepts.	
Workers’	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 are	 based	 on	 socio-cultural	 norms	 of	 social	
behaviour	 (morality),	 and	 on	 their	 subjective	 experiences	 and	 the	 material	
conditions	of	their	work.	This	idea	of	substantive	justice	is	therefore	based	on	social	





Legal	 rationality,	 therefore,	differs	 from	workers’	 conceptions	of	 justice.	Workers’	
rationality	 is	 informed	by	the	aforementioned	constructs	of	morality	and	fairness,	
and	by	their	subjective	experiences	at	work	and	emotions.	The	 law	does	not	 fully	
match	 workers’	 concepts,	 and	 for	 some	 workers,	 it	 does	 not	 capture	 their	
experiences	either	in	its	precepts	or	in	its	processes.	For	some	workers,	legal	justice	
reduces	substantive	justice	to	economic	compensation	when	the	procedures	of	the	
law	 have	 resolved	 their	 individual	 issue,	 in	 most	 cases	 (the	 majority	 of	 them	
occupational	 health	 cases),	 awarding	 them	 economic	 compensation.	 However,	
other	 workers	 are	 left	 with	 what	 Gallagher	 (2006:	 785)	 calls	 “informed	
disenchantment”	 because	 of	 their	 negative	 evaluation	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 and	
fairness	of	the	legal	system.	This,	Gallagher	argues,	leads	workers	to	more	critically	
informed	 action	 in	 the	 future.	 This	 view	 is	mainly	 focused	 on	 procedural	 justice,	
while	the	evidence	above	shows	that	‘disenchantment’	or	other	negative	views	of	
the	law	are	not	only	due	to	the	outcome	of	procedural	(legal)	justice,	but	are	most	
significantly	 related	 to	 a	 fundamental	 incongruity	 between	 legal	 justice	 and	
people’s	 ideas	 of	 substantive	 justice.	 Therefore,	 workers’	 critical	 actions	 may	 be	
due	 to	 their	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 legal	 system,	 but	 workers’	 socio-cultural	
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constructs	and	subjective	experiences	better	explain	the	variety	of	forms	of	action	
that	 they	 resort	 to,	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 legal	 system	 or	 cognitive	 dissonance	
with	 the	 legal	 precepts	 being	 only	 one	 of	 many	 explanatory	 factors.	 Hence,	




that	many	 workers’	 claims	 are	 left	 outside	 the	 law,	 either	 because	 they	 are	 not	




were	 unreasonable	 (buheli,	不合理),	 illegitimate	 or	 illegal	 (buhefa,	不合法).	 They	
were	 unreasonable	 or	 illegal	 because	 they	 were	 not	 covered	 by	 the	 law,	 not	
because	 they	were	 unreasonable	 demands	 according	 to	 the	material	 situation	 of	
the	 worker,	 and	 many	 were,	 indeed,	 reasonable	 for	 the	 worker	 and	 his/her	
subjective	experiences.	As	Lawyer	Gu	said:	“Between	workers	and	lawyers	there	are	
communication	 problems:	 workers’	 demands	 are	 not	 reasonable,	 or	 they	 don’t	








above	 whose	 contract	 was	 irregularly	 terminated	 by	 a	 labour	 dispatch	 agency,	
demonstrates	 this	 clearly.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 labour	 laws	 did	 not	 regulate	 labour	
dispatch	 agencies,	 and	 although	 Lawyer	 Lin	 sympathised	with	 her,	 she	 could	 not	




justice,	and	 the	structural	power	of	 the	 legal	 system	embodied	 in	 the	 judge,	who	
was	 to	 be	 provided	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 claim.	 This	 case	 is	 also	 extremely	
relevant	 in	showing	that	 legal	 justice,	as	well	as	not	delivering	substantive	 justice,	
narrows	 workers’	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 prescribing	 them	 what	 is	 ‘reasonable’,	
what	 they	 are	 entitled	 to,	 and	what	 they	 can	 ask	 for	 or	 not.	 This,	 by	 extension,	
means	 that	 legal	 justice	 also	 requires	 appropriate	 behaviour	 –	 the	 actions	 and	
behaviours	workers	can	take	to	obtain	their	‘reasonable’	and	‘legitimate’	demands	
are	 purely	 legal	 actions,	 all	 other	 actions	 being	 deemed	 illegal,	 and	 by	 these	
definitions,	not	recognized	as	valid	ways	of	pursuing	workers’	legal	rights	(nor	their	
interests).	Hence,	by	definition,	 these	actions	would	not	 reflect	 the	 type	of	 rights	
consciousness	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 (use	 of	 courts	 equals	 rights	
consciousness).	 To	 reiterate	 this,	 a	 group	 of	 workers	 from	 a	 yoghurt	 factory	 in	
Daxing	 (who	 were	 claiming	 eight	 months	 of	 unpaid	 salary	 from	 their	 employer)	
stated:	“We	can	only	depend	on	the	law	to	lawfully	protect	our	rights	(hefa	baohu	
quanyi,	合法保护权益)”	 (W22,	10	September	2012).	 Legal	education	 is	 central	 to	
diffusing	this	form	of	legal	rights	consciousness	and	making	workers	aware	of	what	
is,	 and	 is	 not,	 a	 ‘reasonable’	 demand	 and	 the	 available	 channels	 and	 sanctioned	
actions	to	resolve	conflict,	as	noted	in	the	previous	chapter:	“We	[NGO	Y]	provide	
workers’	 legal	 training	so	that	workers	gain	consciousness	about	how	to	resolve	a	
specific	 problem,	 and	 to	 increase	 their	 rights	 protection	 consciousness”	 (Y4,	 14	
September	 2012).	 This	 dissonance	 indeed	 leads	 to	 workers’	 feelings	 of	




the	 structural	 character	 of	 legal	 system,	which	 reflect	 power	 relations	 in	 society.	
Lawyer	Zhu	clearly	stated:	“The	laws	are	very	unfair	because	they	protect	capital.	In	
some	 respects	 they	 are	 better	 than	 before	 because	 some	workers’	 conditions	 are	
better	 protected.	 However,	 overall,	 these	 laws	 recognize	 an	 unfair	 relation	 and	
protect	more	 the	 corporate	 side.	 It	 is	 a	 problem	of	 redistribution,	 and	 it	 is	 in	 the	
judicial	system	where	the	law	is	most	unfair”	(Y6,	3	September	2012).	The	problem	
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of	 redistribution	 in	 legal	 justice	 has	 to	 do	 with	 structural	 inequalities	 between	
workers	 and	 capital.	 The	 law,	 therefore,	 reflects	 the	existent	unequal	 relations	 in	
society	 and	 this	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 differing	 rationalities	 between	 workers’	






been	 taking	 shape,	 one	 that	 is	 in	 reference	 to	 legally	 entitled	 rights.	Despite	 this	
increase	 in	 legal	rights	awareness,	 I	 find	that	there	are	Chinese	workers	who	hold	
strong	and	negative	opinions	of	the	law,	and	of	the	material	and	social	conditions	of	
their	work.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 these	 perceptions	 are	 informed	 by	
socio-cultural	 factors	 such	 as	 constructs	 of	 morality	 (prevalent	 rules	 of	 social	
behaviour),	 fairness	 and	 justice,	 workers’	 conceptions	 and	 their	 subjective	
experiences	 of	 work.	 Workers’	 voices	 are	 an	 expression	 of	 awareness	 of	 their	
conditions	 and	 expectations	 of	 how	 work	 relations	 should	 unfold,	 which	 reveal	
social	 constructs,	 desires	 and	 life	 expectations.	 These	 voices	 show	 that	 legal	
institutions	rest	far	from	local	knowledge	and	informal	practices,	some	workers	not	
entirely	identifying	with	the	laws	nor	fully	integrating	them	into	their	behaviour	(as	
will	 be	 shown	 in	 the	 next	 chapter).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 evidence	 gathered	 here	
suggests	 that	 the	 analytical	 category	 of	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 is	 rather	 hollow,	
institutionally	 driven	 and	 socio-culturally	 misinformed.	Workers’	 consciousness	 is	
more	aligned	with	Perry’s	(2009)	‘rules	consciousness’	argument.		
	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 social	 category	 of	 ‘peasant	 workers’	 has	
incorporated	the	hardship	of	labour	which	informs	workers’	identity,	in	the	phrase	
‘peasant	workers’	 lives	are	hard’.	Moreover,	 it	appears	that	there	is	an	underlying	
expectation	 that	 peasant	 workers	 (should)	 endure	 this	 hardship	 and	 exploitation	
because	‘there	is	no	alternative’	(meibanfa,	没办法).	In	contrast	to	this	resignation,	




workers,	 but	 was	 also	 present	 in	 manufacturing	 workers.	 It	 would	 be	 worth	
exploring,	 in	 future	research,	 if	 the	different	 forms	of	organizations	of	production	
and	 social	 life	 in	 different	 industries,	 and	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 legal	 compliance	





disagreement	 when	 basic	 social	 values	 are	 disrupted,	 disruption	 which	 may	 not	
necessarily	 be	 illegal.	 Workers	 interviewed	 pointed	 out	 their	 disputes	 over	
wrongdoing	by	employers	or	unfair	treatment;	these	might	not	be	illegal	according	
to	the	 legal	 frameworks,	yet	still	might	trigger	workers	to	act,	as	will	be	shown	in	
the	 next	 chapter.	 Therefore,	 the	ways	workers	 address	work	 or	 labour	 conflict	 is	
coherent	with	these	cognitive	structures,	taking	a	range	of	actions	to	confront	–	or	




I	 have	 argued	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 there	 are	 prevalent	 conceptions	 of	 rights	 and	
justice	 among	 workers	 that	 are	 based	 on	 social	 values	 and	 social	 norms	 of	
behaviour,	morality	and	fairness.	These	are	conceptions	of	substantive	justice	that	
coexist,	but	also	clash,	with	legal	(procedural)	justice,	inasmuch	as	legal	justice	does	
not	 encapsulate	 these	 values,	 but	 rather	 focuses	 on	 economic	 efficiency	 and	
effectively	 achieving	 social	 harmony.	 Institutional	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	of	 law	
(thin	 theories)	 would	 not	 necessarily	 arrive	 at	 these	 findings,	 hence	 the	 need	 to	
broaden	 the	 scope	 to	 thick	 conceptions	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 study	 ordinary	
people’s	conceptions	and	legality.	The	gap	between	the	state’s	legal	institutions	on	
the	one	hand,	and	local	knowledge	and	popular	practices	on	the	other,	is	a	crucial	
element	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 when	 arguing	 for	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 CPC’s	 ‘adaptive	
legality’	(Liebman,	2011)	to	secure	the	stability	of	the	regime.	The	extent	to	which	
	 253	
legal	 institutions	 (laws	 in	particular),	and	the	rule	of	 law	 ideology	more	generally,	
are	working	to	the	benefit	of	the	CPC’s	legitimacy	and	securing	its	control	of	society	
depends	on	the	degree	to	which	this	ideology	is	penetrating	into	existing	concepts,	




basic	 economic	 principles	 on	 which	 they	 rest.	 This	 in	 turn	 signals	 a	 flaw	 in	 the	































Analysing	 workers’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 law	 and	 the	 sense	 of	 justice	 and	 injustice	
they	 express	 has	 highlighted	 the	 divergence	 between	 legal	 norms	 and	 the	
normative	 repertoire	 of	 social	 norms	 and	 morality	 that	 guide	 workers’	
interpretation	 of	 their	 workplace	 relations,	 disputes	 and	 therefore,	 their	 actions.	
Workers’	sense	of	injustice	and	morality	provides	logics	of	action	that	depart	from	
legal	action,	and	informs	a	rich	range	of	alternative	forms	of	action.	Contrary	to	the	
deficit-based	 approach	 held	 by	 LAL	 NGOs	 in	 which	 workers	 are	 ‘the	 weak’,	 the	
evidence	 presented	 here	 demonstrates	 that	 workers	 are	 indeed	 not	 ‘the	 weak’.	
They	do	not	lack	rights	consciousness	either.	The	problem	in	previous	research	has	
been	 that	workers’	 rights	 consciousness	 has	 been	 analysed	 as	 derived	 from	 legal	
institutions,	disregarding	wider	normative	discourses,	workers’	perceptions,	 social	
constructions	 of	 rights,	 justice	 and	 morality,	 socio-cultural	 and	 historical	 factors,	
demographic	 factors	 (age,	migration	 and	work	 experience,	 generation,	 education	
levels,	family	burden),	subjective	factors	(fluidity,	temporality,	life	desires,	and	work	
expectations),	and	even	structural	 factors	 (organization	of	 the	production	process	
in	 a	 specific	 industry	 and	 its	 regulations,	 which	 influences	 workers’	 associational	
and	structural	power;	Wright,	2000).	There	are	a	universe	of	factors	that	contribute	
to	 workers’	 identity	 and	 consciousness,	 legal	 rights	 being	 only	 one,	 and	 not	
necessarily	 the	most	 relevant	one	 in	 the	eyes	of	workers.	Rights	 consciousness	 is	
only	 one	 explanatory	 factor	 of	 or	 rationale	 behind	 workers’	 actions	 and	 it	 has	
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mainly	 been	 used	 to	 explain	 workers’	 rights-based	 actions;	 however,	 it	 does	 not	
explain	 other	 forms	 of	 action,	 such	 as	 interest-based	 action.76	Chen	 and	 Tang’s	
(2013:	 560)	 three-fold	 typology	 (rights-based,	 interest-based,	 and	 pre-reform	
entitlements)	explicitly	pairs	rights-based	actions	with	legal	institutions:	“rights	and	
interests	 are	perhaps	more	 clearly	differentiated	 in	 the	 labour	 sector	 than	 in	 any	
other	 areas,	 thanks	 to	 the	 development	 of	 legal	 institutions	 regulating	 labour	




be	 due	 to	 other	 factors,	 such	 as	 following	 the	 advice	 of	 lawyers,	 or	 having	
exhausted	all	other	means	to	resolve	the	conflict.		
	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 legal	 institutions	 are	 instrumental	 in	 “channelling	 social	
discontent	 into	 moderated	 forums”	 (Diamant	 et	 al.,	 2005:	 7);	 it	 has	 also	 been	
argued	 that	 legal	 institutions	 provide	 the	 legitimate	 rhetoric	 and	 resources	 to	
challenge	 the	 Party-state	 to	 abide	 by	 its	 own	 declared	 legal	 norms	 (Thireau	 and	
Hua,	2003;	O’Brien	and	Li,	2006).	Considerable	scholarly	attention	has	been	paid	to	
the	study	of	 the	role	of	 legal	 institutions	 in	political	activism	and	by	extension,	 to	
their	 role	 in	 triggering	 regime	 transition	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes.	 In	 comparative	
contexts,	and	under	certain	conditions,	it	has	been	shown	that	legal	mobilization	by	
legal	professionals	can	be	a	powerful	force	in	political	liberalization	(Halliday,	et	al.,	
2007;	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	 Karpik	 and	 Halliday,	 2001),	 and	 when	 coordinated	
with	 political	 campaigns	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 collective	 action,	 has	 achieved	
significant	political	 gains,	 for	example,	 in	winning	 civil	 and	 labour	 rights	 (Forbath,	
1991;	 McCann,	 1994;	 Merry,	 1990).	 In	 the	 Chinese	 context,	 however,	 legal	
mobilization	by	 LAL	NGOs	 is	 not	 necessarily	 spilling	over	 into	other	public	 spaces	






such	 as	 higher	 wages,	 better	 overtime	 payment,	 social	 insurance	 coverage,	 or	 demanding	
associational	rights.	
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workers	 to	 take	other	 forms	of	 action,	only	 ‘legitimate’	 action.	However,	Chinese	
workers	 resort	 to	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 forms	 of	 action	 to	 address	 labour	 conflict:	
“There	are	many	ways	workers	are	negotiating	with	employers	and	solving	(or	not)	
their	 problems.	 The	 majority	 of	 workers	 are	 not	 using	 the	 law.	 They	 use	 other	
strategies,	 independently,	 autonomously	 (zizhu,	自主).	 These	 can	 be	 individual	 or	
collective,	legal	or	illegal.	But	workers	are	taking	very	different	types	of	action”	(E3,	
9	 May	 2012).	 Lawyer	 Zhu	 stressed	 the	 same	 idea:	 “All	 workers	 have	 capacities.	
There	 are	 many	 conflicts,	 and	 workers	 have	 their	 own	 ways	 to	 address	 them,	
because	 of	 the	 personal	 relations	 between	 workers	 and	 the	 baogongtou.	
Construction	 is	 chaos,	 there	 are	 no	 regulations	 being	 applied,	 or	 specified.	 But	
workers	 still	have	 their	ways	 to	address	 their	problems”	 (Y7,	21	November	2012).	





In	 this	 chapter	 I	 examine	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 action	workers	 take,	 outside	 the	
law,	autonomously	or	with	 the	support	of	 labour	NGOs,	and	explain	why	workers	
resort	 to	 these	 forms	 of	 action	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 social	 norms	 and	 constructs	
explained	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 Workers	 protect	 themselves,	 their	 rights	 and	
interests	(respect,	fairness,	basic	living,	family,	desires,	emotionality)	with	a	variety	
of	forms	of	action	that	are	presented	in	sections	7.1	to	7.7.	They	include	informal	
and	 autonomous	 actions,	 such	 as	 endurance,	 exit,	 voice	 and	 everyday	 forms	 of	
resistance,	 violence,	 discussing	or	 negotiating	directly	with	 the	boss,	 or	 collective	
forms	 of	 action	 such	 as	 stopping	 work,	 striking	 or	 protesting;	 or	 formal	 actions	
through	 institutional	 channels,	 such	 as	 petitioning,	 denouncing	 to	 the	 Labour	
Bureau,	 mediation	 and	 legal	 action.	 It	 will	 be	 shown	 that	 the	 different	 actions	
workers	 take,	 in	most	 cases,	 are	more	 attuned	 to	 their	 subjective	 experiences	 of	
work	 and	 their	 understanding	 of	 labour	 relations	 and	 social	 norms	 of	 behaviour,	







them,	 and	 win	 what	 they	 understand	 as	 fair	 and	 just.	 This	 dissonance	 –	 or	
institutional	clash	between	legal	norms	and	popular/social	norms	–	and	the	variety	
of	 ‘illegitimate’	 forms	 of	 action	 workers	 take	 can	 indeed	 represent	 a	 significant	
challenge	 to	 the	 Party-state,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 to	 legal	 action.	 Legal	
institutions	 aim	 to	 stabilize	 social	 discontent	 and	 bolster	 regime	 legitimacy	
(Diamant	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Gallagher,	 2006;	 Lubman,	 1999;	 Peerenboom,	 2002),	 but	 I	
find	 that	 ordinary	workers	 dissent	 from	 the	 values	 of	 the	 law,	 both	 conceptually	
and	practically	 in	their	choices	of	action.	The	potential	to	challenge	the	regime	by	
using	 legal	 institutions	 is	 less	 than	 that	of	 the	more	 fundamental	 level	of	political	
contestation	workers	display	when	dissenting	from	the	new	ideological	basis	of	the	
Party-state,	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Section	 7.8	 provides	 concluding	 remarks	 that	 bring	




Some	workers	 that	 encounter	 problems	 at	 the	workplace	 remain	 silent.	 To	 avoid	
social	conflict,	they	deny	or	negate	the	existence	of	problems,	usually	providing	an	
explanation	based	on	trust	and	social	relations,	as	exemplified	by	Worker	Di	when	
referred	 to	 his	 baogongtou	 as	 his	 brother,	 saying,	 “It	 is	 just	 like	 that,	 there	 is	








labour	 issue,	 or	 they	 simply	 see	 it	 as	 normal	 –	 which	 could	 indicate	 false	
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consciousness.77	But	 even	 when	 acknowledging	 the	 existence	 of	 problems,	 some	
workers	would	 rather	 remain	 silent	 and	non-confrontational	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	
their	 (and	 their	 employer’s)	 face,	 to	 preserve	 social	 harmony	 and	 the	 social	
relation.		
	
For	 the	 same	 reasons	 workers	 see	 leaving	 their	 jobs	 as	 an	 option	 that	 avoids	





The	 law	 is	 the	most	basic.	Workers	are	more	conscious	now.	The	
new	 generation	 has	 more	 awareness	 and	 there	 is	 more	 action.	
Before,	 workers	 petitioned	 more.	 Now,	 the	 generation	 of	 the	
eighties	 and	 nineties	 use	 social	 networks	 and	 the	 internet;	 they	
have	more	capacities.	(…)	The	problem	is	that	the	companies	need	
to	respect	the	laws	more.	If	there	is	a	problem,	workers	leave.	This	
is	 a	 characteristic	 of	 Chinese	 people:	 it	 has	 to	 do	 with	 social	
relations.	(Y10,	25	January	2013)		
	
Workers’	 exit	 not	 only	 indicates	 the	 prevalence	 of	 norms	 of	 social	 behaviour,	 or	
rules	 consciousness	 as	 Perry	 (2009)	 would	 suggest,	 but	 also	 that	 they	 have	
increasing	 structural	 power	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 (The	 Economist,	 2010):	 due	 to	
labour	 shortages	 in	 recent	 years,	 workers	 have	 had	 greater	 power	 to	 accept	 or	
reject	 jobs	with	low	wages	or	certain	working	conditions.	Hence,	exit	as	a	form	of	
workers’	 agency	 is	 related	 to	 the	 state	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 workers’	 structural	
power.	Exit	indeed	is	an	individual	form	of	action	and	does	not	reflect	an	organized	




mean	 that	 the	 law	has	 established	a	natural	 order	of	 things,	 a	 hegemonic	 ideology	 (in	Gramscian	
terms)	that	acquires	the	consent	of	the	subordinate	(subject)	classes.	It	therefore	deflects	people’s	
awareness	from	the	structural	sources	of	oppression	and	exploitation,	and	obtains	their	consent	to	








of	 resistance	 to	or	dealing	with	 labour	 conflict;	however,	 it	 is	 a	 fact	 that	workers	
leave	their	jobs	as	an	expression	of	their	disagreement	with	the	working	conditions	
or	so	as	not	to	initiate	labour	disputes	and	distort	norms	of	social	behaviour.	It	has	




conformity	 with	 the	 prevalent	 norms	 of	 social	 relations	 (rules	 consciousness).	
Silence,	 in	 the	case	of	Chinese	workers,	 is	not	a	 result	of	workers	not	wanting	 to	
appear	disloyal	 to	 the	employer	 (Upchurch	et	al.,	2006),	but	 is	due	 to	conformity	
with	the	aforementioned	social	norms,	to	prevent	losing	face	and	disrupting	social	




with	 co-workers	 during	 rest	 time	 –	 can	 match	 Scott’s	 (1985,	 1990)	 ‘hidden	
transcripts’	or	‘weapons	of	the	weak’.	These	forms	of	action	or	inaction,	which	he	
categorized	as	‘everyday	forms	of	resistance’,	are	the	ways	in	which	peasants	and	
subaltern	 groups	 resist	 exploitation	 or	 domination	 in	 ways	 that	 might	 not	 be	
apparent	because	 these	groups	might	not	question	 the	authority	and	domination	
publicly,	but	in	settings	that	are	trusted	and	offstage.	At	the	workplace,	slowdowns,	
stoppages,	 and	 exit,	 for	 example,	 could	 be	 qualified	 as	 ‘hidden	 transcripts’,	 as	
identified	 by	 Pun	 (2005).	 Pun	 (2005)	 identified	 dagongmei’s	 ‘everyday	 forms	 of	
resistance’	in	Southern	China’s	factories:	women	workers	resorting	to	various	forms	
of	action,	transgression	and	resistance	in	their	everyday	life	at	the	workplace.	These	
ranged	 from	 non-verbal	 to	 discursive	 processes	 to	 construct	 their	 identities	 and	
transgress	the	disciplinary	power	of	 the	factory	and	the	hegemonic	gendered	and	





they	 face;	 nor	 do	 they	 indicate	 a	 form	 of	 legal	 rights	 consciousness.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 these	actions	conceal	a	deep	sense	of	dissent	 that	 is	only	aired	 in	ways	
that	the	lens	of	rights	consciousness	and	legal	mobilization	do	not	encapsulate.	Exit,	
especially,	 is	 therefore	 an	 expression	 of	 resistance,	 of	 structural	 power	 and	 risk-




Chinese	workers	 are	 all	 but	 silent	when	 it	 comes	 to	 certain	 social	 spaces.	During	








Forms	 of	 resistance,	 therefore,	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 workplace,	 but	 enter	 into	





have	 their	 own	 ways	 to	 protect	 their	 rights.	 For	 example,	 they	 try	 to	 negotiate	
directly	with	 the	boss,	but	without	much	 result.	 So	much	of	 the	 time	 they	give	up	
(fangqi,	放弃)”	 (Y6,	 31	October	 2012).	Worker	 Tan	 also	 exemplifies	 how	workers	
attempt	to	negotiate	with	their	employers,	and	how	exit	is	a	commonly	considered	













shows	 workers’	 agency,	 but	 power	 and	 determination	 to	 autonomously	 resolve	
their	 issues.	Worker	He	stressed:	“If	 I	was	having	any	problem,	I	would	solve	 it	by	
myself.	If	I	can’t	solve	it,	then	I	will	use	the	law.	I	will	come	to	you	[NGO	X]	and	go	








has	 been	 increasingly	 used	 following	 the	 LDMAL	 (2008),	 and	 its	 effects	 (and	
limitations)	 on	 workers’	 agency	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	
However,	Worker	Liu’s	experience	further	evidences	the	widespread	preference	for	
direct	negotiation	or	mediation.	He	asserted	that:	
Some	 people	 would	 seek	 legal	 assistance,	 but	 most	 would	 not.	
Most	 workers	 would	 behave	 violently,	 for	 example,	 blocking	 the	
doors	of	the	company.	But	this	 is	not	creating	trouble	(naoshi,	闹
事);	 they	 are	 demanding	 their	 rights.	 Some	will	 behave	 violently	
and	 in	 a	 confrontational	 way:	 violence,	 confrontation,	 in	 an	
independent	 resistance	 way	 [collective	 action].	 I	 would	
nevertheless	 recommend	 other	 workers	 to	 do	 their	 best	 to	
negotiate	 with	 their	 employers,	 as	 I	 did.	 If	 the	 issue	 were	 not	
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great	 deal	 of	 experience	 and	 are	 creative	 in	 finding	 ways	 to	 deal	 with	 their	
workplace	problems,	as	stressed	by	 the	quote	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	chapter	by	
one	 of	NGO	 I’s	 staff	 (I1,	 28	December	 2012).	 Voice,	 directly	 negotiating	with	 the	
employer,	 or	 venting	with	 co-workers	 and	 friends,	 are	 therefore	 form	 of	 actions	
and	resistance.	These	are	also	expressions	of	workers’	autonomous	agency.	When	a	
worker	resorts	to	the	assistance	of	a	LAL	NGO,	as	 in	Worker	Liu’s	example	above,	
then	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 their	 actions	 become	 aligned	 with	 the	 legal	 prescriptions.	
Workers’	attempts	 to	directly	negotiate	with	 the	employer	also	 take	 into	account	
accepted	 social	 rules	 of	 behaviour,	 trying	 to	 resolve	 the	 issue	 by	 discussion	





Voicing	 grievances	 through	 governmental	 channels	 is	 a	 traditional	 and	 highly	
resorted	 to	mobilization	 strategy	 in	China.	Although	 the	 administrative	 system	of	
Letters	 and	 Visits	 Offices	 has	 been	 in	 place	 since	 the	 1950s	 (Luehrmann,	 2003),	
petitioning	 the	 government	 to	 express	 complaints	 and	 grievances	 has	 been	 a	
common	practice	since	imperial	times.	Under	the	system	of	State	Bureau	for	Letters	
(guojia	xinfang	 ju,	国家信访局)	and	 local	bureaus	of	 letters,	people	present	 their	
complaints	and	grievances	to	the	relevant	administration	authority	to	seek	 justice	
(Cai,	 2004;	 Chen,	 2003;	Minzner,	 2005;	 Thireau	 and	Hua,	 2003,	 2005;	 Li,	 Liu	 and	
O’Brien,	 2012).	 Thireau	 and	 Hua	 (2003),	 in	 a	 very	 insightful	 study,	 show	 how	
different	types	of	spaces	offer	different	legitimate	avenues	for	different	workers	to	
address	 different	 grievances,	 and	 legitimate	 different	 claims.	 In	 particular,	 they	
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the	 workplace.	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 use	 of	 Letters	 and	 Visits	 Offices	 signals	
continuity	 with	 the	 imperial	 appeals	 procedure,	 and	 by	 recognizing	 the	 state’s	
legitimacy,	 fulfils	 a	 stabilizing	 purpose;	 this	 fits	 with	 Liebman’s	 (2011)	 ‘adaptive	
legality’	 argument,	 with	 institutional	 continuity	 providing	 a	 source	 of	 regime	
legitimacy.	Nathan	(2003:	13-15)	views	these	petitioning	offices	as	input	institutions	
that	 enable	 state-society	 interaction	 and	 allow	 citizens	 to	 believe	 that	 their	
complaints	 are	 being	 heard	 and	 that	 they	 have	 some	 degree	 of	 political	 voice,	
which	in	turn	enables	the	regeneration	of	the	regime’s	legitimacy.	Letters	and	Visits	
Offices	are	certainly	mobilized	on	the	demand-side;	however,	studying	the	degree	




claims	 on	 the	 assumption	 or	 belief	 “that	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 share	 the	 same	
understanding	of	right	and	wrong,	of	just	and	unjust”	(Thireau	and	Hua,	2003:	87).	
This	 –	 assumed	 –	 shared	 understanding	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 workers	
mobilize	 the	 legal	 norms,	 as	 has	 been	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 My	
contention	 here	 is	 that,	 examining	 workers'	 opinions	 of	 these	 governmental	
institutions,	 such	 as	 legal	 institutions,	 reveals	 that	 this	 assumed	 “shared	
understanding”	 between	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 in	 practice,	










labour	 conditions,	 but	 as	 Labour	Bureaus	 are	 the	 state	 institution	 responsible	 for	
monitoring	 labour	 conditions,	 standards,	 and	 compliance	 with	 the	 labour	





the	 medical	 records,	 X-rays	 and	 test	 results,	 together	 with	 their	 pay	 slips	 (all	
evidence	of	 the	existence	of	 a	 labour	 relation	and	occupational	 injury).	 Then	 this	








Workers’	 use	 of	 these	 sanctioned	 channels	 indicates	 that	 they	 continue	 to	 use	
longstanding	 and	 legitimate	 institutions	 to	 address	 their	 grievances,	 as	 the	quote	




satisfaction	with	and	 trust	 in	 the	 system	greatly	decreases.	 “They	don’t	 care”	 is	a	
common	refrain	of	workers	seeking	help	from	the	LAL	NGOs.	Worker	Shan’s	“I	don’t	
agree	 with	 this”	 illustrates	 a	 bottom-line	 disagreement	 with	 governmental	




and	 to	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 the	 non-governmental	 sector.	 As	 Lawyer	 Jian	 said:	
“We,	social	organizations,	cannot	resolve	all	these	problems.	It	is	the	government’s	
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The	 LAL	 NGOs	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis	 focus	mainly	 on	 legal	 action,	 and	 therefore,	
understand	workers’	choices	of	action	within	the	 legal	 framework:	“Workers	need	
to	 know	 how	 to	 protect	 their	 rights	 (weiquan).	 They	 take	 violent	 actions	 but	 this	
does	not	resolve	the	problem.	Through	legal	action,	they	get	protection.	NGOs	help	
them	do	 it”	 (X4,	17	September	2015).	 Lawyer	Ou	 told	me	 that	 “before	 coming	 to	
seek	legal	aid,	workers	have	normally	tried	direct	negotiation,	petitioning	(xinfang,	
新房),	 or	 some	 form	of	mediation.	 But	 this	 has	 no	use”	 (Y9,	 26	December	 2012).	
Lawyers	like	Zuo	and	Ou	believe	that	these	forms	of	action	“have	no	use”	because	






by	 Lawyer	 Ou	 and	 Lawyer	 Zhu	 who	 work	 for	 LAL	 NGOs.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	
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[resolve	 labour	 conflict]	 themselves.	 Maybe	 this	 is	 slower	 and	
takes	 longer	 to	 get	 an	 outcome,	 but	 we	 want	 workers	 to	 do	 it	
themselves	 and	 to	 change	 their	 capacity.	 This	 is	 a	 ‘social	 work’	
technique.	 And	 it	 does	 have	 an	 effect.	 The	 key	 is	 to	 stimulate	
workers	to	try	to	find	the	cause	of	the	problem	–	which	can	be	due	
to	the	weakness	in	the	law	or	other	reasons.	(…)	Each	way	has	its	
own	 effects.	 But	 the	 profession	 defines	 the	 strategy	 [of	 the	
organization].	Mediation,	for	example,	is	conservative	–	the	worker	
















case	of	 a	worker	 taking	 legal	 action,	NGO	B	 can	offer	 assistance	 in	preparing	 the	
necessary	 material,	 documents,	 write	 the	 application	 for	 the	 court;	 and	 provide	
																																																						
79	‘Social	work’	 implies	 a	 focus	on	 social	 and	 community	based	development	 through	 cultural	 and	
educational	 activities,	 seeking	 the	 improvement	 of	 workers’	 lives	 and	 welfare,	 and	 their	
empowerment	by	reciprocal	activities	that	maximize	workers’	potential	and	develop	their	capacities	
to	‘do	it	themselves’,	to	help	themselves,	as	opposed	to	the	more	paternalist	orientation	of	aid	and	










assisting	 one	worker	 and	 building	 the	 capabilities	 of	 one	worker	
there	 are	 more	 workers	 reached,	 because	 the	 first	 worker	 will	
assist	other	friends	and	workers.	(B1,	14	November	2012)		
	





In	 the	 last	 few	 years	 [the	 numbers	 of]	 legal	 dispute	 cases	 have	
been	 decreasing	 very	much.	 This	 is	 a	 change	 in	 the	way	 Chinese	
workers	 protect	 their	 rights	 (weiquan):	 before	 there	 were	 many	
legal	 cases,	 now	 cases	 are	 decreasing	 because	most	 of	 it	 is	 now	
turning	 into	collective	action.	This	 is	 the	change	 into	a	pattern	or	
model	 of	 workers	 protecting	 their	 rights	 (weiquan).	 They	 know	
that	 their	 collective	 power	 is	 very	 strong,	 so	 they	 use	 collective	
power	to	protect	their	rights	(…)	We	[NGO	A]	give	workers	advice	
according	 to	 their	 situation,	 we	 ask	 them	 to	 think	 about	 a	 few	
things	 they	 have	 to	 pay	 attention	 to.	 If	 the	 worker	 has	 already	
exhausted	 all	 regular	 and	 legal	 channels,	 we	 will	 help	 him/her	
think	 through	 some	 illegal	 (feifa,	 非法),	 well,	 it	 can’t	 be	 called	
illegal;	 it	 is	 unconventional	 or	 irregular	ways	 of	 rights	 protection	
(…).	 It	 does	 not	 count	 as	 illegal,	 it	 is	 just	 unconventional	 –	 in	

















to	 social	 norms	 of	 behaviour,	 there	 are,	 indeed,	 workers	 who	 use	 many	
confrontational	 ways	 to	 address	 workplace	 disputes,	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 (or	 the	
threat	 of	 it)	 being	 one	 of	 them.	Worker	Wan’s	 experience	 proves	 the	 extent	 of	




workers	who	 had	migrated	 there	 to	work	 on	 the	Olympic	 building	 sites,	 sending	











RMB	100,000	on	 the	 legal	process;	however,	he	 lost	 the	case	and	he	 received	no	
compensation	or	redress.		
	




not	 like	 in	 the	US	where	 everybody	 can	get	 a	 gun"	 (W14,	 11	 June	2012).	Worker	
Wan	 discussed	 the	 alternative	 actions	 that	 he	 had	 taken,	 including	 litigation,	
assessing	their	efficiency:		
It’s	 all	 useless.	 Nobody	 cares.	 The	 government	 is	 corrupt.	 The	








to	 point	 out	 that	 the	 target	 of	 violent	 acts	 in	 labour	 disputes	 is	 usually	 not	 the	
employer,	 but	 the	 government.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 a	 continuous	 rhetoric	 behind	
workers’	expressions	of	grief	that	the	ultimate	entity	responsible	is	the	government	
–	whether	because	of	lack	of	legal	implementation,	lack	of	protection,	lack	of	care,	
or	 straight	 corruption	 and	 vested	 interests	 with	 capital.	 This	 can	 be	 read	 as	





expectations	 of	 their	 workplaces	 and	 labour	 relations,	 and	 react	 with	 many	
different	strategies	to	workplace	conflict.	But	what	accounts	for	workers	engaging	
in	 collective	 action?	Does	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 have	anything	 to	do	with	 it?	 The	












to	 the	 interest	 of	 workers	 as	 a	 collective,	 the	 equivalent	 of	 class-consciousness.	
Workers	 have	 shown	 a	 narrative	 about	 ‘peasant	 workers’,	 denoting	 the	
identification	with	a	social	figure	or	category,	and	the	features	ascribed	to	it.	Work	




Identification	 with	 these	 features,	 and	 workers’	 overwhelming	 use	 of	 the	 term	




media	 sources	 and	 academic	 research,	 however,	 that	 suggests	 that	 peasant	
workers	are	increasingly	resorting	to	collective	action	including	strikes82	and	various	
other	forms	of	protest	(Chan,	2011;	Chan,	2010a,	2010b;	Chan	and	Pun,	2009;	Lee,	
2007a;	 Pun	 and	 Lu,	 2010),	 for	 which	 collective	 identification	 and	 solidarity	 is	
necessary.	For	example,	an	examination	of	the	diversity	of	causes	and	outcomes	of	
100	protests	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	passing	of	the	Labour	Contract	Law	
(LCL)	 (CLB,	 2009a)	 confirmed	 the	 results	 of	 other	 empirical	 research:	 not	 only	
litigation,	 but	 strikes,	 street	 protests,	 and	 violent	 actions	 were	 becoming	 a	




contrasted	 to	 the	 experiences	 of	 earlier	 generations	 of	 state-owned	 enterprise	
workers	who	participated	in	major	strikes	and	protests	during	the	1980s	and	early	
1990s83	related	 to	 their	 subsistence	 crisis	 (Chen,	 2000).84	Scholarly	 research	 has	
																																																						
82	See	Chapter	Three	for	reference	on	the	absence	of	the	legal	right	to	strike.	
83	For	 research	on	SOE	workers	see	Chapter	Three,	and	Cai	 (2002);	Chen	 (2000);	Hurst	 (2009);	Lee	
(2000,	2002,	2007);	Perry	(1993,	1994);	Perry	and	Li	(1997);	Unger	and	Chan	(2004);	Walder	(1991).		
84	“A	 subsistence	 crisis	 means	 here	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 workers	 have	 incomes	 far	 below	 local	
minimum	 wages	 or	 no	 incomes	 at	 all	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time.	 Not	 all	 laid-off	 workers	 necessarily	
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insisted	 on	 separating	 these	 two	 groups	 of	workers	 to	make	 the	 claim	 that	 their	
different	 life	 and	 work	 experiences	 and	 natures	 of	 employment	 (state-owned	
versus	 foreign/private	enterprises)	determined	their	different	claims	and	forms	of	
action.	SOE	workers	were	 the	 traditional	 industrial	working-class	 (gongren,	⼯⼈),	
having	inherited	their	class	identity	from	the	Maoist	class	politics	(Hurst,	2009;	Lee,	
2000,	 2002,	 2007a),	 who	 held	 a	 collective	 identity	 and	 experience	 in	 collective	
organization	and	mobilization.	Thus,	in	the	1990s	these	workers	had	the	knowledge	
and	 capacity	 to	 launch	 large-scale	 protests	 (Chen,	 2000).	 Yet,	 although	 large	 in	
number,	 these	 protests	 were	 highly	 cellular,	 i.e.	 localized	 and	 restricted	 to	 the	
work-unit	(Lee,	2007a).	On	the	other	hand,	migrant	workers	have	been	depicted	as	
lacking	class-consciousness	and	conceptualizing	their	shared	identity	in	reference	to	
legal	 rights	 (Lee,	 2007a),	 which	 implies	 that	 they	 do	 not	 recognize	 or	 organize	
around	shared	interests.	This	division	of	the	Chinese	labour	force	also	resulted	in	an	
analytical	 division	 between	 SOE	 workers	 and	 migrant	 workers	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
causes	 for	 their	 action	 –	 supposedly	 class-consciousness	 leads	 to	 interest-based	
actions	 while	 rights	 consciousness	 logically	 explains	 rights-based	 action	 (mostly	
legal	 action).	 This	 differentiation	 is	 misleading	 because	 it	 is	 based	 solely	 on	 an	
understanding	of	workers’	identities	and	subjectivities	as	derived	from	institutional	
sources	(the	labour	regime	for	SOE	workers	and	law	for	migrant	workers);	there	is,	




The	 LCL	has	brought	about	more	divisions	 in	 the	 labour	 force	 (both	 informal	 and	
formal	labour)	and	ranks	in	employment.	These	analytical	divisions	of	the	working	
classes	 (SOE	 workers/peasant	 workers,	 first	 and	 second	 generation,	








it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 major	 revolts	 in	 China	 have	 historically	 been	 staged	 by	
peasants. 85 	Peasant	 workers,	 therefore,	 follow	 historical	 and	 social	 rules	 of	
behaviour	 that	 have	 been	 extant	 for	 centuries,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 are	
included	 in	 the	 legislation	or	not.	 It	 could	be	argued	 that	 collective	action	has	an	
established	 and	 much	 longer	 tradition	 as	 a	 mobilization	 strategy	 than	 legal	
mobilization	does.	 Even	during	 the	Maoist	period,	mass	 campaigns	 and	 collective	





Despite	 the	 limitations	 the	 government	 imposes	 on	 collective	 action	 (e.g.,	
repression	and	state	reactions	to	protests	and	strikes),	peasant	workers	continue	to	
use	 collective	 forms	of	 action	 to	 confront	 industrial	 conflict,	 exhibiting	both	 rules	
consciousness	 (Perry,	 2009)	 and	 class-consciousness	 (Chan,	 2011;	 Chan	 and	 Siu,	
2012;	 Chan,	 2010b,	 2012;	 Chan	 and	 Pun,	 2009;	 Leung,	 2015).	 As	 Lawyer	 Tian	
commented,	“workers	strike	and	stage	protests,	engage	in	collective	or	large-scale	
confrontational	action.	Workers	know	how	to	protect	their	rights	(weiquan).	Strikes	
and	 protests	 have	 an	 immediate	 economic	 effect;	 legal	 action	 doesn’t.	 But	 for	 a	
strike	to	have	an	effect	it	needs	experience	to	organize	it”	(Z6,	26	September,	2012).	
Lawyer	Tian’s	 last	point	 is	of	 relevance	here.	Workers	need	 to	organize	 collective	
actions.	It	could	be	argued,	in	line	with	rational	choice	perspectives,	that	workers,	
in	effect,	 ‘run	 the	equations’	 for	each	possible	 course	of	action,	 considering	 their	
abilities	 to	 successfully	 carry	 out	 the	 action,	 possible	 negative	 impact	 on	










sometimes	 years),	 whilst	 strikes	 and	 protests	 can	 obtain	 results	 within	 hours	 or	
days.	 Collective	 action,	 therefore,	might	 be	more	 suitable	 to	workers’	 needs	 and	

















organize	 to	 raise	 our	 claims.	 It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 do,	 nobody	 dares	 to	 do	 it;	 nobody	
dares.	(…)	Everybody	just	looks	after	themselves”	(W2,	20	April	2012).	Worker	Yao	is	
emphasising	 an	 individualized	 behaviour	which	would	 suggest	 a	 lack	 of	 collective	
identification.	 However,	 there	 is	 sufficient	 proof	 of	 social	 sharing	 and	 collective	
identification	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 organized	 action,	 therefore,	 does	 not	 prove	 lack	 of	
class	identity,	but	the	existence	of	other	constraining	factors,	such	as	coercion.	For	
example,	the	three	workers	from	a	clothing	factory	in	Daxing	who	had	participated	
in	 a	 strike	 revealed	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 collective	 action	 to	 take	 place	
spontaneously	because	workers	share	the	bare	minimum	of	collective	identity	and	
awareness	of	 their	 shared	material	 conditions,	and	 therefore,	 common	subjective	





couple	 of	 days	 in	 August”	 (W25	 17	 September	 2012).	 The	 strike	 succeeded	 in	
gaining	 a	 wage	 increase	 of	 RMB	 10	 per	 day,	 and	 between	 RMB	 2-3	 per	
manufactured	 item.	This	proves	 that	autonomous	collective	action	 (in	 this	case,	a	
series	of	wildcat	strikes)	is	taking	place	in	China	with	relative	successes	for	workers	
without	reference	to	the	law,	or	prior	organization.	A	common	sense	of	injustice	is	




The	type	of	rights	consciousness	that	 is	arrived	at	after	 legal	 training	such	as	that	






hundred	million	 (yi	 yi,	⼀亿)?	No,	 it	was	 some	hundred	 thousand	
million,	 the	 equivalent	 to	 10	 years	 of	 the	 salary	 of	 those	 1000	
workers!	 That	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 powerful	 workers	 and	
weak	workers,	because	the	boss	is	really	afraid	of	this,	of	workers	




worker,	 and	 that	 one	 follows	 him,	 and	 then	 a	 third	 one	 follows,	
then	the	power	is	formed.	But	first	you	have	to	think	what	the	goal	
is,	what	you	want	to	achieve.	And	then	think	of	the	ways	to	get	it,	




This	 piece	 of	 evidence	 shows	 the	 differences	 in	 techniques	 to	 stimulate	workers’	
actions.	The	support	provided	from	NGOs	X,	Y	and	Z,	legal	rights	consciousness	and	
legal	mobilization,	are	not	necessarily	the	key	stimulus	to	workers’	collective	action,	





on	the	part	of	 the	NGOs,	but	arises	 from	the	 legal	strategy	they	choose	to	 follow	




workers’	 conceptions	 of	 justice.	 “What	 can	 you	 say	 about	 these	 laws?	 That	 they	




methods	 because	 of	 their	 direct	 economic	 impact	 and	 socio-political	 disruption.	
Another	 mechanism	 that	 is	 increasingly	 resorted	 to	 and	 discussed	 is	 collective	
bargaining.	As	Lee	and	Friedman	 (2009:	24)	point	out:	 "there	are	now	 indications	
that	 some	enterprise-level	 trade	union	 chairs	 are	engaging	 in	active,	 if	 still	 highly	
legalistic,	 defences	 of	 their	members'	 interests.	 (…)	 Top	 officials	 of	 both	 the	 CCP	
and	the	ACFTU	have	expressed	the	wish	that	unions	pursue	collective	bargaining	–





–	 in	 the	 labour	 laws)	 is	 an	 increasingly	 resorted	 to	mechanism	 to	 address	 labour	
conflict,	although	it	is	yet	to	be	fully	addressed	by	the	legal	frameworks.	The	Trade	
Union	Law	(1995)	and	the	LCL	recognize	a	tripartite	framework	for	labour	relations	
(employers,	 the	 state	 and	 trade	 unions),	 and	 acknowledges	 that	 workers’	
representative	units	 (trade	unions	or	workers’	 congresses)	 should	be	able	 to	 take	
part,	“on	an	equal	footing”	(LCL,	Article	4)	in	the	decision-making	process	regarding,	
for	 example,	 changes	 in	 contracts	 (LCL,	 Article	 4)	 or	 the	 content	 of	 collective	




20,	 Article	 33;	 LCL,	 Article	 6;	 Chapter	 V,	 Section	 1,	 Articles	 51-56	 on	 collective	
contracts).	 Yet,	 the	 mechanism	 for	 collective	 bargaining	 remains	 to	 be	 fully	
contemplated	in	the	laws,	and	due	to	the	ambiguous	character	of	the	trade	union	
(its	 ‘dual	 identity’	 as	 state	organization	and	enterprise	management;	 Chan,	 1993;	
Chen,	2003),	the	ability	of	the	negotiation	process	to	protect	workers’	interests	has	





they	 have	 direct	 access	 to	 workers.	 Lawyers	 have	 restrictions;	
NGOs	have	more	margin,	more	space	to	act;	lawyers	have	to	abide	





protest	 formats.	 Official	 statistics	 on	 labour	 disputes	 can	 be	 misleading,	
downplaying	 the	 prevalence	 of	 collective	 labour	 conflict,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	
Three.	 Between	 1996	 and	 2012,	 on	 average,	 collective	 labour	 dispute	 cases	
accounted	 for	 4.57%	 of	 labour	 dispute	 cases	 processed	 through	 legal	 channels	 –	
arbitration	 and	 litigation	 -	 (China	Human	 Resources	 and	 Social	 Security	 Yearbook	
2013).	 If	 only	 considering	 the	 official	 statistics	 one	 could	 interpret	 that	 collective	
labour	 conflict	 is	 insignificant	 in	 China.	 The	 reality,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 legal	
channels	 are	 not	 designed	 to	 deal	 with	 collective	 labour	 conflict,	 as	 Lawyer	 Ai	
																																																						
86	Note	 that	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 ACFTU	 and	 trade	 union	 reform,	 and	 the	
development	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research.	 For	 a	 comprehensive	
study	of	 the	ACFTU	see	Pringle	 (2011:	201),	and	Howell	 (2008);	on	collective	bargaining,	see	Chan	
and	 Hui	 (2013).	 Without	 attempting	 to	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 the	 ACFTU	 and	 the	 system	 of	
collective	bargaining,	it	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	evidence	presented	here	shows	that	workers	
are	 autonomously	 engaging	 in	 collective	 bargaining,	 with	 some	 organizations	 stimulating	 and	
supporting	this,	such	as	Law	Firm	D	or	NGO	A.	It	would	therefore	be	valuable	to	further	research	the	
interactions	 between	 workers,	 labour	 NGOs	 and	 other	 organizations	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	
ACFTU	 on	 the	 other,	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 each	 in	 pushing	 for	 the	 development	 of	




suggested:	 “there	 are	 not	 many	 collective	 dispute	 cases.	 They	 are	 much	 more	
complex	and	only	lawyers	with	more	experience	will	take	these	cases	because	they	
are	much	more	demanding	 for	 the	 lawyer”	 (Y4,	 14	 September	 2012).	 The	 limited	
capacity	 of	 the	 legal	 institutions	 to	 cope	 with	 increasing	 labour	 unrest	 is	 an	
explanation	echoed	by	Lawyer	Eng	earlier	in	Chapter	Four	(D1,	25	September	2012).		
	
Limited	 judicial	 capacity	 and	 independence	 can	 therefore	 explain	 the	 fact	 that	
collective	 cases	 are	 divided	 into	 individual	 cases.	 However,	 Chen	 and	 Xu	 (2012)	
pointed	 out	 that	 judges	 in	 Donguan	 actively	 dismantled	 collective	 cases,	 both	 at	
court	and	using	extra-judicial	mechanisms,	for	the	very	reason	that	legal	institutions	
aim	 to	 contain	potentially	disruptive	 labour	 conflict.	Hence,	both	 the	 institutional	
design	of	the	legal	system	to	favour	individual	grievances,	and	the	procedural	limits	
imposed	by	 legal	 institutions	and	actors	 (both	 judges	and	 lawyers	complying	with	
the	legal	system),	act	to	effectively	stall	political	activism	through	the	judiciary.		
	
Collective	 labour	 conflict	 best	 reflects	 the	 structural	 and	 fundamental	 issue	 in	











already	 being	 done	 by	 workers	 in	 the	 workplace”	 (Y3,	 18	 September	 2012).	
Collective	 bargaining	 is	 being	 done	 unconventionally	 by	 workers	 outside	 of	 the	
framework	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 precisely	 because	 the	 framework	 of	 tripartite	







bargaining,	 but	 they	 can’t	 find	 anyone	 to	 negotiate	 with	 because	 workers	 don’t	
have	 representatives	 or	 don’t	 know	 about	 this	 possibility”	 (D1,	 25	 September	
2012).87	
	
Even	 lawyers	 in	 LAL	 NGOs	 are	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 collective	 bargaining	 is	 more	
suitable	to	resolve	collective	conflict:		
In	 these	 cases,	 collective	 bargaining	 is	more	 effective	 and	 faster.	
The	problem	is	the	trade	union.	The	trade	union	is	not	very	good	at	
protecting	workers’	rights,	also	because	the	enterprise	trade	union	










NGO	A’s	 activities	 for	workers	 and	 training	 sessions	 are	 not	 fully	 focused	 on	 the	
law,	but	on	what	collective	bargaining	is,	how	to	perform	it,	and	most	importantly,	




the	 lack	of	 cohesive	employer	associations	with	which	 the	ACFTU	can	negotiate.	 Friedman	argues	
that,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	 Western	 liberal	 democracies,	 employer	 associations	 are	 crucial	 to	 the	




Federation	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 (ACFIC)	 among	 employers,	 it	 is	 up	 to	 local	 employer	























legal	 framework	 implies	 looking	 into	 alternative	 and	 ‘unconventional’	 forms	 of	
action	 such	as	 collective	organization	and	 collective	bargaining.	NGO	A,	however,	
frames	this	strategy	 in	reference	to	the	 law	–	mainly	 the	Trade	Union	Law,	as	we	
can	see	in	the	playing	cards.	This	indicates	that	even	when	moving	beyond	the	law,	
NGO	A	uses	the	rhetoric	of	the	law	and	authorized	resources	(Trade	Union	Law)	to	





	Similarly	 to	 NGO	 A,	 Law	 Firm	 D	 also	 encourages	 workers	 to	 attempt	 collective	




















bargaining	 in	 the	workplace:	 “We	 stimulate	workers’	 consciousness.	We	 have	 the	
appearance	 of	 lawyers	 from	 the	 outside,	 but	 we	 are	 activists.	 Even	 if	 we	 are	





Collective	 bargaining	 through	 the	 trade	 union	 is	 not	 real.	 And	
litigation	 cannot	 help	 resolve	 this	 issue.	 All	 conflict	 that	 is	
addressed	 through	 legal	 channels	meets	 the	 legal	definitions	and	
can	be	resolved	one	way	or	another.	But	there	are	many	types	of	
conflict	 that	 cannot	 be	 resolved	 through	 the	 legal	 channels,	
because	 the	nature	of	 the	conflict	 is	 collective.	For	 this,	 collective	
bargaining	 is	 necessary.	 Collective	 bargaining	 will	 resolve	 any	





legitimate	 forms	of	action	or	channels	 to	address	 their	grievances	or	pursue	their	
interests.	 Workers	 take	 collective	 action,	 and	 sometimes	 engage	 in	 collective	
bargaining,	without	 legal	 recognition	or	 support	 from	 the	 trade	union.	As	 Lawyer	
Ren	said:	“Workers	need	to	organize	by	themselves,	this	is	the	only	way	for	them	to	






group	 of	 four	 other	 striking	 workers	 narrated	 their	 struggle	 to	 Lawyer	 Chao	
(participant	observation,	D3,	6	January	2013).	Worker	Ou	said	that	he	and	another	
female	worker	had	organized	the	strike,	which	took	place	after	70%	of	the	workers	
of	 the	 factory	 (more	 than	 400	 workers)	 had	 signed	 a	 letter	 addressed	 to	 the	
employer	 stating	 their	 demands.	 The	 factory	 they	 worked	 at	 was	 going	 to	 be	
	 282	
restructured	 (transferred	 from	 Fujianese	 to	 Japanese	 management)	 and	 all	 the	
long-service	workers	(laoyuangong,	老员⼯)	were	demanding	compensation	for	the	
effects	of	the	restructuring	on	their	working	conditions,	and	a	written	proof	of	 its	
effects	 for	 the	 different	 types	 of	workers.	 The	 employer	 did	 not	 respond	 and	 so	
workers	went	on	strike.		
	




interrupted	 Lawyer	 Chao,	 crying	 “but	 we	 can’t	 talk	 with	 the	 boss!”	 Lawyer	 Chao	
responded:		
Of	 course	 you	 can,	 it	 is	 normal	 that	 you	 think	 you	 can’t,	 but	 you	










We	 need	 one	 representative	 (daibiao,	 代 表 )	 for	 each	 30-40	
workers,	 so	 that	 we	 have	 at	 least	 ten	 people	 representing	 the	
workforce.	We	 cannot	 rely	 on	 the	 lawyers.	 Each	 small	 group	will	
have	a	squad	leader	(banzhang,	班长).	It	is	necessary	to	have	400	
workers	 collectively	 united	 and	 the	 lawyer	 can	 help	 you	 bargain	
(tanpan,	 谈 判 )	 by	 giving	 assistance	 to	 the	 workers’	
representatives.	 (…)	We	 can	give	 you	 some	 legal	 advice,	 but	 it	 is	
not	that	the	lawyer	does	everything;	it	cannot	be	done	like	this.	It	
is	 the	 workers	 who	 have	 to	 do	 it!	 We	 can	 first	 give	 some	
recommendations	but	we	are	passive	(beidong,	被动).		
	
Note	that	Lawyer	Chao	used	the	plural	 ‘we’	 rather	than	the	singular	 form	(‘I’,	 the	





the	workers	 then	claimed:	 “The	 trade	union	 (zonggonghui,	总⼯会 )	 said	 it	on	 its	
Weibo	 page;	 the	 Guangdong	 trade	 union	 said	 it”;	 (the	 trade	 union	 had	 been	
discussing	the	use	of	collective	bargaining	(negotiation)	to	resolve	conflicts	such	as	
this	 one).	When	 asked	 where	 the	 offices	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 were,	 Lawyer	 Chao	
recommended	 that	 the	workers	 first	write	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 trade	 union	 instead	 of	
doing	 it	 “the	 formal	 way”,	 and	 that	 they	 also	 use	 Weibo	 to	 write	 about	 the	
problem.	The	worker	next	to	me	said	“workers	are	very	willing	to	unite”.	Worker	Ou	
then	asked	Lawyer	Chao	 if	 they	 (the	 lawyers)	 could	help	 them	write	 the	 letter	 to	
the	trade	union	because	“We	are	worried	that	we	don’t	have	the	level	(shuiping,	⽔
平)	 to	 write	 it”.	 Lawyer	 Chao	 replied:	 “It	 is	 not	 about	 this;	 it	 is	 about	 your	 own	
experience	and	demands.	Write	down	clear	demands”.	Later,	Lawyer	Chao	warned:		
Now,	there	is	no	legal	protection;	it	is	a	little	dangerous	(you	yidian	
weixian,	有⼀点危险).	 But	 we	 do	 it	 so	 that	 later	 on	 there	 is	 no	












not	 passive;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 these	 five	 workers	 were	 completely	 active,	 and	




律是空白)”.	 Lawyer	 Chao	 explained	 in	 reply	 that	 “this	 [collective	 bargaining]	 did	
not	happen	before	and	this	is	why	it	is	not	in	law,	but	because	it	is	happening,	then	
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the	 law	has	 to	 change	and	 improve	 to	address	 this.	Don’t	worry	because	 this	will	
happen”.	 This	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 legal	development	 is	 also	a	 result	of	pressure	
from	below	to	adjust	 the	 law	to	social	 realities,	and	corresponds	to	the	view	that	




stability	 (a	 sign	 of	 ‘adaptive	 governance’,	 one	 could	 say).	 The	 fact	 that	 the	
Guangdong	provincial	government	has	issued	the	Guangdong	Provincial	Regulation	
of	 Collective	 Contracts	 for	 Enterprises	 (GPRCC,	 2013),	 coming	 into	 effect	 on	 1	
January	2015,	proved	Lawyer	Chao’s	prediction	to	be	correct.	
	









has	 something	 to	do	with	me’	and	 that	 they	want	 to	participate.	
Tomorrow	when	we	go	to	work,	we	will	listen	to	the	other	workers	




different	 effects	 than	 the	 consultations	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 NGOs	 of	 this	 study,	
mainly	 NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z.	 Lawyer	 Chao	was	 not	 acting	 ‘on	 behalf’	 of	 these	workers;	
instead,	he	discussed	the	situation	with	them,	critically	analysing	the	way	forward	
with	the	group.	This	is	not	because	of	the	nature	of	the	conflict	(a	collective	labour	
dispute	 in	 the	manufacturing	 sector	 involving	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 company);	
but	 because	 of	 the	 approach	 Law	 Firm	 D	 takes,	 which	 lends	 itself	 to	 a	 more	
emancipatory	 impact	 by	 supporting	 workers’	 agency	 and	 autonomy.	 The	
conclusions	of	Chapter	Five,	especially	with	regard	to	NGOs	Y	and	Z,	suggested	that	
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the	 legalistic	approach	of	 lawyers	acting	“on	behalf	of	workers”	result	 in	workers’	
transferred	agency	to	lawyers	and	workers’	dependency	on	lawyers	to	resolve	their	
labour	 disputes.	 NGO	 A	 and	 Law	 Firm	 D	 much	 more	 closely	 resemble	 a	 labour	
movement	organization,	or	even	a	trade	union,	even	though	Law	Firm	D	is	a	private	
law	 firm,	 because	 it	 supports	 workers’	 collective,	 autonomous,	 and	 independent	
(even	 from	 the	 trade	 union)	 action.	 Despite	 collective	 bargaining	 being	 another	
form	 of	 industrial	 peace	 (Wright,	 2000),	 the	 strategy	 of	 Law	 Firm	 D’s	 legal	




their	 conflict	 with	 capital.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 form	 of	 action	 resolves	 the	
unfairness	 that	 individual	 workers	 feel,	 as	 indicated	 above,	 as	 they	 identify	 with	
other	workers	that	have	been	treated	similarly.	
	
This	 section	 has	 illustrated	 that	 workers	 are	 not	 ‘the	 weak’,	 but	 instead	 have	
powerful	agency	to	take	all	sorts	of	legal,	illegal	and	paralegal	autonomous	actions,	
including	 silence,	 violence,	petitioning	or	 seeking	 Labour	Bureau	or	NGO	support,	
strikes,	 collective	 bargaining,	 and	other	 forms	of	 collective	 action.	 Some	of	 these	
forms	of	action	correspond	to	workers’	rights	consciousness,	but	are	usually	more	
reflective	of	workers’	 subjective	 and	 collective	 experiences	 of	work,	 in	 particular,	
silence	 and	 exit,	 or	 petitioning	 and	 seeking	 governmental	 intervention	 reflecting	
workers’	 alignment	 to	 social	 rules	 and	 institutional	 resources	 that	 suggest	 what	







correspond	 to	 workers’	 pursuit	 of	 rights	 as	 defined	 in	 the	 legal	 institutions,	 and	
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some	workers	pursue	their	interests	guided	not	only	by	their	material	needs,	but	by	
popular	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 and	 morality.	 Alternatively,	 or	 in	 some	 cases	 in	
combination	with	legal	action,	workers	resort	to	weapons	that	may	correspond	to	
Scott’s	 (1990)	 ‘hidden	 transcripts’	 such	 as	 silence,	 exit	 and	 social	 sharing;	 and	 to	
direct	 negotiation,	 petitioning	 or	 denouncing	 to	 Labour	 Bureaus,	 seeking	 NGO	
support,	 violence,	 collective	 action	 and,	 increasingly,	 collective	 bargaining.	 These	
forms	of	action	show	that	there	are	Chinese	workers	that	are	conscious	and	have	
the	agency	–	capacity,	skills,	resources	and	power	–	to	act	vis-à-vis	capital	and	the	
Party-state.	 Rights-based	 analyses	 of	 workers’	 consciousness	 and	 actions	 reduce	
the	universe	of	workers’	material,	 subjective,	 socio-cultural	 and	historical	 lives	 to	
legal	 institutions,	 and	deprive	 them	of	 their	 agency	 to	 shape	 their	 own	 identities	
and	 consciousness	 and	 to	 choose	 among	 different	 forms	 of	 action,	 including	
paralegal,	 ‘illegitimate’	 or	 illegal	 action.	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 the	
institutional	 clash	 between	 the	 laws	 and	 the	 socio-cultural	 norms	 proves	 the	
existence	 of	 dissent	 much	 more	 fundamental	 than	 that	 seen	 in	 the	 courtroom.	





in	 authoritarian	 regimes	 (Moustafa,	 2007,	 Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007,	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	
2007)	as	much	as	 in	 liberal	democracies	 (Epp,	1998;	McCann,	1994;	Merry,	1990;	
Scheingold,	2004).	The	optimistic	view	that	 legal	 institutions	 in	China	are	opening	
avenues	 for	 political	 contestation	 (Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007)	 should	 be	 moderated	
when	 considering	 Chinese	 workers.	 Legal	 institutions	 reduce	 workers’	 actions	 to	
rights-based	 claims	 and	 disputes,	 assume	 deficiencies	 or	 problems	 without	
addressing	 the	 root	 causes	 (palliative),	 and	 individualize	 conflict.	 In	 comparative	
contexts,	 legal	 mobilization	 has	 triggered	 collective	 action	 (McCann,	 1994,	 2004)	
when	an	active	support	structure	(of	lawyers	and	judiciary)	has	mobilized	the	law	in	
parallel	with	 political	 campaigns	 and	 collective	 actions.	 In	 these	 contexts,	 judges,	
lawyers	and	 legal	professionals	were	considered	the	 ‘vanguard’	of	movements	for	
political	 freedom	 (Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 This	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 for	 the	
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support	 structure	of	 LAL	NGOs	 such	as	NGOs	X,	 Y	 and	Z,	 nor	of	 lawyers,	who,	 as	
Michelson	 (2006)	 argued,	 act	 as	 ‘gatekeepers	 to	 justice’.	 For	 these	 reasons,	with	
regard	to	workers,	 legal	mobilization	by	LAL	NGOs	and	 lawyers	neither	challenges	
the	authority	of	 the	 regime,	nor	does	 it	 trigger	workers’	 collective	action.	On	 the	




Nevertheless,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 legal	 institutions	 are	 fulfilling	 the	 goal	 of	
sustaining	 authoritarian	 rule	 in	 China	 is	 questionable,	 but	 not	 because	 of	 the	
citizenry	 using	 legal	 institutions	 to	 politically	 challenge	 the	 Party-state.	 The	
evidence	 presented	 here	 shows	 a	 fundamental	 point	 of	 tension	 between	 legal	
institutions	and	Chinese	social	values.	Workers’	forms	of	action	arise	in	response	to	
different	 conceptions	 of	 morality	 and	 justice	 than	 those	 contained	 in	 the	 legal	
institutions.	These	principles	of	morality,	socio-cultural	norms	responding	to	socio-
cultural	 constructs	 that	 are	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 Chinese	 society,	 better	 reflect	
what	 Perry	 describes	 as	 “rules	 consciousness”	 (Perry,	 2009).	 The	 advent	 of	 the	
market	 economy	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 modern	 system	 of	 governance	
through	rule	of	law	are	encountering	cognitive	contradictions	with	the	foundations	
of	Chinese	society.	As	Fei	(1992:	106-107)	commented:	
“The	 current	 judicial	 system	 has	 very	 distinctive	 side	 effects	 in	
rural	 areas.	 It	 is	 destroying	 the	original	 order	 based	on	 a	 rule	 of	




What	 is	 more,	 the	 first	 thing	 needed	 is	 to	 reform	 the	 social	
structure	and	the	ideological	perspective.”		
	
In	 fact,	 this	process	 is	not	only	occurring	 in	 rural	areas,	but	also	 in	urban	ones.	 If	
applying	Fei’s	 (ibid)	arguments	 to	 the	contemporary	Chinese	context,	 in	order	 for	






either	 ‘adapt’	 to,	 as	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry	 (2011)	 and	 Liebman	 (2011)	 argue,	 or	
absorb	the	popular	values	and	social	norms	into	the	legal	institution	to	obtain	social	
acquiescence	 and	 secure	 institutional	 continuity.	 Alternatively,	 it	 could	 try	 to	
produce	a	ground-breaking	socio-psychological	 change	 in	 the	minds	and	practices	
of	 Chinese	 society,	 so	 as	 to	 make	 Chinese	 society	 adapt	 to	 the	 new	 values	 and	
principles	on	which	the	law	is	based,	and	direct	all	forms	of	popular	action	by	law.		
	
This	 chapter	has	 intended	 to	open	 further	avenues	of	 research	 in	order	 to	better	
understand	the	grassroots	conceptions	of	justice	and	the	ways	in	which	the	macro	
changes	 in	 governance	 institutions	 are	 interpreted,	 adopted,	 and	 resisted	 in	
everyday	 life	 in	 China.	 In	 other	 words,	 I	 assert	 that	 a	 grounded	 law	 in	 society	
research,	 which	 leans	 towards	 a	 socio-psychological	 sensitivity,	 is	 necessary	 to	
better	understand	what	‘rights	consciousness’	means	for	ordinary	people	(and	how	
it	 informs	 their	 actions)	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Party-state’s	 definitions	 of	 rights,	 and	 the	
penetration	of	the	rule	of	law	ideology.	The	literature	on	the	political	role	of	legal	
institutions	 under	 authoritarian	 contexts	 (Ginsberg,	 2008;	 Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007;	
Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	 Moustafa,	 2007,	 2008;	 Moustafa	 and	 Ginsberg,	 2008;	
Solomon,	2010)	has,	so	far,	 lacked	such	a	micro-	psycho-sociological	approach;	on	
the	 contrary,	 research	 has	 largely	 focused	 on	 institutional	 and	 procedural	
conceptions	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 has	 examined	 legal	 institutions	 and	 elites	 (judges	
and	lawyers)	as	political	‘fighters’	(Halliday	et	al.,	2007)	in	authoritarian	contexts.	I	
argue	that	to	better	understand	the	potential	spaces	for	political	contestation	that	
legal	 institutions	 open,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 contrast	 the	 macro-	 and	 institutional	
perspectives	of	policy	 and	governance	 studies	on	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 state	
and	 its	 governance,	 economic	 institutions	 and	 legal	 system	 since	 1978	 (i.e.	
Heilmann	 and	 Perry,	 2011;	 Liebman,	 2011;	 Lubman,	 1999;	 Nathan,	 2003;	
Peerenboom,	 2002;	 Shambaugh,	 2008)	with	 a	 grounded	 examination	 of	 how	 the	
state	 institutions	are	not	only	used,	but	also	perceived	by	ordinary	people,	and	 if	








































China	 renewed	 its	 commitment	 to	 improving	 its	governance	by	“comprehensively	
advancing	the	rule	of	law”.88	In	a	rhetorical	campaign,	Xi	Jinping	declared	the	rule	of	
law	 a	 guiding	 principle	 of	 the	 CPC’s	 governance,	 and	 legal	 reform	 its	main	 focus	
since	 the	 Fourth	Plenum	of	 the	 18th	 CPC	Central	 Committee	was	held	 in	October	
2014.89	Just	a	few	months	later,	in	July	2015,	paradoxically,	the	state’s	police	forces	
executed	the	most	significant	crackdown	on	 lawyers	and	human	rights	activists	 in	
decades,	 detaining	 at	 least	 200	 lawyers	 (Al	 Jazeera,	 2015;	Amnesty	 International,	
2015;	Duggan,	2015;	Jacobs	and	Buckley,	2015),	some	of	whom	were	placed	under	
criminal	 investigation	 for	 subversion	 and	 illicit	 gain	 (Xinhua,	 2015).	 Again,	 in	
December	 2015	 the	 police	 carried	 out	 another	 unprecedented	 crackdown	 on	 a	
number	 of	 labour	 NGOs	 and	 activists	 in	 Guangzhou,	 seven	 labour	 activists	 being	
harassed	 and	 placed	 under	 criminal	 detention,	 accused	 of	 “gathering	 a	 crowd	 to	
disturb	social	order”,	and	“threatening	national	security”	(BBC,	2015b;	Chen,	2015;	






88	Since	 February	 2015	Xi	 Jinping	has	 emphasized	 the	CPC’s	 commitment	 to	upholding	 the	 rule	of	
law.	In	a	Politburo	seminar	Xi	released	his	strategic	political	goals,	the	“Four	Comprehensives”	(sige	
quanmian,	四个全面)	 (BBC,	 2015a;	 Choi,	 2015).	 The	 Four	 Comprehensives	 are	 “comprehensively	
building	 a	 moderately	 prosperous	 society	 (xiaokang	 shehui,	 小康社会),	 comprehensively	 deepen	









yet	another	 test	of	 its	adaptive	 capacity,	 the	CPC	demonstrated	 throughout	2015	
that	 furthering	 legal	 reform	was	 strictly	 subject	 to	 the	 stability	 of	 the	Party-state	
regime.		
	
Through	 a	 combination	 of	 institutionalist	 and	 law	 in	 society	 approaches	 to	 the	
study	of	labour	laws	in	China,	this	thesis	has	addressed	the	broad	question	of	how	
and	why	 legal	 institutions,	 in	particular	 laws,	sustain	authoritarianism	 in	China.	 In	
so	 doing,	 it	 has	 provided	 evidence	 of	 the	 role	 of	 labour	 laws	 as	 institutions	 of	
‘adaptive	governance’	 (Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011)	of	 the	Chinese	Party-state,	and	
the	degree	to	which	such	 legal	 institutions	sustain	authoritarianism.	Accordingly,	 I	
have	 examined	 the	 historical	 processes	 and	 institutional	 arrangements	 that	 have	
made	 labour	 laws	 governance	 instruments	 of	 the	 Party-state,	 and	 I	 have	 argued	
that	these	laws	have	institutionalized	the	rule	of	the	CPC,	and	ensured	that	lawyers	
and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 remain	 subservient	 to	 the	 system.	 I	 have	 also	
explored	the	limitations	that	such	an	institutional	arrangement	imposes	on	lawyers	
and	 civil	 society	organizations	 in	mobilizing	 the	 law	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	on	 the	
other,	 in	catalysing	broad-base	social	movements	or	workers’	activism.	Up	 to	 this	
point,	 I	have	argued	that	 labour	 laws	sustain	the	adaptive	authoritarianism	of	the	
CPC,	 and	 that	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 act	within	 the	 law,	enabling	
the	expansion	and	improvement	of	the	legal	order.		
	




framework)	 collective	 bargaining,	 in	 other	 words,	 acting	 against	 the	 law,	 and	 in	
spite	 of	 the	 law.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 workers’	 voices	 and	 actions	 show	 that	 the	 legal	
institutions	 of	 the	 Party-state	 are	 not	 always	 deemed	 legitimate	 or	 trustworthy,	
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which,	 by	 extension,	 defies	 the	 ideological	 project	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	
Workers’	conceiving	of	their	rights	based	on	social	norms	(morality),	 fairness,	and	
socio-economic	factors,	and	acting	‘outside	the	law’	is	termed	‘rules	consciousness’	
(Perry,	 2008,	 2009),	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 legally	 defined	 ‘rights	 consciousness’.	 This	
thesis	has	provided	evidence	of	the	existence	of	both	these	forms	of	consciousness,	
and	 of	 the	 underlying	 contradiction	 between	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 legal	 norms	
(which	reinforce	capitalism	and	the	power	of	the	Party-state)	on	the	one	hand,	and	
social	norms	 (e.g.,	morality)	on	 the	other.	 It	 is,	of	 course,	not	a	given	 that	 ‘rights	
consciousness’	 and	 ‘rules	 consciousness’	 are	 mutually	 exclusive;	 however,	 the	
evidence	presented	here	suggests	rather	that	they	stand	in	contrast	to	each	other	
because	 of	 the	 fundamental	 difference	 between	 the	 capitalist	 (liberal)	 logic	 of	
‘rights	 consciousness’	 and	 the	 social,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 rationale	 of	 ‘rules	
consciousness’.	 This	 tension	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Party-state’s	 rule	 of	 law	
project	has	created	a	situation	of	coexistence	of	two	conflicting	sets	of	institutions	
(Crouch	 and	 Keune,	 2005;	 Orren	 and	 Skowronek,	 1994,	 2004):	 formal	 legal	
institutions	 and	 informal	 social	 knowledge	 and	 practices,	 each	 extending	
contradictory	 rules	 and	 licensing	 mutually	 contradictory	 (legal	 and	 illegal)	
behaviour.		
	
The	 aforementioned	 tension	 leads	 us	 to	 reconsider,	 both	 theoretically	 and	
empirically,	Heilmann	and	Perry’s	(2011)	thesis	on	the	‘adaptive	governance’	of	the	
CPC.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 workers’	 ‘rules	 consciousness’	 and	 the	 extensive	 use	 of	
illegitimate,	paralegal	and	illegal	forms	of	action	indicate	that	the	adaptation	of	the	
Party-state’s	 legal	 institutions	 to	 the	 social	 and	 environmental	 conditions	 of	 the	
time	 has	 yet	 to	 embrace	 or	 integrate	 these	 illegal	 forms	 of	 behaviour,	 or	 put	 in	
motion	adjunct	mechanisms	 to	obtain	 full	 allegiance	of	 the	populace	 to	 the	 legal	
order.	Conversely,	workers,	 lawyers,	and	activists	stage	a	more	significant	political	






primarily	by	offering	a	perspective	of	 law	 in	 society	 (Ewick	and	Silbey,	1998).	The	
central	object	of	 inquiry	has	been	 labour	 laws,	 to	the	extent	that	 these	represent	
formal	 legal	 institutions	 constituted	 by	 the	 Party-state.	 Institutionalist	 and	 policy	
studies	 of	 law	 can	 only	 tell	 us	 so	 much	 about	 how	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 sustains	
authoritarianism	at	the	formal	political	level.	I,	however,	contend	that	the	scope	of	
such	an	institutionalist	study	of	law	is	narrow,	arguing	that	it	can	only	show	the	role	
of	 law	 within	 the	 formal	 political	 structure.	 We	 need	 to	 study	 the	 law,	 and	 by	
extension,	 the	 state,	 from	 different	 perspectives	 (Migdal,	 1994,	 2001)	 and	 think	
about	 the	political	 life	of	 law	differently.	Hence,	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	combined	such	an	
institutionalist	and	policy-oriented	approach	as	followed	in	previous	studies	of	law	
in	authoritarian	contexts	(including	Heilmann	and	Perry’s	(2011),	with	the	study	of	
law	 from	 below	 (Merry	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 This	 latter	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	 gather	




society	 facilitates	 a	 thick	 (substantive)	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 examining	
legality,	 legal	culture	and	popular	conceptions	of	rights	vis-à-vis	the	institutions	of	






laid	 out	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism,	 and	 in	
opening	avenues	for	political	contestation.	Section	8.2	summarizes	the	theoretical	

















‘socialist	market	economy’.	Second,	 labour	 laws,	and	an	 institutional	arrangement	
that	 monitors	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 such	 as	 labour	 legal	 action	
NGOs,	 restrain	 these	actors	 from	politically	mobilizing	 the	 law	and	contesting	 the	
Party-state,	 and	 from	 triggering	 workers’	 political	 organization	 and	 mobilization.	
Third,	 lawyers	 and	 labour	NGOs	 feed	 back	 into	 the	 Party-state	 and	 contribute	 to	
further	developing	and	perfecting	these	legal	institutions	(labour	laws	in	particular).	







social	 order	 that	 radically	 simplifies	 social	 reality.	 Naturally,	 this	 legal	 order	
excludes	 prevalent	 socio-cultural	 norms	 and	 forms	 of	 behaviour,	 which	 then	
become	potentially	defiant	of	 the	authoritarian	 state	by	virtue	of	 their	 ‘illegality’.	
Some	workers	express	disagreement	with	the	premises	of	the	laws	and	do	not	use	








governance’,	 is	 indeed	 gradually	 integrating	 social	 behaviour	 into	 the	 legal	





use	 it,	 choosing	 other	 forms	 of	 illegitimate	 or	 illegal	 action.	 This	 indicates	 that,	
implicitly	 or	 explicitly,	 people	 do	 not	 fully	 agree	 and	 comply	with	 the	 ideological	
project	of	 the	 state	–	 the	 rule	of	 law	–	 and	 its	 governance	mechanisms.	 In	other	
words,	 the	 laws	 are	 not	 yet	 inclusive	 or	 legitimate	 enough	 to	 effectively	 ensure	
regime	 resilience,	 given	 that	 deviant	 and	 potentially	 politically	 destabilizing	
behaviour	 is	not	contained	by	legal	 institutions.	Evidence	presented	here	is	 in	 line	
with	Scott’s	 (1998)	arguments	about	 the	 failure	of	states’	 schemes	to	standardize	
social	order	(legibility	as	the	central	component	of	statecraft)	due	to	the	exclusion	
of	elements	of	informal	processes	and	practical	knowledge.	I	have	therefore	argued	
that	 the	 flaw	 in	 the	 ‘adaptive	 governance’	 of	 the	 CPC,	 in	 particular	 in	 its	 labour	
laws,	 lies	 in	 its	 failure	 to	 integrate,	 or	 even	 suppress,	 social	 conceptions	of	 rights	





shown	 that	 legal	 institutions	 tend	 to	 fulfil	 instrumental	 functions	 for	 the	 regime,	
institutionalizing	the	authoritarian	rule	(Moustafa,	2007,	2008,	2014;	Moustafa	and	
Ginsburg,	 2008).	 Similarly,	 Nathan	 (2003)	 has	 argued	 that	 legal	 reforms	 have	
promoted	 ‘authoritarian	 resilience’	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 functional	
	 297	
specialization	 of	 the	 CPC’s	 institutions	 of	 governance.	 Liebman	 (2011),	 following	
Heilmann	and	Perry’s	 (2011)	analysis,	argues	that	 laws	are	central	components	of	
the	 ‘adaptive	 authoritarianism’	of	 the	CPC,	which	ultimately	 extend	 its	 legitimacy	
and	 enable	 its	 governance	 without	 systemic	 transformation.	 This	 thesis	 has	
contributed	 comparative	 empirical	 detail	 to	 the	 nascent	 theorization	 about	 the	
political	 role	 of	 law	 in	 authoritarianism,	 and	 in	 particular,	 it	 has	 interrogated	 the	




First,	 in	Chapter	Three,	 I	have	argued	 that	 labour	 laws	 further	 the	 resilience,	 and	
therefore,	the	adaptability	of	the	CPC	because,	through	labour	laws,	the	Party-state	
governs	 labour	 relations.	 Labour	 laws	 are	 part	 of	 the	 institutional	 infrastructure	
created	 to	 support	 the	 capitalist	 economy	and	 its	 transformed	 social	 relations.	 In	
line	 with	 institutionalist	 approaches	 (Moustafa,	 2007;	 North,	 1990;	 North	 and	
Weingast,	1989),	laws	have	endorsed	and	institutionalized	property	rights,	which,	in	
the	realm	of	labour,	has	meant	the	actualization	of	the	commodification	of	labour	




of	 the	 market	 economy	 post-1978,	 both	 to	 regulate	 the	 excesses	 of	 the	 market	
protecting	labour,	and	to	protect	labour	in	a	Polanyian	‘double	movement’	(Polanyi,	
2001).	 Incidentally,	 the	 protection	 of	 labour	 was	 also	 conceived	 as	 a	 method	 of	
pacifying	the	increasing	labour	unrest	of	the	1990s.	Moreover,	through	labour	laws,	
the	CPC	has	retained	the	governance	capacity	to	promote	(Peerenboom,	2002)	and	
regulate	 economic	 development	 (Liebman,	 2011),	 and	 to	 control	 the	 potential	
conflict	 arising	 from	 labour-capital	 disputes	 through	 a	 number	 of	 institutions	 to	
manage	labour	disputes,	including	mediation,	arbitration	and	litigation.	In	this	way,	
labour	 laws	 are	 used	 as	 the	 CPC’s	 new	 governing	 institution	 of	 labour	 in	 the	
capitalist	economy.	Hence,	this	confirms	that	the	creation	of	labour	laws	has	been	
part	 of	 the	 institutionalization	 process	 that	 restores	 class	 divisions	 in	 society	 and	
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the	 turn	 to	 capitalism	 (Ginsberg,	 2008;	 Landry,	 2008;	 Liebman,	 2011;	 Lubman,	
1999;	 Moustafa,	 2007;	 Peerenboom,	 2002).	 Indeed,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 project	 is	
gaining	momentum,	 both	 as	 a	 political	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 CPC	 and	 as	de	 facto	 legal	
reforms	deepen.	I,	however,	have	a	cautious	reading	of	laws	as	legitimacy-boosting,	
as	although	some	research	has	been	undertaken	(Gallagher,	2006;	Li,	2004;	Landry,	
2008,	 2011),	 there	 is	 limited	 evidence	 from	 an	 institutionalist	 and	 policy	
perspective	 that	 the	 public	 actually	 finds	 these	 laws	 legitimate	 and	 trustworthy.	
This	 thesis	 has,	 in	 fact,	 provided	 a	 counterpoint	 to	 this	 argument,	with	 evidence	
that	shows	that	there	are	ordinary	workers	who	disagree	with	the	premises	of	the	
labour	laws	and	distrust	the	legal	system.	Moreover,	in	contrast	to	Landry’s	(2008,	
2011)	 survey	 findings	 of	 high	 levels	 of	 trust	 in	 legal	 institutions	 due	 to	 individual	
characteristics	 such	 as	 education	 levels,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 law	 and	 political	
institutions,	media	 consumption,	 and	 social	 networks,	 this	 thesis	 finds	 that	 there	
are	 socio-economic	 and	 structural	 (power	 relations)	 factors	 that,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	
interviews	quoted	in	this	thesis,	influence	workers’	trust	in	the	legal	system.		
	
Second,	 the	 CPC	 is	 establishing	 a	 hegemonic	 legal	 order.	 In	 Chapter	 Four	 I	 have	
shown	 that	 labour	 laws	 define	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 possibility,	 attempt	 to	 delimit	
workers’	 behaviour	 and	 constrain	 lawyers	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 from	
politically	mobilizing	the	law.	Apart	from	using	coercion	and	repression,	as	in	2015	




Moreover,	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	has	 been	 created	 to	 ensure	 lawyers’	 and	
other	 civil	 society	 legal	 actors,	 such	 as	 LAL	 NGOs’,	 core	 compliance	 (Moustafa,	
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2007,	 2008),	 thus	 also	 ensuring	 that	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 fulfil	 instrumental	
functions	for	the	adaptive	legality	of	the	Party-state.		
	
I	 have	 shown	 that	 this	 formal	 institutional	 arrangement	 consists	 of	 the	 following	
five	main	features.	First,	a	set	of	institutional	requirements	and	monitoring	system	
of	the	legal	profession:	lawyers’	internship,	practice	licence	and	ACLA	membership.	




and	 prevents	 lawyers	 from	 developing	 a	 collective	 identity	 (as	 an	 epistemic	






membership	 is	mandatory	and	 it	 reviews	 the	 lawful	behaviour	of	 lawyers,	and	by	
MOCA,	as	LAL	NGOs	need	to	be	registered.	This	factor,	in	addition	to	the	fact	that	
there	 is	a	certain	degree	of	 incorporation	of	LAL	NGOs	 into	the	political	echelons,	
with	the	leadership	of	some	of	these	organizations	being	highly	recognized	by	the	
Party	 (i.e.	 being	 awarded	 the	 ACFTU	 Labour	 Day	Medal	 –both	NGOs	 Y	 and	 Z)	 or	
even	penetrating	into	the	leadership	of	the	organization	(as	is	the	case	with	NGO	Z,	
whose	 leaders	 are	Party	members	 and	 representatives	 in	 the	People’s	 Congress),	




The	 fourth	 arrangement	 is	 a	 patronage	 relationship	 between	 the	MOJ	 and	 both	
lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	for	registration,	lawyers’	practice	licence	renewal,	and	public	
funding	via	ACLA’s	Legal	Aid	Foundation	Fund.	The	 final	one	 is	 the	 lack	of	 judicial	
independence	and	capacity	to	deal	with	the	increasing	amount	of	labour	disputes,	
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which	means	 that	 LAL	 NGOs	 avoid	 the	 pressure	 of	 labour	 conflict	 proceeding	 to	
court.		
	





CPC	 indicates	 an	 intentional	 return	 to	 the	 popular	 legalism	 of	 the	 revolutionary	
period	 to	 align	 with	 popular	 social	 norms	 and	 preferred	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanisms.	 Moreover,	 this	 strategy,	 even	 if	 sustaining	 the	 adaptive	




lacks	 independence	 increases	 the	 instrumentality	 of	 LAL	 NGOs	 for	 the	 adaptive	
legality	 of	 the	 Party-state,	 as	 though,	 in	 line	 with	 Moustafa’s	 argument	 (2007),	
some	degree	of	perceived	independence	is	necessary	for	legal	institutions	to	build	
legitimacy	and	sustain	authoritarianism.	In	this	case,	LAL	NGOs	have	an	added	value	
to	 the	 Party-state	 in	 preventing	 disputes	 from	 proceeding	 to	 litigation	 and	
therefore	 concealing	 the	 judiciary’s	 lack	 of	 capacity	 and	 independence.	 In	 other	
words,	LAL	NGOs	build	the	ideological	image	of	the	rule	of	law.	However,	there	is	a	
flaw	 in	 the	 ‘adaptive	 legality’	 of	mediation.	 I	 argue	 that	mediation	 is	 increasingly	
institutionalized	 and	 legalistic,	 and	 some	 lawyers	 refuse	 to	 arrange	mediation	 for	










of	 legal	 implementation,	which	 feeds	 into	 policy-	 and	 law-making	 processes,	 and	




that	 results	 in	 institutional	 ‘drift’	 and	 institutional	 stability	 (Streeck	 and	 Thelen,	






and	legal	actors,	 fulfil	 indispensable	functions	 in	sustaining	authoritarianism,	most	
significantly	 ensuring	 that	 political	 activism	 and	 potentially	 contentious	 and	
challenging	 behaviour	 is	 either	 prevented	 or	 contained	 within	 the	 frames	 of	 the	
law.	Laws,	as	governance	institutions,	create	the	rules	to	order	and	control	society,	
in	particular,	lawyers,	LAL	NGOs	and	workers.	Ultimately,	the	final	reason	why	laws,	
and	 adjacent	 institutional	 arrangements,	 secure	 authoritarianism	 is	 because	 they	
do	not	design	realistic	avenues	for	political	contestation,	hobbling	lawyers’	and	LAL	
NGOs’	 attempts	 to	 form	 a	 ‘support	 structure’	 (Epp,	 1998)	 for	 the	 political	
mobilization	of	law	to	challenge	the	regime.	Lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	do	mobilize	the	
law	 and	 support	 workers	 in	 their	 labour	 disputes,	 but	 do	 not	 fully	 fulfil	 the	
conditions	of	a	 ‘support	structure’	 in	the	sense	of	activating	a	political	movement	
against	 the	 Party-state:	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 because	 they	 are	 not	 activists	
themselves,	 but	 because	 they	 are	 constrained	 by	 the	 formal	 institutional	






together	 with	 judges,	 have	 formed	 a	 collective	 force	 and	 organized	 to	 strive	 for	
political	 liberalism,	 contesting	 the	 state	 using	 law	 and	 through	 courts	 (Ginsburg,	
2007;	 Halliday	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Halliday	 and	 Liu,	 2007;	 Karpik	 and	Halliday,	 2011).	 In	
liberal	 democracies,	 lawyers	 have	 led	 the	 political	 mobilization	 of	 law,	 or	 ‘legal	
mobilization’	(Zemans,	1983),	and	have	coordinated	organized	collective	action	and	
campaigns	 so	 that	 legal	 mobilization	 resulted	 in	 effective	 political	 changes	
(McCann,	1994,	2000;	Scheingold,	1974).	Such	leadership	by	 lawyers	required	and	
was	 part	 of	 a	 ‘support	 structure’	 of	 reform-minded	 judges,	 the	 media	 and	 civil	
society	organizations	that	enabled	sustained	and	effective	mobilization	of	 the	 law	
(Epp,	 1998).	 Through	 the	 study	 of	 labour	 law	 in	 practice	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 labour	
lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs,	 I	 have	 provided	 comparative	 evidence	 to	 examine	 the	
validity	of	 the	aforementioned	 theories	 about	 law	and	 resistance	 in	 authoritarian	
China.	 In	doing	so,	 I	have	argued	 that	 the	extent	 to	which	 lawyers	and	LAL	NGOs	
mobilize	 the	 law	 politically	 indicates	 how	 and	 why	 legal	 institutions	 sustain	
authoritarianism	 in	 China;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 law	 opens	 up	




Through	 the	 cases	 of	 NGOs	 X,	 Y	 and	 Z	 I	 have	 provided	 evidence	 of	 LAL	 NGOs’	
activities	 and	 lawyers’	 engagement	 with	 workers,	 showing	 that	 they	 fulfil	 three	
crucial	 functions	 for	 the	 ‘adaptive	 governance’	 of	 the	 CPC.	 First,	 through	 legal	
education	(pufa,	普法)	activities	and	by	providing	legal	consultation	to	workers	with	
labour	 grievances,	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 socialize	 workers	 in	 the	 labour	 laws,	
which	means	that	they	raise	workers’	rights	or	legal	consciousness,	and	define	the	
potential	 workers’	 actions	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 is	 ‘reasonable’	 (helide,	 合理的)	 and	
‘legitimate’	 (hefade,	 合法的),	 which	 contributes	 to	 aligning	 workers’	 ideas	 and	
behaviour	 with	 the	 new	 legal	 order.	 Furthermore,	 the	 revival	 of	 these	 legal	
education	activities,	which	were	used	during	the	Maoist	period	“to	educate	about	
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and	 induce	 compliance	 with	 the	 new	 legal	 norms”	 (Liebman,	 2011:	 183),	 is	
consistent	with	and	facilitates	the	‘adaptive	governance’	of	the	CPC.		
	
Second,	 the	provision	of	 legal	aid	 is	 crucial	 for	broadening	people’s	access	 to	 law	
and	 legal	 justice.	 LAL	 NGOs	 play	 a	 very	 important	 role	 in	 this	 matter,	 not	 only	
enabling	workers	 to	 seek	 redress	 through	 law,	but	 also	buffering	 the	 state,	 given	
the	 limited	 capacity	 of	 the	 judiciary.	 By	 dealing	 with	 labour	 conflict,	 especially	
through	 mediation,	 LAL	 NGOs	 reduce	 the	 pressure	 of	 labour	 disputes	 on	 the	
judiciary,	 and	 other	 governmentally	 run	 legal	 aid	 centres,	 such	 as	 the	 municipal	
government	or	trade	union	legal	aid	centres.	This	basically	works	to	the	benefit	of	
the	 Party-state	 because	 it	 inhibits	 the	 public	 exposure	 of	 the	 inefficiencies	 and	
limitations	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 preserving	 the	 ideological	 smokescreen	 of	 a	
functioning	rule	of	law.	At	the	same	time,	the	question	of	LAL	NGOs’	opening	access	
to	justice	shows	an	important	contradiction.	On	the	one	hand,	 legal	aid	addresses	
the	 problem	 of	 migrant	 workers’	 access	 to	 justice,	 and	 provides	 them	 with	 the	
opportunity	 to	 access	 legal	 channels.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 lawyers,	 by	 virtue	 of	
strictly	 abiding	 by	 the	 law,	 determine	 the	 likelihood	 of	 some	 workers’	 gaining	
redress	 through	 the	 law.	 In	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 lawyers	 deny	 representation	 to	









Third,	 lawyers	and	 LAL	NGOs,	 through	 legal	means	 such	as	mediation,	 arbitration	
and	litigation,	protect	workers’	rights	and	find	redress	and	compensation	for	many,	
but	 mostly	 in	 individual	 cases.	 The	 importance	 of	 these	 activities	 should	 not	 be	
underestimated,	especially	 from	 the	point	of	 view	of	aggrieved	workers	who	 find	
redress	with	 the	assistance	of	 these	actors.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 have	provided	 further	
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empirical	 detail	 with	 a	 comparative	 perspective	 to	 support	 Gallagher’s	 (2006)	
arguments	about	how	legal	aid	centres	empower	workers	and	assist	them	in	their	
labour	 dispute	 cases.	 A	 counterpoint	 I	 have	made,	 however,	 is	 that	 by	 providing	
legal	 representation,	 because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 legal	 profession	 and	 the	 legal	
process,	and	because	the	deficit	model	that	the	LAL	NGOs	employ	depicts	workers	
as	‘the	weak’,	‘lacking	knowledge’	and	‘powerless’,	lawyers	and	workers	develop	a	
power	 relation	 that	 is	 not	 necessarily	 emancipatory	 for	 workers.	 This	 power	
relation	 can	 reflect	 the	 different	 class	 background	 of	weiquan	 lawyers	 (middle-
class)	and	workers	(working	class),	which	in	turn	explains	why	lawyers,	even	when	
working	for	the	cause	of	workers’	rights	protection,	do	not	become	a	‘vanguard’	of	
the	 labour	 movement,	 or	 as	 Hui	 (2014)	 argues	 in	 Gramscian	 terms,	 the	 organic	
intellectuals	 of	 the	working	 class.	On	 the	 contrary,	 these	 LAL	NGOs	 and	weiquan	
lawyers	 contribute	 to	 the	 propagation	 of	 the	 legal	 rationale	 and	 order,	 or	
hegemony	(Hui,	2014;	Lin,	2015),	reinforcing	the	rule	of	the	Party-state.	Moreover,	
from	a	 relational	perspective,	 lawyers	act	 ‘on	behalf	of	workers’,	 and	 in	 the	 legal	
process	 there	 is	a	 transfer	of	agency	 from	workers	 to	 lawyers,	on	whom	workers	
depend	because	of	their	professional	knowledge	and	technical	skills.	The	inequality	
in	 knowledge	 between	 lawyers	 and	 workers	 leads	 to	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	
majority	 of	 lawyers	 are	 central	 actors	 exerting	 social	 control,	 and	 as	 ‘disabling	
professionals’	 (Illich,	1977),	 guide	workers	 to	 take	 specific	 forms	of	 actions	which	
accord	 with	 the	 law,	 as	 mentioned	 above.	 This	 calls	 into	 question	 the	
aforementioned	broadening	of	access	 to	 justice	and	 indicates	 there	 is	an	 intrinsic	
problem	 in	 the	 legal	 process	 –	 the	 redistributive	 role	 of	 law.	 Legal	 mobilization	
would	 have	 an	 effective	 political	 outcome	 if	 it	were	 to	 address	 the	 structures	 of	
power	that	prevail	 in	society,	specifically	 in	 labour-capital	relations,	which	are	the	









NGO	A	and	 Law	Firm	D)	depoliticise	 labour	 conflict	by	 reducing	 it	 to	 strictly	 legal	
definitions	of	rights,	extract	it	from	the	workplace	and	contain	it	within	the	frames	
of	 the	 law.	Although	 the	actors	 studied	here	do	engage	 in	advocacy	at	 the	policy	
level,	 creating	 avenues	 or	 mechanisms	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 and	
improvement	 of	 legal	 institutions,	 these	 actors	 do	 not	 lead	 or	 initiate	 political	
campaigns	in	addition	to	providing	legal	services	because	this	is	not	legally	possible.	
In	 addition,	 they	 dissuade	workers	 from	 taking	 ‘illegal’	 forms	 of	 action	 and	 from	
mobilizing	collectively;	therefore,	not	catalysing	social	movements	as	has	been	the	
case	 in	 other	 settings	 (Epp,	 1998;	McCann,	 1994;	Merry,	 1990;	 Scheingold,	 1974;	
Silverstein,	1996).	Given	the	limits	that	the	law	imposes	on	lawyers’	and	LAL	NGOs’	
actions,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 that	 monitors	 them,	 the	
possibilities	 of	 their	 political	 contestation	 through	 law	 is	 very	 limited,	 precisely	
because	 the	 law	 defines	 what	 they	 can	 and	 cannot	 do.	 Those	 lawyers	 that	 are	
pushing	 the	 law	 beyond	 the	 legal	 definitions,	 such	 as	 human	 rights	 lawyers,	 or	
those	in	Law	Firm	D	trying	to	establish	a	system	of	collective	bargaining,	are	indeed	
engaged	 in	 political	 activism	within	 and	beyond	 the	 law.	Working	within	 the	 law,	
however,	 pre-empts	 the	 lawyers	 and	 LAL	 NGOs	 studied	 here	 from	 forming	 a	
vanguard	 for	 political	 activism,	 which	 by	 default	 makes	 them	 functional	 for	 the	




in	political	 contestation	 in	authoritarian	contexts,	 showing	 that	under	 the	current	
constellation	of	power	 in	China,	given	the	very	nature	of	the	labour	 laws,	and	the	
institutional	 constraints	 imposed	 on	 lawyers,	 legal	 mobilization	 offers	 very	 few	











have	 provided	 evidence	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 shows	 that	 there	 are	 workers	 whose	
conceptions	 of	 rights	 do	 not	 comply	with	 the	 legal	 definitions,	 and	 therefore,	 do	
not	engage	with	 the	 law,	but	 rather	 take	 ‘illegal’	 and	 ‘illegitimate’	 actions.	 I	 have	
argued	 that	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 has	 been	 an	 analytically	 hollow	 and	 unclear	
concept	 as	 used	 in	 the	 literature,	 and	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 without	 sufficient	
empirical	evidence	and	methodological	rigour	of	what	exactly	it	means	for	workers	
to	 have	 ‘rights	 consciousness’.	 Even	 if,	 conceptually,	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 is	 less	
narrow	 than	 ‘legal	 consciousness’	 (as	 knowledge	 of	 the	 law	 and	 its	 processes)	
(Dittmer	and	Hurst,	2006),	 I	have	argued	 that	 ‘rights	consciousness’	has	generally	
been	used	in	the	literature	to	refer	to	workers’	ideas	of	rights	as	derived	from	the	
laws,	which	 overlooks	 the	 fact	 that	workers	 have	 consciousness	 of	 rights	 (as	 per	
rules)	prior	to	the	laws.	Through	a	law	in	society	approach	(Ewick	and	Silbey,	1998)	I	
have	 contrasted	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 meaning	 legal	 rights	
consciousness,	 with	 workers’	 understandings	 of	 rights,	 ideas	 of	 justice,	 and	
perceptions	 and	 opinions	 of	 the	 law.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	workers’	 conceptions	 of	
rights	 and	 justice	 derive	 from	 the	 combination	 of	 their	 subjective	 experiences	 of	
work,	 socio-economic	 needs	 (of	 livelihood,	 fairness	 and	 subsistence),	 and	 socio-
cultural	norms	of	behaviour	(morality),	which	proves	the	existence	and	content	of	
‘rules	 consciousness’	 (Perry,	 2008,	 2009).	 These	 concepts	 of	 rights	 are	 dissonant	
with	 the	 legal	 precepts	 that	 inform	 ‘rights	 consciousness’,	 providing	 both	
contrasting	 and	 contradictory	 logics	 of	 action.	 In	 particular,	 legal	 rights	
consciousness	informs	a	specific	form	of	behaviour	which,	I	have	argued,	is	strictly	
rights-based	 legal	action.	However,	 I	have	 shown	 that	 some	workers	do	not	 trust	
the	 laws	 because	 they	 do	 not	 reflect	 their	 sources	 of	 grievances	 and	 do	 not	
represent	 their	 needs,	 or	 because	 they	 are	 not	 fair	 or	 legitimate	 in	 their	 eyes.	
Consistently,	workers	are	unable	 to	 find	 redress	 in	 the	 legal	 system.	This	 leads	 to	
most	 labour	 struggle	happening	outside	 the	 confines	of	 the	 law,	with	 strikes	 and	









of	 law	 (which	 follow	 a	 thin	 conception	 of	 rule	 of	 law)	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	
reach	partial	conclusions	on	how	laws	sustain	authoritarianism.	Thick	approaches	to	
the	 rule	 of	 law,	 or	 studies	 of	 law	 from	 below,	 or	 in	 society	 provide	 more	
comprehensive	detail	as	to	 if,	how	and	why	 laws	sustain	authoritarianism,	bolster	
regime	 legitimacy,	 and	 obtain	 social	 order.	 I	 have	 therefore	 contributed	 to	 the	
literature	on	the	rule	of	law	in	authoritarianism	by	providing	a	view	from	below.	In	
addition,	 I	 have	 provided	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 what	 Perry	 has	 argued,	 with	 an	
analysis	of	political	discourses,	is	‘rules	consciousness’	(2008,	2009),	and	not	‘rights	
consciousness’.	I	believe	that	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	argue	that	‘rights’	and	
‘rules’	 consciousness	 are	 not	 mutually	 exclusive,	 but	 at	 present,	 coexist	 and	
contend.	 ‘Rights	 consciousness’	 refers	 strictly	 to	 rights	 defined	 by	 law,	which	 are	
indeed	 based	 on	 liberal	 notions	 given	 that	 the	 labour	 laws	 reinforce	 a	 capitalist	
economy	whereby	 labour	relations	are	virtually	relations	of	property	–	 labour	 is	a	
commodity	 to	 be	 sold	 in	 the	 market.	 ‘Rules	 consciousness’	 refers	 to	 a	 socio-




that	 “rules	consciousness”	 is	 “politics	as	usual”	 (2009:	18)	 through	which	Chinese	
people	use	 state-sanctioned	 language	and	 channels	 to	negotiate	with	 the	 state.	 I	
have	found	that	 ‘rules	consciousness’	necessarily	means	the	use	of	mostly	 ‘illegal’	
(not	state-sanctioned)	actions	and	channels,	because	the	Party-state	has	adopted	a	




Such	 contrasting	 forms	 of	 workers’	 consciousness	 and	 action	 therefore	 denote	 a	
conflictual	element	of	the	CPC’s	‘adaptive	governance’	(Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011),	
the	flaw	in	the	CPC’s	‘adaptive	governance’.	The	rule	of	law,	as	a	hegemonic	project	
to	 restore	 a	 class	 society	 and	 to	maintain	 social	 order	 in	 the	 capitalist	 economy,	
sustaining	the	power	of	the	CPC,	is	finding	attempts	at	resistance	on	the	ground.	In	
other	words,	the	introduction	of	capitalism	and	this	modern	system	of	governance	
through	 law	 finds	 contention	 in	 some	 still	 prevalent	 socio-cultural	 norms	 of	









allowing	 intermediary	 institutions	 (LAL	 NGOs,	 labour	 NGOs)	 to	 take	 up	 these	
popular	conceptions	of	rights	and	manage	both	legal	disputes	and	these	paralegal	
and	 illegal	 forms	 of	 behaviour	 (both	 of	 which	 the	 trade	 union	 is	 inefficient	 at),	
and/or	adjusting	 the	 legal	 institutions	and	making	them	more	 inclusive	by	 further	






these	 institutional	 adaptations	 of	 the	 labour	 laws	 do	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 the	
points	of	contention	echoed	by	the	workers’	voices	in	this	thesis.	I	have	interpreted	
workers’	 views	 of	 the	 laws	 as	 forms	 of	 dissent	with	 the	 capitalist	 principles.	 The	
workers’	 voices	 analysed	 here	 reveal	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 project	 is	 neither	 fully	
aligning	with	popular	conceptions	of	rights	and	justice,	nor	is	it	deeply	embedding	
itself	 in	 Chinese	 society.	 This	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 not	 gaining	 ordinary	 people’s	
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compliance	 as	 it	 is	 aims	 to,	 nor	 necessarily	 bolstering	 regime	 legitimacy	 in	 their	







an	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 ‘regime	 resilience’	
(Nathan,	2003)	and	‘adaptive	governance’	(Heilmann	and	Perry,	2011);	and	third,	it	
makes	 an	 empirical	 contribution	 proving	 the	 existence	 and	 content	 of	 “rules	
consciousness”	(Perry,	2008,	2009).		
	
First,	 the	 existing	 research	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 authoritarian	 contexts	 is	
overwhelmingly	 centred	 on	 legal	 institutions,	 and	more	 specifically,	 the	 judiciary,	
and	 on	 legal	 elites.	 Most	 significantly,	 this	 research	 has	 confirmed	 that	 legal	
institutions	sustain	authoritarian	regimes	because	they	institutionalize	or	entrench	
the	 power	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 rulers	 and	 legitimize	 the	 regime	 (Ginsberg,	 2008;	
Landry,	2008;	Liebman,	2011;	Lubman,	1999;	Moustafa,	2007,	2014;	Moustafa	and	
Ginsberg,	 2008;	 Peerenboom,	 2002).	 I	 have	 provided	 comparative	 empirical	
evidence	of	the	case	of	China,	specifically,	on	the	role	and	functions	of	labour	law	in	
sustaining	the	rule	of	the	CPC.	In	doing	so	I	have	confirmed	the	propositions	in	the	
literature	 on	 how	 legal	 institutions	 enable	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 the	
authoritarian	rulers;	obtain	core	compliance	of	legal	actors;	endorse	property	rights	






overly	 institutionalist	 literature	 has	 not	 provided	 evidence	 of	 how	 and	why	 legal	
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institutions	bolster	regime	legitimacy,	particularly,	in	the	eyes	of	the	people.	I	have	
contended	 that	we	 cannot	arrive	at	 compelling	 conclusions	about	how	 legitimate	




Hence,	 the	main	 contribution	 to	 this	body	of	 research	has	been	 to	 combine	 such	
institutionalist	 approaches	 with	 a	 law	 in	 society	 (Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998).	 I	 have	
argued	 that	 to	better	understand	 the	 value	of	 law	 in	 sustaining	 authoritarianism,	
particularly,	workers’	understandings	and	opinions	(public	opinion)	of	the	law,	and	




why	 they	 act	 differently,	 if	 so),	 which	 better	 inform	 conclusions	 about	 how	
legitimate	law	is,	and	how	legitimate	law	makes	the	Party-state	regime.	The	power	
of	laws	to	legitimize	the	Party-state	is	only	in	part	derived	from	the	coercive	power	




the	 law	 is	 not,	 as	 yet,	 accomplished.	On	 the	 contrary,	workers	disagree	with	 and	
distrust	 the	 law	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 including	 conceptual,	 economic,	 socio-
cultural,	and	potentially,	ideological.	
	
Second,	 the	aforementioned	empirical	 evidence	of	workers’	 conceptions	of	 rights	
and	 opinions	 of	 the	 law	 provides	 a	 counterpoint	 to	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry’s	 (2011)	
‘adaptive	 governance’	 thesis.	 As	 with	 previous	 institutionalist	 and	 policy	 process	
research	 on	 regime	 resilience	 and	 adaptability,	 Heilmann	 and	 Perry’s	 (2011)	 and	
Liebman’s	(2011)	‘adaptive	governance’	argument	lacked	empirical	detail	as	to	how	
and	why	the	CPC’s	governance	adaptations	were	functioning	 in	practice,	and	how	
effective	 they	were	 in	making	 the	 regime	 resilient.	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 provided	
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empirical	evidence,	gathered	through	a	 law	 in	society	approach	(Ewick	and	Silbey,	




elite	 groups	 and	 doing	 empirical	 research	 on	 the	 workings	 of	 this	 ‘adaptive	
governance’,	it	appears	that	the	adaptiveness	of	the	CPC’s	structures	or	institutions	
of	 governance	 has	 left	 key	 informal	 practices,	 knowledge	 and	 forms	 of	 social	
behaviour	 outside	 the	 legal	 confines.	 This	 is	 the	 flaw	 in	 the	 CPC’s	 ‘adaptive	
governance’.	
	
Third,	 I	 have	 provided	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 workers	 in	 Beijing,	 and	 in	 the	
construction	 industry,	which	adds	 comparative	 substance	 to	 the	existing	 research	
on	workers’	 subjectivities	 and	 actions	 that	 has	mainly	 focused	 on	manufacturing	
sector	 workers	 in	 the	 Pearl	 River	 Delta	 (Chan,	 2001,	 2011;	 Chan,	 2010a,	 2010b;	
Chan	 and	 Pun,	 2009;	 Leung,	 2015;	 Leung	 and	 Pun,	 2009;	 Pun,	 2009;	 Pun	 et	 al.,	
2010;	Su	and	He,	2010).	Moreover,	I	have	provided	evidence	for	the	discussion	on	
workers’	‘rights	consciousness’,	showing	workers’	contrasting	conceptions	of	rights	




lawyers’	 advice	 ‘according	 to	 the	 law’),	 it	 has	 been	 possible	 to	 see	 that	 workers	
have	divergent	conceptions	of	rights	and	justice	to	those	embodied	in	the	laws.	This	
signals	 a	 tension	 between	 what	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	
(which	 refers	 directly	 to	 rights	 entitled	 by	 law),	 and	 ‘rules	 consciousness’	 (Perry,	
2009).	 Perry	 (2008,	 2009)	 suggested,	 with	 political	 discursive	 data,	 that	 rights	
consciousness	 is	 an	 incorrect	 category	 to	 name	 what	 in	 reality	 is	 ‘rules	
consciousness’;	however,	she	provided	no	empirical	account	of	the	existence	of	this	
rules	 consciousness	 among	 Chinese	 people,	 as	 opposed	 to	 rights	 or	 legal	
consciousness.	 This	 research	 has	 filled	 this	 gap	 in	 Perry’s	 analysis,	 providing	 the	
empirical	detail	to	support	her	argument:	I	have	provided	evidence	of	the	existence	
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and	 content	 of	workers’	 ‘rules	 consciousness’,	which	 is	 composed	 of	 concepts	 of	
equality,	 fairness,	 morality	 and,	 as	 Perry	 (2008)	 suggested,	 socio-economic	
concepts	of	rights	to	livelihoods	and	subsistence.	In	doing	so,	I	have	also	provided	
an	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 the	 discussion	 about	 ‘rights	 consciousness’	 in	 China,	
and	brought	 it	back	to	the	broader	discussion	on	its	capacity	to	stimulate	political	
activism	 and	 bring	 about	 regime	 change.	 Studying	 rights,	 legal	 or	 rules	






The	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 was	 to	 examine	 how	 and	 why	 legal	 institutions,	 in	
particular	 laws,	 sustain	authoritarianism	 in	China.	 In	a	 sense,	 this	question	meant	
that	 the	 point	 of	 inquiry	 was	 state-society	 relations	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 law.	
However,	 when	 narrowing	 this	 down	 to	 the	 study	 of	 labour	 laws,	 the	 political	
constellation	was	complicated	by	the	simple	fact	of	the	pure	number	of	institutions,	
institutional	 dynamics	 and	 political	 actors	 that	 come	 into	 play	 and	 the	 blurred	
conceptual	 and	 empirical	 delimitations	 among	 them:	 the	 Party-state,	 capital,	 civil	
society	(LAL	NGOs,	lawyers),	and	labour	(trade	union,	again	labour	NGOs,	workers).	
The	conceptual	differentiation	of	 the	different	actors	 is	not	so	clear-cut	 in	 reality,	
and	 has	 made	 it	 difficult	 to	 differentiate,	 for	 example,	 non-governmental	
organizations	from	the	Party-state,	especially	when	the	leadership	of	the	NGO	was	










state,	 and	 formal	 and	 informal	 practices.	 I	 focused	 this	 research	 on	 formal	 legal	
institutions	to	engage	directly	with	the	China-related	literature	on	regime	resilience	
and	the	broader	literature	on	authoritarianism,	as	these	overwhelmingly	looked	at	
formal	 institutions	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 legal	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 judiciary.	
However,	 there	 are	 a	wealth	 of	 informal	 practices	 through	which	 the	 Party-state	
extends	 its	power,	 including	the	accommodation	of	collective	action	–	 judges	and	
government	officials	stepping	outside	of	the	courtroom	to	manage	conflict	(Xu	and	
He,	2010).	A	study	of	how	these	informal	practices	operate	within	the	legal	system	
and	 the	degree	 to	which	 they	extend	authoritarianism	as	new	 forms	of	 ‘adaptive	
governance’	was	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	but	in-depth	research	in	courts	at	
different	 levels	 to	 deepen	 the	 findings	 from	 a	 law	 in	 society	 approach	would	 be	
valuable.		
	
Moreover,	 some	 readers	 may	 feel	 that	 not	 enough	 focus	 was	 placed	 on	 the	
implementation	of	labour	laws,	as	this	could	add	variation	to	the	degree	that	laws	
sustain	 authoritarianism,	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 labour	 unrest	 within	 companies	 and	
industries,	and	lead	to	different	levels	of	understanding	and	support	of	the	law	by	
workers.	The	study	of	 legal	 implementation	could	also	aid	the	assessment	of	how	
effective	 laws	 are	 as	 mechanisms	 of	 governance.	 The	 legal	 implementation	
question	was	once	part	of	 this	 research	at	 its	early	 stages,	but	due	 to	 the	nature	
and	time	constraints	of	the	fieldwork,	it	was	left	unresearched	and	I	make	no	claims	
about	 it.	 This	 research	 direction	would	 also	 have	 led	 to	 a	whole	 different	 set	 of	
questions	 to	 those	 asked	 in	 this	 research,	 such	 as	 how	 and	 why	 do	 companies	
comply	 with	 the	 law?	 Is	 there	 any	 difference	 across	 industries	 and	 types	 of	
company?	How	and	why	do	labour	inspectorates	and	government	officials	monitor	
and	 render	 compliance	 with	 the	 law?	 Indeed,	 addressing	 these	 questions	 will	
provide	 further	 evidence	 as	 to	 how	and	why	 legal	 institutions,	 laws	 in	 particular,	
sustain	authoritarianism,	if	indeed	they	do.	
	
In	 relation	 to	 LAL	 NGOs,	 some	 readers	 may	 argue	 that	 the	 sample	 I	 based	 this	
research	on	 limits	 the	generalizability	of	 the	claims	hereby	made	on	 labour	NGOs	
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more	generally.	The	 fact	 that	 the	bulk	of	 this	 research	 is	based	on	three	 in-depth	
case	 studies	 of	 LAL	 NGOs	 in	 Beijing	 can	 disguise	 organizational	 differences	 and	
regional	 variations	 among	 LAL	 NGOs.	 Arguably,	 Beijing	 being	 the	 capital	 and	
political	 centre	 of	 China	 has	 a	 tighter	 political	 environment,	whereas	 Guangdong	
Province	 has	 usually	 enjoyed	 a	 more	 experimental	 (and	 arguably	 open)	 political	
atmosphere,	where	civil	society	organizations	have	been	able	to	flourish	and	even	
behave	 in	 more	 overtly	 politically	 challenging	 ways.	 The	 political	 opportunities	
available	under	 the	various	political	 economies	 in	China	 therefore	 can	 favour	 LAL	
NGOs	taking	a	variety	of	mobilization	strategies	and	engaging	in	different	forms	of	
activism.	 Indeed,	 it	 can	be	argued	that	 labour	NGOs	 in	 the	Pearl	River	Delta	have	
utilized	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 actions	 if	 compared	 to	 those	 in	 Beijing,	 specifically	 if	
compared	 to	 the	 LAL	 NGOs	 hereby	 examined	 which	 mainly	 focus	 on	 legal	
mobilization.	 Therefore,	 the	 political	 opportunities	 LAL	 NGOs	 and	 NGOs	 more	
generally	 have	 across	 different	 regions	 in	 China	 should	 be	 further	 examined	 to	
better	 understand	 the	 factors	 that	 account	 for	 variation	 in	 NGOs’	 activist	
behaviour.	
	
Despite	 regional	 differences	 in	 LAL	 NGOs’	 behaviour,	 with	 three	 in-depth	 case	
studies	of	NGOs	X,	Y	and	Z,	and	comparative	evidence	of	five	other	NGOs	in	Beijing	
and	 of	 labour	 NGOs	 in	 three	 other	 locations	 in	 China	 (Wuhan,	 Guangzhou	 and	
Shenzhen),	 I	 triangulated,	 and	 can	 claim	 that,	 to	 the	 best	 of	my	 knowledge,	 the	
institutional	 arrangement	 for	 LAL	 NGOs	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 these	 three	 cases	 in	
Beijing.	Also,	even	 though	 the	 specific	 institutional	 arrangements	might	 vary	with	
other	types	of	NGOs	(which	need	not	seek	approval	of	the	MOJ	but	that	of	another	
governmental	 department	 relevant	 to	 the	 professional	 area	 of	 the	 NGO,	 for	
example,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Ministry	 of	 Environmental	 Protection	 or	















and	 Law	 Firm	 D	 on	 the	 other,	 which	 indicate	 both	 regional	 and	 organizational	
variation.	 Therefore,	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 evidence	 hereby	 presented	 is	






in	 terms	 of	 representing	 workers’	 interests,	 and	 of	 the	 Labour	 Bureaus	 and	 the	
judiciary	to	implement	and	protect	workers’	legal	rights,	have	caused	labour	NGOs	
to	 come	 into	 existence	 and	 to	 then	 attempt	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 gaps,	 assuming	 a	
significance	over	and	above	what	comparative	NGOs	hold	in	other	contexts	where	
there	is	a	plurality	of	trade	unions,	such	as	in	Indonesia	(Ford,	2006;	Howell,	2015).	
This	 might	 be	 peculiar	 to	 the	 Chinese	 case	 and	 the	 increasingly	 interesting	 role	





for	 generalizable	 purposes.	 However,	 these	 27	 cases	 were	 selected	 from	 an	





(2008,	 2009)	 ‘rules	 consciousness’	 actually	means	 in	 contemporary	 China.	 I	 have	
addressed	this	with	a	small	but	rich	selection	of	workers,	and	indeed	advocate	for	
further	 research	along	 this	 line.	Furthermore,	as	Cai	 (2008:	91)	pointed	out	 some	
time	 ago,	 “the	 relationship	 between	 citizens’	 use	 of	 permitted	modes	 and	 illegal	
modes	 of	 action	 has	 not	 been	 adequately	 addressed.	 (…)	 There	 is	 no	 systematic	
research	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 citizens’	 legal	 action	 escalating	 into	 illegal	 modes.	
Analysis	 of	 this	 likelihood	 illuminates	 the	 degree	 of	 pressure	 faced	 by	 the	 Party-
state	 in	maintaining	 social	 order”.	 I	 have	 partly	 addressed	 this	 in	 this	 thesis	 but	
there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 further	 systematic	 research,	 using	 mixed	 methods,	 on	 the	
coexistence	 or	 coordinated	 use	 of	 legal	 and	 illegal	 forms	 of	 action	 by	 workers,	
and/or	labour	NGOs.	In	the	course	of	this	study	I	did	not	find	evidence	of	LAL	NGOs	
organizing	political	campaigns	or	supporting	workers’	activism	(with	the	exception	
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2	 X2	 Lawyer	Luo	 Volunteer	lawyer	 Beijing	 6	June	2012	
3	 X3	 Lawyer	Ning	 Volunteer	lawyer	 Beijing	 11	Sept.	2012	

























12	 Y3	 Lawyer	Guo	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 18	Sept.	2012	
13	 Y4	 Lawyer	Ai	 Intern	lawyer	 Beijing	 14	Sept.	2012	
14	 Y5	 Lawyer	Zhu	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 31	Oct.	2012	
15	 Y6	 Lawyer	Zhu	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 3	Sept.	2012	
16	 Y7	 Lawyer	Zhu	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 21	Nov.	2012	
17	 Y8	 Lawyer	Wei	 Intern	lawyer	 Beijing	 21	Nov.	2012	
18	 Y9	 Lawyer	Ou	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 4	Dec.	2012	
19	 Y10	 Lawyer	Lin	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 26	Dec.	2012	
20	 Y11	 Lawyer	Hou	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 25	Jan.	2013	
21	 Y12	 Lawyer	Pan	 Director	 Beijing	 25	Jan.	2013	
NGO	Z	(13)	
22	 Z1	 Lawyer	Song	 Deputy	Director/Lawyer	 Beijing	 23	May	2012	
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23	 Z2	 Lawyer	Jian	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 13	Sep.	2012	
24	 Z3	 Lawyer	Xue	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 14	Sep.	2012	
25	 Z4	 Lawyer	Peng	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 20	Sep.	2012	
26	 Z5	 Lawyer	Zeng	 Intern	lawyer	 Beijing	 20	Sep.	2012	
27	 Z6	 Lawyer	Tian	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Shenzhen	 26	Sep.	2012	
28	 Z7	 Lawyer	Yan	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 19	Dec.	2012	
29	 Z8	 Lawyer	Cao	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 20	Dec.	2012	
30	 Z9	 Lawyer	Gu	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 20	Dec.	2012	
31	 Z10	 Lawyer	Hao	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 26	Dec.	2012	
32	 Z11	 Lawyer	Song	 Deputy	 director	 and	
Lawyer	
Beijing	 22	Jan.	2013	
33	 Z12	 Lawyer	Wang	 Pro-bono	lawyer	 Beijing	 22	Jan.	2013	
34	 Z13	 Lawyer	Fu	 Director	 Beijing	 30	Jan.	2013	
NGO	J	(1)	
35	 J1	 Zhang	 Executive	director	 Beijing	 10	May	2012	
NGO	A	(1)	
36	 A1	 Lin	 Director	 Beijing	 6	Nov.	2012	
NGO	B	(1)	
37	 B1	 Shu	 Legal	advisor	 Beijing	 14	Nov.	2012	
NGO	R	(1)	
38	 R1	 Lei	 Project	assistant	 Beijing	 31	Dec.	2012	
NGO	I	(5)	









41	 L1	 Feng	 Legal	consultant	 Wuhan	 21	Oct.	2012	
42	 L2	 Lawyer	Yu	 Legal	consultant	 Wuhan	 22	Oct.	2012	
Legal	Aid	Centre	G	(1)		




44	 D1	 Lawyer	Eng	 Lawyer	 Shenzhen	 25	Sept.	2012	
45	 D2	 Lawyer	Ren	 Director	 Shenzhen	 6	Jan.	2012	
46	 D3	 Lawyer	Chao	 Lawyer	 Shenzhen	 6	Jan.	2012	
Citizen	representative	(1)	




48	 E1	 Labour	 Expert	
Kang	
Academic	 Hong	Kong	 March	2012	
49	 E2	 Labour	 Expert	
Da	
Academic	 Hong	Kong	 March	2012	





51	 E4	 Labour	 Expert	
Mo	
Academic	 Beijing	 26	Nov.	2012	
52	 E5	 Labour	 Expert	
Lai	
Academic	 Beijing	 2	May	2012	
53	 E6	 Labour	 Expert	
Qiao	
Academic	 Beijing	 17	May	2012	














































60	 W6	 Worker	 Di	 and	
others	





61	 W7	 Worker	Da	 Taxi	driver	 Haidian	district,	Beijing	 5	May	2012	 Man,	late	30s,	Beijing	















64	 W10	 Worker	 Nu	 and	
others	




Women,	 44	 and	 late	 40s,	 2	 from	
Anhui,	3	from	Henan	
65	 W11	 Worker	Xi	 Construction	worker	 Construction	 site,	 Haidian	 25	May	2012	 Woman,	39,	Henan	
	 355	
district,	Beijing	 	
66	 W12	 Worker	Ju	 Worker	at	furniture	shop	 NGO	Z,	Beijing	 8	June	2012	 Woman,	59,	Anhui	




68	 W14	 Worker	Wan	 Construction	worker	 NGO	X,	Beijing	 11	June	2012	 Man,	46,	/	
69	 W15	 Worker	Ying	 Office	worker	 NGO	Y,	Beijing	 12	June	2012	 Woman,	mid	20s,	/	
70	 W16	 Worker	Gan	 Unidentified	worker	 NGO	X,	Beijing	 16	June	2012	 Woman,	22,	Hebei	
71	 W17	 Worker	Ai	 Injured	worker	 NGO	Y,	Beijing	 21	June	2012	 Woman,	late	30s,	/	
72	 W18	 Worker	Xu	 Labour	dispatch	worker	 NGO	Z,	Beijing	 27	June	2012	 Woman,	33,	Shanxi	
73	 W19	 Worker	Shan	 Construction	worker	 NGO	Y,	Beijing	 28	June	2012	 Man,	63,	Henan	
74	 W20	 Worker	Man	 Construction	worker	 NGO	Y,	Beijing	 28	June	2012	 Man,	early	50s,	/	












77	 W23	 Worker	He	 Unemployed	worker	 NGO	X,	Beijing	 11	Sept.	2012	 Woman,	40s,	Henan		
78	 W24	 Worker	Liu	 Security	guard	 NGO	X,	Beijing	 11	Sept.	2012	 Man,	40s,	Shanxi	




17	Sept.	2012	 Men,	 early	 20s,	 2	 from	 Sichuan,	 1	
from	Jiangxi	
80	 W26	 Worker	Shou	 Construction	worker	 NGO	Y,	Beijing	 16	Oct.	2012	 Man,	late	20s,	Hebei	
81	 W27	 Workers	 5	 striking	workers	 in	 toy	
factory	
Law	Firm	D,	Shenzhen	 6	 January	
2013	
Men,	20s	and	30s,	/	
	
Appendix	2.	Analytical	pathways	
	
	
	
Research	questions	 Analytical	
approach	
Object	of	analysis	 Research	method	
and	data	
Codes	/	indicators	 Organized	
in	Chapter	
what	functions	do	labour	
laws	fulfil	for	the	
authoritarian	state?	
Historical	
institutionalism	
Formal	institutions	
(labour	laws),	labour	
regime,	labour	
disputes	
Law	(documents),	
historical	secondary	
research,	statistics	
on	labour	disputes	
Labour	regime,	economic	
reforms,	legal	institutions,	
number	and	nature	of	labour	
disputes	
3	
how	and	why	does	the	Party-
state	prevent	lawyers	and	
civil	society	organizations	
from	politically	mobilizing	the	
labour	laws?	
Institutionalism	 Formal	institutions	
Documents	(laws	
and	regulations),	
semi-structured	
interviews	with	
lawyers	and	LAL	
NGO	staff	
Governance	institutions	of	
lawyers	and	NGOs:	legal	
profession,	legal	practice,	
internship,	ACLA	membership,	
NGO	registration,	funding	
4	
to	what	extent	does	the	
mobilization	of	the	law	by	
legal	actors	such	as	lawyers	
and	civil	society	
organizations	initiate	broad	
political	and	social	
mobilization	to	challenge	the	
authoritarian	state?	
Law	and	society	
(law	and	social	
movements)	
Law	in	action:	legal	
processes,	social	
relations,	legal	
mobilization	
Participant	
observations	at	LAL	
NGOs,	semi-
structured	
interviews	with	LAL	
NGO	staff	and	
lawyers	
LAL	NGO's	legal	mobilization,	
lawyer-worker	relation,	
worker	activism?	
5	
	 357	
to	what	extent	are	labour	
laws	understood	and	used	by	
workers?	How	and	why	do	
workers	perceive,	support	
and	use	labour	laws?	To	
what	extent	does	this	
represent	a	challenge	for	the	
authoritarian	state?	
Law	in	society	
Ordinary	workers’	
perceptions,	
understandings,	uses	
of	the	law;	social	
norms	
Unstructured	
interviews	with	
workers,	participant	
observations,	semi-
structured	
interviews	with	
lawyers	
rights	consciousness	(rights	
protection),	rules	
consciousness	(morality,	
fairness,	social	relations),	legal	
action	(mediation,	arbitration,	
litigation,	petitioning),	illegal	
action	(violence,	strike,	
protest,	collective	action)	
6	and	7	
	
	
